A. Introduction

Our study grew out of specific investigations into anti-Semitism. As our work advanced, however, the emphasis gradually shifted. We came to regard it as our main task not to analyze anti-Semitism or any other anti-minority prejudice as a socio-psychological phenomenon *per se*, but rather to examine the relation of anti-minority prejudice to broader ideological and characterological patterns. Thus anti-Semitism gradually all but disappeared as a topic of our questionnaire and in our interview schedule it was only one among many topics which had to be covered.

Another investigation, carried through parallel to our research and partly by the same staff members of the Institute of Social Research, i.e., the study on anti-Semitism within labor (57b), concentrated on the question of anti-Semitism, but at the same time was concerned with socio-psychological issues akin to those presented in the present volume. While the bulk of the material to be discussed in this chapter is taken from the section on prejudice of the Berkeley interviews, an attempt was made to utilize, at least in a supplementary form, some of the ideas of the Labor Study as hypotheses for further investigation. This was done as a part of the work carried out in Los Angeles. In collaboration with J. F. Brown and F. Pollock we drew up an additional section of the interview schedule devoted to specific questions about Jews. These questions were derived for the most part from the material gathered through the “screened interviews” of the Labor Study. The aim of this new section of the interview schedule was to see if it was possible to establish certain differential patterns within the general structure of prejudice.

The list of questions follows. Not all of these questions were put to every subject, nor was the exact wording of the questions always the same, but most of the ground marked off by the questions was covered in each case.

*List of Questions Pertaining to Jews*

- Do you think there is a Jewish problem? If yes, in what sense? Do you care about it?
- Have you had any experience with Jews? What kind? Do you remember names of persons involved and other specific data?
- If not, on what is your opinion based?
- Did you *have* any contrary experiences (or hear about such experiences) with Jewish individuals?
- If you had — would it change your opinion? If not, why not?
- Can you tell a Jew from other people? How?
- What do you know about the Jewish religion?
- Are there Christians that are as bad as Jews? Is their percentage as high or higher than the percentage of bad Jews?
- How do Jews behave at work? What about the alleged Jewish industriousness?
- Is it true that the Jews have an undue influence in movies, radio, literature, and universities?
- If yes — what is particularly bad about it? What should be done about it?
- Is it true that the Jews have an undue influence in business, politics, labor, etc.?
- If yes — what kind of an influence? Should something be done to curb it?
- What did the Nazis do to the German Jews? What do you think about it?
- Is there such a problem here? What would you do to solve it?
- What do you blame them most for? Are they: aggressive, bad-mannered; controlling the banks; black marketeers; cheating; Christ killers; clannish; Communists; corrupting; dirty; draft dodgers; exploiters; hiding their identity; too intellectual; Internationalists; overcrowding many jobs; lazy; controlling movies; money-minded; noisy; overassimilative; overbearing; oversexed; looking for privileges; quarrelsome; running the country; too smart; spoiling nice neighborhoods; owning too many stores; undisciplined; unethical against Gentiles; upstarts; shunning hard manual labor; forming a world conspiracy?
- Do you favor social discrimination or special legislation?
- Shall a Jew be treated as an individual or as a member of a group?
- How do your suggestions go along with constitutional rights?
- Do you object to personal contacts with individual Jews?
• Do you consider Jews more as a nuisance or more as a menace?
• Could you imagine yourself marrying a Jew?
• Do you like to discuss the Jewish issue?
• What would you do if you were a Jew?
• Can a Jew ever become a real American?

The additional interview material taught us more about prevailing overt patterns of anti-Semitism than about its inner dynamics. It is probably fair to say that the detailed questions proved most helpful in understanding the phenomena of psychological conflict in prejudice, problems characterized in Chapter V as “pseudo-democratism.” Another significant observation has to do with the reactions of our interviewees to the list of “bad Jewish traits” presented to them. Most answers to this list read “all-inclusive,” that is to say, very little differentiation takes place. The prejudiced subjects tend to subscribe to any reproach against the Jews, provided they do not have to produce these objections themselves but rather find them pre-established, as if they were commonly accepted. This observation could be interpreted in different ways. Either it may be indicative of the “inner consistency” of anti-Semitic ideology, or it may testify to the mental rigidity of our high scorers, and this apart from the fact that the method of multiple choice may itself make for automatic reactions. Although our questionnaire studies gave evidence of marked consistency within anti-Semitic ideology, it would hardly be enough to account for the all-inclusiveness of the present responses. It seems that one must think in terms of automatization, though it is impossible to say conclusively whether this is due to the “high” mentality or to the shortcomings of our procedure. In all probability, the presentation of extreme anti-Semitic statements as if they were no longer disreputable but rather something which can be sensibly discussed, works as a kind of antidote for the superego and may stimulate imitation even in cases where the individual’s “own” reactions would be less violent. This consideration may throw some light upon the phenomenon of the whole German people tolerating the most extreme anti-Semitic measures, although it is highly to be doubted that the individuals themselves were more anti-Semitic than our high-scoring subjects. A pragmatic inference to be drawn from this hypothesis would be that, in all these cases, the antinomous discussion of anti-Semitism should be avoided. One might refute factual anti-Semitic statements or explain the dynamics responsible for anti-Semitism, but he should not enter the sphere of the “Jewish problem.” As things stand now, the acknowledgment of a “Jewish problem,” after the European genocide, suggests, however subtly, that there might have been some justification for what the Nazis did.

The whole material on ideology has been taken from 63 Los Angeles interviews in addition to the pertinent sections of those gathered in Berkeley (see Chapter IX).

It should be stressed that once again the subjective aspect is in the foreground. The selection of our sample excluded an investigation into the role played by the “object” — that is to say, the Jews — in the formation of prejudice. We do not deny that the object plays a role, but we devote our attention to the forms of reaction directed towards the Jew, not to the basis of these reactions within the “object.” This is due to a hypothesis with which we started and which has been given strong support in Chapter III, namely, that anti-Semitic prejudice has little to do with the qualities of those against whom it is directed. Our interest is centered in the high-scoring subjects.

In organizing the present chapter, we start with the general assumption that the — largely unconscious — hostility resulting from frustration and repression and socially diverted from its true object, needs a substitute object through which it may obtain a realistic aspect and thus dodge, as it were, more radical manifestations of a blocking of the subject’s relationship to reality, e.g., psychosis. This “object” of unconscious destructiveness, far from being a superficial “scape-goat,” must have certain characteristics in order to fulfill its role. It must be tangible enough; and yet not too tangible lest it be exploded by its own realism. It must have a sufficient historical backing and appear as an indiscernible element of tradition. It must be defined in rigid and well-known stereotypes. Finally, the object must possess features, or at least be capable of being perceived and interpreted in terms of features, which harmonize with the destructive tendencies of the prejudiced subject. Some of these features, such as “clannishness” aid rationalization; others, such as the expression of weakness or masochism, provide psychologically adequate stimuli for destructiveness. There can be hardly any doubt that all these requirements are fulfilled by the phenomenon of the Jew. This is not to say that Jews must draw hatred upon themselves, or that there is an absolute historical necessity which makes them, rather than others, the ideal target of social aggressiveness. Suffice it to say that they can perform this function in the psychological households of many people.

The problem of the “uniqueness” of the Jewish phenomenon and hence of anti-Semitism could be approached only by recourse to a theory which is beyond the scope of this study. Such a theory would neither enumerate a diversity of “factors” nor single out a specific one as “the” cause but rather develop a unified framework within which all the “elements” are linked together consistently. This would amount to nothing less than a theory of modern society as a whole.

We shall first give some evidence of the “functional” character of anti-Semitism, that is to say, its relative independence of the object. Then we shall point out the problem of cui bono?: anti-Semitism as a device for effortless “orientation” in a cold, alienated, and largely understandable world. As a

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3Chapter V: The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends in The Authoritarian Personality
4automatization; the act of making things automatic or habitual.
5superego: the part of a person’s mind that acts as a self-critical conscience, reflecting social standards learned from parents and teachers.
6Chapter IX: Comprehensive Scores and Summary of Interview Results in The Authoritarian Personality
7cui bono: Who stands, or stood, to gain (from a crime, and so might have been responsible for it)? (Latin)
parallel to our analysis of political and economic ideologies, it will be shown that this “orientation” is achieved by stereotypes. The gap between this stereotypy on the one hand and real experience and the still-accepted standards of democracy on the other, leads to a conflict situation, something which is clearly set forth in a number of our interviews. We then take what appears to be the resolution of this conflict: the underly- ing anti-Semitism of our cultural climate, keyed to the prejudiced person’s own conscious or preconscious wishes, proves in the more extreme cases to be stronger than either conscience or official democratic values. This leads up to the evidence of the destructive character of anti-Semitic reactions. As remnants of the conflict, there remain traces of sympathy for, or rather “appreciation” of, certain Jewish traits which, however, when viewed more closely, also show negative implications.

Some more specific observations about the structure of anti-Jewish prejudice will be added. Their focal point is the differentiation of anti-Semitism according to the subject’s own social identifications. This survey of anti-Semitic features and dynamics will then be supplemented by a few remarks on the attitudes of low-scoring subjects. Finally, we shall offer some evidence of the broader social significance of anti-Semitism: its intrinsic denial of the principles of American democracy.

**B. The “Functional” Character of Anti-Semitism**

The psychological dynamisms that “call for” the anti-Semitic outlet — most essentially, we believe, the ambivalence of authoritarian and rebellious trends — have been analyzed in detail in other sections of this book. Here we limit ourselves to some extreme but concrete evidence of the fact that anti-Semitism is not so much dependent upon the nature of the object as upon the subject’s own psychological wants and needs.

There are a number of cases in which the “functional” character of prejudice is obvious. Here we find subjects who are prejudiced per se, but with whom it is relatively accidental against what group their prejudice is directed. We content ourselves with two examples. 5051 is a generally high-scoring man, one of a few Boy Scout leaders. He has strong, though unconscious, fascist leanings. Although anti-Semitic, he tries to mitigate his bias by certain semirational qualifications. Here, the following statement occurs:

> “Sometimes we hear that the average Jew is smarter in business than the average white man. I do not believe this. I would hate to believe it. What the Jews should learn is to educate their bad individuals to be more cooperative and agreeable. Actually there is more underhandedness amongst Armenians than there is amongst Jews, but the Armenians aren’t nearly as conspicuous and noisy. Mind you, I have known some Jews whom I consider my equal in every way and I like very much.”

This is somewhat reminiscent of Poe’s famous story about the double murder in the Rue Morgue where the savage cries of an orangutan are mistaken by bystanders as words of all kinds of different foreign languages, to wit, languages particularly strange to each of the listeners who happen to be foreigners themselves. The primary hostile reaction is directed against foreigners per se, who are perceived as “uncanny.” This infantile fear of the strange is only subsequently “filled up” with the imagery of a specific group, stereotyped and handy for this purpose. The Jews are favorite stand-ins for the child’s “bad man.” The transference of unconscious fear to the particular object, however, the latter being of a secondary nature only, always maintains an aspect of accidentalness. Thus, as soon as other factors interfere, the aggression may be deflected, at least in part, from the Jews and to another group, preferably one of still greater social distance. Pseudodemocratic ideology and the professed desire to promote militantly what he conceives to be American ideals are marked in our Boy Scout leader, 5051, and he considers himself not conservative but “predominantly liberal”; hence he tempers his anti-Semitism and anti-Negroism by referring to a third group. He summons the Armenians in order to prove that he is not “prejudiced,” but at the same time his formulation is such that the usual anti-Semitic stereotypes can easily be maintained. Even his exoneration of the Jews with regard to their supposed “smartness” is actually a device for the glorification of the ingroup: he hates to think that “we are less smart than they.” While anti-Semitism is functional with regard to the object choice on a more superficial level, its deeper determinants still seem to be much more rigid.

An extreme case of what might be called “mobile” prejudice is M1225a, of the Maritime School group. Though his questionnaire scores are only medium, the interview shows strong traces of a “manipulative” anti-Semite. The beginning of the minorities section of his interview is as follows:

> (What do you think of the race-minority problem?) “I definitely think there is a problem. I’d probably be prejudiced there. Like the Negro situation. They could act more human . . . It would be less of a problem.”

His aggression is absorbed by the Negroes, in the “idiosyn- cratic” manner that can otherwise be observed among extreme anti-Semites, all of whose aggression appears to be directed against Jews.

> “I wouldn’t sail on a ship if I had to sail with a Negro. To me, they have an offensive smell. Course, the Chinese say we smell like sheep.”

It may be mentioned that a subject of the Labor Study, a Negro woman, complained about the smell of the Jews. The present subject concentrates on the Negroes, exonerating the Jews, though in an equivocal way:

> (What about the Jewish problem?) “I don’t believe there is much of a problem there. They’re too smart to have a problem. Well, they are good business men. (Too much influence?) I believe they have a lot of influence. (In what areas?) Well, motion picture industry. (Do they abuse it?) Well, the thing you hear an awful lot about is help the Jews, help the Jews. But you never hear anything about helping other races or nationalities. (Do they abuse their influence in the movies?) If they do, they do it

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3 stereotype: The persistent repetition of an act, for no obvious purpose.
4 exoneration: the act of absolving (someone) from blame for a fault or wrongdoing, esp. after due consideration of the case.
in such a way that it is not offensive.”

Here again, anti-Semitic stereotypy is maintained descriptively whereas the shift of actual hatred to the Negroes — which cannot be accounted for by the course of the interview — affects the superimposed value judgments. The twist with regard to the term “problem” should be noted. By denying the existence of a “Jewish problem,” he consciously takes sides with the unbiased. By interpreting the word, however, as meaning “having difficulties,” and emphasizing that the Jews are “too smart to have a problem,” he expresses unwittingly his own rejection. In accordance with his “smartness” theory, his pro-Jewish statements have a rationalistic ring clearly indicative of the subject’s ambivalence: all race hatred is “envy” but he leaves little doubt that in his mind there is some reason for this envy, e.g., his acceptance of the myth that the Jews controlled German industry.

This interview points to a way in which our picture of ethnocentrism may be differentiated. Although the correlation between anti-Semitism and anti-Negroism is undoubtedly high, a fact which stands out in our interviews as well as in our questionnaire studies (cf. Chapter IV10) this is not to say that prejudice is a single compact mass. Readiness to accept statements hostile to minority groups may well be conceived as a more or less unitary11 trait, but when, in the interview situation, subjects are allowed to express themselves spontaneously it is not uncommon for one minority more than the others to appear, for the moment at least, as an object of special hatred. This phenomenon may be elucidated12 by reference to persecution mania which, as has been pointed out frequently, has many structural features in common with anti-Semitism. While the paranoid is beset by an over-all hatred, he nevertheless tends to “pick” his enemy, to molest certain individuals who draw his attention upon themselves: he falls, as it were, negatively in love. Something similar may hold good for the potentially fascist character. As soon as he has achieved a specific and concrete counter-cathexis,13 which is indispensable to his fabrication of a social pseudoreality, he may “canalize” his otherwise free-floating aggressiveness and then leave alone other potential objects of persecution. Naturally, these processes come to the fore in the dialectics of the interview rather than in the scales, which hardly allow the subject freely to “express” himself.

It may be added that subjects in our sample find numerous other substitutes for the Jew, such as the Mexicans and the Greeks. The latter, like the Armenians, are liberally endowed with traits otherwise associated with the imagery of the Jew.

One more aspect of the “functional” character of anti-Semitism should be mentioned. We encountered quite frequently members of other minority groups, with strong “conformist” tendencies, who were outspokenly anti-Semitic. Hardly any traces of solidarity among the different outgroups could be found. The pattern is rather one of “shifting the onus” of defamation of other groups in order to put one’s own social status in a better light. An example is 5023, a “psychoneurotic with anxiety state,” Mexican by birth:

Being an American of Mexican ancestry, he identifies with the white race and feels “we are superior people.” He particularly dislikes the Negroes and completely dislikes Jews. He feels that they are all alike and wants as little as possible to do with them. Full of contradiction as this subject is, it is not surprising to find that he would marry a Jewess if he really loved her. On the other hand he would control both Negroes and Jews and “keep them in their place.”

5068 is regarded by the interviewer as representing a “pattern probably quite frequent in second-generation Americans who describe themselves as Italian-Americans.” His prejudice is of the politico-fascist brand, distinctly colored by paranoid fantasies:

He is of pure Italian extraction and naturalized here at the time of the first World War. He is very proud of this extraction and for a long time in the early days of Mussolini was active in Italian-American organizations. He still feels that the war against Italy was very unfortunate. Concerning the other minorities he is quite prejudiced. The Mexicans he feels are enough like the Italians so that if they were educated enough it would be all right. At the present time, however, he feels that they need much education. He believes that the California Japanese were more than correctly handled and that those about whom there is no question should be gradually allowed back. He described the Negro situation as a tough one. He believes there should be definite laws particularly with regard to racial intermarriage and that the color line should also be drawn “regarding where people can live.” “Despite what they say, the Southern Negroes are really the happiest ones.” “The trouble with Jews is that they are all Communists and for this reason dangerous.” His own relations with them have only been fair. In his business relations he says they are “chislers” and “stick together.” Concerning a solution to this problem, he says, “The Jews should actually educate their own. The way the Jews stick together shows that they actually have more prejudice against the Gentiles than the Gentiles have against them.” He illustrates this with a long story which I was not able to get in detail about some acquaintance of his who married into a Jewish family and was not allowed to eat off the same dishes with them.

We may mention, furthermore, 5052, an anti-Semitic Spaniard of Spanish-Negro descent, with strong homosexual tendencies. He is a nightclub entertainer, and the interviewer summarizes his impression in the statement that this man wants to say, “I am not a Negro, I am an entertainer.” Here the element of social identification in an outcast is clearly responsible for his prejudice.

Finally, reference should be made to a curiosity, the interview of a Turk, otherwise not evaluated because of his somewhat subnormal intelligence. He indulged in violent anti-Semitic diatribes until it came out near the end of the interview that he was Jewish himself. The whole complex of anti-Semitism among minority groups, and among Jews themselves, offers serious problems and deserves a study of its own. Even the casual observations provided by our sample suffice to corroborate the suspicion that those who suffer from social pressure may frequently tend to transfer this pressure

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10Chapter IV: The Study of Ethnocentric Ideology in The Authoritarian Personality
11unitary: uniform.
12elucidate: make (something) clear; explain; clarify.
13cathexis: the concentration of mental energy on one particular person, idea, or object (esp. to an unhealthy degree).
onto others rather than to join hands with their fellow victims.

C. The Imaginary Foe

Our examples of the “functional” character of anti-Semitism, and of the relative ease by which prejudice can be switched from one object to another, point in one direction: the hypothesis that prejudice, according to its intrinsic content, is but superficially, if at all, related to the specific nature of its object. We shall now give more direct support for this hypothesis, the relation of which to clinical categories such as stereotypy, incapacity to have “experience,” projectivity, and power fantasies is not far to seek. This support is supplied by statements which are either plainly self-contradictory or incompatible with facts and of a manifestly imaginary character. Since the usual “self-contradictions” of the anti-Semite can, however, frequently be explained on the basis that they involve different layers of reality and different psychological urges which are still reconcilable in the over-all “Weltanschauung” of the anti-Semite, we concern ourselves here mainly with evidence of imaginary constructs. The fantasies with which we shall deal are so well known from everyday life that their significance for the structure of anti-Semitism can be taken for granted. They are merely highlighted by our research. One might say that these fantasies occur whenever stereotypes “run wild,” that is to say, make themselves completely independent from interaction with reality. When these “emancipated” stereotypes are forcibly brought back into relation with reality, blatant distortions appear. The content of the examples of stereotyped fantasy which we collected has to do predominantly with ideas of excessive power attributed to the chosen foe. The disproportion between the relative social weakness of the object and its supposed sinister omnipotence is by itself evidence that the projective mechanism is at work.

We shall first give some examples of omnipotence fantasies projected upon a whole outgroup abstractly, as it were, and then show how the application of such ideas to factual experience comes close to paranoid delusion.

5054, a middle-aged woman with fairly high scores on all the scales, who is greatly concerned with herself and characterized by a “domineering” manner, claims that she has always tried “to see the other side” and even to “fight prejudice on every side.” She derives her feelings of tolerance from the contrast with her husband whom she characterized as extremely anti-Jewish (he hates all Jews and makes no exceptions) whereas she is willing to make exceptions. Her actual weakness of the object and its supposed sinister omnipotence is at least be mentioned. It is the contention that the Jews “are everywhere.” Omnipresence sometimes displaces omnipotence, perhaps because no actual “Jewish rule” can be pretended to exist, so that the image-ridden subject has to seek a different outlet for his power fantasy in ideas of dangerous, mysterious ubiquity. This is fused with another psy-

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14Weltanschauung: (German.) A particular philosophy or view of life; the worldview of an individual or group.
15ubiquitous: present, appearing, or found everywhere.
chological element. To the highly prejudiced subject the idea of the total right of the ingroup, and of its tolerating nothing which does not strictly “belong,” is all-pervasive. This is projected upon the Jews. Whereas the high scorer apparently cannot stand any “intruder” — ultimately nothing that is not strictly like himself — he sees this totality of presence in those whom he hates and whom he feels justified in exterminating because one otherwise “could not get rid of them.”

The following example shows the idea of Jewish omnipresence applied to personal experience, thus revealing its proximity to delusion.

6070, a 40-year-old woman, is high-middle on the E scale and particularly vehement about the Jews:

“I don’t like Jews. The Jew is always crying. They are taking our country over from us. They are aggressive. They suffer from every lust. Last summer I met the famous musician X, and before I really knew him he wanted me to sign an affidavit to help bring his family into this country. Finally I had to flatly refuse and told him I want no more Jews here. Roosevelt started bringing the Jews into the government, and that is the chief cause of our difficulties today. The Jews arranged it so they were discriminated for in the draft. I favor a legislative discrimination against the Jews along American, not Hitler lines. Everybody knows that the Jews are back of the Communists. This X person almost drove me nuts. I had made the mistake of inviting him to be my guest at my beach club. He arrived with ten other Jews who were uninvited. They always cause trouble. If one gets in a place, he brings two more and those two bring two more.”

This quotation is remarkable for more reasons than that it exemplifies the “Jews are everywhere” complex. It is the expression of Jewish weakness — that they are “always crying” — which is perverted into ubiquity. The refugee, forced to leave his country, appears as he who wants to intrude and to expand over the whole earth, and it is hardly too far-fetched to assume that this imagery is at least partly derived from the fact of persecution itself. Moreover, the quotation gives evidence of a certain ambivalence of the extreme anti-Semite which points in the direction of “negatively falling in love.”

This woman had invited the celebrity to her club, doubtless attracted by his fame, but used the contact, once it had been established, merely in order to personalize her aggressiveness.

Another example of the merging of semipsychotic idiosyncrasies and wild anti-Jewish imagery is the 26-year-old woman, 5004. She scores high on the F scale and high-middle on E and PEC. Asked about Jewish religion, she produces an answer which partakes of the age-old image of “uncanniness.” “I know very little, but I would be afraid to go into a synagogue.” This has to be evaluated in relation to her statement about Nazi atrocities:

“I am not particularly sorry because of what the Germans did to the Jews. I feel Jews would do the same type of thing to me.”

The persecution fantasy of what the Jews might do to her, is used, in authentic paranoid style, as a justification of the genocide committed by the Nazis.

Our last two examples refer to the distortions that occur when experience is viewed through the lens of congealed stereotypy. M732c of the Veterans Group, who scores generally high on the scales, shows this pattern of distorted experience with regard to both Negroes and Jews. As to the former:

“You never see a Negro driving (an ordinary car of which subject mentions a number of examples) but only a Cadillac or a Packard. . . . They always dress gaudy. They have that tendency to show off. . . . Since the Negro has that feeling that he isn’t up to par, he’s always trying to show off. . . . Even though he can’t afford it, he will buy an expensive car just to make a show. . . .” Subject mentions that the brightest girl in a class at subject’s school happens to be a Negro and he explains her outstandingness in the class in terms of Negro overcompensation for what he seems to be implying is her inherent inferiority.

The assertion about the Negro’s Cadillac speaks for itself. As to the story about the student, it indicates in personalized terms the aspect of inescapability inherent in hostile stereotypy. To the prejudiced, the Negro is “dull”; if he meets, however, one of outstanding achievement, it is supposed to be mere overcompensation, the exception that proves the rule. No matter what the Negro is or does, he is condemned.

As to the “Jewish problem”:

“As far as being good and shrewd businessmen, that’s about all I have to say about them. They’re white people, that’s one thing. . . . Of course, they have the Jewish instinct, whatever that is. . . . I’ve heard they have a business nose. . . . I imagine the Jewish people are more obsequious19. . . . For example, somehow a Jewish barber will entice you to come to his chair.” Subject elaborates here a definite fantasy of some mysterious influence by Jews. . . . “They’re mighty shrewd businessmen, and you don’t have much chance” (competing with Jews).

The story about the barber seems to be a retrogression towards early infantile, magical patterns of thinking.

F359, a 48-year-old accountant in a government department, is, according to the interviewer, a cultured and educated woman. This, however, does not keep her from paranoid story-telling as soon as the critical area of race relations, which serves as a kind of free-for-all, is entered. (She is in the high quartile on E, though low on both F and PEC.) Her distortions refer both to Negroes and to Jews:

Subject considers this a very serious problem and she thinks that it is going to get worse. The Negroes are going to get worse. She experienced a riot in Washington; there was shooting; street-car windows were broken, and when a white would get into the Negro section of the car, the shooting would start. The white man would have to lie on the floor. She did not dare to go out at night. One day the Negroes were having a procession and some of them started pushing her off the sidewalk. When she asked them not to push, they looked so insolent that she thought they would start a riot, and her companion said, “Let’s get out of here or we will start a riot.” A friend of hers told her that she had asked her maid to work on a Thursday, but the maid had refused because she said it was “push and shove” day — the day they shoved the whites off the sidewalk. Another friend of hers in Los Angeles told her not to let her maid use her vacuum cleaner because they tamper with it in such a way as to cause it to tear your rugs. One day she caught the maid using a file on her vacuum cleaner and asked her what she was doing. The maid replied, “Oh, I’m just trying to fix this thing.” They just want to get revenge on whites. One cannot give them equal rights yet, they are not ready for it; we will have to educate them first. Subject would not want to sit next to a Negro in a theatre or restaurant. She cited the case of a drugstore man who addressed

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19Obsequious: obedient or attentive to an excessive or servile degree.
a Negro janitor, a cleaner, as “Mr.” You just can’t do that to them or they will say, “Ah’m as good as white folks.” (Outcome?) “I think there will be trouble.” She expects riots and bloodshed.

( Jews?) “Well, they are to blame too, I think. They just cannot do business straight, they have to be underhanded — truth has no meaning for them in business.” (What has been your personal experience?) She cited the case of a friend who is interested in photography and bought some second-hand cameras from pawn shops. One day when he was in one, a woman came in with a set of false teeth. She was told that they were not worth anything (there was some gold in them). Finally, the Jew gave her a few dollars for them. As soon as she had gone out, he turned to the man and said, “She didn’t know it, but see that platinum under here?” In other words the teeth were worth many times what he gave for them. Subject’s friend did not get gypped because he knew them and called their bluff.

It is often advocated as the best means of improving intercultural relations that as many personal contacts as possible be established between the different groups. While the value of such contacts in some cases of anti-Semitism is to be acknowledged, the material presented in this section argues for certain qualifications, at least in the case of the more extreme patterns of prejudice. There is no simple gap between experience and stereotypy. Stereotypy is a device for looking at things comfortably; since, however, it feeds on deep-lying unconscious sources, the distortions which occur are not to be corrected merely by taking a real look. Rather, experience itself is predetermined by stereotypy. The persons whose interviews on minority issues have just been discussed share one decisive trait. Even if brought together with minority group members as different from the stereotype as possible, they will perceive them through the glasses of stereotypy, and will hold against them whatever they are and do. Since this tendency is by no means confined to people who are actually “cranky” (rather, the whole complex of the Jew is a kind of recognized red-light district of legitimized psychotic distortions), this inaccessibility to experience may not be limited to people of the kind discussed here, but may well operate in much milder cases. This should be taken into account by any well-planned policy of defense. Optimism with regard to the hygienic effects of personal contacts should be discarded. One cannot “correct” stereotypy by experience; he has to reconstitute the capacity for having experiences in order to prevent the growth of ideas which are malignant in the most literal, clinical sense.

D. Anti-Semitism For What?

It is a basic hypothesis of psychoanalysis that symptoms “make sense” in so far as they fulfill a specific function within the individual’s psychological economy — that they are to be regarded, as a rule, as vicarious wish-fulfillments of, or as defenses against, repressed urges. Our previous discussion has shown the irrational aspect of anti-Semitic attitudes and opinions. Since their content is irreconcilable with reality, we are certainly entitled to call them symptoms. But they are symptoms which can hardly be explained by the mechanisms of neurosis; and at the same time, the anti-Semitic individual as such, the potentially fascist character, is certainly not a psychotipychosis: a severe mental disorder in which thought and emotions are so impaired that contact is lost with external reality.. The ultimate theoretical explanation of an entirely irrational symptom which nevertheless does not appear to affect the “normality” of those who show the symptom is beyond the scope of the present research. However, we feel justified in asking the question: cuibono? What purposes within the lives of our subjects are served by anti-Semitic ways of thinking? A final answer could be provided only by going back to the primary causes for the establishment and freezing of stereotypes. An approach to such an answer has been set forth in earlier chapters. Here, we limit ourselves to a level closer to the surface of the ego and ask: what does anti-Semitism “give” to the subject within the concrete configurations of his adult experience?

Some of the functions of prejudice may doubtless be called rational. One does not need to conjure up deeper motivations in order to understand the attitude of the farmer who wants to get hold of the property of his Japanese neighbor. One may also call rational the attitude of those who aim at a fascist dictatorship and accept prejudice as part of an overall platform, though in this case the question of rationality becomes complicated, since neither the goal of such a dictatorship seems to be rational in terms of the individual’s interest, nor can the wholesale automatized acceptance of a ready-made formula be called rational either. What we are interested in, for the moment, however, is a problem of a somewhat different order. What good does accrue to the actual adjustment of otherwise “sensible” persons when they subscribe to ideas which have no basis in reality and which we ordinarily associate with maladjustment?

In order to provide a provisional answer to this question, we may anticipate one of the conclusions from our consideration of the political and economic sections of the interview (Chapter XVII); the all-pervasive ignorance and confusion of our subjects when it comes to social matters beyond the range of their immediate experience. The objectification of social processes, their obedience to intrinsic supra-individual laws, seems to result in an intellectual alienation of the individual from society. This alienation is experienced by the individual as disorientation, with concomitant fear and uncertainty. As will be seen, political stereotypy and person-alization can be understood as devices for overcoming this uncomfortable state of affairs. Images of the politician and of the bureaucrat can be understood as signposts of orientation and as projections of the fears created by disorientation. Similar functions seem to be performed by the “irrational” imagery of the Jew. He is, for the highly prejudiced subject, extremely stereotyped; at the same time, he is more personalized than any other bogey in so far as he is not defined by a profession or by his role in social life, but by his human exis-

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17 *neurosis*: a relatively mild mental illness that is not caused by organic disease, involving symptoms of stress (depression, anxiety, obsessive behavior, hypochondria) but not a radical loss of touch with reality.

18 Chapter XVII: (add name of chapter here) in *The Authoritarian Personality*
tence as such. For these reasons, as well as for historical ones, he is much better qualified for the psychological function of the “bad man” than the bureaucrats or politicians, who, incidentally, are often but handy substitutes for the real object of hatred, the Jew. The latter’s alienness seems to provide the handiest formula for dealing with the alienation of society. Charging the Jews with all existing evils seems to penetrate the darkness of reality like a searchlight and to allow for quick and all-comprising orientation. The less anti-Jewish imagery is related to actual experience and the more it is kept “pure,” as it were, from contamination by reality, the less it seems to be exposed to disturbance by the dialectics of experience, which it keeps away through its own rigidity. It is the Great Panacea, providing at once intellectual equilibrium, counter-cathexis, and a canalization of wishes for a “change.”

Anti-Semitic writers and agitators from Chamberlain to Rosenberg and Hitler have always maintained that the existence of the Jews is the key to everything. By talking with individuals of fascist leanings, one can learn the psychological implications of this “key” idea. Their more-or-less cryptic hints frequently reveal a kind of sinister pride: they speak as if they were “in the know” and had solved a riddle otherwise unsolved by mankind (no matter how often their solution has been already expressed). They raise literally or figuratively their forefinger, sometimes with a smile of superior indifference; they know the answer for everything and present to their partners in discussion the absolute security of those who have cut off the contacts by which any modification of their formula may occur. Probably it is this delusion-like security which casts its spell over those who feel insecure. By his very ignorance or confusion or semi-erudition the anti-Semite can often conquer the position of a profound wizard. The more primitive his drastic formulae are, due to their stereotypy, the more appealing they are at the same time, since they reduce the complicated to the elementary, no matter how the logic of this reduction may work. The superiority thus gained does not remain on the intellectual level. Since the cliché regularly makes the outgroup bad and the ingroup good, the anti-Semitic pattern of orientation offers emotional, narcissistic gratifications which tend to break down the barriers of rational self-criticism.

It is these psychological instruments upon which fascist agitators play incessantly. They would hardly do so if there were no susceptibility for spurious orientation among their listeners and readers. Here we are concerned only with the evidence for such susceptibility among people who are by no means overt fascist followers. We limit ourselves to three nerve points of the pseudocognitive lure of anti-Semitism: the idea that the Jews are a “problem,” the assertion that they are all alike, and the claim that Jews can be recognized as such without exception.

The contention that the Jews, or the Negroes, are a “problem” is regularly found in our interviews with prejudiced subjects. We may quote one example picked at random and then briefly discuss the theoretical implications of the “problem” idea.

The prelaw student, 105, when asked, “What about other groups?” states:

“Well, the Jews are a ticklish problem — not the whole race; there are both good and bad. But there are more bad than good.”

The term “problem” is taken over from the sphere of science and is used to give the impression of searching, responsible deliberation. By referring to a problem, one implicitly claims personal aloofness from the matter in question — a kind of detachment and higher objectivity. This, of course, is an excellent rationalization for prejudice. It serves to give the impression that one’s attitudes are not motivated subjectively but have resulted from hard thinking and mature experience. The subject who makes use of this device maintains a discursive attitude in the interview; he qualifies, quasi-empirically, what he has to say, and is ready to admit exceptions. Yet these qualifications and exceptions only scratch the surface. As soon as the existence of a “Jewish problem” is admitted, anti-Semitism has won its first surreptitious victory. This is made possible by the equivocal nature of the term itself; it can be both a neutral issue of analysis and, as indicated by the everyday use of the term “problematic” for a dubious character, a negative entity. There is no doubt that the relations between Jews and non-Jews do present a problem in the objective sense of the term, but when “the Jewish problem” is referred to, the emphasis is subtly shifted. While the veneer of objectivity is maintained, the implication is that the Jews are the problem, a problem, that is, to the rest of society. It is but one step from this position to the implicit notion that this problem has to be dealt with according to its own special requirements, i.e., the problematic nature of the Jews, and that this will naturally lead outside the bounds of democratic procedure. Moreover, the “problem” calls for a solution. As soon as the Jews themselves are stamped as this problem, they are transformed into objects, not only to “judges” of superior insight but also to the perpetrators of an action; far from being regarded as subjects, they are treated as terms of a mathematical equation. To call for a “solution of the Jewish problem” results in their being reduced to “material” for manipulation. It should be added that the “problem” idea, which made deep inroads into public opinion through Nazi propaganda and the Nazi example, is also to be found in the interviews of low-scoring subjects. Here, however, it assumes regularly the aspect of a protest. Unprejudiced subjects try to restore the objective, “sociological” meaning of the term, generally

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19 panacea: a solution or remedy for all difficulties or diseases.
21 Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946): Main author of key Nazi ideological creeds, including its racial theory, persecution of the Jews.
22 narcissism: self-centeredness arising from failure to distinguish the self from external objects, either in very young babies or as a feature of mental disorder.
23 spurious: (of a line of reasoning) apparently but not actually valid.
24 equivocal: open to more than one interpretation; ambiguous.
insisting on the fact that the so-called “Jewish problem” is actually the problem of the non-Jews. However, the very use of the term may be partially indicative, even with unprejudiced persons, of a certain ambivalence or at least indifference, as in the case of 5047, who scored low on the E scale but high on F and PEC.

“Yes, I think there is a so-called Jewish problem and a Negro problem, but essentially I believe that it is really a majority problem.” He felt that there was a need for more education of the ignorant masses and for improving economic conditions so that there would not be a necessity for seeking a scapegoat. Generally, his understanding of the problems seemed to be quite sound, and he expressed disagreement with anti-Semitism and discrimination against Negroes. However, the manner in which he approached the matter and his tendency to treat it as a purely academic problem seemed to indicate that he was not thoroughly convinced of his statements and was merely using verbal clichés.

The term “problem” itself seems to suggest a too naïve idea of common sense justice, following the pattern of democratic compromise in areas where decisions should be made only according to the merits of the case. The man who speaks about the “problem” is easily tempted to say that there are two sides to every problem, with the comfortable consequence that the Jews must have done something wrong, if they were exterminated. This pattern of conformist “sensibleness” lends itself very easily to the defense of various kinds of irrationality.

The statement that the Jews are all alike not only dispenses with all disturbing factors but also, by its sweep, gives to the judge the grandiose air of a person who sees the whole without allowing himself to be deflected by petty details — an intellectual leader. At the same time, the “all alike” idea rationalizes the glance at the individual case as a mere specimen of some generality which can be taken care of by general measures which are the more radical, since they call for no exceptions. We give but one example of a case where traces of “knowing better” still survive although the “all alike” idea.

“Knowing better” is mentioned not infrequently by high scorers: they realize they “should” not think that way, but stick to their prejudice under a kind of compulsion which is apparently stronger than the moral and rational counterarguments available to them. In addition to this phenomenon, there is hardly any aspect of the anti-Semitic syndrome discussed in this chapter which could not be illustrated by this quotation from a truly “all-out,” totalitarian anti-Semite. She omits nothing. Her insatiability is indicative of the tremendous libidinous energy she has invested in her Jewish complex. Acting out her anti-Semitism obviously works with her as a wish-fulfillment, both with regard to aggressiveness and with regard to the desire for intellectual superiority as indicated by her cooperation in the present study “in the interests of science.” Her personal attitude partakes of that sinister contempt shown by those who feel themselves to be “in the know” with respect to all kinds of dark secrets.

Her most characteristic attitude is one of pessimism — she dismisses many matters with a downward glance, a shrug of the shoulders, and a sigh.

The idea of the “Jew spotter” was introduced in the Labor Study, where it proved to be the most discriminating item. We used it only in a supplementary way, in work with the Los Angeles sample, but there can be no doubt that people who are extreme on A–S will regularly allege that they can recognize Jews at once. This is the most drastic expression of the “orientation” mechanism which we have seen to be so essential a feature of the prejudiced outlook. At the same time, it can frequently be observed that the actual variety of Jews, which could hardly escape notice, leads to a high amount of vagueness with regard to the criteria according to which Jews might be spotted; this vagueness does not, however, interfere with the definiteness of the spotter’s claim. One example for this configuration will suffice. It is interesting because of the strange mixture of fantasy and real observation.

5039, a 27-year-old student at the University of Southern California and a war veteran, who scores high on E:

“...”

26Libidinous: showing excessive sexual drive; lustful. From libido. (From Psychoanalysis) the energy of the sexual drive as a component of the life instinct.
E. Two Kinds of Jews

The stereotypes just discussed have been interpreted as means for pseudo-orientation in an estranged world, and at the same time as devices for “mastering” this world by being able completely to pigeonhole its negative aspects. The “problematizing” attitude puts the resentful person in the position of one who isrationally discriminating; the assertion that all the Jews are alike transposes the “problem” into the realm of systematic and complete knowledge, without a “loophole,” as it were; the pretension of being able unerringly to recognize Jews raises the claim that the subject is actually the judge in matters where the judgment is supposed to have been pronounced once and for all. In addition, there is another stereotype of “orientation” which deserves closer attention because it shows most clearly the “topographical” function and because it crops up spontaneously with great frequency in the interview material. It is even more indicative of the “pseudo-rational” element in anti-Semitic prejudice than is the manner of speaking about the “Jewish problem.” We refer to the standard division of Jews into two groups, the good ones and the bad ones, a division frequently expressed in terms of the “white” Jews and the “kikes.” It may be objected that this division cannot be taken as an index of subjective attitudes, since it has its basis in the object itself, namely, the different degrees of Jewish assimilation. We shall be able to demonstrate that this objection does not hold true and that we have to cope with an attitudinal pattern largely independent of the structure of the minority group to which it is applied.

It has been established in previous chapters that the mentality of the prejudiced subject is characterized by thinking in terms of rigidly contrasting ingroups and outgroups. In the stereotype here under consideration, this dichotomy is projected upon the outgroups themselves, or at least upon one particular outgroup. This is partly due no doubt to the automatization of black and white thinking which tends to “cut in two” whatever is being considered. It is also due to the desire to maintain an air of objectivity while expressing one’s hostility, and perhaps even to a mental reservation of the prejudiced person who does not want to deliver himself completely to ways of thinking which he still regards as “forbidden.” The “two kinds” stereotype thus has to be viewed as a compromise between antagonistic tendencies within the prejudiced person himself. This would lead to the supposition that people who make this division are rarely extreme high scorers; a supposition which seems to be largely borne out by our data. In terms of our “orientation” theory we should expect that the “two kinds” idea serves as a makeshift for bridging the gap between general stereotypy and personal experience. Thus, the “good” outgroup members would be those whom the subject personally knows, whereas the “bad” ones would be those at a greater social distance — a distinction obviously related to the differences between assimilated and non-assimilated sectors of the outgroup. This again is at least partly corroborated, though it will be seen that the “two kinds” idea is in many respects so vague and abstract that it does not even coincide with the division between the known and the unknown. As a device for overcoming stereotypy the “two kinds” concept is spurious because it is thoroughly stereotyped itself.

5007, who scores high on all the scales, comments as follows:

“Most of the Jews I have known have been white Jews, and they are very charming people. Jews are aggressive, clannish, overcrowd nice neighborhoods, and are money-minded. At least the ‘non-white Jews.’ My experiences have been of two sorts. Some Jews are amongst the most charming and educated people I know. Other experiences have been less friendly. On the whole, I think Jews in the professions are all right, but in commerce they seem to be quite objectionable.”

Here it can be seen clearly how the over-all stereotypy, as suggested by the list of “objectionable Jewish traits,” struggles with the stereotype of a dichotomy, which in this case represents the more humanitarian trend. It is conceived in terms of acquaintances vs. others, but this is complicated by a second division, that between “professional” Jews (supposedly of higher education and morality) and “business” Jews, who are charged with being ruthless money-makers and cheats.

This, however, is not the classical form of the “two kinds” idea. The latter is expressed, rather, by the above-mentioned Boy Scout leader, 5051, the man who brings the Armenians into play:

“Now take the Jews. There are good and bad amongst all races. We know that, and we know that Jews are a religion, not a race; but the trouble is that there are two types of Jews. There are the white Jews and the kikes. My pet theory is that the white Jews hate the kikes just as much as we do. I even knew a good Jew who ran a store and threw some kikes out, calling them kikes and saying he didn’t want their business.”

Research on anti-Semitism among Jews would probably corroborate this “pet” idea. In Germany at least, the “autochthonous” Jews used to discriminate heavily against refugees and immigrants from the East and often enough comforted themselves with the idea that the Nazi policies were directed merely against the “Ostjuden.” Distinctions of this sort seem to promote gradual persecution of Jews, group by group, with the aid of the smooth rationalization that only those are to be excluded who do not belong anyway.

It is a structural element of anti-Semitic persecution that it starts with limited objectives, but goes on and on without being stopped. It is through this structure that the “two kinds” stereotype assumes its sinister aspect. The division between “whites” and “kikes,” arbitrary and unjust in itself, invariably turns against the so-called “whites” who become the “kikes” of tomorrow.

Evidence of the independence of the division from its object is offered by the all-around high scorer, M1229m, of the Maritime School group, who divides the Jews in a manner employed by other Southerners with regard to the Negroes. Here a certain break between general race prejudice and a

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27 topographical: relating to or representing the physical distribution of parts or features on the surface of or within an organ or organism.

28 autochthonous: indigenous rather than descended from migrants or colonists. (Said of an inhabitant of a place.)

29 Ostjuden: East-jews (German).
relative freedom of more personal attitudes and experiences seems to exist.

(Jewish problem?) “Not a terrific problem. I get along with them. Jews in the South are different from those in the North. Not so grasping in the South. (Daughter marrying a Jew?) O.K.; no problem. Large number of Jewish families in Galveston. No prejudice against Jews in Texas.”

This making of private exceptions is sometimes, as by the mildly anti-Semitic radio writer 5003, expressed as follows:

“He doesn’t know about Jews. ‘Some of my best friends are Jews.’ ” In spite of the innumerable jokes, both European and American, about the “some of my best friends” cliché, it survives tenaciously. Apparently it combines felicitously the merits of “human interest” — supposedly personal experience — with a bow to the superego which does not seriously impede the underlying hostility.

Occasionally the concessions made to personal acquaintances are explained by the interspersion of racial theories, and thus a mildly paranoid touch is added. An example is the generally “high” woman, F109:

Father Scotch-Irish, mother English-Irish. Subject is not identified with any of these. “I have an age-old feeling against Jews, some against Negroes. Jews stick together, are out for money; they gyp you. Jews are in big businesses. It seems they will be running the country before long. I know some people of Jewish descent who are very nice, but they’re not full-blooded Jews. Jews have large noses, are slight in stature, little sly Jews. The women have dark hair, dark eyes, are sort of loud.”

This girl student, by the way, to whom the “education” idea is all-important, is among those who show traces of bad conscience.

Subject knows she’s prejudiced; she thinks she needs educating too, by working with people of different races. The intrinsic weakness of the “best friend” idea, which simulates human experience without truly expressing it, comes into the open in the following quotation, where the line between the friend and the “kikes” is drawn in such a way that even the “friend” is not fully admitted.

(Jews?) “There are Jews and Jews. I have a very good girl friend who is a Jew — never enters into our relationship except that she is in a Jewish sorority. (Would you want her in your sorority?) Well … (pause) … I don’t think I’d have any objections. (Would you let in all Jewish girls?) No. One Jew is alright but you get a whole mob and … ! (What happens?) They get into anything and they’ll control it — they’ll group together for their own interests — the kike Jew is as dishonest as they come. Find them on Fillmore Street in San Francisco. I have had no experience with kike Jews. I think that’s created in my family. Father feels strongly against them — I don’t know why. (Nazis?) That’s unnecessary — they have a right to exist — no reason for excluding them as long as they don’t try to overstep the rights of others. I knew a lot of Jews in high school. They kept pretty much to themselves. Don’t think I’m echoing. I would like Jews as long as they don’t reflect typical Jewish qualities. Typical Jewish nose, mouth, voice. The presence of a Jew creates feelings of tension. Squeaky voice, long, pointed nose. Couldn’t name anti-Semitic groups in this country but think they exist.”

Particular attention should be called to the statement of this girl, described by the interviewer as being “tight all over,” that the presence of a Jew creates feelings of tension. There is reason to believe that this is a common experience. It would hardly suffice to attribute this uneasiness solely to repressed guilt feelings, or to the effect of some “strangeness” as such. At least the concrete aspects of this strangeness in social contacts needs further elucidation. We venture the hypothesis that it is due to a certain discomfort and uneasiness on the Jew’s own part in non-Jewish company, and on a certain antagonism of the Jews, deeply rooted in history, against “genial” conviviality and harmless abandonment of oneself in order to enjoy the moment. Since this may be one concrete factor making for anti-Semitism, independent of traditional stereotypy, this whole complex should be followed up most carefully in future research.

As to the evidence for our assertion that the “two kinds” idea is not object-bound but rather a structural psychological pattern, we limit ourselves to two examples. The student nurse, 5013, whose scale scores are generally high:

Feels towards the Japanese and the Mexicans and Negroes very much as she does toward the Jews. In all cases she holds to a sort of bifurcation30 theory, that is, that there are good Japanese and that they should be allowed to return to California, but there are bad ones and they should not. The Mexicans also fall into two groups, as do the Negroes. When it is pointed out to her that people of her own extraction probably also fall into good and bad groups, she admits this but feels that the line between the good and the bad is not as great in her case. She feels that the Negro problem is probably of greater importance than the other minorities but says that she speaks at the hospital to the colored nurses and doctors. At this point she related a long anecdote about taking care of a female Negro patient who had told her that the Negroes had brought their problems on themselves by aspiring to equality with the whites. She feels that this was a very wise Negress and agrees with her.

In the case of Southerners, the “two kinds” idea is frequently applied to the Negroes, those in the South being praised, and those who went away being denounced for demanding an equality to which they were not entitled. In so far as the Southern “white man’s nigger” is more subservient and a better object of exploitation in the eyes of these subjects, this attitude, with its patriarchal and feudalistic rationalizations, can be called semi-realistic. But the construct of “two kinds of Negroes” often results in quite a different connotation, as in the case of F340a. She is high on F and PEC and middle on E.

“The Negroes are getting so arrogant now, they come to the employment office and say they don’t like this kind of a job and that kind of a job. However, there are some who are employed at the employment office and they are very nice and intelligent. There are nice ones and bad ones among us. The Negroes who have always lived in Oakland are all right; they don’t know what to do with all those who are coming in from the South either. They all carry knives; if you do something they don’t like, they ‘will get even with you, they will slice you up.’ ”

Here, the “two kinds” idea results in plain persecution fantasies.

30 bifurcation: the division of something into two branches or parts.
F. The Anti-Semite’s Dilemma

If anti-Semitism is a “symptom” which fulfills an “economic” function within the subject’s psychology, one is led to postulate that this symptom is not simply “there,” as a mere expression of what the subject happens to be, but that it is the outcome of a conflict. It owes its very irrationality to psychological dynamics which force the individual, at least in certain areas, to abandon the reality principle\textsuperscript{31}. The conception of prejudice as a symptom resulting from a conflict has been elucidated in earlier chapters. Here, we are concerned not so much with the clinical evidence of conflict determinants as with the traces of conflict within the phenomenon of anti-Semitism itself. Some evidence bearing on this point has already been presented in the last sections. The “problem” idea as well as the dichotomy applied to the outgroup represent a kind of compromise between underlying urges and hostile stereotypes on the one hand, and the demands of conscience and the weight of concrete experience on the other. The subject who “discusses” the Jews usually wants to maintain some sense of proportion, at least formally, even though the content of his rational considerations is spurious and his supposed insight itself is warped by the very same instinctual urges which it is called upon to check.

The standard form under which conflict appears in statements of high-scoring subjects is, as indicated above, “I shouldn’t, but…” This formula is the result of a remarkable displacement. It has been pointed out that the anti-Semite is torn between negative stereotypy and personal experiences which contradict this stereotypy.\textsuperscript{32} As soon as the subject reflects, however, upon his own attitude, the relation between stereotypy and experience appears in reverse. He regards tolerance as the general law, as the stereotypy as it were, and personalizes his own stereotyped hostility, presenting it as the inescapable result either of experience or of idiosyncrasies which are stronger than he is himself. This can be accounted for partly by the officially prevailing democratic ideology which stamps prejudice as something wrong. It has also to be considered that the superego, being constituted as the psychological agency of society within the individual, regularly assumes an aspect of universality which easily appears to the subject, driven by wishes for instinctual gratification, as “rigid law.” This, however, hardly tells the whole story. The discrepancy between experience and stereotype is put into the service of the prejudiced attitude. The prejudiced subject is dimly aware that the content of the stereotype is imaginary and that his own experience represents truth. Yet, for deeper psychological reasons, he wants to stick to the stereotype. This he achieves by transforming the latter into an expression of his personality and the antistereotypical elements into an abstract obligation. This displacement is enhanced by his innermost conviction that the supposed stereotypes of tolerance are not so strong socially as he pretends. He realizes that while he appears to rebel against the slogans of democracy and equality, for reasons that are strictly personal, he is actually backed by powerful social trends. And yet he will claim, at the same time, that he acts as a sincere and independent person who does not care what others think. Moreover, he relies on the idea that one’s own feelings are always stronger than conventions, that he simply has to follow them, and that his prejudice is a kind of fatality which cannot be changed. This seems to be a common pattern by which the anti-Semite’s conflict situation is rationalized in a way favorable to prejudice.

This pattern manifests itself objectively in a characteristic contradiction: that between general pretensions of being unbiased, and prejudiced statements as soon as specific issues are raised. 5056, a 29-year-old housewife, with high scores on all the scales,

Stated that she and her husband have no particular dislike for any group of people. (This statement is interesting when contrasted with her very high E-score, and with the statements which follow.) “The Negro, however, should be kept with his own people. I would not want my niece marrying a Negro, and I would not want Negro neighbors.” To subject there is quite a Negro problem — “it is probably the most important minority problem.” She prefers “the way things are in the South; the Negroes seem so happy down there. Actually, they should have a separate state. This doesn’t mean that we should snub them. The separate state would be very good, because, although we should govern them, they could run it themselves.”

The underlying conflict could not be expressed more authentically than in the contradiction contained in the last statement. The subject tries to display an unbiased attitude toward Jews:

It is interesting to note that she objected rather strongly to discussing the Jews and the Negroes in the same context and protested when they were presented contiguously in the interview. “I would just as soon have Jews around — in fact, I have some Jewish friends. Some are overbearing, but then some Gentiles are overbearing too.”

But as soon as it comes to her “personal” attitude, she falls for the stereotype and resolves the conflict by an aloofness which amounts for all practical purposes to an endorsement of anti-Semitism:

When asked about Jewish traits, she first mentioned “the Jewish nose.” In addition, she believes Jews have a certain set of personality traits all their own, which will never change. “They want to argue all the time; some are greedy (though some aren’t, in fact, some are generous); they talk with their hands and are dramatic in their speech.” She believes the dislike of the Jews is increasing, to which trend she objects. “Think we’re being selfish when we act that way, just as we accuse the Jews of being.” She doesn’t like to hear attacks on the Jews, but she wouldn’t defend them by argument. This seems to be both a function of her dislike for argumentation as well as a certain attitude of non-involvement in or detachment from the whole question of anti-Semitism.

The subjective mirroring of the conflict between stereotype and experience in reverse, resulting in rigidity of the sup-

\textsuperscript{31}Reality principle: (Psychoanalysis) the ego’s control of the pleasure-seeking activity of the id in order to meet the demands of the external world.

\textsuperscript{32}The most drastic evidence for this hypothesis is, of course, the habit of differentiating between those Jews with whom the subject is acquainted, and who are “good,” and the rest of them, who are the “kikes.” In certain cases this contradiction is both concretized and cleared up etiologically\textsuperscript{33}. We refer here to case 5057, discussed in detail in Chapter XIX, (Arun: Add chapter title here) where the subject’s bias is practically explained by himself as the outcome of resentment aroused by a childhood experience with a Jewish delicatessen man. (Footnote by Adorno)
posed experience, is clearly exemplified in the statements of M1230a, a middle scorer of the Maritime School group:

(What do you think of the problem of racial minorities?)

“Well, for the foreigners coming in, it’s quite a question. This is supposed to be a melting pot. But shouldn’t let too many of them in. . . . And then the Negro problem. . . . I try to be liberal, but I was raised in a Jim Crow state. . . . I don’t think I would ever fall in with giving the Negroes equal rights in every way. . . . And yet, foreigners, you have a natural dislike for them. Yet, all of us were once foreigners. . . .”

The anti-Semite’s dilemma may be epitomized by quoting verbatim the following statements of the girl student 5005, who is high on both the E and F scales, but low on PEC.

“I don’t think there should be a Jewish problem. People should not be discriminated against, but judged on their individual merits. I don’t like it to be called a problem. Certainly I’m against prejudice. Jews are aggressive, bad-manered, clan-nish, intellectual, clean, overcrowd neighborhoods, noisy, and oversexed. I will admit that my opinion is not based on much contact, however; I hear these things all the time. There are very few Jewish students in my school, and I have already referred to my good contact with the one girl.”

Here the contradiction between judgment and experience is so striking that the existence of prejudice can be accounted for only by strong psychological urges.

G. Prosecutor As Judge

In terms of ideology, the anti-Semite’s conflict is between the current, culturally “approved” stereotypes of prejudice and the officially prevailing standards of democracy and human equality. Viewed psychologically, the conflict is between certain foreconscious or repressed id tendencies on the one hand and the superego, or its more or less externalized, conventional substitute, on the other. It is hard to predict or even to explain satisfactorily, on the basis of our data, which way this conflict will be decided in each individual case, though we may hypothesize that as soon as prejudice in any amount is allowed to enter a person’s manifest ways of thinking, the scales weigh heavily in favor of an ever-increasing expansion of his prejudice. We are furthermore entitled to expect this result of the conflict in all cases where the potentially fascist personality syndrome is established. If the conflict within the individual has been decided against the Jews, the decision itself is almost without exception rationalized morally. It is as if the internal powers of prejudice, after the defeat of the countertendencies, would consummate their victory by taking the opposing energies, which they have defeated, into their own service. The superego becomes the spokesman of the id, as it were—a dynamic configuration, incidentally, which is not altogether new to psychoanalysis. We might call the urges expressing themselves in anti-Semitism the prosecutor, and conscience the judge, within the personality, and say that the two are fused. The Jews have to face, in the prejudiced personality, the parody of a trial. This is part of the psycho-

logical explanation of why the chances of the Jews making a successful defense against the prejudiced personality are so slim. It may be noted that the judiciary practice in Nazi Germany followed exactly the same pattern, that the Jews were never given a chance, in the Third Reich, to speak for their own cause, either in private law suits or collectively. It will be seen that the expropriation of the superego by the fascist character, with underlying unconscious guilt feelings which must be violently silenced at any price, contributes decisively to the transformation of “cultural discrimination” into an insatiably hostile attitude feeding upon destructive urges.

There is a clear index of the conquest of the superego by anti-Semitic ideology: the assertion that the responsibility for everything the Jews have to suffer, and more particularly, for the genocide committed by the Nazis, rests with the victims rather than with their persecutors. The anti-Semite avails himself of a cliché which seems to make this idea acceptable once and for all: that the Jews “brought it on themselves” no matter what “it” may be. M107, the young man who marked every question on the questionnaire scale either +3 or −3 but averaged high on all three scales, is a good example of this pattern of rationalization, following the dubious logic of “where there is smoke there must be fire”:

“I never understood why Hitler was so brutal toward them. There must have been some reason for it, something to provoke it. Some say he had to show his authority, but I doubt it. I suspect the Jews contributed a great deal to it.”

How the moralistic construct of Jewish responsibility leads to a complete reversal between victim and murderer is strikingly demonstrated by one subject, 5064, another one of the Los Angeles Boy Scout leaders and a butcher by trade. He scores high on both the E and F scale although lower on PEC. While still officially condemning the German atrocities, he makes a surprising suggestion:

“No American can approve of what the Nazis did to the Jews. I really hope that the Jews will do something about it before we come to any such position here. The solution is in the education, particularly of the minority.”

This type of mental perversion seems to utilize an idea taken from the stock of traditional liberalistic wisdom: God helps those who help themselves. The Jews are in jeopardy, therefore it is up to the Jews. In a cultural climate where success has come to be a major measuring rod for any value, the precarious situation of the Jews works as an argument against them. The affinity of this attitude and the “no pity for the poor” theme, to be discussed in the chapter on politics, can hardly be overlooked. The same line of thought occurs in the interview of another Boy Scout leader, the Austrian-born and somewhat over-Americanized 55-year-old 5044, who is consistently high on all scales:

“The Jews should take the lead rather than the Gentiles. After all, the Jews are the ones who may get into serious trouble. They shouldn’t walk on other people’s feet.”

34Jim Crow: the former practice of segregating black people in the US; apartheid.

35id: (Psychoanalysis) the part of the mind in which innate instinctive impulses and primary processes are manifest. ORIGIN 1920s: from Latin, literally ‘that,’ translating German es (meaning ‘it’). The term was first used in this sense by Freud, following use in a similar sense by his contemporary, Georg Groddeck.
While the Jews “bring it upon themselves,” the Nazis’ extermination policy is either justified or regarded as a Jewish exaggeration itself, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. The high-scoring man, M359, departmental manager for a leather company, is one of those who have “a large number of very close Jewish friends.” Despite this he is high on both the E and PEC scales, although lower on F. Nor does it prevent the following interview episode:

(Nazi treatment?) “Unable to convince myself that the treatment was limited to Jews. This seems to me to be Jewish propaganda to solicit sympathy and help by overemphasizing their hardships, though I have no sympathy for the Nazi’s treatment of people.”

The mercilessness accompanying the semi-apologetic attitude towards the Nazis can be seen in this subject’s pseu-
dorational statements on Palestine: while apparently wishing to “give the Jews a chance,” he simultaneously excludes any prospects of success by referring to the Jews’ supposedly un-
changeably bad nature:

(Solution?) “Sending them to Palestine is silly because it’s not big enough. A good idea to have a country of their own, but big enough so that they can go ahead with their daily pursuits in a normal way, but the Jews would not be happy. They are only happy to have others work for them.”

The explanatory idea that the “Jews brought it upon themselves” is used as a rationalization for destructive wishes which otherwise would not be allowed to pass the censorship of the ego. In some cases this is disguised as a statement of fact; e.g., by 5012, a 21-year-old discharged naval petty officer, who scores high on all scales:

“I don’t want anything to do with them. They are a nuisance, but not a menace. They will get whatever they deserve as a result of their behavior.”

The high-scoring woman F103, however, who used to be a social welfare student but has changed to decorative art, lets the cat out of the bag:

“I don’t blame the Nazis at all for what they did to the Jews. That sounds terrible, I know, but if the Jews acted the way they do here, I don’t blame them. I’ve never had any bad personal experiences with Jews, it’s just the way they act. Don’t help your fellow man; that’s their creed.”

Here the interrelation between death-wish and moralistic rationalization becomes truly terrifying. Particularly noteworthy is the subject’s underscoring of her own irrationality, in spite of her rationalization concerning the Jews’ innate badness. Her confession that she never had any bad experiences with Jews high-lights an important aspect of the whole phenomenon of anti-Semitic extremism. It is the fantastic disproportion between the Jewish “guilt” — even as conceived by the anti-Semite himself — and the judgment that is pronounced. In previous sections, the role played by the theme of “exchange” in the mentality of the prejudiced person has been discussed. Frequently our high-scoring subjects complain that they never get their full share, that they are being exploited by everybody. This sense of victimization goes hand in hand with very strong underlying possessive and appropriative desires. Accordingly, when the subjects speak about the “justice” to be meted out to the Jews they express their own desire for an unjust state of affairs in which the exchange of equivalents has been replaced by distribution according to unmediated and irrational power relationships. This is expressed negatively towards the Jews: they should get more punishment — infinitely more — than they “deserve.” Ordinarily, it would never occur even to a very aggressive person that somebody who is bad-mannered or even a cheat should be punished by death. Where the Jews are concerned, however, the transition from accusations which are not only flimsy but unsubstantial even if they were true, to suggestions of the severest kinds of treatment seems to work quite smoothly. This is indicative of one of the most pernicious features of the potentially fascist character.

The logical property of stereotypes, that is, their all-comprehensiveness which allows for no deviations, is not only well adapted to meet certain requirements of the prejudiced outlook; it is, by itself, an expression of a psychological trait which probably could be fully understood only in connection with the theory of paranoia and the paranoid “system” which always tends to include everything, to tolerate nothing which cannot be identified by the subject’s formula. The extremely prejudiced person tends toward “psychological totalitarianism,” something which seems to be almost a micrometric image of the totalitarian state at which he aims. Nothing can be left untouched, as it were; everything must be made “equal” to the ego-ideal of a rigidly conceived and hypostatized ingroup. The outgroup, the chosen foe, represents an eternal challenge. As long as anything different survives, the fascist character feels threatened, no matter how weak the other being may be. It is as if the anti-Semitic could not sleep quietly until he has transformed the whole world into the very same paranoid system by which he is beset: the Nazis went far beyond their official anti-Semitic program. This mechanism makes for the complete disproportion between “guilt” and punishment. The extreme anti-Semite simply cannot stop. By a logic of his own, which is of an archaic nature, much closer to associational transitions than to discursive inferences, he reaches, after having started from relatively mild accusations, the wildest conclusions, tantamount in the last analysis to the pronouncement of death sentences against those whom he literally “cannot stand.” This mechanism was encountered in the “screened” interviews of the Labor Study where subjects frequently “talked themselves into anti-Semitism.” Our interview schedule, more strictly standardized, prevented us from catching the latter phenomenon. Yet we have striking testimony of the disproportion between guilt and punishment in some of our cases. It is here that the

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30 death instinct: (Psychoanalysis) an innate desire for self-annihilation, thought to be manifest in the conservative and regressive tendency of the psyche to reduce tension. Compare with Life Instinct.

31 ego-ideal: (Psychoanalysis) (in Freudian theory) the part of the mind that imposes on itself concepts of ideal behaviour developed from parental and social standards.

32 hypostatized: treat or represent (something abstract) as a concrete reality.
“expropriation” of the superego by the anti-Semite’s punitive moralism obtains its full significance. This removes the last obstacle to psychological totalitarianism. There are no inhibitions left by which the associational crescendo of destructive ideas could be checked. Hatred is reproduced and enhanced in an almost automatized, compulsive manner which is both utterly detached from the reality of the object and completely alien to the ego. It may be added that, viewed sociologically, the disproportion between guilt and punishment shows that to the extreme anti-Semite the whole idea of rational law has become a sham even though he dwells on orderliness and legalitarian niceties. He is ready to sacrifice his own ideology of equivalents as soon as he has the power to get the major share for himself. Psychologically, the idea of eternal Jewish guilt can be understood as a projection of the prejudiced person’s own repressed guilt feelings; ideologically, it is a mere epiphenomenon\textsuperscript{39}, a rationalization in the strictest sense. In the extreme case, the psychological focal point is the wish to kill the object of his hatred. It is only afterwards that he looks for reasons why the Jews “must” be killed, and these reasons can never suffice fully to justify his extermination fantasies. This, however, does not “cure” the anti-Semite, once he has succeeded in expropriating his conscience. The disproportion between the guilt and the punishment induces him, rather, to pursue his hatred beyond any limits and thus to prove to himself and to others that he must be right. This is the ultimate function of ideas such as “the Jews brought it upon themselves” or the more generalized formula “there must be something to it.” The extreme anti-Semite silences the remnants of his own conscience by the extremeness of his attitude. He seems to terrorize himself even while he terrorizes others.

The sham trial of rationalizations put on by the prejudiced person sometimes makes for a kind of defense of the Jews. But this psychological defense is all too reminiscent of the technique of the Nazi courts. It is permitted only in order to satisfy the formalized and hollow wish for legality, the empty shell of expropriated conscience. The defense must always remain impotent. Whatever good is said about the Jews sounds like an ironical or hypocritical variation of standard blames. Thus, reference is frequently made to the mythical “good family life” of the Jews, a comment which, however thinly, veils the accusation of conspiratorial clannishness; and this is accompanied by insincere protestations of envy of these Jewish qualities, the implication being that the anti-Semitic subject gets the worst deal in life because his noble nature prevents him from the practice of connivance. Still another type of mock-defense can be observed in our interviews. It is the assertion that the Jews are so clever; that they are “smarter” than the Gentiles, and that one has to admire them on this account. The mechanism at work here involves a double set of values which makes itself felt throughout contemporary culture. On the one hand, there are the “ideals” of magnanimity, unselfishness, justice, and love to which one has to pay lip service. On the other hand, there are the standards of achievement, success, and status which one has to follow in one’s actual life. This double set of values is applied to the Jews in reverse, as it were. They are praised for their supposed or actual living up to the standards which the anti-Semite himself actually follows and simultaneously, they are condemned for their violation of the very same moral code of which he has successfully rid himself. The phraseology of conscience is used in order to take back the moral credit given to the chosen foe in order to appease one’s own conscience. Even the praise apportioned to the Jews is used as supporting evidence for their pre-established guilt.

The point being developed here, as well as other features of the prejudiced mentality, is illustrated by the following description of 5039, a 27-year-old veteran student, high on E and middle on the other scales, who is described by the interviewer as a “rather egocentric person.”

In rebelling against his father’s teachings, he has dissociated himself from the church, but nevertheless strongly identifies himself as a Gentile in contrast to the Jews. He explained this on the basis of having grown up in a neighborhood . . . where he was the only Gentile in a Jewish community and where he was made to feel that he was an “outsider.” He feels that there is a basic conflict in the religious teachings and upbringing of Christians as against Jews, which is largely responsible for the incomparability of the two groups. He stated that the Christian religion stresses the pacificist teaching of “turning the other cheek,” thus causing youth to become “maladjusted and submissive,” whereas the Jewish religion spurs youth to achievement and aggression, on the basis that “your fathers have suffered, therefore it is now up to you to prove yourself.” Therefore, he feels that a truly religious Christian is bound to be “outdone” by ambitious and aggressive Jews. . . . He did not seem aware that he was generalizing from his own particular experience and environment.

That the objectivity of these reflections about the supposedly realistic education instigated by Judaism is a mere fake and actually serves as a pretext for boundless hostility is shown by this subject’s answer to the specific question referring to Hitler’s atrocities:

“Well, if I had been in Germany, I think I would have done the same. . . . I suppose I could have been a Nazi. . . . I think discipline is a good thing. . . .”

Whereas this subject’s statements on Jewish smartness are overtly hostile, and limited to the imagined disadvantages of Gentiles in competition with Jews, the smartness idea is sometimes expressed with an air of mock humbleness. An example is afforded by the high-scoring man M104, a former engineering student who has changed to law:

He said “you hear that our country is run by Jewish capitalists, that Jewish capitalists wield all the power here. If this is true, it means that our own people aren’t smart enough. If our people know the way the Jews are, and can’t do the same thing, more power to the Jews. If they know how the Jews work, they should be able to do it just as well.” He doesn’t “want to admit that the others aren’t as smart as the Jews, and that’s what it would mean if this country is run by Jewish capitalists. If they’re smarter than we are, let them run it.”

But the magnanimous ending of the quotation has sinister implications. A tiny shift of emphasis suffices to transform it into the idea that the Jews, because of their sinister cleverness, run the country, that we have to get rid of them and

\textsuperscript{39}Epiphenomenon: a secondary effect or byproduct that arises from but does not causally influence a process.
that, since Jewish smartness makes constitutional procedures ineffective, this can be done only by violent means. That the idea of Jewish omnipotence through smartness is a mere projection becomes nowhere clearer than in the case of the consistently high-scoring woman F105. She is crippled as a result of infantile paralysis in early childhood. She consummates the idea of Jewish smartness — of the Jews “taking over the business affairs of the nation” — by the expectation of a bloody uprising of the Jews which is but a superficially veiled projection of her own wish for anti-Jewish pogroms:

“The white people have decided that we’re the thing — the white vs. black and yellow. I think there’s going to be a Jewish uprising after the war. I’m not against the Jews. Those I’ve had contact with were very nice. Of course, I’ve seen some I didn’t like, too. (What didn’t you like about them?) They’re loud and they seem to like attention. They’re always trying to be at the top of something. I’ve heard stories about how they’ll stab friends in the back, etc., but I have still to see to believe. (Uprising?) I think there will be bloodshed over it in this country. (Do you think it will be justified?) There’s no doubt that they’re taking over the business affairs of the nation. I don’t think it’s right that refugees should be taken care of the way they are. I think they should take care of their own problems.”

It is noteworthy that when coming into the open with the “bloodshed” idea, this subject does not state clearly whose blood is going to be spilled. While putting the blame for the riots she wishes for upon nonexistent Jewish rioters, she leaves it open that it will be the Jews, after all, who are going to be killed. There may be more to this, however. To extreme anti-Semites the idea of bloodshed seems to become independent, an end in itself as it were. On the deepest level, they do not differentiate so very strictly between subject and object. The underlying destructive urge pertains both to the enemy and to oneself. Destructiveness is truly “totalitarian.”

As a summary of the structure of anti-Semitic extremism dealt with in this section, we present in some detail the comments on the Jews of the only interviewee who openly endorses the idea of genocide. This is 5006, a dentistry student and contractor who scores high throughout the questionnaire. He suffers from color-blindness and from psychogenic sexual impotence, determined, according to the interviewer, by a severe Oedipus complex. His radical wishes for the extermination of the Jews are probably conditioned by severe, early childhood traumatia: projections of his own castration fear. His exaggerated ingroup identification seems to be concomitant with an underlying feeling of weakness: he simply does not wish to become acquainted with what is different, apparently because he deems it dangerous.

He is a native-born American, and his grandfather was brought to this country at four. He has never been out of America, nor does he want to go out. Once he went to Tijuana and “that was enough.” He has great pride in being an American.

To him, the minorities are characterized, above all, by their potential strength: “The trouble with the Jews is that they are too strong.” The strength of the outgroups is expressed in symbols of potency — fertility and money:

“Well, of course, there is a problem. The Negroes produce so rapidly that they will populate the world, while the Jews get all of the money.”

As to the basis of his anti-Semitism, he has the following to say:

“I have never had any good experiences with them.” (This is qualified in a second interview where he remembers, as a college athlete, being taken on a private yacht by Jews who were “very nice.”) They have invariably attempted to cheat him and his family in business and are in every way inconsiderate. He tells a long story which I was not able to get verbatim about buying a fur coat as a Christmas present for his mother, at which time the Jewish salesman misread the price tag, quoting a price $100 cheaper than it actually was. They closed the sale and he insisted on taking the coat after the salesman’s error had been noticed. This gave him considerable satisfaction, and he said, “That was a case where I out-Jewed a Jew.”

His references to bad experiences are quite vague except in the case where he “out-Jewed the Jew” — another indication of the projective character of the “smartness” theme. The qualification in favor of the rich Jewish yacht owner shows the complication of anti-Semitism through class consciousness, particularly in cases of such strong upward social mobility as that found in this subject. It took even the Nazis some time to convince themselves, their followers, and the wealthiest Jewish groups that the latter should share the fate of poor cattle dealers and immigrants from Eastern Europe.

The tenets of individualism are altered by this subject as follows:

“They should be treated, I suppose, like individuals; but after all, they are all alike.”

Of course, “everyone can tell a Jew.” The distinction between in- and out-group obtains an almost metaphysical weight: even the imaginary possibility of the disappearance of the dichotomy is excluded:

“I couldn’t be a Jew.”

As to the relation between guilt and punishment and its outcome, he finds a formula which cannot be surpassed:

“I think what Hitler did to the Jews was all right. When I was having trouble with a competing contractor, I often thought, I wish Hitler would come here. No, I don’t favor discrimination by legislation. I think the time will come when we will have to kill the bastards.”

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40 *psychogenic*: having a psychological origin or cause rather than a physical one.

41 *Oedipus complex*: (in Freudian theory) the complex of emotions aroused in a young child, typically around the age of four, by an unconscious sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex and a wish to exclude the parent of the same sex.

42 *castration fear* (or *complex*): (in Freudian theory) an unconscious anxiety arising during psychosexual development, represented in males as a fear that the penis will be removed by the father in response to sexual interest in the mother, and in females as a compulsion to demonstrate that they have an adequate symbolic equivalent of the penis, whose absence is blamed on the mother.

43 *concomitant*: a phenomenon that naturally accompanies or follows something.

44 *punitive*: inflicting or intended as punishment.
H. The Misfit Bourgeois

Our analysis has led us to the extreme consequence of anti-Semitism, the overt wish for the extermination of the Jews. The extremist’s superego has been transformed into an extrapunitive agency of unbridled aggression. We have seen that this consequence consummates the intrinsic irrationality of anti-Semitism by establishing a complete disproportion between the “guilt” and the punishment of the chosen victim. Anti-Semitism, however, does not exhaust itself in the old formula by which it is characterized in Lessing’s Nathan der Weise, “tut nichts, der Jude wird verbrannt” — the Jew is going to be burnt anyway, no matter how things are, or what could be said in his favor. Irrational and merciless wholesale condemnation is kept alive by the maintenance of a small number of highly stereotyped reproaches of the Jews which, while largely irrational themselves, give a mock semblance of justification to the death sentence. By constructing the nature of the Jew as unalterably bad, as innately corrupt, any possibility of change and reconciliation seems to be excluded. The more invariant the negative qualities of the Jew appear to be, the more they tend to leave open only one way of “solution”: the eradication of those who cannot improve. This pattern of quasi-natural incorrigibility is much more important to anti-Semites than is the content of the standard reproaches themselves, the latter being frequently quite harmless and essentially incompatible with the inferences to which they lead those who hate. While these reproaches are so widespread and well known that further evidence of their frequency and intensity is unnecessary, it is worthwhile to follow up some of their aspects which came out clearly in our interviews and which seem to throw some additional light on the phenomena concerned.

It is profitable to examine these reproaches from a sociological point of view. Our sample, in contrast to that of the Labor Study, was predominantly middle class. The San Quentin Group is the only striking exception, but its qualification of Lumpenproletariat as well as the prison situation, with its intrinsic emphasis on “official” moral values, makes it impossible to compare this group with the rest of the sample in terms of working-class identification. This identification is usually not very strong even among workers in this country. The general middle-class character of our sample colors the specific nature of the decisive accusations made against the Jews. If our basic hypothesis concerning the largely projective character of anti-Semitism is correct, the Jews are blamed, in social terms, for those properties which by their existence, sociologically ambiguous though it may be, impinge on sensitive spots in the class identification of the different prejudiced groups. To the true proletarian, the Jew is primarily the bourgeois. The working-man is likely to perceive the Jew, above all, as an agent of the economic sphere of the middle-man, as the executor of capitalist tendencies. The Jew is he who “presents the bill.”

To the anti-Semitic members of the middle classes, the imagery of the Jew seems to have a somewhat different structure. The middle classes themselves experience to a certain degree the same threats to the economic basis of their existence which hang over the heads of the Jews. They are themselves on the defensive and struggle desperately for the maintenance of their status. Hence, they accentuate just the opposite of what workingmen are likely to complain about, namely, that the Jews are not real bourgeois, that they do not really “belong.” By building up an image of the Jew out of traits which signify his failures in middle-class identification, the middle-class member is able subjectively to enhance the social status of his ingroup which is endangered by processes having nothing to do with ingroup-outgroup relations. To the middle-class anti-Semite, the Jew is likely to be regarded as the misfit bourgeois, as it were, who did not succeed in living up to the standards of today’s American civilization and who is a kind of obsolete and uncomfortable remnant of the past. The term “misfit” is actually applied to the Jew by some of our prejudiced subjects. The less the Jew qualifies as a legitimate member of the middle classes, the more easily can he be excluded from a group which, in the wake of monopolization, tends toward the numeros clausus anyway. If the usurper complex (to be discussed in the section on politics and economics) really belongs to an over-all pattern, the Jew functions, for the potentially fascist mentality, as the usurper par excellence. He is the peddler, impudently disguised as a respectable citizen and businessman.

The most characteristic anti-Jewish remarks appearing in our interviews fall within this frame of thinking, although motifs of a more “proletarian” anti-Semitism, such as the idea of the Jewish exploiter or of the Jews dodging hard manual labor, are not lacking. The division between proletarian and middle-class anti-Semitism should not be exaggerated. The traits ascribed to Jews by working men have often the aspect of the “misfit bourgeois” too. What appear to the worker as symptoms of capitalist exploitiveness can easily be transformed by the middle classes into the reproach of dishonesty, a flagrant violation of bourgeois ethics, one of the main tenets of which is, after all, the praise of good honest labor. The stereotypes here in question transcend the frontiers of the classes; it is only their function that changes, and hence the difference in emphasis.

The construct of the “misfit bourgeois” can easily be articulated according to three major groups of motifs: first, that of Jewish weakness and its psychological correlates, second, the middle-class identification of the Jews as an overcompensation that has essentially failed, third, the intrinsic disloyalty of the Jews to the class with which they vainly attempt to

45 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781): prominent German writer of the Enlightenment era. Nathan der Weise (Nathan the Wise) is cited as the first ideological idea drama.
46 incorrigible: (of a person or their tendencies) not able to be corrected, improved, or reformed.
47 Lumpenproletariat: the unorganized and unpolitical lower orders of society who are not interested in revolutionary advancement. (Marxist terminology)
48 numeros clausus: a fixed maximum number of entrants admissible to an academic institution.
49 par excellence: better or more than all others of the same kind.
identify themselves, a disloyalty which is viewed as an expression of their abortive identification and of their nature as an objectionable, isolated, and “clannish” ingroup. The first two of these objections may have some basis in reality. There is considerable evidence (e.g., the recent studies by Anton Lourie,50 of Jewish masochism and its basis in religious psychology. The third objection seems to be predominantly projective and one of the major rationalizations of the wish to “get rid of the whole bunch.”

The idea of Jewish weakness is epitomized by *F14*, a woman consistently high on all scales, who is a surgical nurse of partly Jewish descent:

“I have a cousin who was in love with me and wanted to marry me. He was more Jewish than I. I loved him, but wouldn’t marry him. I told him why — because he’s Jewish. He is now married to a Gentile with two children. He’s more anti-Semitic than I. That’s true of so many Jews — like they were lame or hunchback. They hate it or resent it.”

It is perhaps characteristic that such overt statements on Jewish weakness are made frequently either by persons who are themselves being identified with the Jews or — with a more positive accent — by low-scoring subjects. The prejudiced individual, whose hatred is stimulated by weakness, rather tends to stress, on the surface, the strength of the Jews who “wield undue influence” and “own everything.” An example of the low-scorer’s attitude towards Jewish weakness is the statement of *S055*, an otherwise thoroughly liberal man of 73 years who scored low on all the scales. He feels

“that this protective philosophy of the Jews has led to a situation where they do stimulate antagonism in other people.”

In cases of extreme low scorers the awareness of Jewish weakness sometimes leads to identification: they assume the role of Jews themselves, consciously in order to antagonize anti-Semitic acquaintances, unconsciously, possibly, in order to atone for anti-Semitism by at least figuratively suffering the same humiliations under which they know the Jews live. Here belongs the case of a 20-year-old, somewhat neurotic interior decorator, *S028*, who is in open rebellion against his father but strongly attached to his mother:

The subject and his sister are alike in that they both admire Jewish people. He told of jokes that they had played upon some of their father’s relatives who are extremely anti-Semitic by pretending that a great-grandfather on the maternal side was Jewish. The subject explained that many persons in his mother’s family “look a little Jewish because they have long noses.” The paternal cousin to whom they were talking “almost committed suicide” at the thought. The subject volunteered the comment that perhaps one reason he likes Jews is that he “has never known any who were objectionable.”

To the prejudiced person, the imagery of Jewish weakness, combined as it is with the rationalization of strength, sometimes strikes a peculiar note, remarkable because of its close harmony with one of the standard themes of American fascist agitators. It is the image of the Jewish refugee who is depicted simultaneously as strong (“He takes the jobs away from our American boys”) and as weak (“He is a dirty outcast”). There is reason enough to believe that the second mo-

into physical reality both in order to soothe the fear of the incomprehensible “alien mentality” and to add a sense of the real to that which is actually only projective. This retransliteration probably throws some light on the over-all insistence of the anti-Semite on Jewish physical traits.

5067 “is a portly, rather maternal-looking woman who looks all of her forty-eight years.” She was chosen as a mixed case with high E and PEC. She does not differentiate at all between the physical and the psychological aspect of Jewish “aggressiveness”:

“I do not like their coercive aggression in business. They are not only aggressive, but they should also be segregated. They are always pushing people aside. I noticed nearly every time when there was pushing in the innumerable lines we had to wait in during the war, it was a Jew who started the pushing. I feel a real revulsion towards Jews.”

In other cases, the idea of aggressiveness is used in the exclusively social sense of “intrusiveness.” Sometimes one gets a glimpse into the mechanism behind this standard reproach. It probably has to do with the all-pervasive feeling of social isolation, which is overcompensated for in innumerable middle-class “social activities.” Against this background of emotion the Jews, as the classic agents of circulation, are perceived and probably envied as those who are not isolated, but have “contacts” everywhere. This idea is closely associated with that of clannishness, which also implies the imagery of some kind of togetherness from which the members of the real ingroup pretend to be excluded. The aforementioned F105 finds the formula:

“They seem to know everybody; they pull strings; they are like a clan, more united than any race. They have friends everywhere who can do the right thing.”

Finally, it should be mentioned that there is some evidence in our material that the basis of the stereotype “aggressiveness” lies in repressed sexuality. The Jews are supposed to be uncumbered by the standards of Puritan morality, and the more strictly one adheres oneself to these standards, the more eagerly are the supposed sex habits of the Jews depicted as sordid. What goes uncensored in the case of Jewish “rich food” becomes intolerable in the sphere of supposedly uninhibited and therefore repulsive sensuality. Some insight into this matter is afforded by the 42-year-old woman, F118, a public health nurse — a person, incidentally, whose outgroup hatred is focused on organized labor rather than on minorities and whose score on A–S is middle, while she scores high on PEC and F.

She could not imagine herself marrying a Jew. She then proceeded to relate that actually she once had an opportunity to marry a Jew. One time, when she returned home for the summer after being in New York for a while, she met a very intelligent lawyer who worked in the same office as her brother. He was very well-educated and knew languages. She had dates with a lawyer who worked in the same office as her brother. He was a very well-educated and knew languages. She had dates with a lawyer who worked in the same office as her brother. 

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He did not look Jewish, his name was not Jewish, and he even sang in the choir of her church, so that she never suspected that he was Jewish. She just sat there without saying a word — and that was his answer. She then went on to add that it was very bad for him, because all the girls staying in her boarding house then found out that he was Jewish and it also became known at his place of work and made things bad for him there. Subject saw him again ten years later and felt that he did look more Jewish, but added that that was perhaps because she now knew that he was Jewish. The thing that is most impossible to her in the idea of marrying a Jew is the thought of bearing Jewish children.

It is noteworthy that the resistance of this woman was brought about only by her knowledge of the man’s Jewish descent, not by any of his own characteristics. It is hardly going too far to assume that the stereotype has re-enacted old childhood taboos against sexuality and that it was only afterwards that these were turned against the Jew as an individual. Primary attraction is the basis for subsequent repulsion.

The close relations of the ubiquitous idea of clannishness to the reproach of aggressiveness has become obvious in previous examples. Suffice it to say here that clannishness appears as the justification for excluding the aggressive “intruder”: he always “remains a Jew” and wants to cheat those by whom he wishes to be accepted. At the same time, the idea of clannishness consummates the imagery of Jewish togetherness, of a warm, family-like, archaic and very “ingroup-like” texture of the outgroup which seems to be denied to those who are thoroughly formed by American civilization and obey the rules of technological rationality.

The underlying attractiveness of the Jewish “clan” is accentuated by the statement of M102, a subject scoring high on all scales:

“The Jewish kids I knew in high school were the sons and daughters of the prominent Jewish businessmen, and they were very clannish. It’s hard to say what ought to be done about it. It doesn’t seem to bother them what people think. That is a natural characteristic. It doesn’t do any good to try to exclude them from business because some of them are the smartest businessmen we have. Most of them are out of Germany by now, and I suppose they’ll get back. Some are very crafty about sticking together and getting ahead in business, getting capital. People in Germany will feel the need of Jewish businessmen and they will pool their capital and make a start there. (What about Jewish women?) Some of them are very attractive, and some are very clannish. They are dominated by the men; it’s all in their creed.”

The more patriarchal structure of the Jewish family, whether it be real or imagined, seems to work as an element of sexual attraction. Jewish women are supposed “to do everything for men” — just what the Gentile American girl is expected not to do. At the same time, however, the idea of sexual fulfillment tends to diminish, in American culture, the social value of the women who offer this fulfillment. Here again, the praise of one Jewish quality is prone to tilt over into its opposite.

How the idea of clannishness can sometimes obtain features of an obsession laden with violent resentment is shown in the case of F113, a young woman who is high on the E scale but somewhat lower on F and PEC. She is an attractive, somewhat neurotic girl of 26, a subject from the Extension Class group. She resents both Jewish names and those who
dared to change them. When speaking about Jewish acquaintances, she makes a point of their owning “a chain of burlesque houses,” being rich as well as somewhat disreputable. In her statement about Jewish family life, it is remarkable how closely some observations which have a ring of truth are knit together with somewhat paranoid ideas about the selfishness determining the Jewish behavior in question and with a harsh evaluation of it as a “guilt”:

“The worst experience with them I had was when I was overseas operator in Hawaii a couple of years ago. I had to monitor all the calls that went to New York so I listened to just thousands of conversations. And ninety percent of them were rich Jews calling up their families. That is the only really good thing I can say for them — their devotion to their families. But all purely selfish. The money they spent — and the time — on just purely selfish calls. (Business calls?) Well I worked mostly at night. But the other girls said it was the same people making business calls during the day. (How do you know they were Jews?) Their voices and the things they said. Selfish. (Could there have been Jews you didn’t recognize?) I don’t think so. You get so you always know a Jewish voice.”

I. Observations On Low-Scoring Subjects

Throughout this chapter, we have concentrated on the phenomena of anti-Semitism and their structural interconnections. We have abstained from a detailed discussion of the minority attitudes of the non-anti-Semite and of the anti-anti-Semite. Obviously, it is more difficult and less promising to analyze the absence of highly specific opinions and attitudes than it is to deal with their existence. We have been able, it seems, in the study as a whole to draw a fairly complete picture of the low scorers, ranging from surface ideology to characterological determinants. Their general tendency to be disinterested in so-called racial questions, however, limits the supply of pertinent information. Moreover, the pragmatic aspect of our study naturally requires a closer scrutiny of the attitudes of the non-anti-Semite and of the anti-anti-Semite. Obviously, it is more difficult and less promising to analyze the absence of highly specific opinions and attitudes than it is to deal with their existence. We have been able, it seems, in the study as a whole to draw a fairly complete picture of the low scorers, ranging from surface ideology to characterological determinants. Their general tendency to be disinterested in so-called racial questions, however, limits the supply of pertinent information. Moreover, the pragmatic aspect of our study naturally requires a closer scrutiny of the danger zone than of areas which can be discounted as a potential for fascism. By and large, the attitudes of the high scorers suffice to define, e contrario, the attitudes of the “lows” which are, in many respects, set polemically against the anti-Semitic imagery prevailing in our cultural climate.

Yet a number of observations concerning the low scorers may be allowed, not only in order to round out the picture, but also because the low scorers, in their responses to questions about minorities, go beyond a simple negation of the prejudiced person’s opinions and attitudes, and throw some additional light upon the nonfascist character.

An over-all characteristic of the low scorer’s attitude towards Jews is emphatic rationality. This has a double aspect. On the one hand, the general tendency towards introspection so characteristic of low scorers expresses itself specifically in the racial area through self-reflection: anti-Semitism presents itself to the low scorers as the problem of the anti-Semitism, not of the Jew. On the other hand, racial problems and minority traits are viewed within historical and sociological perspective and thus seen to be open to rational insight and change, instead of being hypostatized in a rigidly irrational manner.

An example of self-reflection in racial matters is M910, a student-minister, consistently low on all scales, who has strong intellectual leanings and, like most low scorers, a tendency toward hesitation, doubt, and qualifications of his own opinions. He traces back prejudice, in a plain-spoken though somewhat primitive manner, to the difficulties of the minority haters, not to the object of their hatred:

(What do you feel are the causes of prejudice?) “Probably the largest reason is the insecurity or fear of insecurity that the person has himself. The people in my community who have talked loudest about the Japs are the ones who have since taken over (the properties left by the Japanese) . . . and they’re afraid they’ll come back . . . and they’re afraid of them as competitors because they work harder. . . . (You feel it’s mainly an economic conflict?) Well, it isn’t altogether economic, and I don’t think it will be solved on an economic basis. . . . All people have some kind of insecurity. It may be pretty well concealed, and they may not know what it is, and it may not have anything to do with the Japanese, but they’ll take it out on them. People are funny (laughs) and are cruel. (What ought to be done to combat prejudice?) I think one thing that could be done — kinda regimementation, is to get the facts, it would help, though it wouldn’t solve the problem . . . e.g., that there is no necessity for separating Negro and white blood in blood banks, and there are a lot of people who think that the Japanese are a treacherous race, and that it’s transmitted through heredity. . . . Of course, a lot of it is irrational.”

As to the emphasis on dynamic factors versus supposedly innate qualities, the most striking illustration is provided by M203, a thoroughly liberal teacher, head of the English department in a junior college. He, too, is low on all scales. His whole philosophy is positivistic, with a strong interest in semantics, though he does not “think they should make a panacea out of semantics.” His general outlook on minority problems is summarized by his statement on the Japanese:

“If the Germans were changed in one generation by the Nazis, then the Japanese can be changed in a democratic way in one or two generations. Anybody can become anything under the proper conditions.”

Consequently, when discussing anti-Semitism, he chooses as an explanation a historical element, the maliciously superimposed Jewish names. The arbitrariness of the selection of this specific factor can probably be accounted for by the interviewee’s semanticist hobby:

“Anti-Semitism is a little different. Semites are not so easily identified. I guess their name is about the main thing. For instance, from your name I guess you’re Jewish though I wouldn’t know to look at you. Are you?” (Yes.) (Subject is quite open about these things. The only sign of inhibition was that it was hard for him to use the word “Jew” as he preferred the word “Semite” at first, but later he used the word “Jew” also.)

This subject’s readiness to discuss the interviewer’s Jewishness is significant. To him, the word Jew is not a magic word, nor is being Jewish a disgrace: thus he does not feel inhibited...
about mentioning it in relation to the person with whom he is talking. It is hard to imagine that a high scorer would casually discuss the origins of an interviewer except on occasions when he feels on the defensive and wants to hurt the other fellow: “You are a Jew yourself, aren’t you?”

The rationality of the unprejudiced subjects expresses itself, above all, in their rejection of anti-minority stereotypes. Frequently, this rejection is of a conscious, articulate nature: they take the concept of individuality seriously. We refer again to M910. His utterance shows a definite sense of proportion even in his rejection of stereotypy: he does not deny the existence of physical racial characteristics, but regards them as nonessential:

“Well, I wouldn’t be tricked into making a statement about any people as a group. The Japanese I’ve known I’ve liked very well. I know there are some Japanese who aren’t so nice. . . . We had a Japanese girl stand up with us at the altar and a Chinese girl too . . . in 1942 when there was some pretty tense feeling. (Do you feel that any racial group has certain distinguishing characteristics?) No, not at all. Of course you have biological characteristics, the height of the bridge of the nose or pigmentation.”

A similar line is followed in the Los Angeles interview 5030, of a 33-year-old Stanford graduate who served for four years in the navy, finally becoming a Lieutenant Commander. His scores on all scales are low. He is judged by the interviewer to be an extremely astute, successful individual:

“The Negroes, Jews, and all minority groups are having a very difficult time. I think many people dislike them because of their physical characteristics. They are really in a very bad spot. Such things as the FEPC53 help a lot and I favor both state and national laws concerning this issue. So many people are not willing to admit that many Negroes are intelligent, superior, and capable individuals. Their environment has held them back as a race. I have had both good and bad experiences with members of these groups but have never considered the people as belonging to a certain race or religion. I always take them for what they are worth as individuals. Yesterday I had a nice experience. There is a girl in one of my classes who is part Negro. She is a very superior and capable individual and I am sure the most intelligent member of the class. I have often thought I would like to visit with her but a suitable opportunity has never presented itself. Yesterday I, after much hesitation and fumbling, invited her to have a cup of coffee with me. Her acceptance was much more gracious than my invitation and we had a nice visit. I think the reason for my hesitation was simply a fear of what other people might think. I once had a Jewish roommate and he was the best roommate I have ever had.”

An extreme example of fully conscious anti-stereotypy is 5046, an executive secretary in the movie industry, in her late thirties, actively engaged in the labor movement. Her questionnaire scores are low for all scales. If some of her formulations suggest a “ticket low,”54 it should be kept in mind that her rejection of stereotypy even prevents her from building up automatically a pro-Jewish stereotype. She is no “Jew lover,” but seems truly to appraise people as individuals. As a matter of fact, she has just severed a relationship with a Jewish man:

When the interviewer began questioning subject on the Jewish problem, it became apparent immediately that she “knew all the answers.” She stated: “Yes, there is a problem . . . but I don’t think we should call it a Jewish problem; it really is a Christian problem . . . question of educating the Gentiles who practice anti-Semitism.” When given the check list, she laughed and said: “Of course, one can’t generalize . . . these are the stereotypes used by the anti-Semites to blame the Jews for certain faults . . . I don’t think one should label any group like this . . . it is dangerous, especially in regard to the Jews, because one has to evaluate the individual on his or her own merits.” None of the other questions brought out even a trace of anti-Semitism, and throughout, her answers indicated a consistent, almost militant stand against anti-Semitism. She feels that anti-Semitism is one of the most dangerous trends in this country and feels that the only solution must be sought through widespread education along liberal lines and through extensive intermarriage. She feels rather optimistic about the process of assimilation, although she is quite alarmed about the increase of anti-Semitism during recent years. Hitler’s race theory and persecution of the Jews should be combatted on every front, in whatever form it may appear. She stated: “I have also known some Jewish people whom I decidedly did not like, and some of them were quite aggressive, but I would never generalize that therefore ‘all Jews’ were aggressive . . . if only we could make people see that some people are aggressive for certain reasons, usually because of insecurity, and Jews are not aggressive because they are Jews.”

As pointed out in great detail in the chapters on the personality aspects of the interview material, the low scorers’ rationality, their rejection of projective imagery and automatized judgment, does not involve as a rule emotional coldness and detachment. Although they are more rational than the “highs” in so far as their judgment seems to be less determined by repressed unconscious factors, they are simultaneously less blocked in positive cathexes55 and in the expression of them. This refers not only to their general psychological make-up but also to their specific minority attitudes. The prejudiced person discusses the Jews as an “object” while he actually hates; the unprejudiced person displays sympathy even when he pretends simply to judge objectively. The link between this sympathy and rationality is the idea of justice, which has come to work, in certain people, spontaneously, almost as if it were instinctual. To the low scorer, racial discrimination violates the basic principle of the equality of all men. In the name of human rights he tends to identify himself with those who are discriminated against and who thus appeal to his own spontaneous feeling of solidarity with the oppressed.

Here are a few examples of this specific configuration. M113, a “religious low scorer” whose F scale shows higher trends and whose PEC scale was still higher:

(Minority problem?) “In a speech the other day in Public Speaking I said that democracy is mainly respect for minority groups.” (Vague, little verbalized ideas.) “They have gotten a dirty deal, as most minorities do.”

Similarly, in M320, a consistently low-scoring student of landscape architecture, protest against unfairness works as a

53 Fair Employment Practices Committee: Signed by President Roosevelt on June 25, 1941, banning racial discrimination in any defense industry receiving federal contracts.

54 See the “rigid low scorer” in Chapter XIX of The Authoritarian Personality. (Note by Adorno)

55 Cathexes: The concentration or accumulation of mental energy in a particular channel.
“Rationalization” for emotional identification which otherwise might not be allowed to come into the open.

“I’m very much pro-Negro, myself. I think I’m in favor of almost any minority that’s discriminated against unfairly... (What about the Jewish problem?) I don’t see why it should be a problem at all. I think that in Europe the Jews should be allowed to live and have their businesses, etc., the same as anyone else.”

Or the young woman F129, also low on all scales, a somewhat high-strung person who, according to the interviewer, is moved by any disturbing subject — including race prejudice — to tears and flushes:

(And how do you feel about Jews?) “Why, I don’t feel any way about them except upset at the way they are treated. There are good and bad in all races but I am inclined to be even more tolerant about the shortcomings of people who are always persecuted and criticized. (Could you have married a Jew?) Why of course, if I had fallen in love with one. (Why do you think Jews are persecuted?) I don’t know except some people have to hate.”

There are indications that the low scorers’ affect-laden sense of justice is not a mere surface ideology, or a means of narcissistic gratification in one’s own humanitarianism, but that it has a real basis within the personality and is only presented afterwards, as it were, in theoretical terms. The sympathy for the underdog leads towards action, towards attempts to correct in concrete, individual situations what is felt to be general unfairness. A pertinent case was 5030 (see p. 646). We give one further illustration: F126, who is low on E and PEC and only slightly higher on F. She is a good-looking young woman, “very articulate and whimsical, with much charm and humor.” She studies journalism and says that her real desire is to do “creative writing”:

“I remember when I was in junior high, there was only one Jewish boy in our class. We were always having parties and affairs and he was left out. At first I didn’t even understand why. He was a very nice boy, smart, and good-looking. But they left him out because he was a Jew. Well, I made it my business to be his special friend, not only invited him to my parties, but paid particular attention to him. That was one time it was really good to be one of the leading kids. The others began to treat him the same way, and he was just one of the crowd from then on. I never have been able to stand to see anyone be mean to anyone else. The same at the shipyards. I always made it a point to get acquainted with Negroes and Jews. They talked frankly with me, too, and I certainly found out what some of their problems are. Whenever I could, I would bring it into a story, too. Not directly about race prejudice, but nice stories about Negroes for instance. People have so many wrong ideas. I sometimes think it is just hopeless.”

The general attitude of the low scorers towards the Jews profoundly affects their evaluation of so-called Jewish traits. It has been said above (pp. 612 ff.) that high scorers perceive the Jew altogether differently: their psychological make-up functions as a frame of reference even for their supposedly “immediate,” everyday experiences. Something similar applies, in reverse, to the unprejudiced. Yet the diffuseness and inarticulateness of the objective “Jewish traits,” complex as they are, is reflected by the low scorers’ attitude no less than by the various projections of the high scorers. There is universal sympathy among the unprejudiced subjects, but no unanimity. Sometimes they try to explain Jewish traits; sometimes they simply deny their existence; sometimes they take an emphatically positive, admiring stand towards those traits.

The explanatory method is applied to the most widespread idea of a Jewish trait, that of clannishness, by M202, a 35-year-old construction engineer, with the lowest possible score on E, but with certain deviations from the usual picture of the low scorer with regard to PEC and also to F — a person who, according to the interviewer, “is conservative but not fascist.”

In response to a question about how he would characterize the Jews, subject replied that they were a close-knit family with certain inborn characteristics like any other racial group. For instance, the Germans “must always be right,” the English — here the interviewer interrupted, pointing out that she wished to know what he thought of the Jews. He replied that the Jews had not been accepted in a certain society and that this had led to their becoming a very close-knit family. The reason for this is that they have certain characteristics. On being asked to be more specific, his reply was they have a tendency to sharp dealing. Of course he doesn’t blame them because he would probably do the same if he had the chance and if he were smart enough.

In this case, the wish to “explain,” frequently an instrument for rationalizations, seems to mediate between broad-mindedness on the one hand and powerful anti-minority stereotypes, which are still there below the surface, on the other. As a matter of fact, the pro-Jewish apologies of the subject are followed by a rather unfriendly story about a supposed conspiracy among three Jewish bidders for a vast quantity of scrap-iron. The guess that the explanatory attitude may sometimes cover up ambivalence seems to be corroborated by M310, an assistant manager for an advertising agency, who scored low on all scales. Nevertheless, his theorizing presupposes the acceptance of the stereotype of Jewish money-mindedness:

(Characteristic Jewish traits?) “Well, I think it is true that Jews, as a group, are more concerned with money... Perhaps because persecuted for so long... It’s some small security in a money economy, that is, a money culture. Some security to be able to defend themselves with money. I also think they are better than average Gentiles at making money because forced to be usurers during the Middle Ages, etc.”

Subjects whose scores are at the lowest extreme often tend simply to deny the existence of any Jewish traits, sometimes with a violence that seems to be due more to the impact of their own conscience than to an objective appraisal of the minority members. Here “neurotic” traits, which are often found in extremely unprejudiced subjects, may easily enter the picture. The vehicle by which they try to argue away Jewish traits is insight into the mechanisms of projectivity and stereotypy, i.e., into the subjective factors making for anti-Semitism.

M112, a “quiet, reserved, well-mannered sophomore of 18 years,” whose scale scores are all low, simply subscribes to the “envy” theory:

(Jews?) “Not an educational problem in this case. People just prejudiced. Want to keep them out of good positions, etc. People make up wild stories, like that the Jews have too much money, control the country, etc.; it’s just to keep them back.”
(Your contacts?) No Negroes in my school. Jews were like anyone else. I’d never know they were Jewish if they hadn’t told me.

5041 (whose scale scores are all low), a 59-year-old housewife who had studied to be a professional pianist, combines the denial of Jewish traits with reference to bygone ages and with the rejection of resentful generalizations:

“I think there is a Jewish problem — but I don’t think that they are different ... not that there is anything inherent in them that they should be set apart or treated differently. ... There are historical reasons for their persecution ... it is not their fault. Well, you can’t apply any of these traits to the Jews as a group. Jews are not a race. ... These terms might apply to some individuals, to Christians as well as Jews ... you have some aggressive people, but they are not aggressive because they are Jewish ... it’s usually something that the other person does not like ... say they appear to be more intellectual and some succeed, outdoing others, this causes resentment, and then they are called aggressive. ...”

An extreme of denial is achieved by the “easy-going” low scorer, M1206a, of the Maritime School Group, who “is a highly introspective person and shows much inhibition against rejecting another person or group, even on the basis of principles founded in reality.” His scores on all the scales are low:

(Most characteristic traits of Negroes?) “Well, I don’t think there is such a thing. They have the same traits the white men have. ... I don’t believe any nationality has any characteristics. ...”

Sometimes the intense emotions behind the denial of Jewish traits find a somewhat irrational expression. F125 (low on E and F, but high on PEC) is a student who would like to become a drama teacher and who finds “the movies very stereotyped.” Her indignation was stirred up by our own study.

“I was mad at some questions in your questionnaire, especially about the Jewish atmosphere. The Irish people and other national groups give an atmosphere to the place in which they live, but only the Jewish atmosphere is stamped as something bad. I don’t find that the ways of living of the Jews are different at all.”

If the prejudiced subjects, for reasons of general conformity and in order to obtain “social confirmation,” frequently stress that practically everybody is anti-Semitic, some low scorers go so far as not only to deny the existence of Jewish traits, but even of anti-Semitism. A case in point is the somewhat muddle-headed M115, characterized as a typical conventional and conservative fraternity man who, however, is within the low quartile on the F scale though in the middle quartile on E and in the high quartile on PEC:

(What about the Jewish problem?) “There’s not much persecution now in the United States. There shouldn’t be any. The only reason for persecuting the Jew is that he is smarter than the next guy, as far as I can see.”

As to the appreciation of the specific qualities of Jews and of other minorities, we content ourselves with two examples which may throw light on significant areas. F128, a 17-year-old girl, is low on F and PEC but slightly higher on E. She is studying social work and is interested in child welfare, but not “in any kind of a career”:

“I guess I have had a better education than many people. We have entertained Negroes in our home as long as I can remember. I have known all sorts of people — lots of them very eccentric people — in music and art groups. The first good friends I ever had were Jewish boys and girls. I don’t know why some people hate Negroes and Jews. With Jewish people perhaps they are a little afraid, because lots of Jews are smarter than other people.”

The interesting element of this statement is contained in the word “eccentric.” It refers to what is “different,” to what is branded as slightly abnormal by standards of conformity, but which expresses individualization, the development of human traits which have not been preformed, as it were, by the social machinery of contemporary civilization. To this subject, the very “alienness” of minorities with respect to the rigid patterns of the highly organized mass society of today, represents the human, which she otherwise might feel to be lacking among the “right people.” The Jewish “failure” to become completely absorbed by the American cultural climate presents itself to this subject as a merit, as a triumph of autonomy and resistance against the leveling impact of the “melting pot.”

5050, a radio news commentator with progressive political affiliations, who is low on all three scales, denies the existence of Jewish traits but emphasizes a point rarely acknowledged: the patience of the minorities in the face of persecution. His praise of this attitude actually contains a critical element which may, by the implication of cowardice, be indicative of some hidden hostility. He blames the minorities for political reasons because they do not take a more energetic stand against American reaction:

He tries at all times to show that there are no so-called “Jewish traits,” and that people such as described by Budd Schulberg in “What Makes Sammy Run” can and do occur quite as frequently among Gentiles. Then he usually points to a man like Rankin or Bilbo as an example of an obnoxious “Gentile.” “I admire both the Negro and the Jewish people for their great patience in swallowing discrimination ... if I were in their shoes, I would start a really militant fight against the oppressors.” He still feels that too many Jews and Negroes are too apathetic and rather let the other fellow do the fighting. ... he feels that had the Jews been more alert, Hitler might have been stopped, or at least prevented from perpetrating the extreme atrocities. Again and again he stated that all forms of discrimination can and must be wiped out by direct political action.

One last characteristic of the unprejudiced attitude toward minority questions should be mentioned: the absence of fatalism. Not only do unprejudiced subjects, in the realm of their conscious convictions, appear to be set against ideas such as those of the inevitability of human badness or the perennial nature of any character traits, but on a deeper level, as suggested in Chapter X, they appear to be relatively free of destructive urges and punitive fantasies. They look at things in a historical and sociological way rather than hypothesizing the existent as something ultimately given. This point of view expresses itself also in their concept of the future relationships between majority and minority. 5008, low on E, in the middle quartile on F, and high on PEC, is a middle-aged woman who worked as a ghost writer, then as a literary agent, and is now employed as secretary to a radio show. In keeping with the
low scorers’ rejection of stereotypy, she sees the solution of the problem of anti-Semitism, however naïvely, in the establishment of personal contacts.

She holds nothing but good wishes for the intelligent immigrants and refugees who have come here recently, but feels that many of them have been undesirable. Concerning Negroes she reports that as a Republican she believes their position should be very much bettered, but says this is a difficult problem. Concerning Jews she says, “Before I went to work, I probably had a slight anti-Jewish feeling,” but in several positions she has worked with and for Jews, and found them very charming, intelligent, and interesting people. She thinks the racial problem most in need of solution is that of anti-Semitism, and feels that if more “anti-Semites would mingle with Jews the way I have” it could be avoided. She believes in the FEPC and thinks that socioeconomic discrimination should be outlawed. When it was pointed out that this is a more New Deal type of political notion, she simply said, “Well, it can’t all be bad.”

This attitude, which stresses human spontaneity and freedom of action rather than rigid, authoritarian laws of nature, does not, however, lead toward “official optimism.” The unprejudiced subjects’ sensitivity to the suffering of human beings, their compassion, makes them keenly aware of the dangers of racial persecution. It is the high scorer who would say, “It can’t happen here,” thus apparently detaching himself from the “objective” course of history with which he actually identifies himself; the low scorer knows that it could happen, but wants to do something about it.

5058, low on all three scales, is a 29-year-old veteran of upper middle-class background whose main identification lies with “liberals” and “intellectuals.”

He is very concerned about the problem of minority groups in this country. “I do a lot of talking about it — hoping to reduce prejudice and to encourage tolerance. In fact, I feel so concerned about this thing I would almost be willing to set myself up in Pershing Square. I tried to do a little crusading in the Navy but without much success.” Subject is very pessimistic about the possibility of a solution to the “minority problem” which seems to stem largely from his failure to modify the opinions of the people with whom he has argued. He feels that dislike of the Jews is increasing because he has heard more talk against them lately. “Of course that might be because I am exposed to it more lately, both while I was in the Navy and in my present job.” He does not feel that the Jews have too much influence in this country, nor does he believe that the Jews are a political force in America. He is certain that they did their part in the war effort. When asked about “basically Jewish traits,” he was not able to respond since to him this term means practically nothing. “Jews are all so different from each other that we cannot speak of there being something ‘basically Jewish’ about them.”

J. Conclusion

It has often been said that anti-Semitism works as the spearhead of anti-democratic forces. The phrase sounds a bit hackneyed and apologetic: the minority most immediately threatened seems to make an all-too-eager attempt to enlist the support of the majority by claiming that it is the latter’s interest and not their own which really finds itself in jeopardy today. Looking back, however, at the material surveyed in this, and other, chapters, it has to be recognized that a link between anti-Semitism and antidemocratic feeling exists. True, those who wish to exterminate the Jews do not, as is sometimes claimed, wish to exterminate afterwards the Irish or the Protestants. But the limitation of human rights which is consummated in their idea of a special treatment of the Jews, not only logically implies the ultimate abolition of the democratic form of government and, hence, of the legal protection of the individual, but it is frequently associated quite consciously, by high-scoring interviewees, with overt antidemocratic ideas. We conclude this chapter with two examples of what appear to be the inescapable antidemocratic consequences of anti-Semitism. M106, a man high on the E, F, and PEC scales, still pretends to be democratic; but it is not difficult to infer what is in the back of his mind:

“Hitler’s plan — well, Hitler carried things just a little too far. There was some justification — some are bad, but not all. But Hitler went on the idea that a rotten apple in the barrel will spoil all the rest of them.” He doesn’t approve of ruthless persecution. “If Hitler had handled the Jews as a minority group, had segregated them and set certain standards for them to live by, there would be less trouble for Hitler now. (Same problem in this country now?) Same problem, but it’s handled much better because we’re a democratic country.”

While the suggestion that a minority be segregated is incompatible with the basic concepts of the same “democratic country” of which the subject professes to be proud, the metaphor of the rotten apple in the barrel conjures up the imagery of “evil germs” which is associated with appalling regularity with the dream of an effective germicide.

Perversion of a so-called democrat is manifested in 5019, another man whose scale scores are all high. He is a 20-year-old laborer, characterized above all, by his blind, authoritarian acceptance of his humble position in life. At the same time, he “dislikes timid people” and has “great admiration for real leaders”:

Respondent believes that the “laws of democracy should favor white, Gentile people,” yet he “would not openly persecute Jews in the way the Hitler program treated them.”

The reservation of the second sentence is disavowed by the momentum of the convictions expressed in the first one.
Politics and Economics in the Interview Material

T. W. Adorno

Chapter XVII from *The Authoritarian Personality*

A. Introduction

The questionnaire findings on political and economic ideology have been analyzed in Chapter V. It is now our task to study the interview material referring to the same topics. The purpose is, first of all, to concretize our insight into these ideologies. If we investigated, in Chapter V, into the responses of our subjects to a number of set, standardized political and economic ideas and slogans with which they are daily confronted, we shall now try to form a picture of “what they really think” — with the qualification that we shall also have to find out whether we are entitled to expect autonomous and spontaneous opinions from the majority of them. It is obvious that the answer to such problems, unless they should be made the very center of research, can be given only in a less rigorous way than was the case with the quantitative analysis of questionnaire responses, and that the results are of a more tentative nature. Their convincing power lies more in the consistency of specific interpretations with facts previously established than in any indisputable “proof” that one or the other of the ideological mechanisms under review prevail within a majority of subjects or within certain groups.

Again, our interpretations of ideology will go below the realm of surface opinion, and will be related to the psychological results of our study. It is not our aim merely to add some padding to our figures. As stated in the Introductory Remarks to this part, we would rather gain insight into the links between ideological opinions and psychological determinants. We do not pretend that psychology is the cause and ideology the effect. But we try to interrelate both as intimately as possible, guided by the assumption that ideological irrationalities just as other irrationalities of overt human behavior are concomitant with unconscious psychological conflicts. We combed through the interview material with particular attention to such irrationalities and to statements revealing something about the dynamics of personality. The establishment of plausible configurations involving both dynamic motivation and ideological rationalization seems to us the foremost means of achieving that consistency on which the evidence of the discussions to follow largely depends. The data discussed so far permit at least the assumption that personality could be regarded as one determinant of ideology.

Yet it is just the area with which we are now concerned that most strongly forbids any simple reduction to terms of personality. Our construct of the “potentially fascist character” was largely based on the division between high and low scorers. Whereas this division retains its value for numerous topics of political and economic ideology and can be substantiated, on a deeper level, probably for all ideological issues, there appears to be at work another determinant which, in numerous issues, blurs the distinction between high and low scorers and refuses to be stated unequivocally in terms of personality. This determinant may be called our general cultural climate, and particularly the ideological influence upon the people of most media for molding public opinion. If our cultural climate has been standardized under the impact of social control and technological concentration to an extent never known before, we may expect that the thinking habits of individuals reflect this standardization as well as the dynamics of their own personalities. These personalities may, indeed, be the product of this very same standardization to a much higher degree than a naïve observer is led to believe. In other words, we have to expect a kind of ideological “over-all pattern” in our interviewees which, though by no means indifferent to the dichotomy of high and low scorers, transcends its boundaries. Our data afford ample evidence that such an ideological over-all pattern exists in fact.

It is a major question for this chapter whether this over-all ideological pattern, perhaps even more than the specific susceptibility of our high scorers to fascist propaganda, does not entail the danger of a large-scale following of anti-democratic movements if they should get under way with powerful support.

The importance of this diagnosis, if it should be corroborated sufficiently by our data, is self-evident, its most immediate implication being that the fight against such a general potential cannot be carried through only educationally on a purely psychological level, but that it requires at the same time decisive changes of that cultural climate which makes for the over-all pattern. Methodologically, the importance of this aspect of our study lies in the fact that it relativizes, somewhat, the distinction between high vs. low scorers; this distinction, if taken as absolute, may easily lead to a “psychologizing” bias that would neglect the objective, supra-individual social forces operating in our society.

The introduction of the concept of an over-all pattern just in this ideological ideological area may appear paradoxical at first glance. Since most political and economic issues are overt and relatively simple with reference to the blunt division between progressivism and reactionism, one should expect the difference to be particularly marked here. This, however, is not borne out by the facts. It is hard to escape the impression that there is much more actual similarity between high and low scorers in the political and economic section of the interviews than in more remote and complicated regions. To be sure, there are some topics which are as clearly discriminatory as some of the more extreme anti-Semitic ideas discussed in the preceding chapter. One hardly needs any research in order to establish that high scorers tend to be anti- and low scorers
pro-Roosevelt, that high scorers more often want a “strong” foreign policy and low scorers favor reconciliation, that high scorers indigantly reject communism and low scorers tend to discuss it on a more discursive plane. However, there is a large number of what might be called more formal constituents of political ideology which seem to permeate the whole pattern while, by their own momentum, making for reactionary and potentially fascist persuasions. Here belong, as will be discussed in detail, general ignorance and confusion in political matters, the habits of “ticket thinking” and “personalization,” resentment of unions, of government interference in business, of income limitations, and a number of other trends.

The existence of such an over-all pattern in politics need not be surprising, when the whole context of our study is considered. As a matter of fact, the problem itself is derived from our quantitative findings. After we once administered the PEC scale, no close relation between politics and anti-Semitism could be expected. Chapter V offered the evidence that the correlation of PEC with either anti-Semitism or ethnocentrism was never very high. There were some subjects high on PEC but low on E, others high on E but middle or low on PEC. This means that in this area particularly we cannot speak in categorical terms of high vs. low scorers. We shall see if this is borne out by a consideration of the interviews: both what the weakening of our basic distinction means qualitatively and whether and how we still can differentiate successfully in this area.

If a trend that differentiates statistically between high and low scorers on E — the “highs” being higher on it — appears very commonly in the interviews of all subjects, then we must conclude that it is a trend in culture itself. In this chapter we shall be particularly concerned with these outstanding features. The evidence that they are potentially fascist is the fact that they “go” statistically, psychologically, and in every other respect with high scale scores; if they also occur with middle or low scorers, it must be because we are living in potentially fascist times.

If a subject is low on all scales, but still shows trends which look potentially fascist, then one might say that the scales and other techniques do not cover everything, that the potential fascism of the trend is hypothetical as far as the statistical evidence goes, and that one might perform an empirical study to see if it really does go with what we know of the subject. We expect our discussion at least to shed some light on this methodological problem.

As far as the differentiation between high and low scorers goes, it is obvious that an over-all pattern would necessitate more differentiated characterizations than those previously employed. This can be hinted at only occasionally throughout this chapter. Sometimes high and low scorers are similar in what they say in politico-economic terms, but different in some more subtle way; just as sometimes they are superficially different but similar with respect to underlying trends.

Political and economic facts are subject to rapid change. This holds particularly true for the last few years. When our material was gathered, mainly throughout 1945, Russia was an ally; today, the tension between this country and the Soviet Union overshadows all other issues. Such changes make a valid interpretation of political ideology difficult and precarious. Thus, it might well be that anti-Russian sentiments, which were in 1945 part and parcel of a general pattern of reactionism, largely conditioned subjectively, would be of a much more “realistic” nature today, or at least they would fall to a greater extent within the “over-all pattern,” being less differentiating per se between high and low scorers. Moreover, in all probability the typical high scorer has become even more articulate with regard to Russia. It is hard to imagine that Mack would still stick to his statement that “Joe” Stalin was all right. Our interpretation, of course, had to stick to the situation of 1945 in order to give an adequate picture of the relationship between ideology and personality factors. However, it should be emphasized that the PEC scale as well as its follow-up in the interviews depends to a much higher degree on external events than do the other scales. This is why we never expected that the correlations of PEC with E and F would be very high, and it is quite possible that under the new political circumstances the direction of some of the more superficial relationships might have changed. Ideology is so sensitive to political dynamics that even some interpretations formulated comparatively late, when the bulk of the chapter had been written, should be qualified at publication time. Yet we may claim that the general trend of events has been entirely in accord with the general formulations reached in the discussion to follow.

With regard to the organization of the chapter we shall deal first with the more formal constituents of political and economic ideology and later with a number of specific political es. The problem of cultural over-all pattern vs. psychological differentiation occurs in both sections, though the presuppositions of the over-all pattern belong mainly to the first one.

B. Formal Constituents Of Political Thinking

1. Ignorance And Confusion

The evaluation of the political statements contained in our interview material has to be considered in relation to the widespread ignorance and confusion of our subjects in political matters, a phenomenon which might well surpass what even a skeptical observer should have anticipated. If people do not know what they are talking about, the concept of “opinion,” which is basic to any approach to ideology, loses much of its meaning. This does not imply that the material becomes insignificant but rather that it cannot be interpreted in factual categories but must be related to the sociopsychological structure of the subject being investigated. In other words, the material itself calls for that personality analysis which marks the general strategy of our research. It is in the light of this analysis that the ideology of our subjects is now to be re-evaluated.

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36 After completion of the study, the writer of this chapter became acquainted with the pertinent article by R. H. Gundlach (46).
While ignorance and confusion marks the political statements of both high and low scorers, it is, nevertheless, by no means “neutral” with regard to the problem of susceptibility to fascist propaganda. Our general impression is that ignorance and confusion is more widespread among high than among low scorers. This would be consistent with our previous observations on the general “anti-intellectual” attitude of high scorers. In addition, the official optimism of the high scorer tends to exclude that kind of critical analysis of existent conditions on which rational political judgment depends. A man who is prone to identify himself a priori with the world as it is has little incentive to penetrate it intellectually and to distinguish between essence and surface. The “practical” bias of the high scorers, their emotional detachment from everything that is beyond their well defined range of action, is another factor contributing to their disinterestedness in, and lack of, political knowledge. However this may be, there is reason to believe that ignorance itself works in favor of general reactionary trends. This belief, based on consistent observations particularly in backward rural areas everywhere, has been epitomized by the old German social-democratic adage that Anti-Semitism is the “socialism of the dole.” All modern fascist movements, including the practices of contemporary American demagogues, have aimed at the ignorant; they have consciously manipulated the facts in a way that could lead to success only with those who were not acquainted with the facts. Ignorance with respect to the complexities of contemporary society makes for a state of general uncertainty and anxiety, which is the ideal breeding ground for the modern type of reactionary mass movement. Such movements are always “populist” and maliciously anti-intellectual. It is not accidental that fascism has never evolved any consistent social theory, but has persistently denounced theoretical thinking and knowledge as “alienation from the grass-roots.”

The existence of such ignorance and confusion as we find in the interviews of subjects, particularly when we consider the relatively high educational level which they as a group represent, has to be regarded as ominous, no matter whether the subjects in question score high or low on our scales. The configuration of technical skill and the “realism” of “looking after oneself” on the one hand, and of the stubborn refusal intellectually to penetrate reality on the other, is the very climate in which fascist movements can prosper. Where this outlook prevails in a critical situation may easily lead to the general acceptance of formulae which are today still regarded as prerogatives of the “lunatic fringe.”

Sometimes ignorance is explicitly commented upon by our interviewers. But even if we do not regard their impression as sufficient proof, there is evidence enough within the material, be it that the statements betray a striking lack of information, be it that the interviewee confesses his disinterestedness in politics or his lack of knowledge. The latter attitude, incidentally, is particularly frequent with women, and often it is accompanied by self-accusing statements.

It is hard to distinguish between simple ignorance and confusedness, that is to say, between the state of simply not knowing the facts, and the state which exists when people without sufficient intellectual training grow muddle-headed under the incessant attack of all kinds of mass communication and propaganda and do not know what to make of the facts they have. It seems as if confusion were the effect of ignorance: as if those who do not know but feel somehow obliged to have political opinions, because of some vague idea about the requirements of democracy, help themselves with scurrilous ways of thinking and sometimes with forthright bluff.

The few quotations to follow are picked at random as illustrations of a phenomenon which is well-nigh universal, but for the very few exceptional cases of people who take a conscious and explicit interest in politics.

An example of ignorance, covered up by pompous phraseology, is the following statement by M117, a low-scoring man from the University Extension Group. He is a semi-educated sailor with high-school background and widely read, but generally muddle-headed.

(American political scene?) “We have a good basis for our political system. The majority of people are not interested or equipped enough to understand politics, so that the biggest portion of U. S. politics is governed by the capitalistic system.”

To this man, the existence or nonexistence of capitalism in this country is simply a matter of “education.”

A “bluffer” is the veteran M732c, a high-scoring man with high-school education, who always starts with sentences which sound up-to-date but rarely finishes them:

(What does he think of political trends today?) “I would say that now we’re in a very sad case. Worse off than two years ago — well, the situation with Russia in Iran — and these strikes that are coming on — quite a deal of good statesmanship to fix the world up…”

The subject’s statements abound with qualifications and evasions:

“I feel somehow that they (i.e., the unions) are progressing in a way but in other ways they are not. I think all things will work out for the best. But I really think they should not go into politics. . . . I am not very well versed on…”

Asked about the most dangerous threats to present form of government:

“Well, let’s see . . . well, we might have another war in the USA. Since the US itself is a huge melting pot. . . . I imagine in the US there are a lot of people who hated to see Hitler die and are pro-German — and maybe one of these little groups will . . . catch on.”

A San Quentin prisoner, M621A, who scores low on the E and PEC scales and middle on F, regards Russia as the most dangerous threat. When asked what ought to be done, he answers:

“Well, people should limit political parties to at least two groups and not have all these socialists and communists, etc. (What to do with socialists and communists?) Well, they could still believe in their own ideal . . . let them have a voice in the election but should not be allowed to have any power. (You mean they should not be allowed to put up any candidates?) No, unless they get a majority.”

One of the most extreme examples is the high-scoring woman F121, who was never good at school work and apparently had very little general education.
Not interested, not informed. Thinks Roosevelt has been good and should see us through the war. Otherwise has no opinions. She had written on the side of the questionnaire, asking about political parties: “Don’t know these parties.”

Again, 5016, a housewife, graduated from high school, high on F and E but middle on PEC, referred to by the interviewer as “being of moderately high intelligence,” says

“I hear that communists and socialists are both bad.”

By contrast, 5052, the Spanish-Negro entertainer, high on F and PEC, middle on E, has an opinion of his own on communism and apparently some sympathy with communists, but his opinion is no less startling:

“All of the people in the entertainment world who are communists are good guys.”

On further questioning it comes out that according to his opinion

Communism seems to be a sort of social club which holds meetings and raises money for worthy causes.

Somewhat exceptional is the statement of the moderately low-scoring call-house girl, 5035, who, before she chose the profession of prostitute, was a graduate of the University of California. She is strongly interested in union activities and actually lost her former job as a dancing teacher because of such activities, but refused on the questionnaire to mark any opinions. It was a struggle for me to get through economics in college.”

In practical issues, however, her views are very liberal and even radical.

The self-accusing attitude of women with regard to political matters seems to be most common among medium and low scorers; this is consistent with the latter’s general introspective and self-critical attitude.

An example is the 17-year-old student of social work, F128, who is middle on E and F but high on PEC:

“I am a little ashamed about this subject. I hate to be ignorant about anything but frankly, I don’t know anything about politics. I am for Roosevelt, of course, but I don’t think I have developed any ideas of my own. Mother and Jim talk about things, but it is mostly social work shop. I intend to read a lot and think a lot about things because I believe all intelligent people should have ideas.”

Interesting also is the low scorer, F517, a 20-year-old freshman student majoring in music, who accuses herself of ignorance and dependence, though her general attitude, particularly with regard to minority questions, shows that she is rather articulate and outspoken and that she differs from her parents.

“I don’t know much about it. I’m quite dependent — I get my opinions from my father. He is a die-hard Republican. He did not like Roosevelt but I think he did some good things (such as making things better for the poor people).”

It would go beyond the scope of the present study to attempt a full explanation of political ignorance so strikingly in contrast to the level of information in many other matters and to the highly rational way in which most of our subjects decide about the means and ends of their own lives. The ultimate reason for this ignorance might well be the opaqueness of the social, economic, and political situation to all those who are not in full command of all the resources of stored knowledge and theoretical thinking. In its present phase, our social system tends objectively and automatically to produce “curtains” which make it impossible for the naive person really to see what it is all about. These objective conditions are enhanced by powerful economic and social forces which, purposely or automatically, keep the people ignorant. The very fact that our social system is on the defense, as it were, that capitalism, instead of expanding the old way and opening up innumerable opportunities to the people, has to maintain itself somewhat precariously and to block critical insights which were regarded as “progressive” one hundred years ago but are viewed as potentially dangerous today, makes for a one-sided presentation of the facts, for manipulated information, and for certain shifts of emphasis which tend to check the universal enlightenment otherwise furthered by the technological development of communications. Once again, as in the era of the transition from feudalism to middle-class society, knowing too much has assumed a subversive touch, as it were. This tendency is met halfway by the “authoritarian” frame of mind of large sections of the population. The transformation of our social system from something dynamic into something conservative, a status quo, struggling for its perpetuation, is reflected by the attitudes and opinions of all those who, for reasons of vested interests or psychological conditions, identify themselves with the existing setup. In order not to undermine their own pattern of identification, they unconsciously do not want to know too much and are ready to accept superficial or distorted information as long as it confirms the world in which they want to go on living. It would be erroneous to ascribe the general state of ignorance and confusion in political matters to natural stupidity or to the mythological “immaturity” of the people. Stupidity may be due to psychological repressions more than to a basic lack of the capacity for thinking. Only in this way, it seems, can the low level of political intelligence even among our college sample be understood. They find it difficult to think and even to learn because they are afraid they might think the wrong thoughts or learn the wrong things. It may be added that this fear, probably often due to the father’s refusal to tell the child more than he is supposedly capable of understanding, is continuously reinforced by an educational system which tends to discourage anything supposedly “speculative,” or which cannot be corroborated by surface findings, and stated in terms of “facts and figures.”

The discrepancy brought about by the absence of political training and the abundance of political news with which the population is flooded and which actually or fictitiously presupposes such training, is only one among many aspects of this general condition. With reference to the specific focus of our research, two aspects of political ignorance may be emphasized. One is that being “intelligent” today means largely
to look after one’s self, to take care of one’s advantages whereas, to use Veblen’s words, “idle curiosity” is discour-aged. Since the pertinence of economic and political matters to private existence, however, is largely obscured to the popu-lation even now, they do not bother about things which ap-parently have little bearing on their fate and upon which they have, as they are dimly aware, not too much influence.

The second aspect of ignorance which has to be stressed here, is of a more psychological nature. Political news and comment like all other information poured out by the radio, the press, and the newsreels, is generally absorbed during leisure time and falls, in a certain way, within the framework of “entertainment.” Politics is viewed in much the same way as sport or the movies, not as something directly involved with one’s own participation in the process of production. Viewed within this frame of reference, however, politics is necessarily “disappointing.” It appears to people conditioned by an industrial culture and its specific kinds of “entertain-ment values” as drab, cold, dry — as boring. This may be enhanced by that undercover of American tradition which regards politics somehow as a dirty business with which a re-spectable person should have but little to do. Disappointment in politics as a leisure-time activity which pays no quick re-turns probably makes for indifference, and it is quite possible that the prevailing ignorance is due not merely to unfa-miliarity with the facts but also a kind of resistance against what is supposed to serve as a pastime and mostly tends to be disagreeable. A pattern most often to be observed, per-haps, among women, namely, skipping the political sections of newspapers, where information is available, and turning immediately to gossip columns, crime stories, the woman’s page, and so forth, may be an extreme expression of some-thing more general.

To sum up, political ignorance would seem to be specific-ally determined by the fact that political knowledge as a rule does not primarily help to further individual aims in reality, whereas, on the other hand, it does not help the individual to evade reality either.

2. Ticket Thinking And Personalization In Politics

The frame of mind concomitant with ignorance and confusion may be called one of lack of political experience in the sense that the whole sphere of politics and economics is “aloof” from the subject, that he does not reach it with concrete in-nervations, insights, and reactions but has to contend with it in an indirect, alienated way. Yet, politics and economics, alien as they may be from individual life, and largely beyond the reach of individual decision and action, decisively affect the individual’s fate. In our present society, in the era of all-comprising social organization and total war, even the most naïve person becomes aware of the impact of the politico-economic sphere. Here belongs, of course, primarily the war situation, where literally life and death of the individual de-

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57 innervate: to stimulate (a nerve, muscle, or body part) to action.
58 This has been pointed out with regard to the imagery of the Jews. See Chapter XVI, p. 618f. (Note by Adorno).
59 stereotypy: the persistent repetition of an act for no obvious purpose.
acter traits, the mechanisms involved make more and more for irrationality. The opaqueness of the present political and economic situation for the average person provides an ideal opportunity for retrogression to the infantile level of stereotypy and personalization. The political rationalizations used by the uninformed and confused are compulsive revivals of irrational mechanisms never overcome during the individual's growth. This seems to be one of the main links between opinions and psychological determinants.

Once again, stereotypy helps to organize what appears to the ignorant as chaotic: the less he is able to enter into a really cognitive process, the more stubbornly he clings to certain patterns, belief in which saves him the trouble of really going into the matter.

Where the rigidly compulsive nature of the stereotype cuts off the dialectics of trial and error, stultification enters going into the matter. Stereotypy becomes — to use J. F. Brown's term — stereopathy. This is the case in the political area where a firm bulk of ignorance and lack of any relation to the objective material forbids any real experience. In addition, industrial standardization of innumerable phenomena of modern life enhances stereotypical thinking. The more stereotyped life itself becomes, the more the stereopath feels in the right, sees his frame of thinking vindicated by reality. Modern mass communications, molded after industrial production, spread a whole system of stereotypes which, while still being fundamentally "un-understandable" to the individual, allow him at any moment to appear as being up to date and "knowing all about it." Thus, stereotyped thinking in political matters is almost inescapable.

However, the adult individual, like the child, has to pay a heavy price for the comfort he draws from stereotypy. The stereotype, while being a means of translating reality in a kind of multiple-choice questionnaire where every issue is subsumed and can be decided by a plus or minus mark, keeps the world as aloof, abstract, "non-experienced" as it was before. Moreover, since it is above all the alienness and coldness of political reality which causes the individual's anxieties, these anxieties are not fully remedied by a device which itself reflects the threatening, streamlining process of the real social world. Thus, stereotypy calls again for its very opposite: personalization. Here, the term assumes a very definite meaning: the tendency to describe objective social and economic processes, political programs, internal and external tensions in terms of some person identified with the case in question rather than taking the trouble to perform the impersonal intellectual operations required by the abstractness of the social processes themselves.

**Both stereotypy and personalization are inadequate to reality.** Their interpretation may therefore be regarded as a first step in the direction of understanding the complex of "psychotic" thinking which appears to be a crucial characteristic of the fascist character. It is obvious, however, that this subjective failure to grasp reality is not primarily and exclusively a matter of the psychological dynamics of the individuals involved, but is in some part due to reality itself, to the relationship or lack of relationship between this reality and the individual. Stereotypy misses reality in so far as it dodges the concrete and contents itself with preconceived, rigid, and overgeneralized ideas to which the individual attributes a kind of magical omnipotence. Conversely, personalization dodges the real abstractness, that is to say, the "reification" of a social reality which is determined by property relations and in which the human beings themselves are, as it were, mere appendages. Stereotypy and personalization are two divergent parts of an actually non-experienced world, parts which are not only irreconcilable with each other, but which also do not allow for any addition which would reconstruct the picture of the real.

### 60 Stereopathy: persistent stereotyped thinking.

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**T. W. ADORNO 30**

**Politics and Economics in the Interview Material**
The decisive twist is achieved by jumping from the very abstract idea “equality and justice for all men” to the equally formalistic condemnation of “running the country by the party in power” — which happens to be the party of the New Deal. The vague cliché of an all-comprising democrat serves as an instrument against any specific democratic contents. It should not be overlooked, however, that some of his statements on unions — where he has some experience — make sense.

M1225a, a medium scorer who has been eighteen months at sea and strongly interested in engineering, is a good example of stereotypy in politics employed by otherwise moderate people, and of its intimate relationship to ignorance. To this man one of the greatest political problems today is “the unions.” Describing them, he applies indiscriminately as an instrument against any specific democratic contents. It should not be overlooked, however, that some of his statements on unions — where he has some experience — make sense.

For one thing they have too much power. Cross between the socialistic part of the union and the government . . . seems to go to the other extreme. Government investigation . . . (subject seems rather confused in his ideas here). The unions . . . socialistic form in there. I know, I belonged to a few unions. They get up there and then call you brother and then drive off in a Cadillac. . . . Nine times out ten the heads of the unions don’t know anything of the trade. It’s a good racket . . .

Most of his subsequent answers are closely in line with a general patter of reactionism, formulated mostly in terms of “I don’t believe in it” without discussing the issue itself. The following passages may suffice as an illustration.

($25,000 limit on salaries?) 61 “I don’t believe in that.”
(Most dangerous threats to present form of government?) “I believe it’s in the government itself. Too many powers of its own.”
(What ought to be done?) “Going to have to solve a lot of other problems first. Get goods back on the market.”
(What about this conflict between Russia on the one hand and England and this country on the other?) “I don’t particularly care for Russia and I don’t particularly care for England.”

In this case, clichés are manifestly used in order to cover up lack of information. It is as if each question to which he does not know any specific answer conjures up the carry-overs of innumerable press slogans which he repeats in order to demonstrate that he is one of those who do not like to be told and do like to think. Underlying is only a rigid pattern of yeas and nays. He is aware of how a man of his general political outlook should react to each political issue but he is not aware of the issues themselves. He therefore supplements his plus and minus marks by phrases which more often than not are mere gaucheries.

F139 belongs to the type which is to be characterized in Chapter XIX as “rigid low.” Her most outstanding trait is her violent hatred of alcohol — which suggests deeper-lying “high” trends. Liquors are her Jews, as it were. She regards herself as a Christian Socialist and solves most problems not by discussing them but referring to what the religious socialist should think.

The break between her opinions and any kind of substantial experience is evidenced by the following statement:

“My favorite world statesman is Litvinov. 62 I think the most dramatic speech of modern times is the one he made at the Geneva Conference when he pleaded for collective security. It has made us very happy to see the fog of ignorance and distrust surrounding the Soviet Union clearing away during this war. Things are not settled yet, though. There are many fascists in this country who would fight Roosevelt if they could.”

She has a ready-made formula for the problem of nonviolence in international affairs:

“Of course, I am an internationalist. Would I be a true Christian if I weren’t? And I have always been a pacifist. Wars are completely unnecessary. This one was. That is, it could have been avoided if the democratic people had recognized their own interest early enough and taken the proper steps. But they did not. And now we ask ourselves: would the interests of the people of the world be advanced by a fascist victory? Obviously they would not. So we must support this war completely because we are faced with a clear choice and cannot avoid it.”

She offers a clear example of the association of stereotypy and personalization. Whereas her political persuasion should induce her to think in objective socio-economic terms, she actually thinks in terms of favorite people, preferably famous ones, of humans who are public institutions as it were — of “human stereotypes.”

“My second favorite world statesman is our own President although, perhaps, I should say Mrs. Roosevelt. I don’t think he would have been anything without her. She really made him what he is. I believe the Roosevelts have a very sincere interest in people and their welfare. There is one thing that bothers me about them though — specially Mrs. Roosevelt — that is liquor. She is not against it and it seems to me she should know how much we would be improved as a people without it.”

She exhibits a significant characteristic of the low scorers’ political stereotypy: a kind of mechanical belief in the triumph of progress, the counterpart to the high scorers’ frequent references to impending doom which is also a keynote of the above-quoted political statements of M359.

“All one has to do is look backward to feel optimistic. I would not be a true Christian if I did not believe that man’s progress is upward. We are so much farther along than we were a century ago. Social legislation that was only a dream is an accomplished fact.”

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61 About $200,000 in 2005.
b. Examples of personalization. The tendency towards personalization feeds on the American tradition of personal democracy as expressed most strikingly by the power delegated to the executive branch of the government by our Constitution, and also on that aspect of traditional American liberalism which regards competition as a contest between men, where the better man is likely to conquer. Cause and effect seem to be somewhat reversed: whereas in market economy the supposedly “better man” is defined by competitive success, people have come to think that success falls to the better man. Consistent with this is the highly personalized character of political propaganda, particularly in electioneering where the objective issues at stake are mostly hidden behind the exaltation of the individuals involved, often in categories which have but very little to do with the functions those individuals are supposed to fulfill. The ideal of a democracy, where the people have their immediate say, is frequently misused under conditions of today’s mass society, as an ideology which covers up the omnipotence of objective social tendencies and, more specifically, the control exercised by the party machines.

The material on personalization is both abundant and monotonous. A few examples may suffice.

The low-scoring man, M116, prefers Wallace to Dewey because

“Wallace is the better man and I usually vote for the better man.”

Here personalization is the more striking since these two figures are actually defined by objectively antagonistic platforms, whereas it is more than doubtful whether the interviewee, or, for that matter, the great majority of the American people, is in any position to say what they are like “as men.”

The high-scoring man, M102, employs almost literally the same expression as M116:

“... put down Democratic, but I never thought much about the party. I don’t vote for the party but for the best man.”

Professed belief in political theories is no antidote for personalization. M117, another “low” man, regards himself as a “scientific socialist” and is full of confidence in sociological psychology. But when asked about American parties, he comes out with the following statement:

“I don’t know about that. I’m only interested in the man and his abilities. I don’t care what party he belongs to. (What man do you like?) F.D.R. is one of the greatest. I did not like him when he was elected but I admit I was wrong. He did a marvelous job. He was concerned with the benefit of the country. Truman is doing a good job so far. The senators and congressmen are run-of-the-mill. Dewey is outstanding, I think; he has potentialities. He is apparently sincere and honest and concerned with the whole country. He did a good job as District Attorney.”

More aspects of personalization will be described when our interviewees’ attitudes towards Roosevelt are under consideration. Here, we content ourselves with suggesting two qualities which seem to play a great role in the personalization complex and which recur regularly in our high scorers’ statements about Dewey: Honesty and Sincerity.

F114, a high-scoring woman, knows that Dewey “is strong, young, courageous, honest. He may have faults, but they’re useful faults. I felt he was a strong, young person.” Obviously, this statement is linked to the adulation of strength that plays so large a role in the psychology of our high scorers (cf. Chapter VII). The honesty of the former D.A. is derived from his much-advertised drive against political racketeering and corruption. He is supposed to be honest because he has exterminated, according to his propagandist build-up, the dishonest. Honesty seems largely to be a rationalization for vindictiveness. Speaking psychologically, the image of Dewey is a projection of the punitive superego, or rather one of those collective images which replace the superego in an externalized, rigid form. The praise of his honesty, together with the repeated emphasis on his strength and youth, fall within the “strong man” pattern.

F117, another high scorer, of the Professional Women group, has a maximal score on A–S and is generally extremely conservative. Her similarly personalized appraisal of Dewey strikes a slightly different note but fits within the same pattern:

She feels that Dewey knows the value of money better than Roosevelt, because he came from a family that did not have too much.

The punitiveness behind the praise of the honest man shows itself in this example as hatred against comfortable living, against the “snobbish upper class” who supposedly enjoy the things which one has to deny to oneself. Dewey, per contra, is the symbol of one’s own frustrations and is unconsciously, i.e., sadomasochistically, expected to perpetuate frustration. What he seems to stand for within the minds of the high-scoring subjects is a state of affairs in which everybody has “learned the value of a dollar.” Identification with him is easy because as a prospective President he has the halo of power whereas his frugality is that of the middle-class subject herself.

Perhaps it is not accidental that infatuation with honesty is particularly frequent among women. They see life from the consumer’s side; they do not want to be cheated, and therefore the noisy promise of honesty has some appeal to them.

As to the differentiation between high and low scorers with regard to personalization, an impression may tentatively be formulated which is hard to substantiate but consistent with our clinical findings. The element of personalization that counts most heavily with the low scorers seems to be confidence, the idea that public figures are good, friendly fathers who take care of one, or of the “underdog.” It seems to be derived from an actual life relationship to one’s parents, from unblocked positive transference. This observation will be given relief when the attitude of our subjects towards Roosevelt is discussed. Conversely, the personal trait most appreciated by the high scorer seems to be strength. Social power and control, the ultimate focus of their identification,

is translated by the personalization mechanism into a quality inherent in certain individuals. The symbols of the powers that be are drawn from the imagery of a stern father to whom one “looks up.”

One last aspect of personalization may be mentioned. To know something about a person helps one to seem “informed” without actually going into the matter: it is easier to talk about names than about issues, while at the same time the names are recognized identification marks for all current topics. Thus, spurious personalization is an ideal behavior pattern for the semi-erudite, a device somewhere in the middle between complete ignorance and that kind of “knowledge” which is being promoted by mass communication and industrialized culture.

To sum up: ever more anonymous and opaque social processes make it increasingly difficult to integrate the limited sphere of one’s personal life experience with objective social dynamics. Social alienation is hidden by a surface phenomenon in which the very opposite is being stressed: personalization of political attitudes and habits offers compensation for the dehumanization of the social sphere which is at the bottom of most of today’s grievances. As less and less actually depends on individual spontaneity in our political and social organization, the more people are likely to cling to the idea that the man is everything and to seek a substitute for their own social impotence in the supposed omnipotence of great personalities.

3. Surface Ideology And Real Opinion

The alienation between the political sphere and the life experience of the individual, which the latter often tries to master by psychologically determined intellectual makeshifts such as stereotypy and personalization, sometimes results in a gap between what the subject professes to think about politics and economy and what he really thinks. His “official” ideology conforms to what he supposes he has to think; his real ideas are an expression of his more immediate personal needs as well as of his psychological urges. The “official” ideology pertains to the objectified, alienated sphere of the political, the “real opinion” to the subject’s own sphere, and the contradiction between the two expresses their irreconcilability.

Since this formal structure of political thinking has an immediate bearing upon one of the key phenomena of susceptibility to fascism, namely upon pseudo-conservatism, it may be appropriate to offer a few examples here.

F116, a prejudiced woman of the University Extension Group, offers an example of a conflict between surface ideology and real attitude through her somewhat deviate pattern of scale scores: she is middle on E and F but low on PEC. In her case, the deeper determinants are doubtless potentially fascist as evidenced particularly by her strong racial prejudice against both Negroes and Jews. In other political issues the picture is highly ambivalent. Characteristically, she classes herself as a Democrat, but voted for Willkie and then for Dewey. She “wasn’t against Roosevelt,” but her statement that “no man is indispensable” thinly veils her underlying hostility. She “knew what Hoover stood for, and I had no use for him. But that didn’t mean I had to worship Roosevelt. He was a good man, but when I heard people weeping and wailing over his death, I was just disgusted. As though he were indispensable.”

The amazing irregularity is an emphatically pro-Russian statement and an outspokenly antifascist attitude in international politics:

“No, I am a great admirer of Russia. Perhaps I shouldn’t say it out loud, but I am. I think they are really trying to do something for all the people. Of course there was a lot of suffering and bloodshed but think of what they had to struggle against. My husband really gets disturbed about this. He says I ought to go to Russia if I like communism so much. He says that to admire communism is to want a change and he thinks it is very wrong for me to even sound as though I wanted any change when we have enough and are comfortable and are getting along all right. I tell him that is very selfish and also that some people under the Czar might have felt that way but when the situation got so bad there was a revolution they got wiped out too. (American Communists?) Well, I couldn’t say because I don’t really know anything about them.

“I don’t hold the United States blameless. I think we have lots of faults. We talk now as though we had always hated war and tried to stop this one. That isn’t true. There were ways to stop this war if they had wanted to. I remember when Mussolini moved on Ethiopia. I always think of that as the real beginning of this war. And we were not interested in stopping that. My husband doesn’t like me to criticize the United States.”

The frequent interspersion of this statement with reference to disagreements with her husband, from whom she is “very much different politically” and with whom she has “terrible arguments” leads us to assume that her “progressive” political views in areas apparently not highly affect-laden by her are rationalizations of her strong resentment of the man of whom she says “I don’t think we can live for ourselves alone.” One is tempted to hypothesize that she wants him to get mad at her when she speaks in favor of Russia. In her case, the broadmindedness and rationality of surface opinion seems to be conditioned by strong underlying, repressed irrationalities:

Interviewer did not have much success with very personal data. She turned aside questions that came close to her deeper feelings. There was no depth to the discussion of her husband.

When it comes, however, to political topics which, for some reason unexplored in the interview, really mean something to this subject, she forgets all about her own rationality and gives vent to her vindictiveness though with a bad conscience, as evidenced by her previously quoted statement (Chapter XVI) that “she is not very proud of her anti-Semitic bias.”

M320, of the University Extension Testing Class, is a low-scoring man, hesitant, apologetic, shy, and unaggressive. He wants to become a landscape architect. His political views are consciously liberal and definitely non-prejudiced. He struggles to maintain his liberalism continuously, but this is not easy for him with regard to certain political matters, his impulses in many instances disavowing what he states. He begins with the typical low scorer’s statement:

“I am afraid I don’t have as many ideas about politics and government as I should, but I think — a lot of people are more liberal now than they have been recently. Possibly some like the
He first takes a mildly anti-strike attitude:

“I don’t know, I cannot see that, as just a straight demand, without taking into consideration the company and its ties and all that. I have not read much about that but . . . in a large company . . . maybe they might be able to take it, all right, but in little shops . . . and if it did go through, and even if it did not have disastrous (effects) on business closing . . . price rises would make it come out even anyway. I guess I am really not in favor of strikes but I can see it just about . . .”

Then he talks himself into a more definite stand against strikes, introduced by the still democratic “getting together” formula.

“They ought to get together and give, maybe, a 20 per cent or 30 per cent raise, then maybe kinda split it . . . and these strikes . . . just start at the wrong end . . . because if the strike is settled . . . they still have to come to some sort of agreement . . . and it’s gonna be forced and men’ll be driven . . . I guess human nature just is not that way but . . .”

The last statement, rather confused, actually belongs to the high-scorer pattern concerning the inherent badness of human nature (cf. Chapter VII).

After he has made this turn, he goes on with the usual high scorer’s condemnation of PAC, government control, etc., and ends up with an ambivalent statement about minimum wage-hour legislation:

“Well, things like that I guess if — I guess they are necessary — I guess maybe I am an idealist — I don’t think there should have been a minimum wage law because I think the employer should pay his employee a living wage and if he cannot pay that, well, the person does not have to work there but if the employer cannot pay that, he is not going to stay in business . . .”

It is the general trend rather than any specific statement which bears witness to the wish to be politically progressive and the very definite changes of mind as soon as concrete issues are raised. This man’s “political instincts” — if this term is allowed — are against his official progressiveness. One might well infer from this observation that one can differentiate better between political potentials by looking at deeper psychological impulses than by looking at avowed ideology.

Something similar can be observed with the medium-scoring man M118, of the Extension Psychology Class group, a registered Democrat. He was middle on A–S but low on F and low-middle on E. It is the interviewer’s impression that he is potentially “low” but that certain personality factors prevent him from going all the way. The exceptional aspect about him may well be explained through the conflict between different opinional layers. In terms of “big” and comparatively abstract political issues, he comes out with a “progressive” statement.

“There is a trend toward socialism. I don’t know how modified. The conflict between labor and business will probably be mediated by the government. The government will probably hold the balance of power in labor-business conflicts. The emphasis now is on free enterprise but that often results in monopoly, the big concerns squeezing the little guys to death. There is too much of a gap between the rich and the poor. People climb up by pushing others down, with no regulation. For this reason, government should have more influence, economi-cally, whether or not it goes as far as socialism.”

The interviewer happened to ride with the subject from Berkeley to San Francisco and continued the discussion in a more informal, unofficial way, touching the subject matter of unionism. In this context a classic example of the gap between official ideology and political thinking in terms of one’s own immediate interests occurred:

He thinks the C.I.O. is better than the A.F. of L. and he thinks that unions ought to extend their functions even more in political and educational and higher management brackets, but he himself won’t join the Federal Workers Union which he would be eligible to join because he feels they are not enough concerned with the problems of the higher level incomes, that they are too much interested in keeping the wages of the poorer groups above a certain minimum. He wishes they would be concerned with promotions and upgrading and developing good criteria by which people could be promoted.

The Canadian M934, again a “medium” of the Public Speaking Class, is studying to become a minister. He calls himself “very far over on the left wing” but qualifies this immediately by the statement:

“… I’m of a practical nature and I would not vote for the socialists . . . especially if I thought they would get in.”

To him, the practical is irreconcilable with socialism. The latter is all right as an idea, as a stimulant, as it were, but heaven forbid that it should materialize.

“I would vote . . . only to maintain socialist opposition . . . to keep the existing government from going too far to the right . . . but don’t think they have the experience to . . . put their socialist program into effect . . . and I think their program has to be modified.”

He praises the British Labour Government but actually only because it has not carried through a socialist program, an abstention interpreted by the interviewee as a sign of “political experience.”

“Well . . . I think they were ready for the job . . . aren’t trying to change social order in one fell swoop . . . I think that is an evidence of their maturity.”

This subject wants to be endowed with the prestige of a left-wing intellectual while at the same time, as an empirical being, he is manifestly afraid of a concrete materialization of ideas to which he subscribes in the abstract.

It is hardly accidental that in these cases the overt ideology is always progressive, the real opinion of an opposite character. This would seem to have something to do with established democracy in this country, which makes the expression of democratic ideas the thing to be done, while the opposite is, in a certain way, unorthodox. There is reason to believe that the fascist potential today shows itself largely in the maintenance of traditional ideas which may be called either liberal or conservative, whereas the underlying “political instinct,” fed largely by unconscious forces of the personality, is completely different. This will be elaborated in the following section.
4. Pseudo-conservatism

Our analysis of the questionnaire findings on PEC (Chapter V) has led to a differentiation between those who are high on PEC but low on E, and those who are high on both. This distinction was interpreted in terms of genuine and pseudo-conservatives, the former supporting not only capitalism in its liberal, individualistic form but also those tenets of traditional Americanism which are definitely anti-repressive and sincerely democratic, as indicated by an unqualified rejection of anti-minority prejudices. Our interview material allows us to give more relief to this construct and also to qualify it in certain respects. Before we go into some details of the pseudo-conservative’s ideology, we should stress that our assumption of a pseudo-conservative pattern of ideology is in agreement with the total trend of our psychological findings. The idea is that the potentially fascist character, in the specific sense given to this concept through our studies, is not only on the overt level but throughout the make-up of his personality a pseudo-conservative rather than a genuine conservative. The psychological structure that corresponds to pseudo-conservativism is conventionality and authoritarian submissiveness on the ego level, with violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destructiveness in the unconscious sphere. These contradictory trends are borne out particularly in those sections of our study where the range between the two poles of the unconscious and the conscious is widest, above all, where the T.A.T. is considered in relation to the clinical parts of the interviews. Traits such as authoritarian aggressiveness and vindictiveness may be regarded as intermediary between these antagonistic trends of the prejudiced personality. When turning to ideology which belongs in the context of psychological determinants here under discussion, to the realm of rationalization, it should be remembered that rationalizations of “forbidden” impulses, such as the drive for destruction, never completely succeed. While rationalization emasculates those urges which are subject to taboos, it does not make them disappear completely but allows them to express themselves in a “tolerable,” modified, indirect way, conforming to the social requirements which the ego is ready to accept. Hence even the overt ideology of pseudo-conservative persons is by no means unambiguously conservative, as they would have us believe, not a mere reaction-formation against underlying rebelliousness; rather, it indirectly admits the very same destructive tendencies which are held at bay by the individual’s rigid identification with an externalized super-ego. This break-through of the nonconservative element is enhanced by certain supra-individual changes in today’s ideology in which traditional values, such as the inalienable rights of each human being, are subject to a rarely articulate but nevertheless very severe attack by ascendant forces of crude repression, of virtual condemnation of anything that is deemed weak. There is reason to believe that those developmental tendencies of our society which point into the direction of some more or less fascist, state capitalist organization bring to the fore formerly hidden tendencies of violence and discrimination in ideology. All fascist movements officially employ traditional ideas and values but actually give them an entirely different, anti-humanistic meaning. The reason that the pseudo-conservative seems to be such a characteristically modern phenomenon is not that any new psychological element has been added to this particular syndrome, which was probably established during the last four centuries, but that objective social conditions make it easier for the character structure in question to express itself in its avowed opinions. It is one of the unpleasant results of our studies, which has to be faced squarely, that this process of social acceptance of pseudo-conservativism has gone a long way — that it has secured an indubitable mass basis. In the opinions of a number of representative high scorers, ideas both of political conservatism and traditional liberalism are frequently neutralized and used as a mere cloak for repressive and ultimately destructive wishes. The pseudo-conservative is a man who, in the name of upholding traditional American values and institutions and defending them against more or less fictitious dangers, consciously or unconsciously aims at their abolition.

The pattern of pseudo-conservativism is unfolded in the interviewer’s description of M109, another high-scoring man, a semi-fascist parole officer:

On his questionnaire, this man writes down “Republican” as the political party of his preference, and then scratches it out. He agrees with the anti-New Deal Democrats and the Willkie-type Republicans and disagrees with the New Deal Democrats and the traditional Republicans. This is cleared up in his interview when he says that the party does not mean anything, the candidate is the thing.\(^{64}\)

Asked what is his conception of the Willkie-type Republican, he says he thinks of the Willkie supporters as the same as the Dewey supporters. Big business favored both Willkie and Dewey.

The score 67 on PEC is high-middle. An examination of the individual items seems to show that he is not a true conservative in the sense of the rugged individual. True, he agrees with most of the PEC items, going to plus 3 on the Child-should-learn-the-value-of-the-dollar and the Morgan and Ford items, but marking most of the others plus 1 or plus 2, but, be it noted, he does not agree that depressions are like headaches, that businessmen are more important than artists and professors; and he believes the government should guarantee everybody an income, that there should be increased taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals, and that socialized medicine would be a good thing. He goes to plus 3 on the last item. Thus, it appears that he favors some kind of social function on the part of the government, but believes that the control should be in the proper hands. This is cleared up by the interview. Before becoming a policeman 6 1/2 years ago, this man was in the hospital insurance business. He says he had first to battle with the A.M.A.,\(^{65}\) who did not favor any kind of medical insurance; and later he thought it wise to give up the business because state medicine was in the offering.

In summing up his position concerning medical insurance, he says:

“I like the collectiveness of it, but believe private business

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\(^{64}\)Personalization, as indicated by these sentences, has an obvious fascist potential. It enhances the individual as against any objective anonymous system of checks and balances, against democratic control. Behind the adulation of the “great man” looms, in the present situation, the readiness to “follow the leader.” (Note by Adorno).

\(^{65}\)A.M.A.: American Medical Association
could do it better than the government. The doctors have butchered the thing and the politicians would do worse. People need this sort of thing and I like it in theory if it is run right."

Thus it becomes clear, according to the interviewer, that he has some kind of collectivist value system but believes that the control should be in the hands of the group with whom he can identify himself. This is clearly the Ford and Morgan sort of group rather than labor unions which he opposes.

The decisive thing about this man is that he has, in spite of his general reactionism and his all-pervasive ideas of power — which are evidenced by most of the other sections of the interview — socialistic leanings. This, however, does not refer to socialism in the sense of nationalizing the means of production but to his outspoken though inarticulate wish that the system of free enterprise and competition should be replaced by a state-capitalist integration where the economically strongest group, that is to say, heavy industry, takes control and organizes the whole life process of society without further interference by democratic dissension or by groups whom he regards as being in control only on account of the process of formal democracy, but not on the basis of the “legitimate” real economic power behind them.

This “socialist,” or rather, pseudo-socialist, element of pseudo-conservatism, actually defined only by anti-liberalism, serves as the democratic cloak for anti-democratic wishes. Formal democracy seems to this kind of thinking to be too far away from “the people,” and the people will have their right only if the “inefficient” democratic processes are substituted by some rather ill-defined strong-arm system.

M651A, another high-scoring man, a San Quentin prisoner, convicted of first-degree murder, is a good example of pseudo-democratism as a particular aspect of pseudo-conservatism.

(What do you think of political trends today?) “We have got a persecutor in California for governor . . . don’t put that in. They call it a democracy . . . democracy is the best type of government but (inefficient) . . . ."

Subject criticizes President Roosevelt strongly, especially his NRA. He mentions his father’s being pushed out of a job partly because of NRA, but he appears to be a little confused in this reference:

“Democracy is good when it is used right. I believe that too few people control the money in the country. I don’t believe in communism . . . but there is so many little people who never have anything . . . .”

Subject mentioned his grandmother’s only receiving $30 a month pension, which, he says, she cannot live on . . . law ought to be changed in that respect . . . subject emphasizes the need of extending old-age insurance to people too old to benefit by recent legislation.

An exceedingly serious dynamics is involved here. It cannot be disputed that formal democracy, under the present economic system, does not suffice to guarantee permanently, to the bulk of the population, satisfaction of the most elementary wants and needs, whereas at the same time the democratic form of government is presented as if — to use a favorite phrase of our subjects — it were as close to an ideal society as it could be. The resentment caused by this contradiction is turned by those who fail to recognize its economic roots against the form of democracy itself. Because it does not fulfill what it promises, they regard it as a “swindle” and are ready to exchange it for a system which sacrifices all claims to human dignity and justice, but of which they expect vaguely some kind of a guarantee of their lives by better planning and organization. Even the most extreme concept of the tradition of American democracy is summoned by the pseudo-conservative way of political thinking: the concept of revolution. However, it has become emasculated. There is only a vague idea of violent change, without any concrete reference to the people’s aims involved — moreover, of a change which has in common with revolution only the aspect of a sudden and violent break but otherwise looks rather like an administrative measure. This is the spiteful, rebellious yet intrinsically passive idea which became famous after the former Prince of Wales visited the distressed areas of North England: the idea that “something should be done about it.” It occurs literally in the interview of the high-scoring woman, F105, a 37-year-old crippled, frustrated housewife with strong paranoid traits. She had voted for Roosevelt every time because “I just decided I’d be a Democrat.” Asked why, she continues as follows:

“I don’t know. I’m just primarily against capitalism, and the Republicans are capitalistic. The Democrats have tried to give the working class a break. Father has voted for Thomas for years. He thinks eventually the world will come to that. But he’s never made an issue of it. (Are your ideals a reflection of his attitude?) Oh, it could be. I’m not conscious of it. I voted as soon as I was able to. (What do you think will happen after the war?) Probably the Republicans will be in again. I think the American public is a very changing type. Probably I’ll change too. The world’s in such a chaotic mess, something should be done. We’re going to have to learn to live with one another, the whole world.”

The phoniness of this subject’s supposed progressiveness comes out in the section on minorities where she proves to be a rabid anti-Semite.

In order to guess the significance of the dull wish of this woman for a radical change it has to be confronted with the stand another pseudo-conservative takes, the violently anti-Semitic San Quentin inmate, M661A, a robber. He plays, according to the interviewer, the bored decadent satiated with “too much experience” and derives from this attitude a fake aristocratic ideology which serves as a pretext for violent oppression of those whom he deems weak. He pays “very little attention to politics, except that I think we are headed for communism, and I am thumbs down on it.” Asked why, he comes forward with the following confession:

66NRA: National Recovery Administration. Part of the “New Deal” under Roosevelt. Instituted minimum wages and maximum weekly hours for workers.
67About $250 in 2005.
68This case is described in detail in Chapter XXI under the name of “Ronald.” (Note by Adorno)
69Norman Thomas, six-time candidate for President for the Socialist Party of America.
“For one thing, I have never forgiven the Russians for the revolution. . . . I consider them murders and not assassinations and I haven’t forgiven Russia any more than I have forgiven France for her revolution, or Mexico . . . in other words, I still believe in the Old Order and I believe we were happiest under Hoover and should have kept him. I think I would have had more money under him too and I don’t believe in inheritance taxes. If I earn $100,000 by the sweat of my brow,70 I ought to be able to leave it to whomever I please. I guess I really don’t believe that all men are created free and equal.”

While he still accepts the traditional critique of government interference in the name of rugged individualism, he would favor such government control if it were exercised by the strong. Here the criminal is in complete agreement with the aforementioned (p. 676) parole officer, M109:

(What about government controls over business?) “I half-approve. I certainly think that somebody should be over. . . . I believe in government control because it makes it less of — I really don’t believe in democracy: if we know somebody’s at the helm, we can’t have revolutions and things. But I have never read much on politics and I don’t think I have a right to say much.”

That the idea of the “right people” is actually behind M661A’s political philosophy is shown by his explanation of why he objects to all revolutions:

“They overthrow the established order . . . and they are always made by people who never had anything . . . I’ve never seen a communist who came from the right strata of society . . . I did read George Bernard Shaw’s (book on socialism).”71

One may differentiate between two kinds of pseudo-conservatives: those who profess to believe in democracy and are actually anti-democratic, and those who call themselves conservative while surreptitiously indulging in subversive wishes. This differentiation, however, is somewhat rationalistic. It does not amount to much, either in terms of psychological motivations or of actual political decision. It seems to pertain merely to thin rationalizations: the core of the phenomenon is both times identical. The just-quoted 661A belongs to the pseudo-conservative group in the narrower sense and so does M105, a prelaw student high on all scales, who stresses his conservative background while admitting overt fascist leanings:

“Naturally, I get my Republican sentiments from my parents. But recently I have read more for myself, and I agree with them. . . . We are a conservative family. We hate anything to do with socialism. My father regretted that he voted for F.D.R. in 1932. Father wrote to Senator Reynolds of South Carolina about the Nationalist Party.72 It’s not America First, it’s not really isolationist, but we believe that our country is being sold down the river.”

The overt link between father-fixation as discussed in the clinical chapters (Part II) and authoritarian persuasions in politics should be stressed. He uses a phrase familiar with fascists when they were faced with the defeat of Germany and the German system and yet somehow wished to cling to their negative Utopia.

“America is fighting the war but we will lose the peace if we win the war. I can’t see what I can possibly get out of it.”

Conversely, a striking example of pseudo-democratism in the narrower sense is offered at the beginning of the political section of the interview of the high-scoring man M108, a strongly fascistic student of insect toxicology, discussed in the chapter on typology as representative of the extreme “manipulative” syndrome. He is against Roosevelt, against the New Deal, and against practically any social humanitarian idea. At the next moment, however, he says he did feel that he was “somewhat of a socialist.”

This is literally the pattern by which the German Nazis denounced the Weimar Republic in the name of authority unchecked by democratic control, exalted the sacredness of private property, and simultaneously inserted the word socialist into the vernacular of their own party. It is obvious that this kind of “socialism,” which actually amounts merely to the curtailment of individual liberties in the name of some ill-defined collectivity, blends very well with the desire for authoritarian control as expressed by those who style themselves as conservatives. Here the overt incompatibility between private interests (what he “gets out of it”) and objective political logic (the certainty of an Allied victory) is by hook and crook put into the service of pro-fascist postwar defeatism. No matter how it goes, democracy must lose. Psychologically, the destructive “impending doom” pattern is involved.

This defeatism is characteristic of another trait of pseudo-conservative political philosophy: sympathy with the fascist enemy, Hitler’s Germany. This is easily rationalized as humane magnanimity and even as the democratic wish to give everybody a fair deal. It is the fifth-column mentality on which Hitlerian propaganda in democratic countries drew heavily before the war and which has by no means been uprooted.

M106, a college student high on all scales, fairly rational in many respects, seems at first sight to be critical of Germany. By tracing grandiloquently the sources of German fascism to supposedly profound historical roots, largely invented themselves by fascist propaganda, however, he slips into an apologetic attitude:

“German people have always been aggressive, have loved parades, have always had a big army. They received an unfair peace after the last war. The treaty of Versailles was obviously unfair to them, and because they were hard up, they were willing to listen to a young man like Hitler when he came along. If there had been a better peace, there’d be no trouble now. Hitler came along with promises, and people were willing to go for him. They had huge unemployment, inflation, and so on.”

The legend of the “unjust” treaty of Versailles must feed mean sympathy is evidenced by a subsequent statement on

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70 About $800,000 in 2005.
71 Bernard Shaw The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism.
Hitler’s policy of exterminating the Jews, already quoted in Chapter XVI:

“Well, Hitler, carried things just a little too far. There was some justification — some are bad, but not all. But Hitler went on the idea that a rotten apple in the barrel will spoil all the rest of them.”

Still, even this subject clings to the democratic cloak and refrains from overt fascism. Asked about the Jews in this country he answers:

“Same problem but it’s handled much better, because we’re a democratic country.”

While pseudo-conservatism is, of course, predominantly a trait of high scorers, it is by no means lacking among low scorers. This pertains particularly to the apologetic attitude toward the Nazis. Thus, F133, a woman low on prejudice though high on F, a young student of mathematics, calls herself “rather conservative.” Her “official” ideology is set against bigotry. But referring to her Irish descent, she re- sents the English and this leads her to pro-German statements which, in harmony with her F score, more than merely hint at underlying fascist leanings:

“I am prejudiced against England. England gave a dirty deal to the Irish people. England says the Nazis are black and Russia is white, but I think England is black. She goes around conquering people and is not just at all; and I am opposed to Russia. It is true that they took up the cause of the people, but on the whole they are not right, and their type of government is inferior to ours. (What about the Nazis?) The Germans lost everything; they just got hopeless. I don’t believe in dividing Germany just in order to make Russia and England richer. It isn’t true that Germany started the war — for war two people are necessary. It is not fair to put all the burden on one nation. The Germans will only feel more persecuted and fight more. One should leave the Germans to themselves. There is much too much emphasis on how cruel the Nazis are. The Germans did not have a just peace. We can’t put our own Nazi regime in to run the Germans. The Russians will cause the next war. The devastation in Germany has been just too great. I am pessimistic because people believe that everybody is bad who is down, and those who are good are strong, and the strong ones cut in pieces the one who is down, and they are just practical and not just.”

The decisive shift occurs when the subject, after demanding “fairness” with regard to the problem of war guilt, protests against “too much emphasis” on Nazi atrocities.

EXCURSUS ON THE MEANING OF PSEUDO-CONSERVATISM. The introduction of the term pseudo-conservative which may often be replaced by pseudo-liberal and even pseudo-progressive, necessitates a brief theoretical discussion of what is “pseudo” about the subjects in question and whether and to what extent the notion of genuine political ideologies can be upheld. All these terms have to be handled with the utmost caution and should never be hy- postatized.\(^{73}\) The distinction between pseudo and genuine political ideologies has been introduced mainly in order to avoid the pitfall of oversimplification, of identifying the prejudiced person, and the prospective fascist in general, with “reactionism.” It has been established beyond any doubt that fascism in terms of efficient organization and technological achievement has many “progressive” features. Moreover, it has been recognized long before our study that the general idea of “preserving the American way of living,” as soon as it assumes the features of vigilantism, hides violently aggressive and destructive tendencies which pertain both to overt political manifestations and to character traits. However, it has to be emphasized that the idea of the genuineness of an attitude or of behavior set against its “overplaying,” is somehow as problematic as that of, say, normality. Whether a person is a genuine or a pseudo-conservative in overt political terms can be decided only in critical situations when he has to decide on his actions. As far as the distinction pertains to psychological determinants, it has to be relativized. Since all our psychological urges are permeated by identifications of all levels and types, it is impossible ever completely to sever the “genuine” from what is “imitation.” It would be obviously nonsensical to call ungenuine those traits of a person which are based on the identification with his father. The idea of an absolute individual per se, completely identical with itself and with nothing else, is an empty abstraction. There is no psychological borderline between the genuine and the “assumed.” Nor can the relation between the two ever be regarded as a static one. Today’s pseudo-conservative may become the genuine conservative of tomorrow.

In the light of these considerations, it will be of some methodological importance to formulate the distinction between “genuine” and “pseudo” with care. The simplest procedure, of course, would be to define both concepts operationally in terms of cluster relationships of the questionnaire and also of the interviews. One would have to call roughly pseudo-conservative those who show blatant contradictions between their acceptance of all kinds of conventional and traditional values — by no means only in the political sphere — and their simultaneous acceptance of the more destructive clusters of the F scale, such as cynicism, punitiveness, and violent anti-Semitism. Yet, this procedure is somewhat arbitrary and mechanical. At its best, it would define the terms but never help to understand their implicit etiology.\(^{74}\) It would be more satisfactory to base the distinction on a psychological hypothesis that makes sense. An hypothesis that might serve is one that takes as its point of departure the differentiation between successful or unsuccessful identification. This would imply that the “genuine” conservative characters would be those who essentially or at least temporarily succeeded in their identification with authoritarian patterns without considerable carry-overs of their emotional conflicts — without strong ambivalence and destructive counter-tendencies. Conversely, the “pseudo” traits are characteristic of those whose authoritarian identification succeeded only on a superficial level. They are forced to overdo it continuously in order to convince themselves and the others that they belong, to quote the revolution-hater of San Quentin, to the right strata of society. The stubborn energy which they employ in

\(^{73}\)hypostatize: treat or represent (something abstract) as a concrete reality.

\(^{74}\)etiology: the cause, or set of causes, or manner of causation of a disease or condition.
order to accept conformist values constantly threatens to shatter these values themselves, to make them turn into their opposite, just as their "fanatical" eagerness to defend God and Country makes them join lunatic fringe racketers and sympathize with the enemies of their country.

Even this distinction, however, can claim only limited validity and is subject to psychological dynamics. We know from Freud that the identification with the father is always of a precarious nature and even in the "genuine" cases, where it seems to be well established, it may break down under the impact of a situation which substitutes the paternal superego by collectivized authority of the fascist brand.

Yet, with all these qualifications, the distinction still can claim some justification under present conditions. It may be permissible to contrast the pseudo-conservatives so far discussed with a "genuine" conservative taken from the Los Angeles sample which, as pointed out in Chapter I, included — in contrast to the Berkeley sample — a number of actual or self-styled members of the upper class.

F5008 is low on E, middle on F, and high on PEC. She is a woman of old American stock, a direct descendant of Jefferson. She is apparently free of any vindictive sense of her social status and lays no emphasis on her good family or on her being a real member of the "right strata of society." She is definitely non-prejudiced. Her T.A.T. shows traits of a somewhat neurotic overoptimism which may or may not be a product of reaction-formation. One might venture that the "genuine" conservatives who still survive and whose number is probably shrinking, may develop an increasingly bad conscience because they become aware of the rapid development of important conservative layers of American society into the direction of labor baiting and race hatred. The more this tendency increases, the more the "genuine" conservative seems to feel compelled to profess democratic ideals, even if they are somewhat incompatible with his own upbringing and psychological patterns. If this observation could be generalized, it would imply that the "genuine" conservatives are more and more driven into the liberal camp by today's social dynamics. This may help to explain why it is so hard to find any striking examples for genuine conservatism among high scorers.

If our assumption is correct, that pseudo-conservatism is based — as far as its psychological aspect is concerned — on incomplete identification, it becomes understandable why it is linked to a trait which also plays a considerable role within the pattern of conventionality: identification with higher social groups. The identification that failed is probably in most cases that with the father. Those people in whom this failure does not result in any real antagonism to authority, who accept the authoritarian pattern without, however, internalizing it, are likely to be those who identify themselves sociologically with higher social groups. This would be in harmony with the fact that the fascist movement in Germany drew heavily on frustrated middle-class people of all kinds: of those who had lost their economic basis without being ready to admit their being déclassé; of those who did not see any chances for themselves but the shortcut of joining a powerful movement which promised them jobs and ultimately a successful war. This socioeconomic aspect of pseudo-conservatism is often hard to distinguish from the psychological one. To the prospective fascist his social identification is as precarious as that with the father. At the social root of this phenomenon is probably the fact that to rise by the means of "normal" economic competition becomes increasingly difficult, so that people who want to "make it" — which leads back to the psychological situation — are forced to seek other ways in order to be admitted into the ruling group. They must look for a kind of "co-optation," somewhat after the fashion of those who want to be admitted to a smart club. Snobbery, so violently denounced by the fascist, probably for reasons of projection, has been democratized and is part and parcel of their own mental make-up: who wants to make a "career" must really rely on "pull and climbing" rather than on individual merit in business or the professions. Identification with higher groups is the presupposition for climbing, or at least appears so to the outsider, whereas the "genuine" conservative group is utterly allergic to it. However, the man who often, in accordance with the old Horatio Alger ideology, maintains his own "upward social mobility" draws from it at least some narcissistic gratifications and felicitously anticipates internally a status which he ultimately hopes to attain in reality.

Here two examples of high scorers may be quoted, both again taken from the Los Angeles group.

5006, an extreme high scorer on all scales, one of the few of our interviewees who actually admitted that they want to kill the Jews (see his interview in Chapter XVI, p. 636), is the grandson of a dentist, whereas his father failed to become one, and he hopes fervently to regain the grandfather's social status. As to the problem of failure in identification, it is significant in this case that the image of the father is replaced by that of the grandfather — just as the idea of "having seen better times," of a good family background clouded over by recent economic developments, played a large role with the pre-fascist, post-inflation generation in Germany.

5013, who is also extremely high on all scales, describes her father as a doctor, whereas he is actually a chiropractor — a habit which seems to be largely shared by the chiropractors themselves. If the German example teaches anything and if our concept of semi-erudition proves to be correct, one may expect that nonacademic "scientists" and "doctors" are strongly attracted by the fascist platform.75

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75 The role played by shady pseudo-medicine in Nazi Germany is sociologically linked to the ascendence of déclassé intellectuals under National Socialism, psychologically to the paranoid twist of Nazi ideology as well as of the personalities of many leaders. There is a direct interconnection between the doctrine of "purity of blood" and the glorification of sundry purifiers of the body. The first academic chair created by Hitler was one for "natural healing." His own physician was a quack, Himmler's a chiropractor, and Rudolf Hess encouraged all kinds of superstitious approaches to medicine. It should be noted that analogous tendencies make themselves felt in the American "lunatic fringe." One of our native crackpot agitators combines Jew-hating with a "health food" campaign, directed against the delikatessen which are not only denounced as being Jewish but also as unwholesome. The imagery of Jewish food throughout the fascist ideology deserves careful examination. (Note by Adorno)
5. The Usurpation Complex

The goal toward which the pseudo-conservative mentality strives — diffusely and semi-consciously — is to establish a dictatorship of the economically strongest group. This is to be achieved by means of a mass movement, one which promises security and privileges to the so-called “little man” (that is to say, members of the middle and lower middle class who still cling to their status and their supposed independence), if they join with the right people at the right time. This wish appears throughout pseudo-conservative ideology in mirrored reflection. Government by representation is accused of perverting democracy. Roosevelt and the New Deal particularly are said to have usurped power and to have entrenched themselves dictorially. Thus pseudo-conservatives accuse the progressives of the very thing which they would like to do, and they utilize their indictment as a pretext for “throwing the rascals out.” They call for a defense of democracy against its “abuses” and would, through attacking the “abuses,” ultimately abolish democracy altogether. Pseudo-conservative ideology harmonizes completely with psychological projectivity.

One may well ask why people so concerned with power, if they really see the Roosevelt policy as a strong-armed dictatorship, do not endorse it and feel happy about it. The reasons, it would seem, are several. First, the social types representative of pseudo-conservatism are not or do not regard themselves as beneficiaries of the New Deal. It appears to them as a government for the unemployed and for labor; and even if they themselves received some benefits from WPA, or the closed shop, they are resentful about it because this demonstrates to them what they are least willing to admit: that their belonging to the middle classes has lost its economic foundation. Second, to them, the Roosevelt administration never was really strong enough. They sense very well the degree to which the New Deal was handicapped by the Supreme Court and by Congress; they know or have an inklings of the concessions Roosevelt had to make — he had to give conspicuous jobs to several men opposed to his political line, e.g., Jesse Jones; they cry “dictator” because they realize that the New Deal was no dictatorship at all and that it did not fit within the authoritarian pattern of their over-all ideology. Thirdly, their idea of the strong man, no matter in what glowing personalized terms it may be expressed, is colored by an image of real strength: the backing of the most powerful industrial groups. To them, progressives in the government are real usurpers, not so much because they have acquired by shrewd and illegal manipulation rights incompatible with American democracy, but rather because they assume a power position which should be reserved for the “right people.” Pseudo-conservatives have an underlying sense of “legitimacy”: legitimate rulers are those who are actually in command of the machinery of production — not those who owe their ephemeral power to formal political processes. This last motif, which also plays a heavy role in the prehistory of German fascism, is to be taken the more seriously because it does not altogether contradict social reality. As long as democracy is really a formal system of political government which made, under Roosevelt, certain inroads into economic fields but never touched upon the economic fundamentals, it is true that the life of the people depends on the economic organization of the country and, in the last analysis, on those who control American industry, more than on the chosen representatives of the people.

Pseudo-conservatives sense an element of untruth in the idea of “their” democratic government, and realize that they do not really determine their fate as social beings by going to the polls. Resentment of this state of affairs, however, is not directed against the dangerous contradiction between economic inequality and formal political equality but against the democratic form as such. Instead of trying to give to this form its adequate content, they want to do away with the form of democracy itself and to bring about the direct control of those whom they deem the most powerful anyway.

This background of the dictatorship idea, that democracy is no reality under prevailing conditions, may be evidenced by two quotations from medium-scoring men. \textit{M1223h} follows up his statement that the Democrats are going communist and that the unions should be curbed, by the statement, “The people aren’t running the country.” \textit{M1225a} speaks cautiously about democracy: “It’s supposed to be a government of the people by representation.”

Asked whether we had it in this country he answers bluntly: No, but qualifies this immediately with the statement — a pretty standardized one — “We have as close to it as there is.”

Similarly, \textit{M1223h} qualifies his critique by the contention that “America is still fairly democratic but going away from democracy too fast.”

The contradictory utterances of these two men, apart from wishful thinking, indicate that they are perturbed by the antagonism between formal political democracy and actual social control. They just reach the point where they see this antagonism between formal political democracy and actual social control. They did not dare, however, to explain it but rather retract their own opinions in order not to become “unrealistic.” Conformism works as a brake on their political thinking.

A few examples of the usurpation fantasy proper follow. \textit{M208}, who obtained a middle score on E and F and a high score on PEC, insists, according to his interviewer, that President Roosevelt lost the popular vote by several thousand votes, according to counts he and his father made following the news reports over the radio, implying that the official count had been incorrect.

While this man is for “initiative and competition, against government bungling and inefficiencies,” he has boundless confidence in social control exercised by the proper organization:

> “The best organizations for a citizen to belong to in order to influence the conditions in his community are local Chambers of Commerce. By improving your city, you make it attractive and create wealth.” He said the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce.

\textsuperscript{76}WPA: Works Progress Administration (1935–40). Largest New Deal agency, employing millions of people and affecting every locality.

\textsuperscript{77}Jesse Jones, US Secretary of Commerce (1940–45)

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Commerce was something he belonged to and his organization would send out postcards very soon to every single individual in the city in a huge membership drive.

*M656,* a high-scoring prison inmate (grand theft and forgery), was interviewed shortly after President Roosevelt’s death and when asked what he regarded as the greatest danger facing this country, said

“the government we just had, the one that brought on the war, the Nazi-dictatorship.”

The high-scoring man *M108,* the aforementioned insect toxicologist, is convinced that Roosevelt only carried out Hoover’s ideas, a statement not infrequent among prejudiced subjects who regard the New Deal as usurpation in so far as it has “stolen” its ideas from its opponents. Asked further about Roosevelt, he goes on:

“he usurped power that was necessary to do something — he took a lot more power than a lot . . . . He has been in too long, and there were deals on the fire that we don’t know about with Churchill or Stalin.”

In the end the usurper idea coincides with that of the conspirator who makes “secret deals” detrimental to his country.

The frequency and intensity of the usurper idea, together with the fantastic nature of many of the pertinent assertions in our material justifies our calling it a “complex,” that is to say, looking for a widespread and stable psychological configuration on which this idea feeds. As far as we know, no attention has been given to this complex in psychological literature, though the frequency of usurpation conflicts throughout occidental drama warrants the assumption that there must be some deep-rooted basis in instinctual dynamics for it. Suffice it to recollect that Shakespeare’s most famous tragedies: *Hamlet,* *King Lear,* *Macbeth,* *Julius Caesar,* and *Richard III* deal in one way or the other with usurpation, and that the usurper theme runs as a red thread through the whole dramatic work of Schiller, from Franz Moor in *The Robbers* to Demetrius. On a socio-psychological level, that is to say comparatively abstractly and superficially, an explanation is easy at hand. The existence of power and privilege, demanding sacrifices of all those who do not share in its advantages, provokes resentment and hurts deeply the longing for equality and justice evolved throughout the history of our culture. In the depth of his heart, everyone regards any privilege as illegitimate. Yet one is forced continuously, in order to get along in the world as it is, to adjust himself to the system of power relationships that actually defines this world. This process has been going on over the ages, and its results have become part and parcel of today’s personalities. This means that people have learned to repress their resentment of privilege and to accept as legitimate just that which is suspected of being illegitimate. But since human sufferings from the survival of privilege have never ceased, adjustment to it has never become complete. Hence the prevailing attitude towards privileges is essentially ambivalent. While it is being accepted consciously, the underlying resentment is displaced unconsciously. This is done in such a way that a kind of emotional compromise between our forced acceptance of the existence of power, and resistance against it, is reached. Resentment is shifted from the “legitimate” representatives of power to those who want to take it away from them, who identify themselves, in their aims, with power but violate, at the same time, the code of existent power relations. The ideal object of this shift is the political usurper in whom one can denounce “greed for power” while at the same time taking a positive stand with regard to established power. Still, sympathy with the usurper survives at the bottom. It is the conflict between this sympathy and our displaced aggressiveness which qualifies him for dramatic conflict.

There is reason to believe, however, that this line of thought does not fully explain the usurper complex. Much more deep-lying, archaic mechanisms seem to be involved. As a rule, the usurper complex is linked with the problem of the family. The usurper is he who claims to be the member of a family to which he does not belong, or at least to pretend to rights due to another family. It may be noted that even in the Oedipus legend, the usurper complex is involved in so far as Oedipus believes himself to be the real child of his foster-parents, and this error accounts for his tragic entanglement. We venture, with all due reservation, the hypothesis that this has something to do with an observation that can be made not infrequently: that people are afraid of not really being the children of their parents. This fear may be based on the dim awareness that the order of the family, which stands for civilization in the form in which we know it, is not identical with “nature” that our biological origin does not coincide with the institutional framework of marriage and monogamy, that “the stork brings us from the pond.” We sense that the shelter of civilization is not safe, that the house of the family is built on shaky ground. We project our uneasiness upon the usurper, the image of him who is not his parents’ child, who becomes psychologically a kind of ritualized, institutional “victim” whose annihilation is unconsciously supposed to bring us rest and security. It may very well be that our tendency to “look for the usurper” has its origin in psychological resources as deep as those here suggested.

**6. F.D.R.**

The usurpation complex is focused on Roosevelt, whose name evokes the sharpest differences between high and low scorers that are to be found in the interview material on politico-economic topics.

It hardly needs to be said that all the statements touching upon the late president are personalized. The political issues involved appear mainly as qualities of the man himself. He is criticized and praised because he is this or that, not because he stands for this or that. The most drastic accusation is that of war-monger. This accusation often assumes the form of those conspiracy fantasies which are so highly characteristic of the usurper complex.

The high-scoring man *M664c,* serving a San Quentin term of one year for forgery and check writing, professes to have been originally pro-Roosevelt.

“Hell, at that (election) I was strong for Roosevelt, we had an awful depression, one thing he’d done for that state he put that...
The idea of the “red Roosevelt” belongs to the same class of objections and paranoid exaggerations of political antipathies. Though much more common among subjects who score high on E and PEC, it can sometimes be found in the statements of low scorers. Note the remarks of F140, a young nursery school helper, rated according to her questionnaire score as low on E but high on A–S and PEC. She first refers to her father.

(Is your father anti-Roosevelt?) “Oh, sure he is. He just don’t have any use for Roosevelt. It’s all communism that is what he says. (And what do you think about it?) Oh, I don’t know. I guess he’s right. He ought to know. That’s all he thinks about — politics — politics.”

Sometimes the suspicion that Roosevelt was a Russophile war-monger is cloaked by legalistic argumentations, such as the statement that he left the country illegally during the war. F104, a woman who stands high on all scales, a somewhat frustrated young college student, relates that her father is “extremely anti-Roosevelt,” and, when asked why, answers:

“No president is supposed to leave the country without the consent of Congress, and he goes whenever he feels like it. He is being a little too dictatorial.”

With regard to domestic politics, F359, the accountant in a government department who was quoted before (Chapter XVI, p. 616), states quite clearly and in fairly objective terms the contradiction which seems at the hub of anti-Roosevelt sentiment:

Subject did not like Roosevelt because of WPA. It creates a class of lazy people who would rather get $20 a week than work. She feels that Roosevelt did not accomplish what he set out to do — raise the standard of the poorer classes.

The conceptions of communist, internationalist, and war-monger are close to another one previously mentioned — that of the snob. Just as the fascist agitator persistently mixes up radicals and bankers, claiming that the latter financed the revolution and that the former seek financial gains, the contradictory ideas of an ultra-leftist and an exclusive person alienated from the people are brought together by anti-Roosevelt sentiment. One may venture the hypothesis that the ultimate content of both objections is the same: the resentment of the frustrated middle-class person against those who represent the idea of happiness, be it by wanting other people — even the “lazy ones” — to be happy, be it that they are enjoying life themselves. This irrationality can be grasped better on the level of personality than on that of ideology.

M1223h, of the Maritime School, with medium scores on E and PEC, but high on F, does not like Roosevelt — “a socialist; got too much power.” Similarly, the high-scoring married woman F117, 37 years old, employed in a Public Health Department,

feels that Roosevelt does not know how to handle money; he was born with a great deal. Now he throws it around — “millions here and millions there.”

This is the exact opposite of the praise of Dewey, whose more humble origin is supposed to guarantee thriftiness. The “democratic cloak” of the pseudo-conservative consists, in cases like these, in the assertion that measures taken for the benefit of the people cannot be approved because the one who carried them out is not one of the people and therefore, in a way, has no right to act in their behalf — he is a usurper. Really folksy men, one might suppose, would rather let them starve.

The idea that the late President was too old and too ill, and that the New Deal was decrepit plays a particular role among anti-Roosevelt arguments. The dark forebodings about Roosevelt’s death have come true. Yet, one may suspect here a psychological element: the fear of his death often rationalizes the wish for it. Moreover, the idea of his supposed old age pertains to the illegitimacy complex: he should give way to others, to the “young generation,” to fresh blood. This is in keeping with the fact that German Nazism often denounced the over-age of the representatives of the Weimar Republic, and that Italian fascism heavily emphasized the idea of youth per se. Ultimately, some light is shed on the whole complex of the President’s age and illness by our clinical findings, pertaining to the tendency of our high scorers to praise physical health and vigor as the outstanding quality of their parents, particularly of the mother (pp. 340 ff.). This is due to the general “externalization” of values, the anti-intracateness of the prejudiced personalities who seem to be continuously afraid of illnesses. If there is an interconnection between at least some syndromes of high scorers and psychotic dispositions, one may also think of the disproportionate role played by the concern with one’s own body in many schizophrenics — a phenomenon linked to the mechanisms of “depersonalization”?9 which represents the extreme of the “ego-alienness” of the id characteristic of the high scoring subject. It should be remembered once again how large a role was played by ideas such as physical health, purity of the blood, and syphilophobia throughout fascist ideology.

M104, a high scoring young man of the Public Speaking Class, who changed from studying engineering to law is an example:

Subject would have voted for Dewey. The whole New Deal has become very stagnant, old, and decrepit. He feels Roosevelt has done some fine things, some of his experiments were about as good a cure as you could get for the depression, but it is now time for a change in party, a new President, younger blood.

As in most cases, the argument has, of course, a “rational” aspect too — the Roosevelt government held office for a longer period than any other one in American history. However, the complaints about “too long” are uttered only in the name of “changing the guard,” not in the name of concrete progressive ideas which could be brought about by younger people.

78About $160 in 2005.
79Cf. Otto Fenichel (27). (Note by Adorno)
80syphilophobia: fear of syphilis.
Resentment against old people has a psychological aspect by which it seems to be linked to anti-Semitism. There is reason to believe that some subjects displace their hostility against the father upon aged persons and the notion of old age as such. Old people are, as it were, earmarked for death. In accordance with this pattern, the image of the Jew often bears features of the old man, thus allowing for the discharge of repressed hostility against the father. Judaism is regarded, not incidentally, as the religion of the father and Christianity that of the son. The most emphatic stereotype of the Jew, that of the inhabitant of the Eastern ghetto, bears attributes of the old, such as the beard or worn and obsolete clothes.

Hostility for the aged has, to be sure, a sociological as well as a psychological aspect: old people who cannot work any more are regarded as useless and are, therefore, rejected. But this idea, like those just discussed, has little immediate bearing upon the person of Roosevelt; rather, they are transferred to him after aggression has turned against him. The universally ambivalent role of the President as a father figure thus makes itself felt.

As to those who are in favor of Roosevelt, there are two clear-cut main motifs which are almost the reverse of those found in the Roosevelt haters. The man “who thinks too much of himself and assumes dictatorial powers” is now praised as a great personality; the leftist and initiator of the New Deal is loved as a friend of the underdog.

The “great personality” motif appears in the statement of the low-scoring man, M106, another high-scoring man, M102, a student of seismology who went to college because he did not want to be “lined up as just an electrician,” praises Roosevelt’s “talent”:

“Well, if another candidate had approached Roosevelt, I’d have voted for him. But, no other candidate approached his talent.”

M106, another high-scoring man, again characterized by upward social mobility, is pro-Roosevelt for reasons that are just the opposite of those given by one of his critics for disliking him, although he too suffers from the “old age” complex.

“Roosevelt has done a wonderful job but we should have a young man. Roosevelt stabilized the nation’s currency, helped on unemployment, has handled foreign relations marvelously. He is a common man, goes fishing, takes time for relaxation — that’s what I like. Mrs. Roosevelt has been active in political and social affairs.”

The explanation of the deviation of this highly prejudiced man, who is beset by power ideas and objects to the Jews because they supposedly strive for power, is that he himself “had infantile paralysis, and you appreciate what Roosevelt has done.”

The inference may be allowed that if the same man is praised by some people as a “common man” and by others blamed as a “socialite,” these judgments express subjective value scales rather than objective facts.

The established status of a President of the United States, the irrefutable success of Roosevelt, and, one may add, his tremendous impact as a symbolic father figure on the unconscious, seem in more cases than this particular one to check the usurper complex of the pseudo-conservative and allow only for vague attacks about which there is something half-hearted, as if they were being made with a bad conscience.

7. Bureaucrats And Politicians

There is no mercy, however, for those to whom Roosevelt is supposed to have delegated power. They are usurpers, parasites, know nothing about the people, and should, one may well assume, be replaced by the “right men.” The wealth of statements against bureaucrats and politicians in our interview material is tremendous. Although it comes mostly from high scorers, it is by no means confined to them, and may again be regarded as one of those patterns of political ideology which spread over the well-defined border lines of right vs. left.

It is beyond the scope of the present study to analyze the amount of truth inherent in American distrust of professional politics. Nor should it be denied that a tremendously swollen bureaucratic apparatus, such as that which was necessitated by war conditions and which was, to a certain extent, safe from public criticism, develops unpleasant features, and that the machinery has an inbound tendency to entrench itself and to perpetuate itself for its own sake. However, as one analyzes carefully the standard criticism of the bureaucrats and politicians, he finds very little evidence of such observations, very few specific indictments of bureaucratic institutions which prove them to be incompetent. It is impossible to escape the impression that “the bureaucrat,” with the help of some sections of the press, and some radio commentators, has become a magic word, that he functions as a scapegoat to be blamed indiscriminately for all kinds of unsatisfactory conditions, somewhat reminiscent of the anti-Semitic imagery of the Jew with which that of the bureaucrat is often enough merged. At any rate, the frequency and intensity of anti-bureaucratic and anti-politician invectives is quite out of proportion with any possible experience. Resentment about the “alienation” of the political sphere as a whole, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, is turned against those who represent the political sphere. The bureaucrat is the personification of un-understandable politics, of a depersonalized world.

Striking examples of this general attitude of high scorers are provided by the above-quoted political statements of
Mack (p. 34) and of the markedly anti-Semitic manager of a leather factory, M359 (p. 666 of this chapter).

Sometimes the invectives against politics terminate in tautologies: politics is blamed for being too political.

*M1230a* is a young welder who wanted to study engineering. He scores high on E but low on F and PEC.

(What thinking of political trends today?) “Well, they’re very disrupted. We discussed them a lot, and a lot of things we don’t like. The administration seems to be so tied up in politics…. Statesmanship is gone completely…. Can’t believe anything you read in the newspapers. We read the newspapers mainly to laugh. . . .”

The last passage is characteristic of the alienation from politics which expresses itself in a complete, and by no means altogether unjustified, distrust of the reliability of any news which has gone through the filter of a system of communications controlled by vested interests. This distrust, however, is shifted to the scapegoat, the bureaucrat and the politician, usually attacked by the same press which is this subject’s laughing stock.

*F120*, a high-scoring woman, differentiates between Roosevelt and the bureaucracy.81

(Roosevelt and the New Deal?) “I admired him, in fact I voted for him, although I did not approve of a lot of things about the New Deal. All the bureaus. I would not have minded the spending if it had gone to help people. But I resented all the wasted motion — professional people digging ditches — and especially the expensive agencies stuffed with do-nothings, bureaucrats.”

*M1214b*, a medium scorer of the Maritime School, is anti-political in a traditionalistic way, the ultimate direction of which is still undetermined.

“No respect for politicians: bunch of windbags. They try to sound people out and follow along.” (This is just the opposite of the usual argument according to which the politicians are too independent. This particular twist may indicate the underlying awareness of the weakness of the representatives of formal democracy.) “They are not sincere public servants. Roosevelt, Lincoln, Jefferson, and Bryan are exceptions. Wilson was also sincere.” Subject has no respect for Harding or Coolidge.

Finally, an example from a low scorer. *M112*, asked about politics, simply states:

“I don’t like it. We can get along without it. Don’t think that people should be just politicians. Should have an ordinary life, just hold office at times. Not be trained for politics and noth-

The tone of this accusation is markedly different from the phraseology of the high scorers. This man seems really to be worried lest bureaucracy should become reified, an end in itself, rather than democratically expressing the wishes of the people.

The motivation of the low scorers’ criticism of bureaucrats and politicians seems largely to vary from that of the high scorers; phenomenologically, however, it reminds so much of the latter that one is led to fear that in a critical situation quite a few anti-political low scorers may be caught by

81This observation is in accordance with experience in Nazi Germany where all kinds of criticism and jokes about the party hierarchy were whispered everywhere, whilst Hitler seems to have been largely exempted from this kind of criticism. One heard frequently the remark: The Führer does not know about these things” — even when concentration camps were concerned. (Note by Adorno)

8. There Will Be No Utopia

The political thinking of high scorers is consummated by the way they approach the ultimate political problem: their attitude toward the concept of an “ideal society.” Their opinonal pattern not only concerns the means but also the ultimate social ends.

According to the frame of mind which is being analyzed here, there is no utopia and, one may add, there should be no utopia. One has to be “realistic.” This notion of realism, however, does not refer to the necessity of judging and accounting on the basis of objective, factual insight, but rather to the postulate that one recognizes from the very beginning the overwhelming superiority of the existent over the individual and his intentions, that one advocates an adjustment implying resignation with regard to any kind of basic improvements, that one gives up anything that may be called a day-dream, and reshapes oneself into an appendage of the social machinery.

This is reflected by political opinion in so far as any kind of utopian idea in politics is excluded altogether.

It must be pointed out that an anti-utopia complex seems to occur in the interviews of low scorers even more frequently than in those of high scorers, perhaps because the former are more ready to admit their own worries and are less under the impact of “official optimism.” This differentiation between the stand taken by high and low scorers, against utopia seems to be corroborated by the study “Psychological Determinants of Optimism regarding the Consequences of the War” by Sanford, Conrad, and Franck (108). Official optimism, the “keep smiling” attitude, goes with underlying traits of contempt for human nature, as expressed by the cynicism cluster of the F scale, which differentiates clearly between high and low scorers. Conversely, low scorers are much more ready to admit negative facts in general, and particularly with regard to themselves, on a surface level, being less spellbound by the conventional cliché that “everything is fine,” but they show, on a deeper level of their opinions, much greater confidence in the innate potentialities of the human race. One may epitomize the difference dynamically by stating that the high scorers deny utopia because they ultimately do not want it to materialize, whereas anti-utopian statements of the low scorers are derived from a rejection of the official ideology of “God’s own country.” The latter are skeptical about utopia, because they take its realization seriously and therefore take a critical view of the existent, even up to the point where they acknowledge the threat exercised by the impact of prevailing conditions against just those human potentialities in which they trust in the depth of their hearts.

*M345* is a high-scoring man of the University Extension Testing Class group. He scores high on E and PEC but low on F. When asked about what he thinks of an ideal society, his answer reads:
This answer is significant in many respects. The denial of the possibility of an ideal society is based on the assumption that otherwise everything ought to be changed — an idea apparently unbearable to the subject. Rather than change everything, that is to say, to disobey ultimate respect for the existent, the world should be left as bad as it is. The argument that first the people should be changed before the world can be changed belongs to the old anti-utopian armory. It leads to a vicious circle, since, under prevailing external conditions, no such internal change can ever be expected, and, actually, those who speak in this way do not even admit its possibility, but rather assume the eternal and intrinsic bad-ness of human nature, following the pattern of cynicism discussed in the chapter on the F scale. Simultaneously wealth and poverty which are obviously the products of social conditions are hypostatized by the subject as if they were inborn, natural qualities. This both exonerates society and helps to establish the idea of unchangeability on which the denunciation of utopia feeds. We venture the hypothesis that the brief statement of this subject bares a pattern of thinking which is exceedingly widespread, but which few people would epito-mize as overtly as he does.

To the aforementioned M105, who comes as close to overt fascism as any the idea of natural qualities excluding an ideal society is related immediately to the most pressing issue: the abolition of war.

“Naturally, I like America best. The question is, is it worth while to give up what we have in order to have world trade? The Japs make cheap products and can undersell us. What I’m afraid of is a perpetual lend-lease. If we do trade with other nations we should have the cash. World trade would not prevent war. The fighting instinct is there.”

The significant fact about his statement is that the assumption of a “fighting instinct,” which apparently is never supposed to disappear, is related in an overrealistic manner to economic advantages, cash, sticking to what one has, and so on. Incidentally, this is the same man who speaks against the present war because he “can’t see what he can possibly get out of it.”

Self-contradictory is a statement by the executive secretary, F340B, a medium-scoring woman, whose personality as a whole, as well as her ready-made political opinions, come closer to the type of the high scorer than her questionnaire leads us to believe. In terms of surface opinion she wants to be “idealistic,” in terms of her specific reactions she is under the spell of “realism,” the cult of the existent.

“I’m not happy about our foreign policy here — it’s not definite enough, and not idealistic enough. (What are your specific criticisms?) It is not much of anything: seems we haven’t got any foreign policy. (What kind of foreign policy would you like to see?) I would like to see the four freedoms,” the Atlantic Charter actually applied in other countries. Then we also have to be realistic about it, but we have to strive to be idealistic — to realize the ideals eventually.”

There is something pathetic about this statement. For the contention that one has to be “realistic” in order ultimately to realize the ideals is certainly true. Taken in abstracto, however, and without specific concepts as to how this could be achieved, the truth becomes perverted into a lie, denoting only that “it cannot be done” while the individual still maintains the good conscience that she would be only too happy if it were possible.

Psychologically, the anti-utopian pattern of political thinking is related to sadomasochistic traits. They manifest themselves strikingly in the statement of the high-scoring San Quentin inmate, M622A, who comes fairly close to the “tough-guy” syndrome discussed in Chapter XIX. When asked “what is an ideal society like,” he answers: “Plenty of work for everybody; have all the strikes stopped.”

To the naive of this man, who certainly belongs to the poorest strata himself, the image of the present order has been petrified to such an extent that he cannot even conceive of a social system where, because of rational organization, each individual has less to work — to him the ideal is that everybody can work, which does not only include satisfaction of basic needs but also efforts which might easily be dispensed with today. The idea that some strict order should prevail is so overpowering to him that utopia becomes a society where no strikes are to be tolerated any more, rather than a society where strikes would be unnecessary.

It should be mentioned that the general denial of utopianism is sometimes reversed by the subjects whose statements we are scrutinizing here, when they speak about the United States.

Thus, M619, a low scorer of the San Quentin group, led by the prison situation to complete political resignation, still feels: “… I think part of the reason America has become the greatest country in the world is that because the dreams a man makes might come true.”

Of course, this is to be understood primarily as an expression of the dream that can be measured by the dollars and cents an individual can make, but it should not be forgotten that among the ideological foundations of American liberalism there is also a utopian element which, under certain conditions, may break through and overcome the gospel of supposed realism.

Apparently, the anti-utopian somehow feels uneasy about his own “realism,” and seeks an outlet by attributing to the reality with which he is most strongly identified, his own country, some of the utopian qualities he otherwise disavows.

Only the low- to medium-scoring San Quentin murderer, M628B, a man who has nothing to lose in life, says bluntly: “This country educates people, but in the so-called Ameri-
can way. . . I don’t believe this is the best country. Maybe in a materialistic way. . . . I would not value my life by material things.”

The undertone of this statement is, similar to M619, one of fatalistic resignation. Even low scorers who are not anti-utopian cannot think of utopia but in a quasi-fatalistic way: as if it were something preconceived, fixed once and for all; something which one has to “look up” rather than think and realize oneself. M711:

(What is ideal society like?) “That’s an awfully difficult question. Isn’t it based on the four freedoms?”

9. No Pity For The Poor

One should expect that a frame of mind which regards everything as basically bad should at least favor, in the area of politics and social measures, as much help for those who suffer as possible. But the philosophy of the anti-utopian pessimists is not tinged by Schopenhauerian mercy. The general pattern we are investigating here is characterized by an all-pervasive feature. These subjects want no pity for the poor, neither here nor abroad. This trait seems to be strictly confined to high scorers and to be one of the most differentiating features in political philosophy. At this point, the interrelatedness of some ideas measured by the PEC scale and certain attitudes caught by the F scale should be stressed. Abolition of the dole, rejection of state interference with the “natural” play of supply and demand on the labor market, the spirit of the adage “who does not work, shall not eat” belong to the traditional wisdom of economic rugged individualism and are stressed by all those who regard the liberal system as being endangered by socialism. At the same time, the ideas involved have a tinge of punitiveness and authoritarian aggressiveness which makes them ideal receptacles of some typical psychological urges of the prejudiced character. Here goes, for example, the conviction that people would not work unless subject to pressure — a way of reasoning closely related to vilification of human nature and cynicism. The mechanism of projectivity is also involved: the potentially fascist character blames the poor who need assistance for the very same passivity and greediness which he has learnt not to admit to his own consciousness.

Examples: The extremely high-scoring San Quentin inmate, M664C, whose F score is outstanding, shows clearly the psychological aspect of this particular ideology. He regards as the “major problem” facing this country the fact that it might do something for the starving people abroad. His statement shows also the intimate interrelation between the “no pity for the poor” and the fatalism complexes.

“Christ, we licked those other countries and now we’re gonna feed ‘em. . . . I think we ought to let ’em starve, especially them Japs. . . . Lucky I don’t have any relations killed in this war, I’d go out and kill me some Japs. . . . We’re gonna have another depression and gonna have another war too in a few years.”

By contrast, M658, another high-scoring convict with certain psychopathic traits, turn his affects against the unemployed rather than against the Japanese:

“I believe everybody should have an opportunity. Should not be any unemployment. Only reason they are unemployed, they are lazy like me.”

This may be regarded as one of the most authentic examples of sadomasochistic thinking in our interviews. He wants others to be treated harshly because he despises himself: his punitiveness is obviously a projection of his own guilt feelings.

Women are freer of the “no pity for the poor” complex. They rather over-compensate for it in terms of social welfare and charity which is, as indicated previously, a “high” value anyway. The following statement may be regarded as characteristic of the woman who humiliates him whom she pretends to help, and actually does not help at all but just makes herself feel important.

F359, a high scorer who combines conventionality with somewhat paranoid ideas about the Negroes:

Subject thinks that the poorer people should be taken care of by state or community projects. People in the community should get together, like people, for instance, who are good at organizing boys’ clubs; or they might organize dances and hold them at one person’s house one week, and at somebody else’s the next week. Everybody should contribute something: take up a small collection. In the case of a poor section it might get the funds from the city. One might also call on public funds for buildings, if needed.

The attitude of indifference to the lot of the poor together with admiration for rich and successful people sheds light on the potential attitude of the high scorers toward the prospective victims of fascism in a critical situation. Those who humiliate mentally those who are downtrodden anyway, are more than likely to react the same way when an outgroup is being “liquidated.” This attitude has, of course, strong sociological determinants: upward social mobility, identification with the higher class to whom they wish to belong themselves, recognition of universal competition as a measuring rod for what a person is worth, and the wish to keep down the potential threat of the dispossessed masses. These sociological motives, however, are inseparably bound up with the psychological mechanisms indicated above. The specific infantile implications may be indicated as follows: identification with the poor is quite enticing for children, since the world of the poor appears to them in many ways less restricted than their own, whilst they somehow sense the similarity between the social status of a child in an adult society and the status of the poor in a rich man’s world. This identification is repressed at an early phase for the sake of “upward mobility,” and also — even if the children are poor themselves — for the sake of the reality principle in general which tolerates compassion only as an ideology or as “charity” but not in its more spontaneous manifestations. They project the “punishment” they have re-

84Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), German philosopher. He espoused a philosophical pessimism that saw life as essentially evil, futile, and full of suffering. However, in accordance with Eastern thought (Hinduism and Buddhism) he saw salvation, deliverance, or escape from suffering in aesthetic contemplation, sympathy for others, and ascetic living.

85The “dole” : welfare.
ceived for their own compassion upon the downtrodden by regarding poverty as something the poor “brought upon themselves.” The same formula, incidentally, plays a decisive role in anti-Semitism.

10. Education Instead Of Social Change

The complement of the “no pity for the poor” complex is the overemphasis given to the education of people within the political sections of our interviews. The frequent reference to this topic is the more significant since it does not appear in the interview schedule. Nobody will deny the desirability of political education. It is hard to overlook, however, that the ideal of education often serves as a rationalization for social privileges. People who do not want to confess to anti-democratic leanings prefer to take the stand that democracy would be all right if only people were educated and more “mature.” This condition, naturally, would here and now exclude from political activities those who, on account of their economic situation, need most urgently a social change. This, of course, is never stated in so many words. If, however, as once happened, an overtly fascist man speaks in favor of the abolition of the poll tax in the South, and wants to replace it by an “intelligence test,” there is little doubt about the ultimate purpose. The adulation of “education” occurs quite frequently among uneducated people — perhaps because, for some reason beyond the scope of the present study, education has come to be a kind of a panacea in American ideology. None of our subjects ever takes the trouble of defining to what the mysterious “education” should refer: whether it pertains to the general educational level or whether some special kind of political education is envisaged and how it should be carried out.

The education complex is not confined to high or medium scorers but seems to be more frequent with them than with low scorers. Some examples are given. M1230A, a high-scoring man of the Maritime School Group, states,

(What is an ideal society like?) “It would take generations of breeding to bring everybody to the same educational standards . . . though not to have such great classes . . . although I think we should always have class distinction . . . some initiative to try to improve yourself.”

Here it is obvious that the education idea serves as a subtle device by which the anti-utopian can act to prevent a change and yet appear progressive. It is also characteristic that the stress put on a long drawn-out educational process is concomitant with the idea that there always should be some class distinction.

Similarly, the Canadian M934, a medium scorer, endorses the education idea as a “brake,” this time on the labor movement. He believes:

“The important thing in the labor movement today is education of the rank and file. I just don’t think labor is ready to take more influence today.”

It may be noted at random that the more production processes are standardized, the less special training is required, the more technological progress leads toward a certain enlightenment of the masses, the emptier the postulate of education becomes. Our subjects stick to it in a rather fetishistic way.

For the very high-scoring woman, F104, majoring in Spanish and interested in business, the political demarcation line between her ingroup, the Republicans, and the Democrats coincides with that of education.

“The type of people I have known who are Democrats are usually uneducated people who really don’t know what is happening. The present administration has made a mess of things.”

Thus the education ideology interprets the fact that the Democratic Party is more of a lower-class party than the Republicans.

Among low scorers the education idea is somewhat mixed up with the traditional socialist wish for enlightenment. Frequently, there occurs a complaint about the lethargy and the lack of political interest of the masses — from which, regularly, the subjects exempt themselves. In this context we may mention again the phraseological statement of our sailor, M117:

“We have a good basis for our political system. The majority of people are not interested or equipped enough to understand politics, so that the big proportion of U.S. politics is governed by the capitalistic system.”

The education complex leads us back to where our analysis started, to the ignorance and confusion which clouds the political thinking of most of our sample. It is possible that the education complex somehow expresses the awareness that one really does not know what one talks about when one discusses politics — often enough the praise of education follows, with low scorers, self-accusations on account of their lack of knowledge. However, the vague idea of education takes care of the experience of ignorance rather summarily by a slogan and reliance on an isolated factor of cultural life, thus dispensing with the effort of political thinking. Moreover, it serves in most cases the purpose of projecting one’s own ignorance onto others so that one may appear informed oneself.

One last observation may prove to be significant. Whereas the praise of education is heavily accentuated by high scorers, it is at the same time one of the most frequently heard anti-Semitic statements that “the Jews are all out for education” — generally associated with the assertion that they dodge hard manual labor. We may suspect that there is, at the hub of the education complex, the vague realization that this culture excludes the bulk of those whom it embraces from real participation in its more subtle gratifications. While the awkward talk about education expresses longing for a state of affairs where one is no longer stunted by the requirements of “being practical,” fury about one’s own educational frustration is projected upon the chosen foe who is supposed to possess what one has to deny to oneself.
C. Some Political And Economic Topics

Our previous discussion was, in accordance with the general approach of our study, formulated in subjective, rather than objective terms. That is to say, we have focused our interest on the patterns of political thinking of our interviewees, rather than on the stand they take with regard to objective political issues. As a matter of course our approach led also to a discussion of numerous political topics such as, for example, the evaluation of Roosevelt, the problem of government “bureaucracy,” attitudes taken toward “ideal society,” etc. No strict dichotomy between the subjective and objective political issues could be made. What remains now to be discussed are the attitudes of our subjects toward those political topics of the interview schedule so far not covered, though some of them, particularly with regard to the bureaucrat complex and the problem of government control of business, have been touched upon.

1. Unions

The problem of unionism was heavily emphasized in our interview schedule because it is a very timely political-economic topic, and because we expected it to be highly discriminatory. The questionnaire item, “Labor Unions should become stronger and have more influence generally,” did indeed prove to be discriminating in the statistical sense (D.P., 3.16 for men and 3.49 for women on Forms 40–45), but the interview protocols offer ample warning against any such primitive formula as low-score = pro-union, high-score = anti-union. A certain amount of criticism of unions is universal and there is no lack of otherwise outspoken low scorers who deviate with regard to the union question. Unambiguously pro-union are only a small number of politically conscious and highly articulate left-wingers. Otherwise, there are strong reservations with respect to unions throughout our sample. High and low scorers differ more in the way these reservations are made than in the simple pro- vs. anti-dimension. A critical attitude is taken by people who do not belong to unions, as well as by those who are members.

Some differences between questionnaire and interview might be expected on the basis that the questionnaire calls for more or less forthright statements, whereas the interview allows the subjects to elaborate their ideas in all their complexity. Here, it would seem, the interview comes closer to the subjects’ real opinion than does the questionnaire. Since the organization of labor and the issue of the closed shop affects the lives of most people in some immediate way, the factor of “alienation” and the accompanying ignorance and confusion plays a lesser part than it does, say, when people discuss “all those bureaus” far away in Washington.

Thus, the critical sentiment expressed with regard to the unions has to be taken very seriously. This criticism must not be identified automatically with reactionism. Here more than anywhere else, there is some basis in reality, and the complaints are, generally, much more reasonable, show much more common sense than when it comes to issues such as the politicians or the Jews. Labor organizations have more or less to adapt themselves to the prevailing conditions of an economic life ruled by huge combines, and thus they tend to become “monopolies.” This means discomfort for innumerable persons who in their business are faced with a power which interferes with what they still feel to be their individual right as free competitors. They have to yield an extra part of their profit to what labor demands from them, over and above the price for the commodity which they buy, the laborer’s working power. This appears to them as a mere tribute to the power of the organization. It is significant, however, that at least the high scorers resent labor monopolies but not their model, industrial monopolization as such. This is not surprising. The population has much more direct contact with the labor organizations than with the organizations of industry. People have to negotiate with their local unions about extra pay, overtime, wage increases, and working conditions, while Detroit, where their car is being made and priced, is far away. Of course, deeper-lying motives of social identification are also involved.

The monopolization of labor affects also the workers themselves who feel bossed by the huge organization upon which they exercise very little influence as individuals and who, if they are not admitted, feel hopelessly “out-grouped.” This nucleus of experience in the critique of organized labor has to be recognized lest one rush to conclusions.

The element of partial truth in the critique of labor is among the most dangerous fascist potentials in this country. While there are quite a few points in the critique of labor which cannot be refuted, they are easily chosen as points of departure, in order to do away with unions altogether, replacing them by government-controlled corporations — one of the main economic objectives of fascists everywhere. No analysis of the fascist potential is valid which does not give account of the agglomerate of rational critique and irrational hatred in the people’s attitude toward labor. Some characteristic reactions of our interviewees may, at least, illustrate the problem.

We begin with examples of an attitude toward labor which is very widespread among low scorers: the acceptance of unions with more or less incisive qualifications. Obviously, anti-labor attitudes among otherwise “progressive” people are particularly important for broader issues of prognosis.

M310, a thoroughly liberal and progressive member of the University Extension Testing Class, speaks about the “so-called free enterprise system which really is monopoly.” To the question about the 30 per cent wage increase demanded by labor, he answers:

“Well, don’t like to see anybody set an arbitrary figure for any demand. At the same time very sympathetic to wage demands. E.g. the auto workers right now. On the other hand, the bakery workers in San Francisco are striking merely for a base rate, although all of them are making above that now: they are just thinking of the future. … I am for unions, but I think we should recognize that sometimes they become selfish-interest groups. … Disappointed in the labor movement as a reform vehicle, their only interest is in higher wages for their own small group, especially A.F. of L. craft unions or monopolies.”

Behind this statement looms the dim consciousness that
today’s labor movement, instead of aiming at a better society, is satisfied with securing certain advantages and privileges within the present setup. This is just the opposite of the typical high scorer’s complaint that unions have become too political, a matter to be discussed later.

M112, a low-scoring college sophomore, senses the danger that cumbersome, mammoth unions might become undemocratic. He is anti-monopoly in the sense that he hopes to stop social trends by breaking down highly centralized units into smaller ones.

“I don’t like large organizations. There should be local unions, local companies, never very large. There is Kaiser, but he’s not so bad. Standard Oil is not good or I.G. Farben of Germany.”

M620, a low-scoring convict, is typical of those who resent the interference of organized labor with the functioning of the machinery of production as a whole:

(What do you think of political trends today?) “Well, I believe seriously that labor is going to have to acquire a sense of responsibility. . . . Well, to me a contract is more or less sacred.” Subject objects to strikes in general, especially to jurisdictional strikes. (What about 30% increase in wage demands?) “I believe if the unions are willing to work they should have it. But if they give no returns, completely unjustified. (What about G.M. strike?) Should be settled as quickly as possible, one way or the other. . . . I believe both labor and business sort of ignore the little fellow. . . . I am sort of bitter about this strike business. . . . I feel labor should have more responsibility.”

M711, an extreme low scorer of the Employment Service Veterans group, mixes up the collectivistic power of unions with the threat of fascism and makes, by projection, Hitler a Veterans group, mixes up the collectivistic power of unions with the threat of fascism and makes, by projection, Hitler a typical high scorer’s complaint that unions have become too political, a matter to be discussed later.

(What do you think of political trends today?) “Well, I believe seriously that labor is going to have to acquire a sense of responsibility. . . . Well, to me a contract is more or less sacred.” Subject objects to strikes in general, especially to jurisdictional strikes. (What about 30% increase in wage demands?) “I believe if the unions are willing to work they should have it. But if they give no returns, completely unjustified. (What about G.M. strike?) Should be settled as quickly as possible, one way or the other. . . . I believe both labor and business sort of ignore the little fellow. . . . I am sort of bitter about this strike business. . . . I feel labor should have more responsibility.”

M620, a low-scoring convict, is typical of those who resent the interference of organized labor with the functioning of the machinery of production as a whole:

(What do you think of political trends today?) “Well, I believe seriously that labor is going to have to acquire a sense of responsibility. . . . Well, to me a contract is more or less sacred.” Subject objects to strikes in general, especially to jurisdictional strikes. (What about 30% increase in wage demands?) “I believe if the unions are willing to work they should have it. But if they give no returns, completely unjustified. (What about G.M. strike?) Should be settled as quickly as possible, one way or the other. . . . I believe both labor and business sort of ignore the little fellow. . . . I am sort of bitter about this strike business. . . . I feel labor should have more responsibility.”

F340B has been mentioned before. She is of the University Extension Testing Class and scores middle on E, low on F, and high on PEC. She differentiates between the positive function of unions and their inherent evils which she describes in personalistic terms as “capitalistic” themselves.

(What do you think of labor unions in general?) “I think they are necessary — as an idea they are fine, but in practice — I have had the misfortune to meet some of the labor leaders in this area, and it was very disillusioning to me. (In what way? ) Well, if there ever were ‘capitalists,’ they were every bit of it, running their organization just like running a business — to squeeze everything out of it. (What do you think should be done about that?) Well, they should not object to having their financial statements audited — should be more open about it. (Do you think standards should be set up then, by the government perhaps?) Yes, I think I would rather see a strong public opinion do it — makes them realize they should be more fair-minded and open.”

Although no scoring has been done, the impression created by careful perusal of the whole interview material is that the attitude which accepts unions as a necessary evil is the average one, at least among those who are not articulately reactionary.

There is an exceedingly small number of unqualified pro-labor statements. The two examples to follow stem from San Quentin, both, of course, from low scorers.

M628B, a murderer:

(What do you think of labor unions?) “Definitely in favor of the closed shop. I don’t believe in private enterprise as in this country. If it was what they say it is, I would be in favor of it. . . . I don’t suppose the Constitution, but . . . we don’t live by it. . . . This story of work hard, my boy, and you’ll be great one day is fine . . . but when you won’t clothe and house, etc. the masses, I’ll say that’s an outrage . . . .”

M619, a sex criminal characterized by the psychiatrist as “simple schizophrenic,” is not altogether uncritical of labor but believes that the weaknesses of the unions are gradually disappearing: his unqualified acceptance is based on a somewhat empty general idea of progress.

(How do you feel about labor leaders today?) “The A.F. of L. I am in favor of it very much. The C.I.O., formerly I was not in favor of it, but as time moves on, the people seem to accept it more and more. I’m inclined to feel the faults of its inception have been ironed out . . . of course, the unions in the beginning used pretty high-handed methods, but perhaps the end will justify the means they took.”

One particular aspect of critical feelings toward labor should be stressed. It is the idea that unions should not engage in politics. Since this has nothing to do with those economic experiences with labor at which the complaints of many people aim, it is a matter of plain ideology, derived very probably from some belief that according to American tradition unions offer a means of “bargaining,” of obtaining higher shares, and should not meddle in other issues. The anger about wage disputes and strikes is displaced and becomes rationalized by hasty identification of organized labor and communism. Since unions in this country are incomparably less political and class-conscious than anywhere else, this objection is of an entirely different order from those previously discussed: it is truly an expression of reactionism. However, in this area the reactionary ideology is so strongly backed by preconceived notions that it infiltrates easily into the opinion of people of whom it could hardly be expected.

M621A is serving a term in San Quentin for theft. He scores low on E and F but high on PEC.

“I admire unions, but they shouldn’t agitate. (Evidently referring to any political activities.) They shouldn’t try to get more money, but should help people more. They should want to keep prices down like anyone else . . . unions have no business in pol-
against labor, however, make this evaluation appear to be a lit-
“a person who is conservative but not fascist.” His invectives
His interviewer, as was mentioned above (p. 649), called him
low, is nevertheless strongly identified with the entrepreneurs.

That many statements of forthright hostility to labor can
be found in our material is not astonishing. The striking fact,
however, is that such statements occur not only among high
scorers but again also among medium and low scorers.

We again limit ourselves to a few examples which will
give an idea of the structure of unqualified anti-unionism.

M202, a construction engineer, scoring generally very
low, is nevertheless strongly identified with the entrepreneurs.
His interviewer, as was mentioned above (p. 649), called him
“a person who is conservative but not fascist.” His invectives
against labor, however, make this evaluation appear to be a lit-
tle too optimistic. As an interesting deviation, a full account
of his anti-labor stand should be given.

In connection with the discussion of his work subject was
asked about his attitude toward labor unions. His response was,
“I am hipped about unions; there you have a hole in me!” He
joined a company as a strike-breaker in 1935. He took on a
job as a chemist. At that time he was just out of California
and there was a depression on. He had no strong feeling about
unions then, but just wanted a job. However, he did feel that a
man had a right to work if he wanted to, and he had no com-
punction about taking another man’s job. He continued with
the company after the strike was over. He described himself as
a “company man,” and, consequently, as having the company
point of view. When he works for a company he is one hundred
per cent for that company’s interests, otherwise he would not
stay with them. He has two objections to unions: (1) their pol-
cy of assuming that older men are better than younger men and
giving the better jobs to them rather than to newcomers; (2) the
closed shop. He thinks men should be allowed to “enjoy their
work.” If men know that they are going to be kept on a job even
if they don’t work hard, it does not encourage them to do their
best. For example, he hired two shop stewards whom he found
were no good, so he fired them; but the union demanded that he
take them back, which he had to do, as otherwise he would have
had no one to work for him. If a man sees that the fellow next
to him goes slow on the job and yet makes the same wages, he
will have no incentive to work hard and pretty soon he, too, will
slow down. The unions should not prevent a man from working
who does not want to join a union. The interviewer suggested
that the main purpose of the closed shop was to bargain for rates
of pay. Subject replied that if a group of men would band to-
gether to rate themselves and ask for more pay for the skilled
workers, or to work out better means of production, that would
be all right. If a company is not willing to pay for skilled work,
they don’t need to work there. By way of a summary, it may be
pointed out that the subject’s objections to unions boil down to
a feeling that unions not only do not foster hard work, but even
discourage it.

This case seems to be that of a man who, although politi-
cally unbiased, became highly antagonistic to labor through
concrete experience. It should be emphasized that, in spite of
his own description of himself as a “company man,” he by
no means admires businessmen, thinks that poverty could be
done away with by changes in our social system, and favors

government control in many respects. His views may be sum-
marized as being torn by a conflict between very progressive
general ideology and violent reactionary impulses within the
sphere of his own immediate interests — a configuration that
may be indicative of a dangerous pattern of potentialities in
many “liberals.” It seems, however, that the inconsistency of
this subject is not so much due to psychological factors as to
his professional position. His reactionary traits are derived
from his function as a member of the technological hierarchy
who has to look out for “efficiency” and finds that union inter-
ference tends to lower this efficiency rather than to enhance it.
Thus his attitude is not really so inconsistent as it appears on
the surface: one might rather say that his over-all progressive-
ness clashes with his technological progressiveness because
the two kinds of progress by no means harmonize objectively
under the present conditions of production.

The 22-year-old woman, F316A, is structurally similar.
She is a low scorer who turns violently anti-labor on account
of some grudges she has developed in her work as a junior
chemist in an oil development company.

Subject feels that the present labor situation is very bad be-
cause of all the strikes and that industry is really hamstrung.
The big unions are asking too much. (What about the union
at S.?) The S. union (C.I.O.) is undemocratic because the de-
partment heads and the junior chemists make all the decisions,
then tell the members about it at meetings, and they are not even
members of the union. (You also have a company union at S.,
don’t you?) “You mean the Association of Industrial Scientists?
It is not a company union (rather angrily). That was a dirty trick
of the C.I.O. — or rather not a dirty trick but a ruse — to ac-
cuse it of being a company union, because then it could not be
registered with the W.P.B. and so could not become a bargain-
ing agent for the employees. They thought if they could prevent
it from being registered for one or two years that it would die.
Because it is not the bargaining agent it cannot make a con-
tract for the workers, it can only hint to the company what it
would like. Although the A.I.S. only has a chapter at S., I don’t
think it is company dominated, although I have no proof. (Don’t
the laboratory assistants get paid almost as much as the junior
chemists?) Yes, when the junior chemists were getting $170 a
month and the C.I.O. secured a raise to $180 for the laboratory
assistants, the company had to raise the junior chemists to $200
a month. The C.I.O. complains that they do all the work and
yet the junior chemists won’t join. (Was not the raise a good
thing?) Yes, but I still would like to see what the A.I.S. could
do if it were registered: maybe it wouldn’t do anything.

As to the high scorers, the key theme of their anti-labor
ideology is that of the racket. They regard the pressure ex-
ercised by organized labor as illegitimate in a way compa-

\[86\] $170 = \$1,400; \$200 = \$1,600 in 2005.
rable to organized crime and conspiracy — the latter being one of the high scorers’ favorite topics anyway. To them, whose moralism has been emphasized from time to time in this book, the concept of the free market coincides with the moral law, and any factors which introduce, as it were, an extra-economic element into the business sphere are regarded by them as irregular. Incidentally, this suspicion does not concern to industrial monopolies and their pricing agreements but merely to the supposedly monopolistic structure of unions. Here again the idea of “legitimacy” — of identification with the strong — comes into play. Industrial combines seem, according to this kind of thinking, to be the outgrowth of a “natural” tendency, labor organizations a banding together of people who want to get more than their due share.

Viewed from a purely psychological angle the idea of “labor racketeering” seems to be of a nature similar to the stereotype of Jewish clannishness. It dates back to the lack of an adequately internalized identification with paternal authority during the Oedipus situation. It is our general assumption that the typical high scorers, above all, fear the father and try to side with him in order to participate in his power. The “racketeers” are those who by demanding too much (though the subject wants as much himself) run the risk of arousing the father’s anger — and hence the subject’s castration anxiety. This anxiety, reflecting the subject’s own guilt feelings, is relieved by projection. Thinking in terms of in- and outgroup, the high scorer who wants to “outgroup” the others is continuously prone to call them the ingroup. The more he tends himself, on account of his pretense to “status,” to circumspect the “normal” channels of free competition, the more he is likely to blame those he deems weak for the very same thing. Workers become “racketeers,” criminals to him as soon as they organize. They appear as the guilty ones after the pattern of “peddler bites dog.” Such psychological tendencies are, of course, magnetically attracted by any elements of reality which fit into the projective pattern. Here, labor organizations afford a rare opportunity.

M352, a shift foreman who calls himself a “head operator,” scores high on all scales.

“Well, at Standard Oil, no unions recognized. I’ve never been a union man. Through union there is strength, if it’s run okay, but a lot of unions of today have developed into a racket, and a source of political influence. The C.I.O. Political Action Committee particularly ... politics and unionism shouldn’t become too involved. The unions shouldn’t become a political organization; and the A.F.L. has developed into a racket for making money. The officers keep themselves in positions practically until they die, with no strings on how they use the money, and that should be controlled ... but if the local organization can run itself in an orderly fashion, okay, if the officers are conservative, but the minute they get too liberal, use a strike as a first weapon instead of as a last resort... etc.”

Here, as in many instances, critique is directed against the largeness of unions per se; with the romantic idea that purely local organization, being less institutionalized, would be better automatically.

87 About $1,200 in 2005.
88 About $4,000 in 2005.

M658, the San Quentin man quoted above, goes so far as plainly to advocate the abolition of unions:

(Political trends today?) “Oh, I think we are going to be ruled by a lot of clowns, by a lot of labor unions, ... Look at all these working stiffs ... that don’t know anything else, but how to drive a nail ... they try to run things, because a few hundred thousands of them get together. (What ought to be done?) Straighten them out, show them where they belong... . Take away their charters. (Meaning?) Well, every union has to have a charter. Abolish them. If necessary, abolish their meetings. (What about strikes?) That’s what I’m thinking of ... they’re a detriment to the country. (How should strikes be handled?) Refuse to re-employ them, or fine them. I don’t believe in sweat shops either, but this quietin’ when you’re making $150 a week87 anyway — kind of silly. Create inflation.” (Subject had earlier made a remark in discussing vocation and income — which interviewer neglected to record — to the effect that he himself thinks in terms of saving perhaps $500 or so,88 e.g., by theatre work, and then quitting for awhile. Note subject’s highly exaggerated fantasies of wartime wages.)

A few statements of extreme anti-unionism can be found among the Los Angeles sample. Perhaps the 20-year-old boy, 5014, high on E and PEC and middle on F, represents a certain kind of war veterans’ anti-unionism:

When asked about organized labor he says: “I am against it.” He doesn’t know the difference between the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. but he feels “like many of the veterans, we worked for nothing while the workers at home were on strike and making good money.”

The contrast between this subject’s hostility and his complete lack of information is striking.

5031–5032 are a husband and wife in a very high income group. Both are high on PEC, low on F, and low-middle on E. For them violent anti-unionism is concomitant again with contempt for human nature: they regard unionism simply as a device of the lazy ones to dodge labor.

Both of them are anti-labor. The husband is quite vehement about this. Although he expects prosperity to continue he feels it will be at the cost of a continual fight against labor’s demands. He feels that labor’s demands are unreasonable and that with labor’s recent victories that “even if one met labor’s demands one certainly does not get a day’s work out of carpenters, plumbers, etc.” Both of them claim to be without prejudice with regard to various minorities. It is interesting, however, that they did raise the issue of the acceptance of Jewish children in the school where their son went.

F5043, an extremely high-scoring middle-aged housewife, belongs to that school of potential fascists who find that “everything is a mess.” She first creates in true “we-the-mothers” style the imagery of a desperate crisis and then puts the blame on the labor situation.

“I have never seen anything like this,” she lamented when asked about the labor situation. “What have our boys been fighting for? Why, they come back to find that they have to go without a lot of things ... not even a place to live ... all because of the strikes.” Thus she blames labor for the present crises and resents the growth and strength of labor unions. She also feels that there is an irreconcilable breach between veterans and the workers and fears internal strife. She also blames the strikers for the growing trend of unemployment and is very pessimistic.
about the possibility of full employment. However, she does not feel that there is too much government interference and is rather vague about the role of big business and free enterprise. In fact, she seems to harbor only very strong anti-labor and anti-strike feelings, without any strong convictions on other issues. “It’s just a terrible mess,” she repeated, and she does not think the layman should get his hands dirty by “messing with politics.”

Whereas the low scorers who generally take a “pro, but” attitude toward unions insist on the soundness of the principle but object that unions are “going too far,” getting more, as it were, than their share, the typical high scorers blame them indiscriminately for the supposedly critical social situation, for the standardization of life (5001 and 5003), and for forthright dictatorial aims. To the high scorers anti-unionism is no longer an expression of dissatisfaction with concrete conditions from which they might have suffered, but a plank in the platform of reactionism which also automatically includes anti-Semitism, hostility toward foreign countries, hatred of the New Deal, and all those hostile attitudes which are integrated in the negative imagery of American society underlying fascist and semi-fascist propaganda.

2. Business And Government

As was to be expected, the general ideological pattern pertaining to government interference in business is highly consistent with that which pertains to labor. The average opinion — if such a term, without proper quantification, is allowed — seems to be that a certain degree of government control is indispensable, particularly in wartime, but that it contradicts basically the principle of economic liberalism. State interference still falls within the category of the necessary evil. To the high scorers in particular the government interference in business is just another aspect of the usurpation complex, a matter of dictatorial arbitrariness jeopardizing the rights of the hard-working money earners. But it should be noted again that there is no sharp line between high and low scorers with regard to government interference, whilst the how, the way in which both groups express their critical attitude, differentiates.

The following examples of a partly positive attitude toward government interference are chosen from medium and high scorers.

F340A, of the Extension Testing Class, a young clerk, is middle on E but high on F and PEC. She is interesting because of a certain attitude of intellectual fairness expressing itself in attempts to see also the other side of the picture: an “anti-paranoid” trait of the American frame of mind which, incidentally, is among the strongest bulwarks against fascism as far as subjective factors are concerned.

She doesn’t believe in government control of industry. Maybe it would be all right for the government to take over transportation, gas, electricity, and water. (Why?) Maybe they could do it cheaper; she is not sure about that. Anyway, if there was a strike, like on the Key System they would be holding up everything and the government could make them go back to work. “When the government tells you to do something, you do it.”

The quotation shows an ambiguous element in the affirmation of government interference: whereas the latter is resented as a violation of liberalism, it is, simultaneously, appreciated as a potential means to keep organized labor at bay. It should be remembered that the National Socialists always complained about the “Welfare State” of Weimar but later on surpassed by far any state interference ever attempted by German socialist governments.

The high-scoring parole officer, M109, is reminiscent of F340A in so far as his support for some kind of government interference is authoritarian rather than favorable to any restrictions on the anarchy of free enterprise or to rational planning for the sake of all. (Cf. quotations on pp. 676, 679.)

Those who are outspokenly set against government controls again comprise both low and high scorers. Here, of course, the low scorers are particularly interesting.

The already quoted M711, an “easy going” low scorer, is opposed to state interference simply because he feels a fascist potential in it, apparently unaware of the progressive function this interference had under Roosevelt:

(Government control?) “I don’t. There, again, that could be a road to a fascist state eventually. Certain controls would have to be exercised.”

In spite of his leftist ideology this man shows symptoms of a confusion which may make him the prey of pseudo-progressive slogans of fascist propaganda: it is the same man who justifies his anti-union attitude with the spurious assertion that Hitler was in favor of unions.

M204, another low scorer, a young man of the Psychiatric Clinic group, suffering from anxiety neurosis, calls himself a socialist and feels that the New Deal was too conservative, but states, nevertheless:

The government should not be completely in control of everything. Favors something like the Scandinavian system: CCF, full employment, labor government, favors cooperatives. “I think it will come that way in this country. Government control can be run wrong. Instead we should preserve individual freedom and work through education.”

To sum up: the low scorers’ criticism of government interference is based on the traditional idea of freedom, the fear of an authoritarian abolition of democratic institutions and an individualistic way of living. This makes for a potential resistance against any attempts at a planned economy. There is a possibility that a good many traditional values of American democracy and liberalism, if naively maintained within the setup of today’s society, may radically change their objective functions without the subjects even being aware of it. In an era in which “rugged individualism” actually has resulted in far-reaching social control, all the ideals concomitant with an uncritical individualistic concept of liberty may simply serve to play into the hands of the most powerful groups.

The statements against government control of our high scorers are of a completely different kind. To them, unionism, New Dealism, government control are all the same, the rule of those who should not rule. Here resentment of government interference is fused with the “no pity for the poor” complex.

The San Quentin “tough guy,” M664b:
The San Quentin murderer, M651a, who is serving a life sentence, is set against government interference, his point of view being that of the businessman who talks “common sense.”

(What about government controls over business?) “No, I believe in free enterprise. I believe that business should be able to conduct their own business, except during the war we had to have ceiling prices. . . . But competitive business makes low prices. . . .”

It may be noted that the feeling, even of the high scorers, with regard to government control as such, though it represents to them the hated New Deal, does not seem to be as “violent” as their anti-unionism. This may be partly due to the authoritarian undercurrent which, somehow, makes them respect, to a certain extent, any strong government, even if it is built on lines different from their own, partly from the rational insight into the necessity of some government interference. Many of our interviews were conducted during or shortly after the war, at a time when it was obvious that nothing could be achieved without government control, and it is this fact which reference is frequently made, mostly as a qualification of the rejection of government control. This, however, certainly depends largely on the situation, and if interviews should be conducted today, the picture would very probably be different.

There is one particular issue which deserves some attention in this connection, the attitude of our subjects toward monopolism. On the one hand, monopolies are the outgrowth of free enterprise, the consummation of rugged individualism; on the other hand, they tend to assume that kind of non-competitive control which is rejected when exercised by the government. Probably no “public opinion” concerning monopoly has crystallized so far, mainly because much fewer people are aware of the anonymous and objective power of big combines than are aware of official legal measures of the state. However, a few examples may illustrate how the problem of institutionalized super-business is reflected in the minds of some of our subjects.

M115, a conventional but non-fascistic fraternity man, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC, is set against “this Mandan stuff,” but nevertheless, feels:

“Big business should be controlled when it gets too large. In some fields, like transportation, power, etc., large-scale organization is necessary. The main thing there is to prevent monopoly, and to have limitations on profits.”

The unresolvable contradiction between this man’s strongly anti-socialist and equally outspoken anti-monopoly attitudes, is in all probability characteristic of a very large section of the population. In practice, it amounts to an artificial “holding up” of economic developmental tendencies, rather than to a clear-cut economic concept. Those layers of the European middle class which were finally enlisted by fascism were also not infrequently set, in ideology, against the big combines.

M118, a low-scoring man of the University Extension Testing Class, sees the problem but is still so deeply imbued with traditional economic concepts that he is prevented from following his logic to its conclusions.

“The emphasis now is on ‘free enterprise,’ but that often results in monopoly, the big concerns squeezing the little guys to death. There is too much of a gap between the rich and the poor. People climb up by pushing others down, with no regulation. For this reason, government should have more influence economically, whether or not it goes as far as socialism.”

The same man criticizes Wallace for being “too impractical.” One cannot escape the impression that monopolism is used as a vague negative formula but that very few subjects are actually aware of the impact of monopolization on their lives. The union issue, in particular, plays a much bigger role in over-all ideology.

3. Political Issues Close To The Subjects

It has been pointed out in the early part of this chapter that political confusion and ignorance, and the gap between surface ideology and concrete reactions, are partly due to the fact that the political sphere, even today, seems to most Americans too far away from their own experiences and their own pressing interests. Here we go briefly into a discussion of some political and economic topics of the interview schedule which, for imaginary or actual reasons, are closer to the hearts of our subjects, in order to form at least an impression on how they behave with regard to these matters, and whether their behavior differs markedly from that in the field of “high politics.”

First, an illustration of what may be called “imaginary closeness.” Our interview schedule contained at least one question which was, in the middle of its realistic surroundings, of a “projective” nature. It was concerned with the $25,000 income limit.89 Neither is this question a pressing political issue nor could many of our interviewees be expected to have any immediate personal interest in limitations of income on such a high level. The answers to this question, which would deserve a thorough going analysis of its own, are indicative of an element of the American dream much more than of political attitudes. There were exceedingly few among our subjects who wanted to accept such an income limitation. The utmost concession they made was the acknowledgment that one can live on this amount. The prevailing view, however, was that, in a free country, every person should be allowed to earn as much as he can, notwithstanding the fact that the chance to make as much today has become largely illusory. It is as if the American kind of utopia was still much more that of the shoeshine boy who becomes a railroad king, than that of a world without poverty. The dream of unrestricted happiness has found its refuge, one might almost say, in the somewhat infantile fantasy of infinite wealth to be gathered by the individual. It goes without say-

89 About $200,000 in 2005.
ing that this dream works in favor of the status quo; that the identification of the individual with the tycoon, in terms of the chance to become one himself, helps to perpetuate big business control.

Among those subjects who are outspokenly in favor of the income limit is the San Quentin check-writer, M664C, a high-scoring man, so full of fury and envy against everything that he does not even like the wealthy.

(What about $25,000 limit on salaries?) “What the hell is that for? That’s no more than fair; hell, that’s too much money anyway.”

The apparent radicalism of this man can be appreciated only if one recollects that it is he who is outraged by the idea of feeding starving countries.

The very widespread feeling of our subjects on the $25,000 income limit can be summed up in the eager plea of M621A, of the San Quentin Group, a low scorer on E and F but a high scorer on PEC.

“They shouldn’t do that. If a man has the ability, more power to him.”

The next few topics are characteristic of the aforementioned tendency of our subjects to become more rational and “progressive” as soon as institutions or measures of a supposedly “socialistic” nature, from which the individual feels he can draw immediate benefits, are, brought into the discussion. OPA and health insurance are examples.

Our interviews seem to show that OPA, also a “bureaucratic” agency of government interference, is very generally accepted. Here are a few examples, picked at random:

Again M621A:

(OPA?) “I think it’s done a very wonderful thing in this country. May have gone too far, e.g., in the housing situation in San Diego.” (Subject thinks the OPA should have solved the housing situation.)

One of the few exceptions is the wealthy Los Angeles couple, S031 and S032, who are “disgusted and fed up with the New Deal, priorities, and all this damn red tape created by OPA.”

Most others are in favor of OPA, sometimes, however, with a certain strain of punitiveness, such as the San Quentin low scorer, M627, already quoted:

“Well, the OPA is doing a good job if they control this black market.”

This comes out most strongly in the interview of the San Quentin high scorer M658, the man who wants to abolish labor unions.

“If (the OPA) had an iron glove underneath their kid gloves, he all right. They fine a guy $100 — for making $100,000.”

The general appreciation of OPA is the more interesting since this institution has been under constant newspaper attacks for many years. But here the advantages, particularly with regard to the housing situation, are so obvious that ideological invectives apparently lose some of their impact on the population. To demand the abolition of OPA because of the “damn red tape” in Washington may mean that one has no roof over one’s head.

Something similar holds true of health insurance. High and low scorers, with very few exceptions, concur in its appreciation. M656A, a high scorer of the San Quentin Group, serving a term for second-degree murder, after having stated that a person can live on $25,000 a year but should be allowed to make what he is capable of making, and who certainly cannot be called a socialist, answers to the question about public health insurance, “I’m for it.”

The above quoted easy-going, low-scoring man, M711, is enthusiastic:

“Public health insurance? Unqualifiedly yes . . . important as almost any measure of ideal society.”

Finally, our attention should be directed toward an economic area which is of the utmost importance for the formative processes of fascism. This is taxes. It is perhaps the point at which pent-up social fury is most freely given vent. With the high scorers, this fury is never directed overtly against basic conditions but has nevertheless the undertone of desired violent action. The man who bangs his fist on the table and complains about heavy taxation is a “natural candidate” for totalitarian movements. Not only are taxes associated with a supposedly spendthrift democratic government giving away millions to idlers and bureaucrats, but it is the very point where people feel, to put it in the words of one of our subjects, that this world does not really belong to the people. Here they feel immediately that they are required to make sacrifices for which they do not get any visible returns, just as one of our subjects complains that he cannot see what he can get out of the war. The indirect advantages each individual may draw from taxes paid are obscure to him. He can only see that he has to give something without getting anything back, and this, in itself, seems to contradict the concept of exchange upon which the free market idea of liberalism is built. However, the extraordinary amount of libido attached to the complex of taxes, even in a boom period, such as the years when our subjects were interviewed, seems to confirm the hypothesis that it draws on deeper sources of the personality as much as on the surface resentment of being deprived of a considerable part of one’s income without visible advantages to the individual. The rage against the rational tax system is an explosion of the irrational hatred against the irrational taxation of the individual by society. The Nazis knew very well how to exploit the complex of the “taxpayer’s money.” They went so far as to grant, during the first years of their rule, a kind of tax amnesty, publicized by Goering. When they had to resort to heavier taxation than ever before they camouflaged it most skilfully as charity, voluntary donations, and so forth, and collected large amounts of money by illegal threats, rather than by official tax legislation.

Here are a few examples of the anti-taxation complex:

The high-scoring man, M105, who is violently anti-
Semitic and associated with the “lunatic fringe,” says:

“It is the taxpayer’s money that has been put into South America; other countries will think we are fools.”

M345, a radar engineer of the Extension Testing Class, who scores middle on E, low on F, but high on PEC, believes:

(What about government control of business?) “It has gotten to the point where it is requiring too much of the citizens’ tax money and time.”

Again, the taxpayer’s complex is not limited to high scorers. The low-scoring man, M116, the deviate case of a conformist, conventional conservative definitely opposed to prejudice, strongly identified with his father, accepts his Republican views:

“… also because businessmen generally don’t like the taxes.”

In case of a new economic crisis, where unemployment would necessitate high taxation of people whose incomes have shrunk, this complex would undoubtedly play an exceptionally dangerous role. The threat is the more serious since, in such a situation, a government which would not impose taxes would fail, while one which would take steps in this direction would invariably antagonize the very same group from which totalitarian movements most likely draw their support.

4. Foreign Policy And Russia

Lack of information on the part of our subjects prevails, even more than anywhere else, in the area of foreign politics. There are usually rather vague and misty ideas about international conflicts, interspersed with morsels of information on some individual topics with which the subjects either happen to be familiar or to which they have taken a fancy. The general mood is one of disappointment, anxiety, and vague discontent, as symbolically epitomized by the medium-scoring woman, F340B: “Seems we haven’t got any foreign policy.”

This may easily be a mere echo of newspaper statements frequently made at the time of the study by columnists such as Walter Lippman and Dorothy Thompson. Repeating them transforms the feeling of insecurity and disorientation of many of our subjects into the semblance of critical superiority. More than in any other political sphere, our subjects live “from hand to mouth” in the area of international affairs.

There is a striking lack of a sense of proportion, of balanced judgment, considering the importance or unimportance of topics of foreign politics. One illustration, stemming from the “easy going” low scorer M711:

(Major problems facing country?) “Hard question to answer… Perhaps the main one is how we’re going to fit in with the rest of the world… I’m a little concerned about what we seem to be doing in China… If we are a carrier of the torch of the Four Freedoms, I think we are a little inconsistent in our maneuverings in China and Indonesia.”

This statement seems to be a “day residue” of continuous newspaper reading rather than the expression of autonomous thinking. Yet it should be noted that it remains within the anti-imperialist frame of reference of the low scorer.

The symbol of political uneasiness is the atom bomb which is dreaded everywhere. The stand taken toward the atom bomb seems to differentiate the high from the low scorers. As is to be expected, also for psychological reasons, the high scorers are all out for secrecy. Here, as elsewhere, “they want to keep what we have.”

M662A, the San Quentin “tough guy,” high on all scales:

(Threats to present form of government?) “Atom bomb. If these other countries get it, they’re going to use it on us and we’re going to have to look out for Russia. . . . I’m for Russia, but . . . I think sooner or later we’re going to go to war with them.”

As to the prospect of a devastating war, this man seems to take a fatalistic view as if it were a natural catastrophe rather than something dependent on humans. This is in keeping with our clinical knowledge of the male high scorers’ psychological passivity (cf. p. 575).

The low scorers either want to outlaw the atom bomb or to make the secret public:

M627, the alcoholic sex-offender, low on E and PEC but high on F:

(Major problems facing this country?) “Well, I think this atom bomb. (Solution?) … Well, it ought to be outlawed and money appropriated to see if we can’t use that power for good.”

F515, the “genuine liberal” who is to be discussed in detail in Chapter XIX (p. 782), pleads for international atomic control:

“Truman doesn’t want to give away the secret of the atom bomb — I think he should. It’s already out anyway.”

Although the over-all ideology is fear of war, the high scorer’s attitude indicates that, while deeming war inevitable, they have some underlying sympathy for war-making, such as that found in the Los Angeles high-scoring radio writer 5003 characterized as highly neurotic:

As for the world state, he expects anything at the present time. “Why shouldn’t we have further wars? We are animals and have animal instincts and Darwin showed us it is the survival of the fittest. I’d like to believe in the spiritual brotherhood of men, but it’s the strong man who wins.”

This kind of phrasing, “why shouldn’t we have further wars,” is indicative of his agreement with the idea, in spite of his talk of spiritual brotherhood. The use that is often made of the Darwinian slogan of the survival of the fittest in order to rationalize crude aggressiveness, may be significant of the fascist potential within American “naturalism,” although it is supposedly linked to progressive ideals and enlightenment. 5009, a 32-year-old teaching principal in a small California town, who scores high on all scales, rationalizes his belief in a forthcoming war differently:

He expects no warless world and thinks that the next war will be with Russia. “The United States has always ranged itself against dictatorship.”

While he shows the typical high scorers’ attitude — psychologically linked to cynicism and contempt for man — of regarding war as unavoidable, he justifies a policy which actually may lead to war with a democratic ideal: the stand to be taken against dictatorships.
A third aspect of subscribing to the war idea comes up in the interview of the aforementioned 5031, a wealthy building contractor. He feels that perhaps we had better go to war with Russia now and get it over with.

Here the high scorer’s typical cynicism, a fusion of contempt for man, exaggerated down-to-earthness, and underlying destructiveness, is allowed uncensored expression. Whereas in the sphere of private morale such psychological urges are held at bay by the acceptance of more or less conventionalized humane standards, they are let loose in the sphere of international politics where there seems to be as little of a collective superego as there is of a truly powerful supranational control agency.

The all-too-ready assumption that war cannot be abolished — which, according to this man, could be hoped for only if military men ran the UNO93 — is fused with the administrative, quasi-technical, idea that one “should get it over with” as soon as possible, that Russia should be taken care of. War and peace become matters of technological expediency. The political consequence of this way of thinking is self-explanatory.

As with many other political topics, attitude toward Russia, whether for or against, does not by itself differentiate with any sharpness between high and low scorers. There is, first, a kind of “pseudo-low” attitude toward Russia. It falls in line with the general admiration of power in high scorers and is positive only as far as Russian military successes are concerned. It turns into hostility where Russian strength is presented as potentially dangerous. This happens with the San Quentin inmate M621A, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC. He expresses his true anti-Russian feelings by means of personalization:

(Major problems facing country today?) “I think Russia…. (Subject fears a war with Russia sooner or later over the atom bomb.) Russia wants control of territory in China, so do the United States and England. (What do you dislike most about Russia?) Well, a little bit too aggressive. Of course, they’ve done some wonderful things. Five year plan, educated themselves. (What good things about Russia?) Lots of stamina to stand up under hardship. (Objections?) I met quite a few Russians. Don’t like them, because they seem to be overbearing. (How do you mean?) They like to have their own way. … (Subject met the Russians he has been exposed to in Shanghai, chiefly Russian merchants.) They really believe in ‘taking’ you. They are not very clean…. I didn’t have any very definite ideas before.”

It may be noted how close this man’s attitude toward the Russians comes to certain anti-Semitic stereotypes. However, he has nothing against the Jews; as a matter of fact his wife is Jewish. In this case anti-Russianism may be a phenomenon of displacement.

However, there is also a “genuine” low scorer’s negative attitude against Russia, based on aversion to totalitarianism. Here, the Psychiatric Clinic patient M204, suffering from anxiety neurosis, a moderate socialist and militant pacifist, with low scores on all scales, fits in:

He is a little skeptical about the Soviet Union, disapproving of their totalitarian methods, but being interested in “their interesting experiment.”

Another example is M310, a liberal of the Extension Testing Class with an unusually low score, assistant manager for an advertising agency, whose criticism touches upon formal democratism while at the same time he is repelled by the oligarchical aspects of Russian government:

(Your understanding of democracy?) “Government of, for, and by the people. Government by majority, directed to its achieving good results for the people. May be a difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, in that sense, may be democracy in Russia. I don’t think it necessarily takes our voting system, although I like (democratic voting)…. (You are critical of Soviet Russia?) I don’t like the concentration of political power in so few hands.”

Sometimes this kind of critique assumes, with low scorers, the aspect of disagreement with American communists because of their wholesale endorsement of Russian politics.

M203, a teacher, “liberal but not radical,” with low scores on all scales:

“It is good to have intelligent, liberal leadership, rather than radical leadership, which would be bad. (Example?) Well, like the communists in this country: they are not intelligent, they are too radical, and there is too much line which is determined by Russia. For instance, Roosevelt was less rigid and learned more by his mistakes.”

It should be noted that this man is an outspoken anti-fascist who finds it “disgraceful that Bilbo94 should be in Congress.”

As to the pro-Russian attitude found among low scorers, it cannot be overlooked that it has sometimes a somewhat mechanical outlook. Here the element of stereotypy comes clearly to the fore in low scorers. As an example M713A may serve. He is a young veteran, studying landscape architecture, whose scores are all low.

(How do you feel about Soviet Russia?) “A very wonderful experiment…. I believe that if left alone will be the greatest power in a few years. (Disagreement with the communists’ line?) Just in the matter of approach. Their approach is a little too violent, though I can see the reason for that…. I think we ought to approach it a little more gradually…. If went into communism would just be like the army…. Maybe take a hundred years — we are working gradually toward it.”

It is a question whether the idea of a gradual development is compatible with the theory of dialectical materialism officially accepted in Russia, or whether it is indicative of a dubious element in the subject’s appreciation of the “wonderful experiment.” It should be noted that the idea of socialism as an “experiment” stems from the vernacular of middle-class “common sense” and it tends to replace the traditional socialist concept of class struggle with the image of a kind of joint, unanimous venture — as if society as a whole, as it is today, were ready to try socialism regardless of the influence of existing property relations. This pattern of thinking is at least inconsistent with the very same social theory to which our subject seems to subscribe. Anyway, he, like any of our

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other subjects, goes little into matters of Marxian doctrine or of specific Russian issues, but contents himself with rather a summary positive stand.

And then there is the idea of the “greatest power.” That this idea is not exceptional among low scorers, in other words, that a positive stand toward Russia may have something to do with the Russian successes on the battle-fields and in international competition, rather than with the system, is corroborated by the San Quentin inmate M619, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC, the man who does not believe in any real utopia:

“Well, Russia is undoubtedly one of the most powerful nations in the world today. They’ve risen to power in the last few years and made more progress than any other country.”

Our general impression concerning our subjects’ attitude towards Russia may be summed up as follows. To the vast majority of Americans, the very existence of the Soviet Union constitutes a source of continuous uneasiness. The emergence and survival of a system that has done away with free enterprise seems to them a threat to the basic tenets of the culture of this country, to the “American way,” by the mere fact that it has shattered the belief in liberal economy and liberal political organization as a “natural” eternal phenomenon which excludes any other rational form of society. On the other hand, the success of Russia, particularly her performance during the war, appeals strongly to the American belief that values can be tested by the outcome, by whether they “work” — which is a profoundly liberalistic idea by itself. The way our subjects cope with this inconsistency of evaluation differentiates between high and low scorers. To the former, the Soviet Union, incompatible with their frame of reference, should be done away with as the extreme expression of the “foreign,” of what is also in a psychological sense “strange,” more than anything else. Even the fact that Russia has proved successful in some respects is put into the service of this fantasy: frequently, Russian power is exaggerated, with a highly ambivalent undertone comparable to the stereotypes about “Jewish world power.” To the low scorers Russia is rarely less “strange” — an attitude which has doubtless some basis in reality. But they try to master this sense of strangeness in a different way, by taking an objective attitude of “appreciation,” combining understanding with detachment and a dash of superiority. When they express more out-spoken sympathies for the Soviet Union, they do so by implicitly translating Russian phenomena into ideas more familiar to Americans, often by presenting the Russian system as something more harmless and “democratic” than it is, as a kind of pioneering venture somehow reminiscent of our own tradition. Yet indices of a certain inner aloofness are rarely missing. The low scorers’ pro-Russian sympathies seem to be of a somewhat indirect nature, either by rigid acceptance of an extraneous “ticket” or by identification based on theoretical thinking and moral reflections rather than on an immediate feeling that this is “my” cause. Their appraisal of Russia frequently assumes an air of hesitant, benevolent expectancy — let us see how they will manage. This contains both an element of authentic rationality and the potential of their swinging against Russia under the cover of handy rationalizations if pressure of public opinion should urge such a change.

5. Communism

The complex, Russia, is closely associated with the complex of communism in the minds of our subjects. This is all the more the case since communism has ceased to be in the public mind an entirely new form of society, based on a complete break in the economic setup, and has become bluntly identified with the Russian government and Russian influence on international politics. Hardly any reference to the basic issue of nationalization of the means of production as a part of the communist program has been found in our sample — a negative result which is significant enough with regard to the historical dynamics to which the concept of communism has been subjected during the last two decades.

Among the high scorers the only feature of the old idea that seems to have survived is the “bogy” of communism. The more the latter concept is emptied of any specific content, the more it is being transformed into a receptacle for all kinds of hostile projections, many of them on an infantile level somehow reminiscent of the presentation of evil forces in comic strips. Practically all features of “high” thinking are absorbed by this imagery. The vagueness of the notion of communism, which makes it an unknown and inscrutable quantity, may even contribute to the negative affects attached to it.

Among the crudest expressions of these feelings is that of our insect toxicologist M108, by whom the problem of communism is stated in terms of plain ethnocentrism:

(Why is he against communism?) “Well, it is foreign. Socialism, o.k. — you respect a man who is a socialist but a communist comes from a foreign country and he has no business here.”

F111, who scores high on E, middle on F, and low on PEC, is a young girl who wants to become a diplomat because she is “mad at England and Russia.” Her idea of communism has an involuntarily parodic ring:

(Political outgroups?) “Fascists and communists. I don’t like the totalitarian ideas of the fascists, the centralization of the communists. In Russia nothing is private, everything goes to one man. They have violent ways of doing things.”

To the mind of this woman, the idea of political dictatorship has turned into the bogy of a kind of economic supra-individualism, just as if Stalin claimed ownership of her type-writer.

By a similarly irrational twist another high scorer, M664B, an uneducated and unintelligent sex offender of the San Quentin group, with high scores on all scales, simply associates communism with the danger of war:

“If labor keeps getting more power, we’ll be like Russia. That’s what causes wars.”

The complete irrationality, not to say idiocy, of the last three examples shows what vast psychological resources fascist propaganda can rely on when denouncing a more or less imaginary communism without taking the trouble to discuss any real political or economic issues.
If representatives of this attitude enter upon any argumentation at all, it is, the last examples indicate, centered in the facile, though not completely spurious identification of communism and fascism which displaces hostility against the defeated enemy upon the foe to be.

Low scorers are not immune in this respect. Thus the low-scoring student-minister M910 is of the following opinion:

(How do you feel about Russia’s government?) “I think there is very little difference between fascism and communism as it’s practiced in Russia. The 1936 Constitution is a marvelous document. I think it’s five hundred years ahead of our Constitution because it guarantees social rights instead of individual rights but when man hasn’t any rights except as a member of the Communist Party . . . I think it’s capitalistic . . . . (What is the nature of your objections to Russia?) Well, first of all, I think it was Russia that carried the ball in entering this veto power into the UNO which I think will be the death of the thing right now . . . . Russia has got the things right where they want them. We think we’re the leaders but we fool ourselves . . . .” (Subject objects strongly to deceitful diplomacy.)

High scorers who make less intellectual effort simply find communism not individualistic enough. The standard phraseology they employ contrasts nicely with the belief in spiritual independence which they profess. We quote as an example F106, a high scorer of the Public Speaking Class group, a young teacher:

(Political outgroups?) “Communists have some good ideas but I don’t think too much of them. They don’t give the individuals enough mind of their own.”

Sometimes the identification of communism and fascism is accompanied by paranoid twists in the Elders of Zion95 style. M345, our radar field engineer:

(What do you think of the P.A.C.?) “Never found any definite information on the C.I.O . . . but . . . C.I.O. seems the agency to turn international, certainly has got all the earmarks, not because of being labor union, but just because of the way they compare.” (Subject compares communism to Hitler in Mein Kampf, telling exactly what planned to do and how, and then doing it.) “C.I.O. has followed the lines of action very similar to pronounced policies of Comintern — even their name, Congress for Industrial Workers; not much faith in the communists succeeding. Their aim is tight little control of their own group.”

The mix-up of Comintern, CIA, and Mein Kampf is the appropriate climate for panic, and subsequent violent action.

But this climate by no means prevails. There is one quite frequently noted way of dealing with the problem of communism which safeguards the aspects of detached objectivity while allowing for good-natured rejection. It reminds one of the story of the boy who, when offered some very sour dish and asked whether he liked it answered: “Excellent — when I’ll be grown up.” Communism is a good thing for the others, particularly for “those foreigners,” from whom it has been imported anyway. This technique is employed by both high and low scorers. 5008, the liberal-minded Jefferson descendant:

“The communists may be able to do something in the Soviet Union, but they would utterly fail here.”

In M115, the low-scoring fraternity man, the argument has a noticeable taint of contempt for the have-nots. This is the man who wants “none of this Marxian stuff.”

“. . . but in poorer countries, like in Russia, Germany, etc., it’s necessary in some modified form; but not in America. We have too much here already, that is we are too developed already.”

The subject is not struck by the idea that a collectivistic economy might be easier in an industrially highly advanced, mature country, rather than more difficult. To him, communism is simply identified with enhancement of material productive powers through more efficient organization. He seems to be afraid of overproduction as if this concept would still make sense in an economy no longer dependent upon the contingencies of the market.

Even the extreme low scorer M1206a, of the Maritime School group, who believes that America will eventually become a socialist country,

thinks that Russia has a wonderful system of government — for Russia “though I don’t think we could transplant its system to this country . . . though we should watch her and get ideas to build our own country better.”

In this case the argument is mitigated by an element of thoughtfulness which is in accordance with the stand taken by this subject with regard to the Communist Party in this country:

“Well, I don’t know a great deal about it. I believe that if a man wants to be a communist, that’s not only his privilege, but his duty . . . to try and convince as many people as he can . . . .” Subject objects vigorously to red-baiting tactics . . . . “I think that Russia will be the most democratic country in the world in time . . . Joe has been a little ruthless at times, but . . . .”

Sometimes the argument is fused with the idea that socialism would not be “practical,” for purely economic reasons which are mostly taken from the very sphere of a profit system which is supposed to be replaced under socialism by an economic organization molded after the needs of the population. F359, the previously (pp. 616, 690) quoted high-scoring accountant in a government department:

Subject thinks that communism is all right for Russia, but not for this country, although the trend seems to be more and more that way. She believes in private ownership of property and the private enterprise system. She considers it more efficient. She is not so sure about government ownership of public utilities such as water, etc. She thinks that they probably operate better under private ownership, that the costs are lower.

The interviews of other subjects show an unmistakably condescending overtone of this same argument, such as M107, a medical student who scores high on E but middle on F and PEC:

“We can cooperate with Russia; if they want communism they have to have it.”

This type of liberal approach, of which, incidentally, the Hitler regime profited during the whole Chamberlain era of noninterference, is not as broad-minded as it may appear. It often hides the conviction that there is no objective truth in politics, that every country, as every individual, may behave as it likes and that the only thing that counts is success. It

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95The Protocols of the Elders of Zion: A antisemetic literary forgery that purports to describe a Jewish plot to achieve world domination.
is precisely this pragmatization of politics which ultimately defines fascist philosophy.

Obviously, the relationship between anti-communism and fascist potential as measured by our scales should not be oversimplified. In some of our earlier studies the correlation between anti-Semitism and anti-communism was very high, but there is reason to believe that it would not be so high today, not, at least, at the surface level. During the last several years all the propaganda machinery of the country has been devoted to promoting anti-communist feeling in the sense of an irrational “scare” and there are probably not many people, except followers of the “party line,” who have been able to resist the incessant ideological pressure. At the same time, during the past two or three years it may have become more “conventional” to be overtly opposed to anti-Semitism, if the large number of magazine articles, books, and films with wide circulation can be regarded as symptomatic of a trend. The underlying character structure has little bearing on such fluctuations. If they could be ascertained, they would demonstrate the extreme importance of propaganda in political matters. Propaganda, when directed to the anti-democratic potential in the people, determines to a large extent the choice of the social objects of psychological aggressiveness.

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96 Cf. Levinson and Sanford (71).
A. Introduction

The relationship between prejudice and religion played a relatively minor role in our research. This may be due in a large part to the nature of our sample. It did not include any specific religious groups nor was it drawn from geographical areas such as the Bible Belt or cities with a heavily concentrated Irish-Catholic population in which religious ideology has considerable social importance. If research along the lines of the present work should be carried through in such areas, the religious factor might easily come to the fore to a much greater extent than in the present study.

Apart from this limitation, there is another and more fundamental one. Religion does not play such a decisive role within the frame of mind of most people as it once did; only rarely does it seem to account for their social attitudes and opinions. This at least was indicated by the present results. The quantitative relationships obtained (Chapter VI) are not particularly striking, and although part of the interview schedule was devoted specifically to religion, it cannot be said that the material gathered in this part of the interviews is very rich. On an overt level at least, religious indifference seems to put this whole sphere of ideology somewhat into the background; there can be no question but that it is less affect-laden than most of the other ideological areas under consideration and that the traditional equation between religious “fanaticism” and fanatical prejudice no longer holds good.

Yet, there is reason enough to devote some close attention to our data on religion, scarce though they may be. The considerable part played by actual or former ministers in spreading fascist propaganda and the continuous use they make of the religious medium strongly suggest that the general trend toward religious indifference does not constitute altogether a break between religious persuasion and our main problem. Although religion may no longer stimulate open fanaticism against those who do not share one’s own belief, we are led to suspect that on a deeper, more unconscious level the religious heritage, the carry-over of old belief and the identification with certain denominations, still make themselves felt.

Our approach was guided by certain theoretical considerations inherent in our general frame of reference. In order to give relief to the focus of our observations, it is appropriate to indicate the more fundamental of these theoretical reflections.

It was expected from the very beginning that the relations between religious ideology and ethnocentrism would be complex. On the one hand the Christian doctrine of universal love and the idea of “Christian Humanism” is opposed to prejudice. This doctrine is doubtless one of the major historical presuppositions for the recognition of minorities as sharing equal rights with majorities “in the sight of God.” The Christian relativization of the natural, the extreme emphasis on the “spirit,” forbids any tendency to regard natural characteristics such as “racial” traits as ultimate values or to judge man according to his descent.

On the other hand, Christianity as the religion of the “Son” contains an implicit antagonism against the religion of the “Father” and its surviving witnesses, the Jews. This antagonism, continuous since St. Paul, is enhanced by the fact that the Jews, by clinging to their own religious culture, rejected the religion of the Son and by the fact that the New Testament puts upon them the blame for Christ’s death. It has been pointed out again and again by great theologians, from Tertullian and Augustine to Kierkegaard, that the acceptance of Christianity by the Christians themselves contains a problematic and ambiguous element, engendered by the paradoxical nature of the doctrine of God becoming man, the Infinite finite. Unless this element is consciously put into the center of the religious conception, it tends to promote hostility against the outgroup. As Samuel (101) has pointed out, the “weak” Christians resent bitterly the openly negative attitude of the Jews toward the religion of the Son, since they feel within themselves traces of this negative attitude based upon the paradoxical, irrational nature of their creed — an attitude which they do not dare to admit and which they must therefore put under a heavy taboo in others.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that many of the usual rationalizations of anti-Semitism originate within Christianity or at least have been amalgamated with Christian motives. The fight against the Jews seems to be modeled after the fight between the Redeemer and the Christian Devil. Joshua Trachtenberg (119) has given detailed evidence that the imagery of the Jew is largely a secularization of the medieval imagery of the Devil. The fantasies about Jewish bankers and moneylenders have their biblical archetype in the story of Jesus driving the usurers from the Temple. The idea of the Jewish intellectual as a sophist is in keeping with the Christian denunciation of the Pharisee. The Jewish traitor who betrays not only his master but also the ingroup to which he has been admitted, is Judas. These motifs are enhanced by more unconscious trends such as are expressed in the idea of the crucifix and the sacrifice of blood. Although these latter ideas have been more or less successfully replaced by “Christian Humanism,” their deeper psychological roots have still to be reckoned with.97

In attempting to evaluate the influence of such elements of religion upon the existence or absence of prejudice today, one has to take into consideration the position in which Chris-

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97 A detailed theoretical analysis of the relationship between Christianity and anti-Semitism has been contributed by Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno (53).
Christianity presently finds itself: it is faced with an “indifference” which often seems to make it altogether unimportant. The Christian religion has been deeply affected by the process of Enlightenment and the conquest of the scientific spirit. The “magical” elements of Christianity as well as the factual basis of Christian belief in biblical history have been profoundly shaken. This, however, does not mean that Christian religion has been abolished. Although largely emasculated in its profoundest claims, it has maintained at least part of the social functions acquired throughout the centuries. This means that it has largely become neutralized. The shell of Christian doctrine, above all its social authority and also a number of more or less isolated elements of its content, is preserved and “consumed” in a haphazard way as a “cultural good” like patriotism or traditional art.

This neutralization of religious beliefs is strikingly exemplified by the following statement of M109, a high-scoring Roman Catholic who attends church regularly. He writes on his questionnaire that he considers religion a “thoroughly important part of existence, perhaps it should occupy 2 to 5 per cent of leisure time.”

The relegation of religion, which was once regarded as the most essential Sphere of life, to “leisure,” as well as the time allotment made for it and, above all, the fact that it is subsumed under a calculated time schedule and referred to in terms of per cent is symbolic of the profound changes which have taken place with regard to the prevailing attitude towards religion.

It may be assumed that such neutralized residues of Christianity as that indicated in M109’s statement are largely severed from their basis in serious belief and substantial individual experience. Therefore, they rarely produce individual behavior that is different from what is to be expected from the prevailing patterns of civilization. However, some of the formal properties of religion, such as the rigid antithesis of good and evil, ascetic ideals, emphasis upon unlimited effort on the part of the individual, still exercise considerable power. Severed from their roots and often devoid of any specific content, these formal constituents are apt to be congealed into mere formulae. Thus, they assume an aspect of rigidity and intolerance such as we expect to find in the prejudiced person.

The dissolution of positive religion and its preservation in a noncommittal ideological form are due to social processes. While religion has been deprived of the intrinsic claim of truth, it has been gradually transformed into “social cement.” The more this cement is needed for the maintenance of the status quo and the more dubious its inherent truth becomes, the more obstinately is its authority upheld and the more its hostile, destructive and negative features come to the fore. The transformation of religion into an agency of social conformity makes it fall in line with most other conformist tendencies. Adherence to Christianity under such conditions easily lends itself to abuse; to subservience, overadjustment, and ingroup loyalty as an ideology which covers up hatred against the disbeliever, the dissenter, the Jew. Belonging to a denomination assumes an air of aggressive fatality, similar to that of being born as a member of one particular nation. Membership in any particular religious group tends to be reduced to a fairly abstract ingroup-outgroup relationship within the general pattern brought out by the foregoing discussion of ethnocentrism.

These theoretical formulations are not intended as hypotheses for which crucial tests could be provided by our research; rather, they furnish some of the background against which the observations now to be reported may plausibly be interpreted.

B. General Observations

There is much in the interview material to support the view, suggested by findings from the questionnaire, that the more religion becomes conventionalized, the more it falls in line with the general outlook of the ethnocentric individual. An illustration of this point is afforded by the following excerpt from the interview of F5054, a woman who scored high on the ethnocentrism scale.

The subject seems to have accepted a set of rather dogmatic moral codes which makes her regard people, especially “youngsters who call themselves atheists” as falling outside the circle in which she wants to move. She made a point of admitting (confidentially) that one of the main reasons she was looking forward to moving away from Westwood was that she could thereby get her youngest daughter away from the influence of the neighbor’s boy, who is an atheist because his father tells him “religion is a lot of hooey.” She is also distressed, because her eldest daughter “just won’t go to church.”

From the above it is evident that she is quite in agreement with organized religion and tends to be a conformist in religious matters. Christian ethics and its moral codes are regarded as absolutes; and deviations are to be frowned upon or punished.

This account suggests that there is a connection between conventional religious rigidity and an almost complete absence of what might be called personally “experienced” belief. The same holds for the high-scoring man 5057, a person who sticks to the Church although he “does not believe in a personal God.”

The subject believes that most Protestant religions are very much the same. He selected Christian Science because “it is a quieter religion than most.” He started going to Unity Sunday school while living with his grandparents and liked the Unity Church, which, in his estimation, presents a mild form of Christian Science. He joined the Christian Science Church when he married, inasmuch as his wife’s family and his wife are all Christian Scientists. “Religion should not be allowed to interfere with the ordinary essentials. However, religion should restrain you from overindulgences of any kind, such as drinking, gambling, or anything to excess.”

A high-scoring young woman, F103, says “My parents let us make our own choice; just so we go to church.” There we see the lack of any interest in the content of religion; one goes to church because “it’s the thing to do” and because one wants to please one’s parents. A final example is afforded by another prejudiced young woman, F104, who remarks “I have never known any people who were not religious. I have known one fellow who was wavering, and he was a very morbid person.” The idea here seems to be that one goes to church in order to express one’s normality or at least to be

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classed with normal people. These examples help us to understand why persons or groups who “take religion seriously” in a more internalized sense are likely to be opposed to ethnocentrism. What proved to be true in Germany, where “radical” Christian movements, such as the dialectical theology of Karl Barth, courageously opposed Nazism, seems to hold good beyond the theological “elite.” The fact that a person really worries about the meaning of religion as such, when he lives in a general atmosphere of “neutralized” religion, is indicative of a nonconformist attitude. It may easily lead toward opposition to the “regular fellow,” for whom it is as much “second nature” to attend church as it is not to admit Jews to his country club. Moreover, the stress on the specific content of religion, rather than on the division between those who belong and those who do not belong to the Christian faith, necessarily accentuates the motives of love and compassion buried under conventionalized religious patterns. The more “human” and concrete a person’s relation to religion, the more human his approach to those who “do not belong” is likely to be: their sufferings remind the religious subjectivist of the idea of martyrdom inseparably bound up with his thinking about Christ.

To put it bluntly, the adherent of what Kierkegaard, a hundred years ago, called “official Christianity” is likely to be ethnocentric although the religious organizations with which he is affiliated may be officially opposed to it, whereas the “radical” Christian is prone to think and to act differently. However, it should not be forgotten that extreme religious subjectivism, with its one-sided emphasis on religious experience set against the objectified Church, may also under certain conditions fall in line with the potentially fascist mentality. Religious subjectivism that dispenses with any binding principles provides the spiritual climate for other authoritative claims. Moreover, the sectarian spirit of people who carry this outlook to an extreme sometimes results in a certain affinity for the aggressive ingroup mood of movements generally condemned as “crack-pot,” as well as for those underlying anarchical trends which characterize the potentially fascist individual. This aspect of religious subjectivism plays an important role in the mentality of fascist agitators who operate in a religious setting.

Among those who reject religion, a number of significant differences may be noted. As our quantitative results have shown, no mechanical identification of the non- or anti-religious person with the “low scorer” can be made. There are, to be sure, “agnostic” or “atheistic” persons whose persuasions are part and parcel of a universally progressive attitude which holds for minority questions. The actual meaning of this “progressiveness,” however, may vary widely. Whereas anti-religious progressives are definitely opposed to prejudice under present conditions, when it comes to the question of susceptibility to fascist propaganda, it makes all the difference whether they are “ticket thinkers” who subscribe wholesale to tolerance, atheism, and what not, or whether their attitude toward religion can be called an autonomous one based on thinking of their own. Moreover, it may turn out to be an important criterion of susceptibility whether a person is opposed to religion as an ally of repression and reaction, in which case we should expect him to be relatively unprejudiced, or whether he adopts an attitude of cynical utilitarianism and rejects everything that is not “realistic” and tangible, in which case we should expect him to be prejudiced. There also exists a fascist type of irreligious person who has become completely cynical after having been disillusioned with regard to religion, and who talks about the laws of nature, survival of the fittest and the rights of the strong. The true candidates of neo-paganism of the fascist extreme are recruited from the ranks of these people. A good example is the high-scoring man 5064, the Boy Scout leader, discussed in Chapter XVI. Asked about religion, he confesses to “worshiping nature.” He exalts athletics and camp collectivity, probably on the basis of latent homosexuality. He is the clearest example we have of the syndrome involving pagan pantheism, belief in “power,” the idea of collective leadership, and a generally ethnocentric and pseudo-conservative ideology.

It is against the background of these general observations on the structure of the relationship between religion and modern prejudice that the following, more specific observations may be understood.

### C. Specific Issues

#### 1. The Function Of Religion In High And Low Scorers

Evidence in support of our hypothesis concerning “neutralized” religion is offered by a trait which seems to occur rather frequently in our interview material. It is the disposition to view religion as a means instead of an end. Religion is accepted, not because of its objective truth, but on account of its value in realizing goals that might also be achieved by other means. This attitude falls in line with the general tendency toward subordination and renunciation of one’s own judgment so characteristic of the mentality of those who follow fascist movements. Acceptance of an ideology is not based upon understanding of or belief in its content but rather upon what immediate use can be made of it, or upon arbitrary decisions. Here lies one of the roots of the stubborn, conscious, and manipulative irrationalism of the Nazis, as it was summed up by Hitler’s saying: “Man kann nur für eine Idee sterben, die man nicht versteht.” (One can die only for an idea which one does not understand.) This is by its intrinsic logic tantamount to contempt for truth per se. One selects a “Weltanschauung” after the pattern of choosing a particularly well advertised commodity, rather than for its real quality. This attitude, applied to religion, must necessarily produce ambivalence, for religion claims to express absolute truth. If it is accepted for some other reason alone, this claim is implicitly denied and thereby religion itself rejected, even while being accepted. Thus, rigid confirmation of religious values on account of their “usefulness” works against them by necessity. Subordination of religion to extrinsic aims is common in

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98 The interaction between revivalism, religious subjectivism, and fascist propaganda has been analyzed in detail by T. W. Adorno (3).
both high and low scorers; by itself, it does not appear to differ-
entiate between them. It seems, however, that prejudiced
and unprejudiced subjects do differ with respect to the kinds
of goals that are emphasized and the ways in which religion
is utilized in their service.

High scorers, more often than low scorers, seem to make
use of religious ideas in order to gain some immediate prac-
tical advantage or to aid in the manipulation of other peo-
ple. An example of the way in which formalized religion is
adhered to as a means for maintaining social status and so-
cial relationships is afforded by the highly prejudiced young
woman, F201, who is very frankly interested in “a stable so-
ciety” in which class lines are clearly drawn.

“I was brought up in the Episcopal Church through going
to a school for girls. It’s nice. My friends go. It’s more of a phi-
losophy (than Christian Science); it raises your standards. The
philosophy of the Episcopal Church follows the pattern of all
Protestant churches. It takes in the upper classes and gives them
a religion or makes it a little nearer.”

Ethnocentric subjects frequently think of religion as a
practical aid in the mental hygiene of the individual. The
statement of F109 is characteristic.

“I don’t understand religion. It’s like a fairy tale to me. I
don’t know if I believe in God. There must be one but it is hard
to believe it. Religion gives you something to hold on to, to base
your life on.”

If religion only serves the need for something “to hold on to,”
this need may also be served by anything which provides the
individual with absolute authority, such as the fascist state.
There is a strong probability that fascism played exactly the
same role with German womanhood which was formally ex-
ercised by their belief in positive religion. Psychologically,
fascist hierarchies may function largely as secularizations and
substitutes of ecclesiastical ones. It is not accidental that
Nazism arose in Southern Germany with its strong Roman-
Catholic tradition.

M118, a moderately high scorer, shows clearly the ele-
ment of arbitrariness in his religious belief, mixed up with
pseudo-scientific statements which take the stamina out of
this belief.

“I am willing to believe in the existence of a God. Some-
thing I can’t explain anyway. Was it Darwin who said the world
started with whirling gas? Well, who created that? Where did
the start of it come from? That of course has little to do with
church ritual.” (He has stated just before that the church “is
pretty important.”)

There is no logical interconnection between this reasoning
and the subject’s adherence to positive Christianity. Con-
sequently the continuation of the passage reveals by its
sophistry the aspect of insincerity in conventionalized reli-
gion which leads easily to malicious contempt for the values
one officially subscribes to. M118 goes on to say:

“I believe in the power of prayer even if it’s just in the satis-
faction of the individual performing it. I don’t know if there

is any direct communication but it helps the individual, so I’m
for it. It’s also a chance for introspection; to stop and look at
yourself.”

The approach to religion for extraneous reasons is proba-
ably not so much an expression of the subject’s own wants and
needs as an expression of his opinion that religion is good
for others, helps to keep them content, in short, can be used
for manipulative purposes. Recommending religion to others
makes it easier for a person to be “in favor” of it without any
actual identification with it. The cynicism of the central Eu-
ropean administrators of the nineteenth century who taught
that religion is a good medicine for the masses, seems to have
been to a certain extent democratized. Numerous members of
the masses themselves proclaim that religion is good for the
masses, whereas they make for themselves, as individuals, a
kind of mental reservation. There is a strong similarity be-
tween these appreciations of religion and a trait which played
a large role in Nazi Germany. There, innumerable persons
exempted themselves privately from the ruling ideology and
talked about “they” when discussing the Party. The fascist-
minded personality, it seems, can manage his life only by
splitting his own ego into several agencies, some of which fall
in line with the official doctrine, whilst others, heirs to the old
superego, protect him from mental unbalance and allow him
to maintain himself as an individual. Splits of this kind be-
come manifest in the uncontrolled associations of uneducated
and naïve persons, such as the rather medium-scoring man
M629, who is serving a life sentence in San Quentin prison.
He makes the extraordinary statement:

“I believe, personally, I have a religion that hasn’t been de-
\nined so far as I know in any books yet. I believe that religion
\nhas a value for people who believe in it. I think it’s used as an
\nescape mechanism by those who use it.”

The illogical way in which this man has made a sedative of
religion can be accounted for without much psychological in-
terpretation by the fact that he spent nineteen months in con-
demned row.

More sophisticated persons sometimes have to deal with
the same conflict. An example is the moderately high woman,
5059, who rejects atheism because “an atheistic funeral was
so cold.” She simply denies any contradictions between sci-
ence and religion, calling the idea of a contradiction a “malev-
olent invention,” thus apparently projecting her own uneasi-
ness about this conflict upon those who speak it out. This is
similar to the mentality of the Nazi who puts the blame for
social defects on the critique of our social order.

It must now be pointed out that low scorers also often ac-
cept religion, not because of any intrinsic truth that it may
hold for them, but because it may serve as a means for fur-
thering human aims. An example of such practical religion is
the following excerpt from the interview with a woman stu-
dent of journalism, F126, who obtained extremely low scores
on both the A–S and the E scales.

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This attitude, that of a homespun psychologist as it were, can also be found in low scorers. The characteristic configuration to be found in high scorers,
however, seems to be the unresolved contradiction between a critical attitude toward religion as an objectivity and a positive attitude toward it for purely
subjective reasons. It is characteristic of the prejudiced mentality as a whole that he stops thinking at certain contradictions and leaves them as they are, which
implies both intellectual defeatism and authoritarian submissiveness. This mechanism of arbitrarily giving up processes by command of the ego, as it were, is
often misinterpreted as “stupidity.”

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Family were moderate church-goers. She rarely goes now. However, she has much respect for religion and seems to feel that it might be developed into something that would give people that faith and understanding for each other that is lacking. "I don't know what else could give people something to hold onto, some purpose in life. They seem to need something to believe in. Some of us seem to have a love for people without that, but not very many."

In one sense this way of looking at religion has something in common with the externalized attitudes described above. However, it is our impression that when the practical approach to religion appears in the thinking of the low scorer its content, or its context, can usually be distinguished from what is found in the thinking of the high scorer. Thus, although the young woman just quoted believes that religion is good for people, gives them "something to hold onto," she seems to mean that they need it at least for a humane and ideal purpose, that is, so that they may have more "understanding for each other," not simply in order to get along better or to function more efficiently. Low as well as high scorers are likely to consider that religion contributes to the mental hygiene of the individual; but whereas the high scorers characteristically indicate that it is good for other people because they are chronically weak, and possibly good for themselves in times of acute external stress ("fox-hole religion"), the low scorers are more likely to think of religion in internalized terms, as a means for reducing hatred, resolving inner conflicts, relieving anxiety, and the like. Practically never do we encounter a low scorer who conceives of religion primarily in terms of external practical utility — as an aid to success, to status and power, or to a sense of being in accord with conventional values.

2. Belief In God, Disbelief In Immortality

The neutralization of religion is accompanied by its dissection. Just as emphasis on the practical uses of religion tends to sever religious truth from religious authority, so the specific contents of religion are continually submitted to a process of selection and adaptation. The interview material suggests that the tendency to believe selectively in religion is a distinguishing feature of our prejudiced subjects. A fairly common phenomenon among them is belief in God accompanied by disbelief in immortality. Two examples follow. In the case of 5009, a devout Baptist, the interviewer reports:

sincerely feels deeply religious, believes in God, but has, as an educated man, occasional doubts concerning the life after death.

And in the case of 5002:

still is a "Christian," believes in God, would like to believe in life after death, but has doubts and thinks that a sincere religious revival or a new religious myth would be a good thing for the world.

Particularly common are statements to the effect that interviewees regard themselves as religious, as followers of the church, but disagree with "some of its teachings," which sometimes refers to miracles, sometimes to immortality. This outlook seems corroborative of an underlying pattern of considerable significance the elements of which have been established in our psychological analyses. The abstract idea of God is accepted as an expansion of the father idea, whereas general destructiveness makes itself felt in a reaction against the hope for the individual expressed by the dogma of immortality. Subjects with this point of view want a God to exist as the absolute authority to which they can bow, but they wish the individual to perish completely.

The concept of God underlying this way of thinking is that of the absolute essence of punitiveness. It is therefore not astonishing that religious leanings of this particular brand are frequent in the high scorers among our group of prison inmates (cf. Chapter XXI).

M627, who is serving a life sentence for rape, is "having trouble with religion" and does not believe that "there should be a set way of worship." But he believes, in spite of an undertone of religious rebelliousness,

"that every man should have his own way of worship as long as he believes in a power greater than himself."

This power has the form of external authority, but remains completely abstract, nothing but the projective concept of power as such.

"Well, I have heard so many fellows talk about the powers they believed in . . . and I tried to recognize the power in myself and just couldn't . . . read all kinds of religious books . . . but still kind of foggy."

The same line of thought is expressed by M656A, who is serving a term for forgery, "Robert" in Chapter XXI.

"Well, I'm not a man to discuss religion a great deal, because I don't know a lot about it. I believe in the Bible, I believe there is someone a lot bigger and stronger than anyone on this earth . . . I don't attend church often but . . . try to live the right way."

For this man all specific religious content is negligible compared with the idea of power and the closely related rigid, moralistic stereotypes of good and bad:

"The Catholic religion, for example, is just as good as the one I believe in. They all are patterned after the same type of living, right or wrong. I'm the type of person that doesn't believe in any particular denomination."

This "abstract authoritarianism" in religious matters easily turns into cynicism and overt contempt for what one professes to believe. M664C, asked about his religious views, answers:

"Oh, I don't pay much attention . . . I believe in God and all that stuff but that is about all."

The choice of the word "stuff" refutes the statement in which it occurs. One effect of neutralization in such cases is that little is left of God but the object of swearing.

The nihilistic aspect of the configuration here under consideration is clearly indicated in the case of the murderer M651.

"The part I like about it is the fact that it makes other people happy, though it doesn't concern me, and you see so much hypocrisy."

Asked what is most important in religion, he says:
“Belief, I think that belief is everything. That is the thing that holds you together.”

When this is pursued by the interviewer who wants to find out something about the subject’s own religious feelings, he answers:

"... I believe when you die you are through... Life is short and eternity is forever. How could God send you to Hell for eternity, just on the basis of a short lifetime’s record... it doesn’t seem to be either merciful or just."

This material is indicative of relationships among abstract belief in power, rejection of the more concrete and personal aspects of religion, particularly the idea of an eternal life, and thinly veiled impulses toward violence. As this violence is taboo within the individual, particularly in situations such as a prison, it is projected upon a Deity. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that an entirely abstract idea of the almighty Deity, as it prevailed during the eighteenth century, could be reconciled much more easily with the "scientific spirit" than could the doctrine of an immortal soul, with its “magical” connotations. The process of demythification liquidates traces of animism earlier and more radically than it does the philosophical idea of the Absolute.

It may be noted, however, that just the opposite tendency can be observed among addicts of astrology and spiritualism. They often believe in the immortality of the soul, but strongly deny the existence of God, because of some kind of pantheism which ultimately results in exaltation of nature. Thus, case M651, not quite consistently with his previous confession of religiousness for extraneous reasons, comes out with the statement that he: believes in astrology because he doesn’t believe in God.

There is reason to believe that the ultimate consequence of this attitude is sinister.

3. The Irreligious Low Scorer

The difference between irreligious and religious low scorers may correspond to a difference between rational and emotional determinants of freedom from prejudice. Subject M203 is characteristic of the former. He may be regarded as a genuine liberal with a somewhat abstract, rationalistic mentality. His anti-religious attitude is based not so much on political persuasions as on a general positivistic outlook. He rejects religion for “logical reasons” but differentiates between “Christian ethics,” which he regards as falling in line with his progressive views, and “organized religion.” Originally, his anti-religious attitude may have been derived from anticonventional rebellion: “I went to church because I was expected to.”

This rebellion is somewhat vaguely rationalized as being of a purely logical nature, perhaps on account of some unconscious guilt feelings. (He is unemotional and apathetic in a way suggesting neurotic traits, possibly a disturbance in his relation to objects.) His rational critique of religion is formulated as follows:

"But I was always pretty skeptical of it; I thought it kind of phony, narrow, bigotted and snobbish, hypocritical... unsemantic, you might say. It violates the whole Christian ethics."

Religion is here experienced both as a humanizing factor (Christian ethics) and as a repressing agency. There can be no doubt that this ambiguity has its basis in the double function of religion itself throughout history and it should, therefore, not be attributed solely to subjective factors.

The term hypocritical, used by M203, occurs very frequently in the interviews of low scorers, and sometimes in those of high scorers, usually with reference to the organization of the church in contrast to “genuine” religious values. This expresses the historical emancipation of subjective religious experience from institutionalized religion. The hatred of the hypocrite, however, may work in two ways, either as a force toward enlightenment or as a rationalization of cynicism and contempt for man. It seems that the use of the term hypocrite, like that of the term “snob” obtains more and more the connotation of envy and resentment. It denounces those who “regard themselves as something better” in order to glorify the average and to establish something plain and supposedly natural as the norm. The struggle against the lie is often a mere pretext for coming into the open with destructive motives rationalized by the supposed “hypocrisy” and “uppishness” of others.

This phenomenon can be understood against the background of democratized culture. The critique of religion as “hypocritical,” a critique which in Europe was either confined to small intellectual layers or countered by metaphysical philosophy, is in this country as widespread as Christian religion itself. Part of the amivalence toward religion can be accounted for by the simultaneous ubiquity of both the Christian heritage and the “spirit of science.” This double cultural ubiquity may favor an inconsistent attitude toward religion without necessarily involving the individual’s psychological make-up.

The fact that America, for all its interest in science, is still close to a religious climate may help to explain a more general trait of irreligious low scorers: their actual or fictitious “negative” conversion. Thus, for example, 5028 and 5058, like M203, report that they “broke away” from religion. In American culture one is rarely “born” as an irreligious person: one becomes irreligious through conflicts of childhood or adolescence, and these dynamics favor nonconformist sympathizes which, in turn, go with opposition to prejudice.

That a subject is consciously irreligious under the prevailing cultural conditions suggests the existence of a certain strength of the ego. An example is M202, our “conservative but not fascist” person (see pp. 649, 707), who scores extremely low on the E scale.

As a child subject was very religious. He went to church with his family every Sunday and he would “fall on my knees in the street” to pray for something. At the age of 19 he changed. He became disgusted by the gossip in church. They would tell him things about someone that were “none of their damned busi-

100Cf. the section on F.D.R. in Chapter XVII. (Note by Adorno)
ness." Also these people would come and testify in church and do bad things again. He could not understand this inconsistency in their actions.

In this case the anti-religious attitude, as far as it goes, is overtly derived from resentment against outside interference with individual liberty and this, be it noted, is hardly less an element in American ideology than is Christianity itself. Here, as in many other respects, individual, psychological ambivalence toward religion on the part of the subject reflects objective antagonism in our culture.

M310, a genuine liberal, offers another example of the rebellious feature in irreligiosity. The subject, who rejects Christian tradition altogether, is the child of religious parents. He admits no open conflict with them, although relations with them were apparently very cool. In all probability he displaced his rebellion against the family upon their religion, thus avoiding the trouble of undergoing difficulties of a more personal kind. Often enough, strong ideological attachments or oppositions can be understood as such displacements of family conflicts, a device which allows the individual to express his hostilities on a level of rationalization and so dispense with the necessity of deep emotional entanglements — and which also allows the youngster to remain within the family shelter. It may also be in some respects more gratifying to attack the infinite father than to attack the finite one. It should be emphasized, however, that the term rationalization does not imply, here or elsewhere, the allegation untruth. Rationalization is a psychological aspect of thinking which by itself decides neither truth nor untruth. A decision on this matter depends entirely on the objective merits of the idea in which the process of rationalization terminates.

In contrast to those irreligious low scorers who underwent a "negative" conversion are easy-going low scorers such as M711. His negative attitude toward religion is marked not so much by opposition as by an indifference that involves the element of a somewhat humorous self-reflection. This subject professes rather frankly a certain confusion in religious matters but in a way which suggests that his apparent weakness is allowed to manifest itself on the basis of some considerable underlying strength of character. With people like him it is as if they could afford to profess intellectual inconsistencies because they find more security in their own character structure and in the depth of their experience than in clear-cut, well-organized, highly rationalized convictions. When asked about his attitude toward religion, he answers:

"I don't really have any (laughs). More or less an absence of views. On organized religion I suppose I am confused (laughs) if anything."

He does not need to reject religion because he is not under its spell; there are no traces of ambivalence, and therefore no signs of hatred, but rather a kind of humane and detached understanding. The religious idea he accepts is tolerance, in a characteristically nonconventional way demonstrated by his choice of negative expressions rather than high sounding "ideals." "I think I became aware of intolerance." But he does not use this awareness for ego enhancement but is rather inclined to attribute his religious emancipation to external accidental factors:

"If I'd stayed in Denver, I'd probably attended a church. I don't know. I don't think of it; I don't feel the need of organized religion particularly."

Interesting is this subject's discussion of prayer. He admits the psychological efficacy of prayer, but is aware that this "therapeutic" aspect of religion is incompatible with the idea of religion itself. He regards prayer as a kind of autosuggestion, which could "accomplish results" but "I certainly don't see there is anyone on the receiving end."

This subject makes the bizarre but strangely profound statement:

"My religious curiosity did not last very long. Probably took up photography (laughs) about that time."

Only an interpretation making full use of psychoanalytic categories would do justice to this sentence. The link between his early interest in religion and the later one in photography is apparently curiosity, the desire to "see" things — a sublimation of voyeurism. It is as if photography in a somewhat infantile way would fulfill the wish for "imagery" which underlies certain trends in religion and is at the same time put under a heavy taboo by both Judaism and Protestantism. This may be corroborated by the fact that the subject during his religious phase was attracted by theosophy, by religious ways of thinking which promised to "lift the curtain."

It should be noted that this subject's attitude toward atheism is no more "radical" than is his opposition to religion.101 He says:

"Well, I don't think any more about atheists than anything else. As a matter of fact I talked with several people who profess to be atheists and they don't even seem to agree. Perhaps I am an atheist (laughs) ... you get into semantics, really. Professional atheists ... just impress me as doing it because it seems to be a stunt. Don Quixote battling windmills."

This may be indicative of the easy-going person's suspicion of the "ticket," his awareness of the tendency of any rigid formula to degenerate into a mere piece of propaganda.102

Incidentally, the subject senses clearly what was formulated one hundred years ago in Baudelaire's Diary: that atheism becomes obsolete in a world the objective spirit of which is essentially areligious. The meaning of atheism undergoes historical changes. What was one of the decisive impulses of the eighteenth century Enlightenment may function today as a manifestation of provincial sectarianism or even as a paranoid system. Half-mad Nazis such as Mathilde Ludendorff fought, besides the Jews and the Free Masons, the Roman-Catholics as an ultra-montan conspiracy directed against Germany, transforming the tradition of Bismarck's Kulturkampf into a pattern of persecution mania.

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101 The "easy-going" low scorer is rarely radical in any respect. This, however, does not make him a middle-of-the-roader. He is persistently aware of the nonentity between concept and reality. He is fundamentally nontotalitarian. This is behind his specific idea of tolerance.

102 More material on this subject is presented in Chapter XIX. (Note by Adorno)
4. Religious Low Scorers

A clear-cut example of a religious low scorer is the somewhat sketchy interview of F132, a young woman brought up in India where her parents are missionaries. Her combining positive Christianity with an outspoken concrete idea of tolerance (“equality for everyone”) is derived from “life experience with the Indians.” She is passionate in matters of racial understanding. However, her church affiliations make it impossible for her to draw the political consequences from her tolerance idea:

“I don’t like Ghandi. I don’t like radical people. He is a radical. He has done much to upset and disunite the country.”

Her association with the church involves an element of that religious conventionalism which is usually associated with ethnocentrism. In spite of her closeness to the church and to theological doctrine, her religious outlook has a practical coloring.

“It (religion) means a great deal. It makes a person happier — more satisfied. Gives them peace of mind. You know where you stand and have something to work for — and example to follow. Hope for an afterlife. Yes, I believe in immortality.”

This girl is probably atypical in many ways because of her colonial upbringing as well as because of the mixture of “official” religiosity and more spontaneous religious humanism. Her particular attitude is probably due, on the surface level at least, to her insight into ingroup-outgroup problems. However, this example seems to offer some support for the hypothesis that only fully conscious, very articulate, unconventional Christians are likely to be free of ethnocentrism. At any rate, the rareness of religious low scorers in our sample is significant. As indicated above, the composition of the sample itself may be responsible for this. However, this rarity suggests something more fundamental. The tendency of our society to become split into “progressive” and “status quo” camps may be accompanied by a tendency of all persons who cling to religion, as a part of the status quo, also to assume other features of the status quo ideology which are associated with the ethnocentric outlook. Whether this is true or whether religion can produce effective trends in opposition to prejudice, could be elucidated only after much extensive research.

\[\text{It would be a tempting task to analyze the change of meaning undergone by the word “belief.” It illustrates most clearly religious neutralization. Formerly the idea of belief was emphatically related to the religious dogma. Today it is applied to practically everything which a subject feels the right to have as his own, as his “opinion” (for everybody is entitled to have opinion) without subjecting it to any criteria of objective truth. The secularization of “believing” is accompanied by arbitrariness of that which one believes: it is molded after the preferences for one or the other commodity and has little relation to the idea of truth. (“I don’t believe in parking,” said a conventional high-scoring girl in her interview.) This use of belief is almost an equivalent of the hackneyed, “I like it,” which is about to lose any meaning. (Cf. the statement of Mack, given in Chapter II, “I like the history and sayings of Christ.”)}\]
Types And Syndromes

T. W. Adorno

Chapter XIX from The Authoritarian Personality

A. The Approach

Hardly any concept in contemporary American psychology has been so thoroughly criticized as that of typology. Since “any doctrine of types is a halfway approach to the problem of individuality, and nothing more,” (9) any such doctrine is subject to devastating attacks from both extremes: because it never catches the unique, and because its generalizations are not statistically valid and do not even afford productive heuristic tools. From the viewpoint of general dynamic theory of personality, it is objected that typologies tend towards pigeonholing and transform highly flexible traits into static, quasi-biological characteristics while neglecting, above all, the impact of historical and social factors. Statistically, the insufficiency of twofold typologies is particularly emphasized. As to the heuristic value of typologies, their overlapping, and the necessity of constructing “mixed types” which practically disavow the original constructs, is pointed out. At the hub of all these arguments is aversion against the application of rigid concepts to the supposedly fluid reality of psychological life.

The development of modern psychological typologies, as contrasted, for example, with the old scheme of “temperaments,” has its origin in psychiatry, in the therapeutic need for a classification of mental diseases as a means of facilitating diagnosis and prognosis. Kraepelin and Lombroso are the fathers of psychiatric typology. Since the clear-cut division of mental diseases has in the meantime completely broken down, the basis of typological classifications of the “normal,” derived from the former, seems to vanish. It is stigmatized as a remnant of the “taxonomic phase of behavior theory” the formulation of which “tended to remain descriptive, static and sterile” (80). If not even the mentally diseased, whose psychological dynamics are largely replaced by rigid patterns, can be sensibly divided according to types, how, then, is there any chance of success for procedures such as the famous one of Kretschmer, the raison d’être of which was the standard classification of manic-depression and dementia praecox?

The present state of the discussion on typology is summed up by Anne Anastasi (11) as follows:

“Type theories have been most commonly criticized because of their attempt to classify individuals into sharply divided categories . . . Such a procedure implies a multi-modal distribution of traits. The introverts, for example, would be expected to cluster at one end of the scale, the extroverts at the other end, and the point of demarcation between them should be clearly apparent. Actual measurement, however, reveals a unimodal distribution of all traits, which closely resembles the bell-shaped normal curve.

“Similarly, it is often difficult to classify a given individual definitely into one type or the other. The typologists, when confronted with this difficulty, have frequently proposed intermediate or ‘mixed’ types to bridge the gap between the extremes. Thus Jung suggested an ambivert type which manifests neither introvert nor extrovert tendencies to a predominant degree. Observation seems to show, however, that the ambivert category is the largest, and the decided introverts and extroverts are relatively rare. The reader is referred, for example, to the distribution curve obtained by Heidbreder with an introversion questionnaire administered to zoo college students . . . . It will be recalled that the majority of scores were intermediate and that the extremes of either introversion or extroversion were approached, the number of cases became progressively smaller. The curve, too, showed no sharp breaks, but only a continuous gradation from the mean to the two extremes. As was indicated in Chapter II, the same may be said of all other measurable traits of the individual, whether social, emotional, intellectual, or physical.

“It is apparent, then, that insofar as type theories imply the classification of individuals into clear-cut classes, they are untenable in the face of a mass of indisputable data. Such an assumption, however, is not necessarily inherent in all systems of human typology. It is more characteristic of the popular versions and adaptations of type theories than of the original concepts. To be sure, type psychologists have often attempted to categorize individuals, but this was not an indispensable part of their theories; their concepts have occasionally been sufficiently modified to admit of a normal distribution of traits.”

In spite of such concessions to more satisfactory categorizations, the “nominalistic” exclusion of typological classifications has triumphed to such a degree that it is almost tantamount to a taboo, no matter how urgent the scientific and pragmatic need for such classifications may be. It should be noted that this taboo is closely related to the notion, still taught by numerous academic psychiatrists, that mental diseases are essentially inexplicable. If one would assume, for the argument’s sake, that psychoanalytic theory has really succeeded in establishing a number of dynamic schemata of psychoses, by which the latter become “meaningful” within the psychological life of the individual in spite of all their irrationality and the disintegration of the psychotic personality, the problem of typology would be completely redefined.

It cannot be doubted that the critique of psychological types expresses a truly humane impulse, directed against that kind of subsumption of individuals under pre-established classes which has been consummated in Nazi Germany, where the labeling of live human beings, independently of their specific qualities, resulted in decisions about their life and death. It is this motive which has been stressed particularly by Allport (9); and Boder has demonstrated in great detail in his study of “Nazi Science” the interconnections of psychological pro et contra schemes, the repressive function of categories such as Jaensch’s “Gegentypus” and the arbitrary manipulation of empirical findings (47). Thus, enquiries devoted to the study of prejudice have to be particularly cautious when the issue of typology comes up. To express it pointedly, the rigidity of constructing types is itself indicative of...
of that “stereopathic” mentality which belongs to the basic constituents of the potentially fascist character. We need only to refer, in this connection, to our high scorer of Irish descent who attributes his personal traits unhesitatingly to his national extraction. Jaensch’s “anti-type,” for example, is an almost classic case of the mechanism of projection, the effectiveness of which in the make-up of our high scorers has been established, and which in Jaensch’s has wormed its way into the very same science whose task it would be to account for this mechanism. The essentially undynamic, “antisociological,” and quasi-biological nature of classifications of the Jaensch brand is directly opposed to the theory of our work as well as to its empirical results.105

Yet all these objections do not dispose altogether of the problem of typology. Not all typologies are devices for dividing the world into sheep and buck, but some of them reflect certain experiences which, though hard to systematize, have, to put it as loosely as possible, hit upon something. Here one has to think primarily of Kretschmer, Jung, and Freud. It should be particularly emphasized that Freud, whose general emphasis on psychological dynamics puts him above the suspicion of any simple “biologism” and stereotypical thinking, published as late as 1931 (39) a rather categorical typology without bothering much about the methodological difficulties of which he must have been aware very well, and even, with apparent naïveté, constructing “mixed” types out of the basic ones. Freud was too much led by concrete insights into the matters themselves, had too intimate a relationship to his scientific objects, to waste his energy on the kind of methodological reflections which may well turn out to be acts of sabotage of organized science against productive thinking. This is not to say that his typology has to be accepted as it stands. Not only can it be criticized by the usual anti-typological arguments to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter; as Otto Fenichel has pointed out, it is also problematic from the viewpoint of orthodox psychoanalytic theory. What counts, however, is that Freud found such a classification worthwhile. One has only to look at the relatively easy and convincing integration of different kinds of twofold typologies in Donald W. MacKinnon’s Structure of Personality (55) to gain the impression that typologies are not altogether arbitrary, do not necessarily do violence to the manifoldness of the human, but have some basis in the structure of psychological reality.

The reason for the persistent plausibility of the typological approach, however, is not a static biological one, but just the opposite: dynamic and social. The fact that human society has been up to now divided into classes affects more than the external relations of men. The marks of social repression are left within the individual soul. The French sociologist Durkheim in particular has shown how and to what extent hierarchical social orders permeate the individual’s thinking, attitudes, and behavior. People form psychological “classes,” inasmuch as they are stamped by variegated social processes. This in all probability holds good for our own standardized mass culture to even higher a degree than for previous periods. The relative rigidity of our high scorers, and of some of our low scorers, reflects psychologically the increasing rigidity according to which our society falls into two more or less crude opposing camps. Individualism, opposed to inhuman pigeonholing, may ultimately become a mere ideological veil in a society which actually is inhuman and whose intrinsic tendency towards the “subsumption” of everything shows itself by the classification of people themselves. In other words, the critique of typology should not neglect the fact that large numbers of people are no longer, or rather never were, “individuals” in the sense of traditional nineteenth-century philosophy. Ticket thinking is possible only because the actual existence of those who indulge in it is largely determined by “tickets,” standardized, opaque, and overpowering social processes which leave to the “individual” but little freedom for action and true individuation. Thus the problem of typology is put on a different basis. There is reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and “produces” different “types” of persons. Only by identifying stereotypical traits in modern humans, and not by denying their existence, can the pernicious tendency towards all-pervasive classification and subsumption be challenged.

The construction of psychological types does not merely imply an arbitrary, compulsive attempt to bring some “order” into the confusing diversity of human personality. It represents a means of “conceptualizing” this diversity, according to its own structure, of achieving closer understanding. The radical renunciation of all generalizations beyond those pertaining to the most obvious findings would not result in true empathy into human individuals but rather in an opaque, dull description of psychological “facts”: every step which goes beyond the factual and aims at psychological meaning — as it has been defined in Freud’s basic statement that all our experiences are meaningful (“dass alle unsere Erlebnisse einen Sinn haben”) — inevitably involves generalizations transcending the supposedly unique “case,” and it happens that these generalizations more frequently than not imply the existence of certain regularly recurring nuclei or syndromes which come rather close to the idea of “types.” Ideas such as those of orality, or of the compulsive character, though apparently derived

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104 stereopathy: Persistent stereotyped thinking.

105 It should be remembered that Jaensch’s anti-type is defined by synaesthesia, that is to say, the supposed or actual tendency of certain people “to have color experiences when listening to a tone, or to music in general, and to have tone experiences when looking at colors or pictures” (Boder, in (47), p. 15). This tendency is interpreted by Jaensch as a symptom of degeneracy. It may well be assumed that this interpretation is based on historical reminiscence rather than on any factual psychological findings. For the cult of synaesthesia played a large role within the lyrical poetry of the same French authors who introduced the concept of décadence, particularly Baudelaire. It can be noted, however, that synaesthetic imagery fulfills a specific function in their works. By clouding the division between different realms of sense perception, they simultaneously try to efface the rigid classification of different kinds of objects, as it is brought about under the practical requirements of industrial civilization. They rebel against reification.106 It is highly characteristic that an entirely administrative ideology chooses as its archetyp an attitude which is, above all, rebellion against stereotypy. The Nazi cannot stand anything which does not fit into his scheme and even less anything which does not recognize his own reified, “stereopathic” way of looking at things.
from highly individualized studies, make sense only if they are accompanied by the implicit assumption that the structures thus named, and discovered within the individual dynamics of an individual, pertain to such basic constellations that they may be expected to be representative, no matter how “unique” the observations upon which they are based may be. Since there is a typological element inherent in any kind of psychological theory, it would be spurious to exclude typology per se. Methodological “purity” in this respect would be tantamount to renouncing the conceptual medium or any theoretical penetration of the given material, and would result in an irrationality as complete as the arbitrary subsumptiveness of the “pigeonholing” schools.

Within the context of our study, another reflection of an entirely different nature points in the same direction. It is a pragmatic one: the necessity that science provide weapons against the potential threat of the fascist mentality. It is an open question whether and to what extent the fascist danger really can be fought with psychological weapons. Psychological “treatment” of prejudiced persons is problematic because of their large number as well as because they are by no means “ill,” in the usual sense, and, as we have seen, at least on the surface level are often even better “adjusted” than the non-prejudiced ones. Since, however, modern fascism is inconceivable without a mass basis, the inner complexion of its prospective followers still maintains its crucial significance, and no defense which does not take into account the subjective phase of the problem would be truly “realistic.” It is obvious that psychological countermeasures, in view of the extent of the fascist potential among modern masses, are promising only if they are differentiated in such a way that they are adapted to specific groups. An over-all defense would move on a level of such vague generalities that it would in all probability fall flat. It may be regarded as one of the practical results of our study that such a differentiation has at least to be also one which follows psychological lines, since certain basic variables of the fascist character persist relatively independently of marked social differentiations. There is no psychological defense against prejudice which is not oriented toward certain psychological “types.”

We would make a fetish of the methodological critique of typology and jeopardize each attempt of coming psychologically to grips with prejudiced persons if a number of very drastic and extreme differences — such as the one between the psychological make-up of a conventional anti-Semite and a sadomasochistic “tough guy” — were excluded simply because none of these types is ever represented in classic purity by a single individual.

The possibility of constructing largely different sets of psychological types has been widely recognized. As the result of the previous discussions, we base our own attempt on the three following major criteria:

a. We do not want to classify human beings by types which divide them neatly statistically, nor by ideal types in the usual sense which have to be supplemented by “mixtures.” Our types are justified only if we succeed in organizing, under the name of each type, a number of traits and dispositions, in bringing them into a context which shows some unity of meaning in those traits. We regard those types as being scientifically most productive which integrate traits, otherwise dispersed, into meaningful continuities and bring to the fore the interconnection of elements which belong together according to their inherent “logic,” in terms of psychological understanding of underlying dynamics. No mere additive or mechanical subsumption of traits under the same type should be permitted. A major criterion for this postulate would be that, confronted with “genuine” types, even so-called deviations would no longer appear as accidental but would be recognizable as meaningful, in a structural sense. Speaking genetically, the consistency of meaning of each type would suggest that as many traits as possible can be deduced from certain basic forms of underlying psychological conflicts, and their resolutions.

b. Our typology has to be a critical typology in the sense that it comprehends the typification of men itself as a social function. The more rigid a type, the more deeply does he show the hallmarks of social rubber stamps. This is in accordance with the characterization of our high scorers by traits such as rigidity and stereotypical thinking. Here lies the ultimate principle of our whole typology. Its major dichotomy lies in the question of whether a person is standardized himself and thinks in a standardized way, or whether he is truly “individualized” and opposes standardization in the sphere of human experience. The individual types will be specific configurations within this general division. The latter differentiates prima facie between high and low scorers. At closer view, however, it also affects the low scorers themselves: the more they are “typified” themselves, the more they express unwittingly the fascist potential within themselves.107

c. The types must be constructed in such a way that they may become productive pragmatically, that is to say, that they can be translated into relatively drastic defense patterns which are organized in such a way that differences of a more individual nature play but a minor role. This makes for a certain conscious “superficiality” of typification, comparable to the situation in a sanatorium where no therapy could ever be initiated if one did not divide the patients into manic-depressives, schizophrenics, paranoiacs, and so forth, though one is fully aware of the fact that these distinctions are likely to vanish the deeper ones go. In this connection, however, the hypothesis may be allowed that if one could only succeed in going deep enough, at the end of the differentiation just the more universal “crude” structure would reappear: some basic libidinous

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107 It should be stressed that two concepts of types have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there are those who are types in the proper sense, typified persons, individuals who are largely reflecting set patterns and social mechanisms, and on the other hand, persons who can be called types only in a formal-logical sense and who often may be characterized just by the absence of standard qualities. It is essential to distinguish the real, “genuine” type structure of a person and his merely belonging to a logical class by which he is defined from outside, as it were.
constellations. An analogy from the history of the arts may be permitted. The traditional, crude distinction between Romanesque and Gothic style was based on the characteristic of round and pointed arches. It became apparent that this division was insufficient; that both traits were overlapping and that there were much deeper-lying contrasts of construction between the two styles. This, however, led to such complicated definitions that it proved impossible to state in their terms whether a given building was Romanesque or Gothic in character though its structural totality rarely left any doubt to the observer to which epoch it belonged. Thus it ultimately became necessary to resume the primitive and naive classification. Something similar may be advisable in the case of our problem. An apparently superficial question such as “What kind of people do you find among the prejudiced?” may easily do more justice to typological requirements than the attempt to define types at first sight by, say, different fixations at pregenital or genital developmental phases and the like. This indispensable simplification can probably be achieved by the integration of sociological criteria into the psychological constructs. Such sociological criteria may refer to the group memberships and identifications of our subjects as well as to social aims, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. The task of relating psychological type criteria to sociological ones is facilitated because it has been established in the course of our study that a number of “clinical” categories (such as the adulation of a punitive father) are intimately related to social attitudes (such as belief in authority for authority’s sake). Hence, we may well “translate” for the hypothetical purposes of a typology a number of our basic psychological concepts into sociological ones most closely akin to them. These considerations have to be supplemented by a requirement prescribed by the nature of our study. Our typology, or rather, scheme of syndromes, has to be organized in such a way that it fits as “naturally” as possible our empirical data. It should be borne in mind that our material does not exist in an empty space, as it were, but that it is structurally predetermined by our tools, particularly the questionnaire and the interview schedule. Since our hypotheses were formulated according to psychoanalytic theory, the orientation of our syndromes toward psychoanalytic concepts is reinforced. Of course, the limitations of such an attempt are narrow since we did not “analyze” any of our subjects. Our characterization of syndromes has to concentrate on traits that have proved to be psychoanalytically significant rather than on the ultimate dynamic patterns of depth psychology.

In order to place the following typological draft into its proper perspective, it should be recalled that we have pointed out in the chapter on the F scale that all the clusters of which this scale is made up belong to one single, “over-all” syndrome. It is one of the outstanding findings of the study that “highness” is essentially one syndrome, distinguishable from a variety of “low” syndromes. There exists something like “the” potentially fascist character, which is by itself a “structural unit.” In other words, traits such as conventional-ity, authoritarian submissiveness and aggressiveness, projectivity, manipulativeness, etc., regularly go together. Hence, the “subsyndromes” which we outline here are not intended to isolate any of these traits. They are all to be understood within the general frame of reference of the high scorer. What differentiates them is the emphasis on one or another of the features or dynamics selected for characterization, not their exclusiveness. However, it seems to us that the differential profiles arising within the over-all structure can readily be distinguished. At the same time, their interconnection by the over-all potentially fascist structure is of such a nature that they are “dynamic” in the sense that transitions from one to the other could easily be worked out by analyzing the increase or decrease of some of the specific factors. Such a dynamic interpretation of them could achieve more adequately — that is to say, with a better understanding of the underlying processes — what is usually done in a haphazard way by the “mixed types” of static typologies. However, theory and empirical substantiation of these dynamic relations among the syndromes could not be touched upon within the present research.

The principle according to which the syndromes are organized is their “type-being” in the sense of rigidity, lack of cathexis, stereopathy. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the order of our syndromes represents a more dynamic “scale of measurement.” It pertains to potentialities, and accessibility to countermeasures, but not to overt prejudice — basically to the problem of “over-all highness” vs. “lowness.” It will be seen, for example, that the case illustrating the psychologically relatively harmless syndrome at the bottom of our scheme is extremely high in terms of overt anti-minority prejudice.

Pragmatic requirements as well as the idea that the high scorers are generally more “typed” than the low scorers seem to focus our interest on the prejudiced person. Yet, we deem it necessary also to construct syndromes of low scorers. The general direction of our research leads us to stress, with a certain onenessidedness, psychological determinants. This, however, should never make us forget that prejudice is by no means an entirely psychological, “subjective” phenomenon. It has to be remembered what we pointed out in Chapter XVII: that “high” ideology and mentality are largely fostered by the objective spirit of our society. Whereas different individuals react differently, according to their psychological make-up, to the ubiquitous cultural stimuli of prejudice, the objective element of prejudice cannot be neglected if we want to understand the attitudes of individuals or psychological groups. It is therefore not sufficient to ask, “Why is this or that individual ethnocentric?” but rather: “Why does he react positively to the omnipresent stimuli, to which this other man reacts negatively?” The potentially fascist character has to be regarded as a product of interaction between the cultural climate of prejudice and the “psychological” responses to this climate. The former consists not only of crude outside factors, such as economic and social conditions, but

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109 *cathexis*: the concentration of mental energy on one particular person, idea, or object (esp. to an unhealthy degree).

109 *ubiquitous*: present, appearing, or found everywhere.
of opinions, ideas, attitudes, and behavior which appear to be the individual’s but which have originated neither in his autonomous thinking nor in his self-sufficient psychological development but are due to his belonging to our culture. These objective patterns are so pervasive in their influence that it is just as much of a problem to explain why an individual resists them as it is to explain why they are accepted. In other words, the low scorers present just as much of a psychological problem as do the high scorers, and only by understanding them can we obtain a picture of the objective momentum of prejudice. Thus the construction of “low” syndromes becomes imperative. Naturally, they have been chosen in such a way as to fit as well as possible with our general principles of organization. Yet it should not come as a surprise that they are more loosely interconnected than the “high” ones.

The syndromes to be discussed have been developed gradually. They go back to a typology of anti-Semites worked out and published by the Institute of Social Research (57). This scheme was modified and extended to the low scorers during the present research. In its new form, which emphasized the more psychological aspects, it was applied particularly to the Los Angeles sample; the interviewers here tried as far as possible to ascertain the relation between their case findings and the hypothetical types. The syndromes which are presented here are the result of the modifications which this draft underwent on the basis of our empirical findings, and of continuous theoretical critique. Still, they have to be regarded as tentative, as an intermediate step between theory and empirical data. For further research, they need redefinition in terms of quantifiable criteria. The justification of presenting them now lies in the fact that they may serve as guides for this future research. Each syndrome is illustrated by a profile of one characteristic case, mainly on the basis of the interview protocol of each person selected.

B. Syndromes Found Among High Scorers

A rough characterization of the several types may precede their detailed presentation. Surface Resentment can easily be recognized in terms of justified or unjustified social anxieties; our construct does not say anything about the psychological fixations or defense mechanisms underlying the pattern of opinion. With the Conventional pattern, of course, acceptance of conventional values is outstanding. The superego was never firmly established and the individual is largely under the sway of its external representatives. The most obvious underlying motive is the fear of “being different.” The Authoritarian type is governed by the superego and has continuously to contend with strong and highly ambivalent id tendencies. He is driven by the fear of being weak. In the Tough Guy the repressed id tendencies gain the upper hand, but in a stunted and destructive form. Both the Crank and the Manipulative types seem to have resolved the Oedipus complex through a narcissistic withdrawal into their inner selves. Their relation to the outer world, however, varies. The cranks have largely replaced outward reality by an imaginary inner world; concomitantly, their main characteristic is projectivity and their main fear is that the inner world will be “contaminated” by contact with dreaded reality: they are beset by heavy taboos, in Freud’s language by the “délire de toucher.” The manipulative individual avoids the danger of psychosis by reducing outer reality to a mere object of action: thus he is incapable of any positive cathexis. He is even more compulsive than the authoritarian, and his compulsiveness seems to be completely ego-alien: he did not achieve the transformation of an externally coercive power into a superego. Complete rejection of any urge to love is his most outstanding defense.

In our sample, the conventional and the authoritarian types seem to be by far the most frequent.

1. Surface Resentment

The phenomenon to be discussed here is not on the same logical level as the various “types” of high and low scorers characterized afterwords. As a matter of fact, it is not in and of itself a psychological “type,” but rather a condensation of the more rational, either conscious or preconscious, manifestations of prejudice, in so far as they can be distinguished from more deep-lying, unconscious aspects. We may say that there are a number of people who “belong together” in terms of more or less rational motivations, whereas the remainder of our “high” syndromes are characterized by the relative absence or spuriousness of rational motivation which, in their case, has to be recognized as a mere “rationalization.” This does not mean, however, that those high scorers whose prejudiced statements show a certain rationality per se are exempt from the psychological mechanisms of the fascist character. Thus the example we offer is high not only on the F scale but on all scales: she has the generality of prejudiced outlook which we have taken as evidence that underlying personality trends were the ultimate determinants. Still, we feel that the phenomenon of “Surface Resentment,” though generally nourished by deeper instinctual sources, should not be entirely neglected in our discussion since it represents a sociological aspect of our problem which might be underestimated in its importance for the fascist potential if we concentrate entirely on psychological description and etiology.111

We refer here to people who accept stereotypes of prejudice from outside, as ready-made formulae, as it were, in order to rationalize and — psychologically or actually — overcome overt difficulties of their own existence. While their personalities are unquestionably those of high scorers, the stereotype of prejudice as such does not appear to be too much libidinized, and it generally maintains a certain rational or pseudo-rational level. There is no complete break between their experience and their prejudice: both are often explicitly contrasted one with the other. These subjects are able to present relatively sensible reasons for their prejudice, and are accessible to rational argumentation. Here belongs the discontented, grumbling family father who is happy...
if somebody else can be blamed for his own economic failures, and even happier if he can derive material advantages from anti-minority discrimination, or the actually or potentially “vanquished competitors,” such as small retailers, economically endangered by chain stores, which they suppose to be owned by Jews. We may also think of anti-Semitic Negroes in Harlem who have to pay excessive rents to Jewish collectors. But these people are spread over all those sectors of economic life where one has to feel the pinch of the process of concentration without seeing through its mechanism, while at the same time still maintaining one’s economic function.

5043, a housewife with extremely high scores on the scales who “had often been heard discussing the Jews in the neighborhood,” but is “a very friendly, middle-aged” person who “enjoys harmless gossip,” expressed high respect for science and takes a serious though somewhat repressed interest in painting. She “has fears about economic competition from zootsuiters” and “the interview revealed that similar attitudes are strongly held about Negroes.” She “has experienced quite a severe comedown in terms of status and economic security since her youth. Her father was an extremely wealthy ranch owner.”

Although her husband was making a good living as a stockbroker when she married him in 1927, the stockmarket crash and the ensuing depression made it necessary for her to grapple with economic problems, and finally it even became necessary for them to move in with her wealthy mother-in-law. This situation has caused some friction while at the same time relieving her of a great deal of responsibility. In general, the subject seems to identify herself with the upper-middle-class, thus striking a balance between her upper-class background and her present precarious middle-class position. Although she does not admit this into her ego, the loss of money and status must have been very painful to her; and her strong prejudice against Jews infiltrating the neighborhood may be directly related to her fear of sinking “lower” on the economic scale.

The consistently high scores of this subject are explained by the interviewer on the basis of a “generally uncritical attitude” (she always “agrees very much” on the questionnaire) rather than by an active, fascist bias, which does not come out in the interview. Characteristic is the relative absence of serious family conflicts.

She was never severely disciplined; on the contrary, both parents tended to give in to her wishes and she was ostensibly their favorite. … There was never any serious friction and, continuing through the present, the relationship among the siblings and the family in general is still very close.

The reason why she was chosen as a representative of “Surface Resentment” is her attitude in race questions. She “shows a very strong prejudice towards all minority groups” and “regards the Jews as a problem,” her stereotypes following “pretty much the traditional pattern” which she has taken over mechanically from outside. But “she does not feel that all Jews necessarily exhibit all the characteristics. Also she does not believe that they can be distinguished by looks or any special characteristics, except that they are loud and often aggressive.

The last quotation shows that she does not regard those features of the Jews which she incriminates as inborn and natural. Neither rigid projection nor destructive punitiveness is involved:

With regard to the Jews she feels that assimilation and education will eventually solve the problem.

Her aggressiveness is evidently directed against those who might, as she fears, “take something away from her,” either economically or in status, but the Jews are no “countertype.”

Hostility is openly expressed toward the Jews who have been moving into the neighborhood as well as toward those Jews who she believes “run the movies.” She seems to fear the extension of their influence and strongly resents the “infiltration” of Jews from Europe.

She also expresses the above-mentioned differentiation between “outside” stereotypy and concrete experiences, thus keeping the door open for a mitigation of her prejudice, though, according to the interviewer, if a fascist wave should arise, “it seems likely that she would display more hostility and quite possibly accept fascist ideology”:

Experiences with Jews have been limited to more or less impersonal contacts with only one or two closer acquaintances, whom she describes as “fine people.”

It may be added that if there is any truth in the popular “scapegoat theory” of anti-Semitism, it applies to people of her kind. Their “blind spots” are at least partly to be attributed to the narrow, “petty bourgeois” limitations of experience and explanation on which they have to draw. They see the Jew as the executor of tendencies actually inherent in the total economic process, and they put the blame upon him. It is a postulate necessary for the equilibrium of their ego that they must find some “guilt” responsible for their precarious social situation: otherwise the just order of the world would be disturbed. In all probability, they primarily seek this guilt within themselves and regard themselves, preconsciously, as “failures.” The Jews relieve them superficially of this guilt feeling. Anti-Semitism offers them the gratification of being “good” and blameless and of putting the onus on some visible and highly personalized entity. This mechanism has been institutionalized. Persons such as our case 5043 probably never had negative experiences with Jews, but simply adopt the externally pronounced judgment because of the benefit they draw from it.

2. The “Conventional” Syndrome

This syndrome represents stereotypy which comes from outside, but which has been integrated within the personality as part and parcel of a general conformity. In women there is special emphasis on neatness and femininity, in men upon being a “regular” he-man. Acceptance of prevailing standards is more important than is discontent. Thinking in terms of ingroup and outgroup prevails. Prejudice apparently does not fulfill a decisive function within the psychological household of the individuals, but is only a means of facile identification with the group to which they belong or to which they wish to belong. They are prejudiced in the specific sense of the term: taking over current judgments of others without having looked into the matter themselves. Their prejudice is a “mat-
ter of course,” possibly “preconscious,” and not even known to the subjects themselves. It may become articulate only under certain conditions. There is a certain antagonism between prejudice and experience; their prejudice is not “rational” inasmuch as it is little related to their own worries but at the same time, at least on the surface, it is not particularly outspoken, on account of a characteristic absence of violent impulses, due to wholesale acceptance of the values of civilization and “decency.” Although this syndrome includes the “well-bred anti-Semite,” it is by no means confined to upper social strata.

An illustration of the latter contention, and of the syndrome as a whole, is 5057, a 30-year-old welder, “extremely charming in manner,” whose case is summarized by the interviewer as follows:

He presents a personality and attitudinal configuration encountered rather frequently among skilled workers, and is neither vicious nor exploitive, but instead merely reflects the prejudices of his own ingroup in the fashion of the “Conventional” anti-Semite.

His acceptance of his own situation as well as his underlying concern with status is evidenced by the description of his occupational attitude:

The subject likes his work very much. He expressed absolutely no reservations about his present job. It was clear from the outset that he sees himself as a skilled craftsman, and finds in welding a chance for creative and constructive activity. He did say that one limitation is that welding is certainly not a “white-collar” job; it is physically dirty and carries with it some hazards. His satisfaction with his present work is further corroborated by his questionnaire statement that if he were not restricted in any way his occupation would be in the same line of work, perhaps on the slightly higher level of welding engineer.

His professional outlook is optimistic in a realistic way, with no indications of insecurity. His conventionalism is set against “extremes” in every respect: thus he

selected Christian Science because “it is a quieter religion than most . . . religion should restrain you from overindulgences of any kind, such as drinking, gambling, or anything to excess.”

. . . He has not broken away from his grandparents’ teachings and hasn’t ever questioned his religious beliefs.

Most characteristic of the subject’s over-all attitude are the following data from his questionnaire:

Replying to the projective question, “What moods or feelings are the most unpleasant or disturbing to you?” the subject mentioned “disorder in my home or surroundings” and “the destruction of property.” The impulse which he finds hard to control is “telling people what is wrong with them.” In answering the question, “What might drive a person nuts?” he said, “Worry — A person should be able to control their mind as well as their body.”

With regard to ethnocentrism he is, in spite of his general moderateness and seeming “broad-mindedness,” in the high quartile. The specific color of his anti-minority attitude is provided by his special emphasis upon the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy: he does not have, or does not like to have, “contacts” with the outgroup, and at the same time he projects upon them his own ingroup pattern and emphasizes their “clannishness.” His hostility is mitigated by his general conformity and his expressed value for “our form of government.” However, a certain rigidity of his conventional pattern is discernible in his belief in the unchangeability of the traits of the outgroup. When he experiences individuals who deviate from the pattern, he feels uneasy and seems to enter a conflict situation which tends to reinforce his hostility rather than to mitigate it. His most intense prejudice is directed against the Negroes, apparently because here the demarcation line between in- and outgroup is most drastic.

Concerning other minorities his remarks are as follows:

The biggest minority problem right now, according to the subject, is that of the Japanese-Americans “because they are coming back.” Subject feels they should be “restricted in some way and their parents deported.” As for their traits: “I have had no personal contact with them except in school where they always seemed to be good students. I have no personal dislike for them.”

When questioned as to the “Jewish problem” subject commented, “They certainly stick together. They support each other a lot more than the Protestants do.” He thinks they should not be persecuted just because they are Jewish. “A Jew has just as much right to freedom in the United States as anyone else.” This was followed by the statement: “I hate to see an excessive amount of them coming in from other countries. I favor complete exclusion of Jewish immigrants.”

His rejection of the Jews is primarily based on their difference from the subject’s conventional ingroup ideal, and the Jews themselves are differentiated according to degrees of assimilation:

Subject can recognize a Jew by the “kinkiness” of his hair, his heavy features, his thick nose, and sometimes by his thick lips. As for Jewish “traits,” the subject remarked that there are “different types of Jews just as there are different types of Gentiles.” He spoke of the “kikey type, like those at Ocean Park,” and the “higher type, like those in Beverly Hills.”

As to the relation between stereotypy and experience,

“What contacts I have had have all been on the good side. When I was running the gas station in Beverly Hills I had to deal quite a bit with them, but I cannot remember any unfortunate experiences with them. All the experiences were rather pleasant in fact.” At this point, the subject recounted an experience with a Jewish delicatessen owner in Ocean Park. At the time the subject was 8–10 years old. He was selling magazines in this area, and went into the store to try to sell a magazine to the owner. While waiting to get the owner’s attention he spied a wonderful-looking coffee cake and wished that he could have it. The man bought the magazine and noticed the longing look on the boy’s face. Apparently thinking that the boy did not have enough money to buy it, he took it out of the case, put it in a bag, and gave it to the boy. From the respondent’s account of this incident, it was apparent that this gesture was both humiliating and gratifying at the same time. He recalls how embarrassed he was that the man should think that he was “poor and hungry.”

Subject believes that there are some “good” Jews as well as “bad” Jews — just as there are “good” and “bad” Gentiles. However, “Jews as a whole will never change, because they stick together close and hold to their religious ideals. They could improve the opinion that people have of them, nevertheless, by not being so greedy.” . . . Would permit those Jews already here to remain, though he adds, “Jews should be allowed to return to Palestine, of course.” Further, “I would not be sorry to see them go.” With respect to the educational quota system the subject expressed his approval, though he suggested the alternative of having “separate schools established for the Jews.”
3. The “Authoritarian” Syndrome

This syndrome comes closest to the over-all picture of the high scorer as it stands out throughout our study. It follows the “classic” psychoanalytic pattern involving a sadomasochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex, and it has been pointed out by Erich Fromm under the title of the “sadomasochistic” character (56). According to Max Horkheimer’s theory in the collective work of which he wrote the sociopsychological part, external social repression is concomitant with the internal repression of impulses. In order to achieve “internalization” of social control which never gives as much to the individual as it takes, the latter’s attitude towards authority and its psychological agency, the superego, assumes an irrational aspect. The subject achieves his own social adjustment only by taking pleasure in obedience and subordination. This brings into play the sadomasochistic impulse structure both as a condition and as a result of social adjustment. In our form of society, sadistic as well as masochistic tendencies actually find gratification. The pattern for the translation of such gratifications into character traits is a specific resolution of the Oedipus complex which defines the formation of the syndrome here in question. Love for the mother, in its primary form, comes under a severe taboo. The resulting hatred against the father is transformed by reaction-formation into love. This transformation leads to a particular kind of superego. The transformation of hatred into love, the most difficult task an individual has to perform in his early development, never succeeds completely. In the psychodynamics of the “authoritarian character,” part of the preceding aggressiveness is absorbed and turned into masochism, while another part is left over as sadism, which seeks an outlet in those with whom the subject does not identify himself: ultimately the outgroup. The Jew frequently becomes a substitute for the hated father, often assuming, on a fantasy level, the very same qualities against which the subject revolted in the father, such as being practical, cold, domineering, and even a sexual rival. Ambivalence is all-pervasive, being evidenced mainly by the simultaneity of blind belief in authority and readiness to attack those who are deemed weak and who are socially acceptable as “victims.” Stereotypy, in this syndrome, is not only a means of social identification, but has a truly “economic” function in the subject’s own psychology: it helps to canalize his libidinous energy according to the demands of his overstrict superego. Thus stereotypy itself tends to become heavily libidinized and plays a large role in the subject’s inner household. He develops deep “compulsive” character traits, partly by regression to the anal-sadistic phase of development. Sociologically, this syndrome used to be, in Europe, highly characteristic of the lower middle-class. In this country, we may expect it among people whose actual status differs from that to which they aspire. This is in marked contrast to the social contentment and lack of conflict that is more characteristic of the “Conventional” syndrome, with which the “Authoritarian” one shares the conformist aspect.

Interview M352 begins as follows:

(Satisfaction?) “Well, I’m the head operator — shift foreman — rotating schedules. . . . (Subject emphasizes “head” position) — small department — 5 in department — 5 in a shift — I get personal satisfaction . . . that I have 5 people working for me, who come to me for advice in handling the production that we make, and that the ultimate decision . . . is mine, and in the fact that in the ultimate decision, I should be right — and am usually, and the knowledge that I am correct gives me personal satisfaction. The fact that I earn a living doesn’t give me any personal satisfaction. It’s these things that I have mentioned . . . knowing that I am pleasing someone else also gives me satisfaction.”

The denial of material gratifications, indicative of a restrictive superego, is no less characteristic than the twofold pleasure in being obeyed and giving pleasure to the boss.

His upward social mobility is expressed in terms of overt identification with those who are higher in the hierarchy of authority:

(What would more money make possible?) “Would raise our standard, auto-mobile; move into better residential section; associations with business and fraternal, etc., would be raised . . . to those in a bracket higher, except for a few staunch friends which you keep always; and naturally, associate with people on a higher level — with more education and more experience. After you get there, and associate with those people . . . that fires you on to the next step higher . . . .”

His religious belief has something compulsive and highly punitive:

“My belief is that, just according to the Bible, there is a God — the world has gone along and needed a Savior, and there was one born-lived, died, risen again, and will come back some time; and the person who has lived according to Christianity will live forever — those who have not will perish at that time.”

This overt rigidity of conscience, however, shows strong traces of ambivalence: what is forbidden may be acceptable if it does not lead to social conflict. The over-rigid superego is not really integrated, but remains external.

“Adultery, as long as never found out, is o.k. — if found out, then it’s wrong — since some of the most respected people do it, it must be all right.”

The subject’s concept of God is plainly identical with such an externalized superego or, to use Freud’s original term, with the “ego ideal,” with all the traits of a strong, but “helpful” father:

“Well, when it comes down to the fundamentals, everybody has an idea of some sort: may not call Him God, but an ideal that they live up to and strive to be like. . . . Heathens or anybody else has some sort of religion, but it is something that they put their faith in that can do things for them — can help them.”

The genetic relation between the “Authoritarian” syndrome and the sadomasochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex is borne out by some statements of the subject about his own childhood:

“Well, my father was a very strict man. He wasn’t religious, but strict in raising the youngsters. His word was law, and whenever he was disobeyed, there was punishment. When I was 12, my father beat me practically every day for getting into the tool chest in the back yard and not putting everything away . . . finally he explained that those things cost money, and I must learn to put it back.” . . . (Subject explains that his carelessness led to a beating every day, as promised by the father, and finally after several weeks, he simply quit using the tools altogether, because “I just couldn’t get ‘em all back”) . . . “But, you know, I never
hold that against my father — I had it coming. He laid the law down, and if I broke it, there was punishment, but never in uncontrolled anger. My father was a good man — no doubt about that. Always interested in boys’ activities.

“My father was a great fraternal man; was out practically every night. Took an active part always on committees — a good mixer, everybody liked him ... a good provider. We always had everything we needed, but no unnecessary luxuries ... no whisks provided for... Father felt they were luxuries that probably — felt they were unnecessary ... Yes, rather austere... (Which parent closest to?) I think my father. Although he beat the life out of me, I could talk to him about anything...” (Subject emphasizes that his father always gave everyone, including himself, a square deal.)

The subject has been “broken” by the father: he has been overadjusted. It is exactly this aspect which bears the main emphasis in his anti-Semitism. He who admires brute force blames the Jews for their recklessness in practical matters.

“The Jews seem to be taking advantage of the present-day situation, I think. Now, they want to — they’re bringing these Jews in from Europe, and they seem to click together, somehow, and they seem to be able to corner capital. They’re a peculiar people — no conscience about anything except money.” (Subject apparently meant, here, no conscience about money, although maybe about other things.) “If you stand in the way of their making money, they’ll brush you aside.”

Rigidity of the image of the Jew, visible already in the “Conventional” syndrome, tends to become absolute and highly vindictive:

“To me a Jew is just like a foreigner in the same class as say, oh, I was gonna say a Filipino. You would be pointed out ... they observe all these different religious days that’s completely foreign to me — and they stick to it — they don’t completely Americanize... (What if there were less prejudice against them?) I don’t know — I can’t help but feel that a Jew is meant to be just the way he is — no change possible — a sort of instinct that will never lose — stay Jewish right straight...”

Again the idea of authority is the focal point: the Jews appear dangerous to him as usurpers of “control.”

One last feature of the “Authoritarian” syndrome should be mentioned. It is the psychological equivalent of the “nobody-for-the-poor” ideology discussed in Chapter XVII. The identification of the “authoritarian” character with strength is concomitant with rejection of everything that is “down.” Even where social conditions have to be recognized as the reason for the depressed situation of a group, a twist is applied in order to transform this situation into some kind of well-deserved punishment. This is accompanied by moralistic invectives indicative of strict repression of several desires:

He went on to emphasize that you should segregate Negroes and whites, that by all means give equal opportunities and everything instead of “evading the problem” as he called it. He refers to high prevalence of venereal disease among Negroes, which he blames on their low morals and, under further questioning by the interviewer, he finally attributes it to “congested conditions of living” and tries very hard to explain what he means. This leads to a lack of modesty and respect for pri-

vacy — everybody’s thrown together — “lose the distance that is supposed to be between people,” etc., etc.

The emphasis on “distance,” the fear of “close physical contacts” may be interpreted as corroborative of our thesis that, for this syndrome, the ingroup–outgroup dichotomy absorbs large quantities of psychological energy. Identification with the familial structure and ultimately with the whole ingroup becomes, to this kind of individual, one of the main mechanisms by which they can impose authoritarian discipline upon themselves and avoid “breaking away” — a temptation nourished continuously by their underlying ambivalence.

4. The Rebel And The Psychopath

The resolution of the Oedipus complex characteristic of the “Authoritarian” syndrome is not the only one that makes for a “high” character structure. Instead of identification with parental authority, “insurrection” may take place. This, of course, may in certain cases liquidate the sadomasochistic tendencies. However, insurrection may also occur in such a way that the authoritarian character structure is not basically affected (56). Thus, the hated paternal authority may be abolished only to be replaced by another one — a process facilitated by the “externalized” superego structure concomitant with the over-all picture of the high scorer. Or masochistic transference to authority may be kept down on the unconscious level while resistance takes place on the manifest level. This may lead to an irrational and blind hatred of all authority, with strong destructive connotations, accompanied by a secret readiness to “capitulate” and to join hands with the “hated” strong. It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish such an attitude from a truly non-authoritarian one and it may be well-nigh impossible to achieve such a differentiation on a purely psychological level: here as much as anywhere else it is the socio-political behavior that counts, determining whether a person is truly independent or merely replaces his dependency by negative transference.

The latter case, when it is combined with an urge to take pseudo-revolutionary actions against those whom the individual ultimately deems to be weak, is that of the “Rebel.” This syndrome played a large role in Nazi Germany: the late Captain Roehm, who called himself a “Hochverräter” in his autobiography, is a perfect example. Here we expect to find the “Condottiere” which was included in the typology drafted by the Institute of Social Research in 1939, and described as follows:

This type has arisen with the increased insecurity of post-war existence. He is convinced that what matters is not life but chance. He is nihilistic, not out of a “drive for destruction” but because he is indifferent to individual existence. One of the reservoirs out of which this type arises is the modern unemployed. He differs from former unemployed in that his contact with the sphere of production is sporadic, if any. Individuals belonging to this category can no longer expect to be regularly absorbed by the labor process. From their youth they have been ready to act wherever they could grab something. They

112 Cf. also in this connection Erikson, E. H., Hitler’s Imagery and German Youth (25).
113 Condottiere: mercenary leaders employed by Italian city-states from the late Middle Ages until the mid-sixteenth century.
are inclined to hate the Jew partly because of his cautiousness and physical inefficacy, partly because, being themselves unemployed, they are economically uprooted, unusually susceptible to any propaganda, and ready to follow any leader. The other reservoir, at the opposite pole of society, is the group belonging to the dangerous professions, colonial adventurers, racing motorists, airplane aces. They are the born leaders of the former group. Their ideal, actually an heroic one, is all the more sensitive to the “destructive,” critical intellect of the Jews because they themselves are not quite convinced of their ideal in the depths of their hearts, but have developed it as a rationalization of their dangerous way of living (57, p. 135).

Symptomatically, this syndrome is characterized, above all, by a penchant for “tolerated excesses” of all kinds, from heavy drinking and overt homosexuality under the cloak of enthusiasm for “youth” to proneness to acts of violence in the sense of “Putsch.” Subjects of this type do not have as much rigidity as do those who exhibit the orthodox “Authoritarian” syndrome.

The extreme representative of this syndrome is the “Tough Guy,” in psychiatric terminology the “Psychopath.” Here, the superego seems to have been completely crippled through the outcome of the Oedipus conflict, by means of a retrogression to the omnipotence fantasy of very early infancy. These individuals are the most “infantile” of all: they have thoroughly failed to “develop,” have not been molded at all by civilization. They are “asocial.” Destructive urges come to the fore in an overt, non-rationalyzed way. Bodily strength and toughness — also in the sense of being able to “take it” — are decisive. The borderline between them and the criminal is fluid. Their indulgence in persecution is crudely sadistic, directed against any helpless victim; it is unspecific and hardly fluid. Their indulgence in persecution is crudely sadistic, directed against any helpless victim; it is unspecific and hardly fluid.

Robert M. Lindner’s extensive case study, Rebel Without a Cause (74), offers a description and dynamic interpretation of the “Tough Guy” which establish the affinity of this type to the “Rebel” as well as to the “Authoritarian” character. According to Lindner:

The psychopath is not only a criminal; he is the embryonic Storm-Trooper; he is the disinherited, betrayed antagonist whose aggressions can be mobilized on the instant at which the properly-aimed and frustration-evoking formula is communicated by that leader under whose tinselled aegis license becomes law, secret and primitive desires become virtuous ambitions readily attained, and compulsive behavior formerly deemed punishable becomes the order of the day.

The psychopath is described as a “rebel, a religious disobeyer of prevailing codes and standards” whose main characteristic is that he cannot wait, “cannot delay the pleasures of gratification” — an inability suggesting that, together with the failure to build up a superego, the formation of the ego has been crippled, in spite of the bridled “egotism” of such persons. As to the masochistic component, the following passage from Lindner may be quoted:

That the psychopath is burdened with guilt and literally seeks punishment has been observed by the author in countless cases.

The clue to this strange situation lies, as one would suspect, in the Oedipus situation. Deprived of an avenue to satisfactory post-Oedipal adjustment and continuously beset by the consequent incest and parricidal fantasies, the mergent guilt can be assuaged only through expecation. “I have sinned against my father and I must be punished” is the unverbalized theme of psychopathic conduct: and for this reason they very often commit crimes free from acquisitional motives, marry prostitutes or, in the case of women, apportion their charms occupationally in an attempt at self-castigation. That such activities constitute a species of “neurotic gain” is also to be considered. The fact of punishment sought, received and accepted does not complete the tale: there is in addition a narcissistic “yield” which derives directly from the punitive act and mediates the original need. This is naturally on a subliminal level of apprehension, unportable directly but always noticeable.

Examples of the rebel-psychopath are to be found in our San Quentin sample. We think mainly of the psychopath, Floyd, our M658, and the “Tough Guy,” Eugene, our M662A, dealt with extensively in Chapter XXI. If the traits under consideration here do not appear so vividly there, it should be borne in mind that the guiding interest of the San Quentin study was defined by our over-all variables rather than by psychological subgroups among the high and low scorers. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the prison situation works as a heavy check on the expression of the decisive traits of the psychopath who, after all, is not a narcissotic and behaves, in a certain sense, quite “realistically.” In addition, his completely living “for the moment,” his lack of ego identity enables him to adapt himself successfully to a given situation; when talking to an interviewer, he is likely not to display directly the attitudes indicative of his “toughness.” Rather, the latter have to be inferred indirectly, particularly from certain speaking habits, such as the frequency of references to bodily violence. It is with an eye to such indices that the statements of those two San Quentin interviewees should be read. Neither the widespread existence of the “Tough Guy” syndrome, particularly in marginal spheres of society, nor its importance for some of the most sinister aspects of the fascist potential can be doubted.

5. The Crank

In so far as the introjection of paternal discipline in the “Authoritarian” syndrome means continuous repression of the id, this syndrome can be characterized by frustration in the widest sense of the term. However, there seems to be a pattern in which frustration plays a much more specific role. This pattern is found in those people who did not succeed in adjusting themselves to the world, in accepting the “reality principle” — who failed, as it were, to strike a balance between renunciations and gratifications, and whose whole inner life is determined by the denials imposed upon them from outside, not only during childhood but also during their adult life. These people are driven into isolation. They have to build up a spurious inner world, often approaching delusion, emphatically set against outer reality. They can exist only by self-aggrandizement, coupled with violent rejection of the
external world. Their “soul” becomes their dearest possession. At the same time, they are highly projective and suspicious. An affinity to psychosis cannot be overlooked: they are “paranoid.” To them, prejudice is all-important: it is a means to escape acute mental diseases by collectivization, and by building up a pseudo-reality against which their aggressiveness can be directed without any overt violation of the “reality principle.” Stereotypy is decisive: it works as a kind of social corroboration of their projective formulae, and is therefore institutionalized to a degree often approaching religious beliefs. The pattern is found in women and old men whose isolation is socially reinforced by their virtual exclusion from the economic process of production. Here belong organized war mothers, ham-an’-eggers, and regular followers of agitators even in periods when racist propaganda is at a low ebb. The often-abused term “lunatic fringe” has a certain validity with regard to them: their compulsiveness has reached the stage of fanaticism. In order to confirm to each other their pseudoreality, they are likely to form sects, often with some panacea of “nature,” which corresponds to their projective notion of the Jew as eternally bad and spoiling the purity of the natural. Ideas of conspiracy play a large role: they do not hesitate to attribute to the Jews a quest for world domination, a certain kind of crackpot religious movement, based on readiness to hear “inner voices” which give both moral uplifting and sinister advice: 

“... The Catholics have been wonderful to her, and she admires them but wouldn’t join their church. There was something inside her that said “No.” (She gestures her rejection.) She has an individualistic religion. Once she was out walking in the early morning — the birds were singing — she raised her hands and her face to the sky, and they were wet . . . (She considered it a supernatural phenomenon.)

6. The “Manipulative” Type

This syndrome, potentially the most dangerous one, is defined by stereotypy as an extreme: rigid notions become ends rather than means, and the whole world is divided into empty, schematic, administrative fields. There is an almost complete lack of object cathexis and of emotional ties. If the “Crank” syndrome had something paranoid about it, the “Manipulative” one has something schizophrenic. However, the break between internal and external world, in this case, does not re-
sult in anything like ordinary “intro-version,” but rather the contrary: a kind of compulsive overrealism which treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled, manipulated, seized by the subject’s own theoretical and practical patterns. The technical aspects of life, and things qua “tools” are fraught with libido. The emphasis is on “doing things,” with far-reaching indifference towards the content of what is going to be done. The pattern is found in numerous business people and also, in increasing numbers, among members of the rising managerial and technological class who maintain, in the process of production, a function between the old type of ownership and the workers’ aristocracy. Many fascist-political anti-Semites in Germany showed this syndrome: Himmler may be symbolic of them. Their sober intelligence, together with their almost complete absence of any affections makes them perhaps the most merciless of all. Their organizational way of looking at things predisposes them to totalitarian solutions. Their goal is the construction of gas chambers rather than the pogrom.115 They do not even have to hate the Jews; they “cope” with them by administrative measures without any personal contacts with the victims. Anti-Semitism is reified, an export article: it must “function.” Their cynicism is almost complete: “The Jewish question will be solved strictly legally” is the way they talk about the cold pogrom. The Jews are provocative to them in so far as supposed Jewish individualism is a challenge to their stereotypy, and because they feel in the Jews a neurotic overemphasis on the very same kind of human relationships which they are lacking them-selves. The ingroup-outgroup relationship becomes the principle according to which the whole world is abstractly organized. Naturally, this syndrome can be found in this country only in a rudimentary state.

As to the psychological etiology of this type, our material sets us certain limitations. However, it should be borne in mind that compulsiveness is the psychological equivalent of what we call, in terms of social theory, reification. The compulsive features of the boy chosen as an example for the “Manipulative” type, together with his sadism, can hardly be overlooked — he comes close to the classical Freudian conception of the “anal” character and is in this regard reminiscent of the “Authoritarian” syndrome. But he is differentiated from the latter by the simultaneity of extreme narcissism and a certain emptiness and shallowness. This, however, involves a contradiction only if looked at superficially, since whatever we call a person’s emotional and intellectual richness is due to the intensity of his object cathexes. Notable in our case is an interest in sex almost amounting to preoccupation, going with backwardness as far as actual experience is concerned. One pictures a very inhibited boy, worried about masturbation, collecting insects while the other boys played baseball. There must have been early and deep emotional traumata, probably on a pregenital level. M108

is going to be an insect toxicologist and work for a large organization like Standard Oil or a university, presumably not in private business. He first started in chemistry in college but about the third term began to wonder if that was what he really wanted. He was interested in entomology in high school, and while hashing in a sorority he met a fellow worker in entomology, and in talking about the possibility of combining entomology and chemistry, this man said he thought it would be a very good field to investigate a little further. He found out insect toxicology had everything that combined his interests, wasn’t overcrowded, and that he could make a good living there, and that there wasn’t likely to be a surplus as there would be in chemistry or engineering.

Taken in isolation, the professional choice of this subject may appear accidental, but when viewed in the context of the whole interview, it assumes a certain significance. It has been pointed out by L. Lowenthal (75) that fascist orators often compare their “enemies” to “vermin.” The interest of this boy in entomology may be due to his regarding the insects, which are both “repulsive” and weak, as ideal objects for his manipulation.116

The manipulative aspect of his professional choice is stressed by himself:

Asked what he expects to get from the job other than the economic side, he said that he hopes to have a hand in organizing the whole field, that is, in organizing the knowledge. There is no textbook, the information is scattered, and he hopes to make a contribution in organizing the material.

His emphasis on “doing things” goes so far that he even appreciates people whom he otherwise hates, though in a terminology with destructive overtones. Here belongs his statement about Roosevelt, which was quoted in part in Chapter XVII:

“Will he do good points of Roosevelt, he said, “Well, the first term he was in office he whipped the U.S. into shape. Some people argue he only carried out Hoover’s ideas, but actually he did a good job which was badly needed. He usurped power that was necessary to do something — he took a lot more power than a lot.” . . . Asked whether his policies were good or bad, subject replied, “Well, at any rate, he was doing something.”

His political concepts are defined by the friend-foe relationship, in exactly the same way as the Nazi theoretician Karl Schmitt defined the nature of politics. His lust for organization, concomitant with an obsession with the domination of nature, seems boundless:

“There will always be wars. Is there any way of preventing wars? No, it’s not common goals but common enemies that make friends. Perhaps if they could discover other planets and some way of getting there, spread out that way, we could prevent wars for a time, but eventually there’d be wars again.”

The truly totalitarian and destructive implications of his dichotomous way of thinking become manifest in his statement about the Negroes:

(What can we do about the Negroes?) “Nothing can be done.

115 *pogrom*: an organized, often officially encouraged massacre or persecution of a minority group, especially one conducted against Jews.

116 This, of course, covers only a superficial aspect. It is well known from psychoanalysis that insects and vermin serve frequently as symbols for siblings. The fantasies involved here may be traces of the little boy’s wish to beat his little brother until he “keeps quiet.” Manipulativeness may be one form in which death wishes for the siblings are allowed to come to the fore. “Organizers” are frequently persons who want to exercise dominating control over those who are actually their *equals* — substitutes for the siblings over whom they wish to rule, like the father, as the next best thing, if they cannot kill them. Our insect toxicologist mentions frequent childhood quarrels with his sister.
There are two factions. I’m not in favor of interbreeding because this would produce an inferior race. The Negroes haven’t reached the point of development of Caucasians, artificially living and absorbing from the races.” He would approve of segregation, but that’s not possible. Not unless you are willing to use Hitler’s methods. There are only two ways of handling this problem — Hitler’s methods or race mixture. Race mixture is the only answer and is already taking place, according to what he has read, but he’s against it. It wouldn’t do the race any good.

This logic allows only for one conclusion: that the Negroes should be killed. At the same time, his way of looking at the prospective objects of manipulation is completely unemotional and detached: although his anti-Semitism is marked he doesn’t even claim that you can

“tell the Jews by their appearance, they’re just like other people, all kinds.”

His administrative and pathologically detached outlook is again evidenced by his statement on intermarriage:

He said that if he were an American businessman in Germany or England he’d probably marry first an American woman if he could, then he might marry a German or an English woman.

However, “swarthy” people like Greeks or Jews have no chance in this experimental setup. It is true, he has nothing against his Spanish brother-in-law, but expresses his approval by the phrase that “you couldn’t tell him from a white person.”

He takes a positive attitude towards the church for manipulative purposes:

“Well, people want church; there is a purpose, it sets standards for some people, but for other people, it is not necessary. A general sense of social duty would do the same thing.”

His own metaphysical views are naturalistic, with a strong nihilistic coloring:

Asked about his own beliefs he said he’s a mechanistic — there is no supernatural entity, not concerned with us as humans; it goes back to a law of physics. Humans and life are just an accident — but an inevitable accident. And then he tried to explain that — that there was some matter accrued when the earth was started and it was almost by accident that life started and it just kept on.

As to his emotional structure:

His mother is “just Mom”; he seems to have some respect for his father and father’s opinions, but there was no real attachment anywhere. He said as a child he had a lot of friends, but on further questioning, he couldn’t mention any closer friends. He did a lot of reading as a child. Didn’t have many fights — couldn’t remember them — didn’t have any more than any other boys. He has no real close friends now. His closest friends were when he was in the 10th or 11th grade, and he still keeps track of some of them, he said. (How important are friends?) “Well, they’re especially important in younger years, and in your older years you don’t enjoy life as much without them. I don’t expect my friends to help me get along.” They’re not needed so much at present age, but he supposed that at the interviewer’s age it would be very important to have friends.

Finally it should be mentioned that the only moral quality that plays a considerable role in the thinking of this subject is loyalty, perhaps as a compensation for his own lack of affection. By loyalty he probably means complete and unconditional identification of a person with the group to which he happens to belong. He is expected to surrender completely to his “unit” and to give up all individual particularities for the sake of the “whole.” M108 objects to Jewish refugees not having been “loyal to Germany.”

C. Syndromes Found Among Low Scorers

The following schematic observations may help towards orientation among the “low” syndromes. The Rigid low scorers are characterized by strong superego tendencies and compulsive features. Paternal authority and its social substitutes, however, are frequently replaced by the image of some collectivity, possibly molded after the archaic image of what Freud calls the brother horde. Their main taboo is directed against violations of actual or supposed brotherly love. The Protesting low scorer has much in common with the “Authoritarian” high scorer, the main difference being that the further-going sublimation of the father idea, concomitant with an undercurrent of hostility against the father, leads to the conscious rejection of heteronomous authority instead of its acceptance. The decisive feature is opposition to whatever appears to be tyranny. The syndrome of the Impulsive low scorer denotes people in whom strong id impulses were never integrated with ego and superego. They are threatened by overpowering libidinous energy and in a way as close to psychosis as the “Crank” and the “Manipulative” high scorer. As to the Easy-Going low scorer, the id seems to be little repressed, but rather to be sublimated into compassion, and the superego well developed, whereas the extraverted functions of the otherwise quite articulate ego frequently do not keep pace. These subjects sometimes come close to neurotic indecision. One of their main features is the fear of “hurting” anyone or anything by action. The construct of the Genuine Liberal may be conceived in terms of that balance between superego, ego, and id which Freud deemed ideal.

In our sample the “Protesting” and the “Easy-Going” low scorers apparently occur most frequently. Emphasizing, however, once again that the low scorers are as a whole less “typed” than the high scorers, we shall refrain from any undue generalization.

1. The “Rigid” Low Scorer

We may start with the “low” syndrome that has most in common with the over-all “high” pattern, and proceed in the direction of sounder and more durable “lowness.” The syndrome which commands first attention is the one which shows the most markedly stereotypical features — that is to say, configurations in which the absence of prejudice, instead of being based on concrete experience and integrated within the personality, is derived from some general, external, ideological pattern. Here we find those subjects whose lack of prejudice, however consistent in terms of surface ideology, has to be regarded as accidental in terms of personality, but we also find people whose rigidity is hardly less related to personality than is the case with certain syndromes of high scorers. The latter kind of low scorers are definitely disposed towards totalitar-
ianism in their thinking: what is accidental up to a certain degree is the particular brand of ideological world formula that they chance to come into contact with. We encountered a few subjects who had been identified ideologically with some progressive movement, such as the struggle for minority rights, for a long time, but with whom such ideas contained features of compulsiveness, even of paranoid obsession, and who, with respect to many of our variables, especially rigidity and “total” thinking, could hardly be distinguished from some of our high extremes. All the representatives of this syndrome can in one way or another be regarded as counterparts of the “Surface Resentment” type of high scorer. The accidentalness in their total outlook makes them liable to change fronts in critical situations, as was the case with certain kinds of radicals under the Nazi regime. They may often be recognized by a certain disinterestedness with respect to crucial minority questions per se, being, rather, against prejudice as a plank in the fascist platform; but sometimes they also see only minority problems. They are likely to use clichés and phraseology hardly less frequently than do their political opponents. Some of them tend to belittle the importance of racial discrimination by labeling it simply as a by-product of the big issues of class struggle — an attitude which may be indicative of repressed prejudice on their own part. Representatives of this syndrome can often be found, for example, among young, “progressive” people, particularly students, whose personal development has failed to keep pace with their ideological indoctrination. One of the best means for identifying the syndrome is to note the subject’s readiness to deduce his stand towards minority problems from some general formula, rather than to make spontaneous statements. He also may often come forward with value judgments which cannot possibly be based on any real knowledge of the matter in question.

\[ F139 \] is a religious educator.

For the past ten years she has considered herself very progressive. Lately she has little time to read, but her husband reads and studies constantly and keeps her up to date by discussion. “My favorite world statesman is Litvinov." I think the most dramatic speech of modern times is the one he made at the Geneva conference when he pleaded for collective security. It has made us very happy to see the fog of ignorance and distrust surround the Soviet Union clear away during this war. Things are not settled yet though. There are many fascists in our own country who would fight Russia if they could.”

The hollowness of her enthusiasm about Litvinov has already been noted in our discussion of stereotyped thinking in politics (Chapter XVII). The same seems to be true of her assertion that she is an internationalist, followed up by her rhetorical question, “Would I be a true Christian if I weren’t?" This is typical of the “deductive” way of thinking which seems to characterize the rigid low scorer. The present subject seems to proceed in the same way as she approaches minority questions.

Subject believes that all people are one, and again she feels that is the only point of view possible for a true Christian.

The somewhat sweeping expression “that all people are one” should be noted: a person free of stereotypy would rather tend to acknowledge differences and to take a positive stand towards differentiation. What is meant is probably “equal in the sight of God” and she deduces her tolerance from this general assumption.

As mentioned in the chapter on politics, the superficiality of her progressivism is indicated by her highly aggressive attitude towards alcoholism, called by herself “one of her pet subjects,” which plays almost the same role as do certain paranoid ideas in the “Crazes” among the high scorers. It may be recalled in this connection, that Alfred McClung Lee has demonstrated the close connection between prohibitionism and prejudiced ways of thinking. As a matter of fact, there is evidence enough that this “Rigid” low scorer has more than a sprinkling of the “high” mentality. There is the emphasis on “status,” with reference to her daughter:

“...I feel badly about her school too — (names the school). The influx of people with lower educational and cultural standards than ours has had effect on the schools of course.”

There are destructive fantasies, thinly veiled by “sensible” moral reflections:

“The same with smoking. I am not really worried about it though. No one of either side of our family ever smoked or drank, with one exception. My husband’s sister smoked. She is dead now.”

There is a rationalization of punitiveness:

“If I could bring about Prohibition tomorrow I would do it. I believe in preventing everything that doesn’t make man better — that makes him worse. Some people say if you forbid something it makes people do it on the sly. Well, I say, how about murder, and robbery, and dope? We have prohibited them and some people still commit crimes, but we do not think of taking off the ban on them.”

And there is, finally, official optimism, a characteristic reaction-formation against underlying destructiveness:

“If one didn’t always have hope and believe everything was moving upwards, one’s Christianity wouldn’t mean anything, would it?”

Under changing conditions she might be willing to join a subversive movement as long as it pretended to be “Christian” and to “move upwards.”

2. The “Protesting” Low Scorers

This syndrome is in many respects the counterpart of the “Authoritarian” high scorer. Its determinants are psychological rather than rational. It is based on a specific resolution of the Oedipus complex which has deeply affected the individuals in question. While they are set against paternal authority, they have at the same time internalized the father image to a high degree. One may say that in them the superego is so strong that it turns against its own “model,” the father, and all external authorities. They are thoroughly guided by conscience which seems to be, in many cases exhibiting this pattern, a

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117 Maxim Litvinov (1876–1951). Russian revolutionary and prominent Soviet diplomat.
118 This term was suggested by J. F. Brown.
secularization of religious authority. This conscience, however, is quite autonomous and independent of outside codes. They “protest” out of purely moral reasons against social repression or at least against some of its extreme manifestations, such as racial prejudice. Most of the “neurotic” low scorers who play such a large role in our sample show the “Protest” syndrome. They are often shy, “retiring,” uncertain about themselves, and even given to tormenting themselves with all kinds of doubts and scruples. They sometimes show certain compulsive features, and their reaction against prejudice has also an aspect of having been forced upon them by rigid superego demands. They are frequently guilt-ridden and regard the Jews a priori as “victims,” as being distinctly different from themselves. An element of stereotypy may be inherent in their sympathies and identifications. They are guided by the wish to “make good” the injustice that has been done to minorities. At the same time they may be easily attracted by the real or imaginary intellectual qualities of the Jews which they deem to be akin to their desire to be “aloof” from worldly affairs. While being nonauthoritarian in their way of thinking, they are often psychologically constricted and thus not able to act as energetically as their conscience demands. It is as if the internalization of conscience has succeeded so well that they are severely inhibited or even psychologically “paralyzed.” Their eternal guilt feelings tend to make them regard everyone as “guilty.” Though they detest discrimination, they may find it sometimes difficult to stand up against it. Socially, they seem usually to belong to the middle class, but it is hard to define their group membership in more precise terms. However, our material seems to indicate that they are frequently to be found among people who underwent serious family troubles, such as a divorce of their parents. F127

is extremely pretty in the conventional “campus girl” style. She is very slight, blond, fair-skinned, and blue-eyed. She wears a becoming “ sloppy Joe” sweater, daintily fixed blouse, and brief skirt, with bobby socks. She wears a sorority pin. She is very friendly and interested, seems to enjoy the discussion, but is quite vague in her answers about family life until the interview is quite well along. Then she suddenly decides to reveal the most important single fact in her life — her parents’ divorce which she usually hides — and from that point on speaks with apparent freedom about her own feelings.

She shows the characteristic neurotic concern with herself, indicative of a feeling of impotence: she has a somewhat magical belief in psychology, apparently expecting that the psychologist knows more about her than she does herself:

What she would like above all is to be a psychiatrist. (Why?) “Because psychiatrists know more about people. Everyone tells me their troubles. I don’t think there is anything more satisfying than to be able to help people with their problems. But I don’t have the brains or the patience to be a psychiatrist. That is just an idea.”

Her attitude towards the father is hostile:

Father is a lawyer. At present he is enlisted in the army and is somewhere in the Pacific, in charge of a Negro battalion. (What does he think about that?) “I don’t know what he thinks about anything.”

Her social attitude is a combination of conformist “correctness,” the emphatic and self-confessed desire for “pleasure” (almost as if her conscience would order her to enjoy herself), and a tendency towards retiring internalization. Her indifference to “status,” though perhaps not quite authentic, is noteworthy.

(Interests?) “Oh fun — and serious things too. I like to read and discuss things. I like bright people — can’t stand clinging vines. Like to dance, dress up, go places. Am not much good at sports, but I play at them — tennis, swimming. I belong to a sorority and we do lots of war work as well as entertaining service men. (Subject names sorority.) (That is supposed to be a good house isn’t it?) They say so. I didn’t think there was anything very special about it.”

Her social progressiveness is characterized by both an element of fear and a conscientious sense of justice:

(What do you think about poverty?) “I hate to think of it. And I don’t think it is necessary. (Who is to blame?) Oh, I don’t mean the poor people are. I don’t know, but you would think that by now we could work out a way so that everyone would have enough.”

Her anxiety makes her more aware of the fascist potential than most other low scorers:

“It would be terrible to have Nazis here. Of course there are some. And they would like to have the same thing happen… Lots of Jewish kids have a hard time — in the service, and in going to medical school. It isn’t fair. (Why the discrimination?) I don’t know unless it is the Nazi influence. No, it went back before that. I guess there always are some people who have ideas like the Nazis.”

Her indignation is primarily directed against “unfairness.” The notion that “there are always people with ideas like the Nazis” is remarkable: a highly developed sense of responsibility seems to give her an understanding in social matters that goes far beyond her purely intellectual insight. Psychologically, the complete absence of prejudice in her case seems best understood as a superego function, since the girl relates a rather unpleasant experience which otherwise might well have made her prejudiced: she was kidnapped, as a child of four, by a Negro but

“He didn’t hurt me. I don’t think I was even scared.”

As to the genetic background of her attitude, the following clinical data are pertinent:

“I am more like my father I am afraid and that isn’t good. He is a very impatient man, overbearing, and everything for himself. He and I didn’t get along. He favored my sister because she played up to him. But both of us suffered with him. If I even called my sister a name as kids will do when they fight, I got spanked, and hard. That used to worry my mother. For that reason she hardly ever punished us, because he did it all the time, and mostly for nothing. I was spanked constantly. I remember that better than anything. (Do you think your mother and father loved each other?) No, perhaps they did at first, but my mother couldn’t stand the way he treated us. She divorced him.” (She flashes and her eyes fill with tears as she says this. When interviewer commented that she had not realized the par-

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119It was pointed out in Chapter XVIII that religion, when it has been internalized, is an effective antidote against prejudice and the whole fascist potential, notwithstanding its own authoritarian aspects.
it is doubtful to what extent they succeed in conceptualization in other areas. They certainly do not think in stereotypes, but individuals somewhat unstable in political matters as well as both in the superego and in the ego, and that this makes these of this syndrome. It seems, however, that there is weakness of this syndrome might come out. And the imbeciles could be sterilized.” (Quotes some study on heredity subject has learned about.) “It seems improvements aren’t made fast enough. The whole society is ill and unhappy.”

The last sentence indicates that her own discontent leads her, by the way of empathy, towards a rather radical and consistent critique of society. The keenness of her insight as well as her being attracted by what is “different” comes out even more clearly in her statement on minority problems:

“There is a terrific amount of minority oppression — prejudice. There is a fear of minorities, a lack of knowledge. I would like to assimilate all groups — internationally. Would want the education of the world unified. The minorities themselves also keep themselves apart. It’s a vicious circle. Society makes them outcasts and they react this way.” (Differences?) (Interviewer tried hard to have subject describe differences between groups, but subject insisted): “All differences that exist are due to conditions people grow up in and also to the emotional responses (to discrimination). (Jews?) I don’t see how they are different as a group. I have Jewish friends… Maybe they are more sensitive because of prejudice against them. But that’s good.”

According to the clinical data the girl is a genuine Lesbian, who was severely reprimanded because of her homosexuality, and became afterward “rather promiscuous to determine whether she did react sexually to men.” “All emotionally upset in one way or the other, she said. Her later history indicates that the Lesbian component is stronger than anything else.

It may be added that the Los Angeles sample contains three call-house girls, all of them completely free of prejudice and also low on the F scale. Since their profession tends to make them resentful about sex altogether, and since they profess symptoms of frigidity, they do not seem to belong to the “Impulsive” syndrome. However, only much closer analysis could ascertain whether the ultimate basis of their character formation is of the “impulsive” kind and has only been hidden by later reaction-formations, or whether their low score is due to a purely social factor, namely the innumerable contacts they have with all kinds of people.

4. The “Easy-Going” Low Scorer

This syndrome is the exact opposite of the “Manipulative” high scorer. Negatively, it is characterized by a marked ten-
dency to “let things go,” a profound unwillingness to do violence to any object (an unwillingness which often may approach, on the surface level, conformity), and by an extreme reluctance to make decisions, often underscored by the subjects themselves. This reluctance even affects their language: they may be recognized by the frequency of unfinished sentences, as if they would not like to commit themselves, but rather leave it to the listener to decide on the merits of the case. Positively, they are inclined to “live and let live,” while at the same time their own desires seem to be free of the acquisitive touch. Grudging and discontent are absent. They show a certain psychological richness, the opposite of constrictedness: a capacity for enjoying things, imagination, a sense of humor which often assumes the form of self-irony. The latter, however, is as little destructive as their other attitudes: it is as if they were ready to confess all kinds of weaknesses not so much out of any neurotic compulsion as because of a strong underlying sense of inner security. They can give themselves up without being afraid of losing themselves. They are rarely radical in their political outlook, but rather behave as if they were already living under nonrepressive conditions, in a truly human society, an attitude which may, sometimes, tend to weaken their power of resistance. There is no evidence of any truly schizoid tendencies. They are completely nonstereopathic — they do not even resist stereotypy, but simply fail to understand the urge for subsumption. The latter, however, is as little destructive as their other attitudes: it is as if they were ready to confess all kinds of weaknesses not so much out of any neurotic compulsion as because of a strong underlying sense of inner security. They can give themselves up without being afraid of losing themselves. They are rarely radical in their political outlook, but rather behave as if they were already living under nonrepressive conditions, in a truly human society, an attitude which may, sometimes, tend to weaken their power of resistance. There is no evidence of any truly schizoid tendencies. They are completely nonstereopathic — they do not even resist stereotypy, but simply fail to understand the urge for subsumption.

The etiology of the “Easy-Going” syndrome is still somewhat obscure. The subjects in whom it is pronounced seem not to be defined by the preponderance of any psychological agency, or by retrogression to any particular infantile phase though there is, superficially seen, something of the child about them. Rather, they should be understood dynamically. They are people whose character structure has not become “congealed”: no set pattern of control by any of the agencies of Freud’s typology has crystallized, but they are completely “open” to experience. This, however, does not imply ego weakness, but rather the absence of traumatic experiences and defects which otherwise lead to the “reification” of the ego. In this sense, they are “normal,” but it is just this normality which gives them in our civilization the appearance of a certain immaturity. Not only did they not undergo severe childhood conflicts, but their whole childhood seems to be determined by motherly or other female images. Perhaps they may best be characterized as those who know no fear of women. This may account for the absence of aggressiveness. At the same time, it is possibly indicative of an archaic trait: to them, the world has still a matriarchal outlook. Thus, they may often represent, sociologically, the genuine “folk” element as against rational civilization. Representatives of this syndrome are not infrequent among the lower middle-classes. Though no “action” is to be expected of them, one may count on them as on persons who, under no circumstances, ever will adjust themselves to political or psychological fascism. The aforementioned M711 is very amiable, mild, gentle, casual, slow, and somewhat lethargic in both voice and manner. He is quite verbal, but very circumstantial. His statements are typically surrounded with qualifications to which he commonly devotes more attention than to the main proposition. He seems to suffer from pervasive indecision and doubt, to be pretty unsure of his ideas, and to have great difficulty in committing himself to positive statements on very many matters. In general, he tends to avoid committing himself to things, either intellectually or emotionally, and in general avoids getting involved in things.

He describes his choice of profession as accidental, but it is interesting that he was originally a landscape architect — which may imply a desire for the restitution of nature rather than its domination — and later became an interviewer in government employment, a job that gives him the gratification of helping other people without his stressing, however, this aspect narcissistically. He is not indifferent to wealth and admits his wish for “security,” but is, at the same time, totally unimpressed by the importance of money per se. His religious attitude has been described in Chapter XVIII, and it fits psychologically, in every detail, into the make-up of the “Easy-Going” syndrome. It may be added that he “does not believe in the Immaculate Conception” but doesn’t think “it makes any difference.”

When asked about discipline in childhood, he answers “practically none,” “very undisciplined.” His strong attachment to his mother is emphasized without any inhibition: the only period of his childhood when there were any “bones of contention” was when his mother “exhibited her possessiveness. She didn’t like the gals I went with.” What he himself likes about women is described as follows:

“Af‘fully hard to say when you’re pretty sold on a gal... Seems to have all the things I like — fun to be with, brains, pretty. She likes me, which is important. We share things together. (What enjoy doing together?) Music, reading, swimming, dancing. Most of the things which don’t require too much energy, which makes it good.”

It is remarkable that there is no trace of hostility against the father — whom he lost very early — in spite of the mother-fixation. It is the imaginative gift of the father which lingers in his memory:

(Pleasant memories of father?) “Lots of pleasant memories, because he spoiled us when he was home, always cooking up wonderful ideas for things to do. (Mother and father got along?) I think very well. (Which parent take after?) I don’t know, because I didn’t know my father very well. (Father’s faults?) Don’t know.”

Most significant are his statements on race issues:

(What think of minority group problems?) “I wish I knew. I don’t know. I think that is one problem we should all be working on. (Biggest problem?) Negroes, in terms of numbers... I don’t think we’ve ever faced the problem squarely... Many Negroes have come to the West Coast... (Have you ever had Negroes as friends?) Yes... Not intimately, though have known a number that I’ve liked and enjoyed. (What about intermarriage?) I think it’s a false issue... They say, ‘What if your sister married a Negro?’ I wouldn’t have any feelings about it, frankly... (Negro traits?) No.”

As to the Jews, he does not come to their “defense,” but actually denies that they are a “problem”:

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120The subject chosen as an illustration of this type “was brought up in a household of women — mother and grandmother.”

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(What about the Jewish problem?) “I don’t think there is a Jewish problem. There again, I think that’s been a herring for agitators. (How do you mean?) Hitler, Ku Klux Klan, etc. (Jewish traits?) No... I’ve seen Jewish people exhibit so-called Jewish traits, but also many non-Jewish people.” (Subject emphasizes there is no distinction along racial lines.)

The danger implicit in the “Easy-Going” syndrome, i.e., too great reluctance to use violence even against violence, is suggested by the following passage:

(What about picketing Gerald K. Smith?) “I think Gerald K. Smith should have an opportunity to speak, if we are operating under a democracy. (What about picketing as registering a protest?) If a certain group wants to, they have a right to... I don’t think it’s always effective.”

That the subject’s attitude of noncommitment to any “principle” is actually based on a sense of the concrete and not purely evasive is indicated by the following highly elucidating passage:

(Interviewer reads question... about tireless leader and refers to subject as agreeing a little, asks for elaboration.) “I agree a little. However, the opposite of that, Huey Long, was a courageous, tireless leader and Hitler (laughs). It depends. (How do you mean?) Well, I admired Willie; I admired Roosevelt; I admired Wallace. But, I don’t think we should ever have leaders in whom the people put their faith and then settle back. People seem to seek leaders to avoid thinking for themselves.”

This subject’s interview concludes with the dialectical statement that “power is almost equivalent to the abuse of power.”

5. The Genuine Liberal

By contrast to the pattern just described, this syndrome is very outspoken in reaction and opinion. The subject in whom it is pronounced has a strong sense of personal autonomy and independence. He cannot stand any outside interference with his personal convictions and beliefs, and he does not want to interfere with those of others either. His ego is quite developed but not libidinized — he is rarely “narcissistic.” At the same time, he is willing to admit tendencies, and to take the consequence — as is the case with Freud’s “erotic type” (39). One of his conspicuous features is moral courage, often far beyond his rational evaluation of a situation. He cannot “keep silent” if something wrong is being done, even if he seriously endangers himself. Just as he is strongly “individualized” himself, he sees the others, above all, as individuals, not as specimens of a general concept. He shares some features with other syndromes found among low scorers. Like the “Impulsive,” he is little repressed and even has certain difficulties in keeping himself under “control.” However, his emotionality is not blind, but directed towards the other person as a subject. His love is not only desire but also compassion — as a matter of fact, one might think of defining this syndrome as the “compassionate” low scorer. He shares with the “Protesting” low scorer the vigor of identification with the underdog, but without compulsion, and without traces of overcompensation: he is no “Jew lover.” Like the “Easy-Going” low scorer he is anti-totalitarian, but much more consciously so, without the element of hesitation and indecisiveness. It is this configuration rather than any single trait which characterizes the “Genuine Liberal.” Aesthetic interests seem to occur frequently.

The illustration we give is a girl whose character of a “genuine liberal” stands out the more clearly, since, according to the interviewer, she is politically naïve like the majority of our college women, regardless whether they are high or low. No “ticket” is involved. F515

is a 21-year-old college student. She is a handsome brunette with dark, flashing eyes, who exudes temperament and vitality. She has none of the pretty-pretty femininity so frequently seen in high subjects, and would probably scorn the little feminine wiles and schemes practiced by such women. On the contrary, she is extremely frank and outspoken in manner, and in build she is athletic. One senses in her a very passionate nature and so strong a desire to give intensely of herself in all her relationships, that she must experience difficulty in restraining herself within the bounds of conventionality.

Apart from a semiprofessional interest in music she also “enjoys painting and dramatics.” As to her vocation, however, she is still undecided. She

has taken nurses’ aid training. She liked helping people in this way. “I enjoyed it. I feel that I could now take care of a sick person. It didn’t bother me to carry bed-pans and urinals. I learned that I could touch flesh without being squeamish. I learned to be tactful about certain things. And then it was patriotic! (slightly joking tone). People liked me. (Why did they like you?) Because I smiled, and because I was always making cracks — like I’m doing now.”

Her views with regard to minorities are guided by the idea of the individual:

“Minorities have to have just as many rights as majorities. They are all people and should have just as many rights as the majority. There should be no minorities; there should only be individuals and they should be judged according to the individual. Period! Is that sufficient?”

(Negroes?) “Same thing! Still as individuals. Their skin is black, but they are still people. Individuals have loves and sorrows and joys. I don’t think you should kill them all or liquidate them or stick them in a corner just because they are different people. I would not marry one, because I should not want to marry a person who has a trait I don’t like, like a large nose, etc. I would not want to have children with dark skins. I would not mind if they live next door to me.” (Earlier in the interview subject had brought out the fact that she had also to care for Negro patients during her nurses’ aid work, and that she had not minded at all having to give baths to them, etc.)

(Jews?) “Same! Well I could marry a Jew very easily. I could even marry a Negro if he had a light enough skin. I prefer a light skin. I don’t consider Jews different from white people at all, because they even have light skins. It’s really silly. (What do you think are the causes of prejudice?) Jealousy. (Explain?) Because they are smarter and they don’t want any competition. We don’t want any competition. If they want it they should have it. I don’t know if they are more intelligent, but if they are they should have it.”

The last statement shows complete absence of any aspect of guilt feelings in her relation to the Jews. It is followed up by the joke:

“Maybe if the Jews get in power they would liquidate the majority! That’s not smart. Because we would fight back.”

Her views on religion, with a slightly humorous touch, are centered in the idea of Utopia. She mentions the word herself, when referring to her reading of Plato. The gist of her religion is contained in the statement: “Perhaps we will all be saved.” This should be compared with the prevailing “anti-Utopian” attitude of our subjects.

The description of both her parents contains elements of her own ego ideal, in quite an unconventional way:

“Father has been employed for 25 years in the freight complaint department of the ____ R.R. Co. His work involves the hiring of many men. He has about 150 people working under him.” (Subject described her father as follows:) “He could have been vice-president by now — he has the brains — but he does not have the go-get-in nature; he is not enough of a politician. He is broad-minded — always listens to both sides of a question before making up his mind. He is a good ’argumenter’ for this reason. He is understanding. He is not emotional like mother. Mother is emotional, father factual. Mother is good. She has a personality of her own. She gives to all of us. She is emotional. She keeps Daddy very satisfied. (In what way? ) She makes a home for him to come home to — he has it very hard at the office. It’s living. Their marriage is very happy — everybody notices it. Their children perform too — people notice them! Mother is very friendly. Understanding. She gives sympathy. People love to talk to her. Someone calls her up on the telephone and they become lifelong friends just from having talked on the telephone! She is sensitive; it is easy to hurt her.”

Her attitude towards sex is one of precarious restraint. Her boy friend wants to have sexual intercourse everytime that they have a date — in fact he wanted it the first time he dated her — and she doesn’t want it that way. She cries every time he tries something, so she supposes it cannot be right for her. She thinks that friendship should precede sexual relations, but he thinks that sex relations are a way of getting to know each other better. Finally she broke with him three days ago (said with mock tearfulness). He had said, “Let’s just be friends,” but she didn’t want that either! The sex problem bothers her. The first time she danced with him he told her that he thought she wanted intercourse; whereas she just wanted to be close to him. She is worried because she didn’t mean it the other way, but perhaps unconsciously she did!

It is evident that her erotic character is connected with a lack of repression with regard to her feelings towards her father:

“I would like to marry some-one like my father.”

The result of the interview is summed up by the interviewer:

The most potent factors making for the low score in this case are the open-mindedness of the parents and the great love subject’s mother bore all her children.

If this can be generalized, and consequences be drawn for high scorers, we might postulate that the increasing significance of the fascist character depends largely upon basic changes in the structure of the family itself (see Max Horkheimer, 53a).
Public Opinion Questionnaire E

The following statements refer to opinions regarding a number of social groups and issues, about which some people agree and others disagree. Please mark each statement in the left-hand margin according to your agreement or disagreement, as follows:

| +1: slight support, agreement | –1: slight opposition, disagreement |
| +2: moderate support, agreement | –2: moderate opposition, disagreement |
| +3: strong support, agreement | –3: strong opposition, disagreement |

1. The many political parties tend to confuse national issues, add to the expense of elections, and raise unnecessary agitation. For this and other reasons, it would be best if all political parties except the two major ones were abolished.

2. If there are enough Negroes who want to attend dances at a local dance hall featuring a colored band, a good way to arrange this would be to have one all-Negro night, and then the whites could dance in, peace the rest of the time.

3. Patriotism and loyalty are the first and most important requirements of a good citizen.

4. Certain religious sects whose beliefs do not permit them to salute the flag should be forced to conform to such a patriotic action, or else be abolished.

5. The Negroes would solve many of their social problems by not being so irresponsible, lazy, and ignorant.

6. Any group or social movement which contains many foreigners should be watched with suspicion and, whenever possible, be investigated by the FBI.

7. There will always be superior and inferior nations in the world and in the interests of all concerned, it is best that the superior ones be in control of world affairs.

8. Negro musicians are sometimes as good as white musicians at swing music and jazz, but it is a mistake to have mixed Negro-white bands.

9. Although women are necessary now in the armed forces and in industry, they should be returned to their proper place in the home as soon as the war ends.

10. Minor forms of military training, obedience, and discipline, such as drill, marching and simple commands, should be made a part of the elementary school educational program.

11. It would be a mistake to have Negroes for foremen and leaders over whites.

12. The main threat to basic American institutions during this century has come from the infiltration of foreign ideas, doctrines, and agitators.

13. Present treatment of conscientious objectors, draft-evaders, and enemy aliens is too lenient and mollycoddling. If a person won’t fight for his country, he deserves a lot worse than just a prison or a work camp.

14. Negroes may have a part to play in white civilization, but it is best to keep them in their own districts and schools and to prevent too much intermixing with whites.

15. One main difficulty with allowing the entire population to participate fully in government affairs (voting, jobs, etc.) is that such a large percentage is innately deficient and incapable.

16. Manual labor and menial jobs seem to fit the Negro mentality and ability better than more skilled or responsible work.

17. It is a mistake to allow any Japanese to leave internment camps and enter the army where they would be free to commit sabotage.

18. In view of the present national emergency, it is highly important to limit responsible government jobs to native, white, Christian Americans.

19. In a community of 1,000 whites and 50 Negroes, a drunken Negro shoots and kills an officer who is trying to arrest him. The white population should immediately drive all the Negroes out of town.

20. European refugees may be in need, but it would be a big mistake to lower our immigration quotas and allow them to flood the country.

21. The many faults, and the general inability to get along, of the Oklahomans ("Okies"), who have recently flooded California, prove that we ought to send them back where they came from as soon as conditions permit.

22. The people who raise all the talk about putting Negroes on the same level as whites and giving them the same privileges are mostly radical agitators trying to stir up conflicts.

23. It has become clear that the Germans and Japanese are racially war-minded and power-seeking, and the only guarantee of future peace is to wipe out most of them and to keep the rest under careful control.

24. A large-scale system of sterilization would be one good way of breeding out criminals and other undesirable elements in our society and so raise its general standards and living conditions.
25. An occasional lynching in the South is a good thing because there is a large percentage of Negroes in many communities and they need a scare once in a while to prevent them from starting riots and disturbances.

26. Mexico can never advance to the standards of living and civilization of the U.S., due mainly to the innate dirtiness, laziness, and general backwardness of Mexicans.

27. Filipinos are all right in their place, but they carry it too far when they dress lavishly, buy good cars, and go around with white girls.

28. It would be best to limit Negroes to grammar and trade school education since more schooling just gives them ambitions and desires which they are unable to fulfill in white competition.

29. Zootsuiters demonstrate that inferior groups, when they are given too much freedom and money, just misuse their privileges and create disturbances.

30. The most vicious, irresponsible, and racketeering unions are, in most cases, those having largely foreigners for leaders.

31. There is something inherently primitive and uncivilized in the Negro, as shown in his music and his extreme aggressiveness.

32. We are spending too much money for the pampering of criminals and the insane, and for the education of inherently incapable people.

33. There will always be wars because, for one thing, there will always be races who ruthlessly try to grab more than their share.

34. Most Negroes would become officious, overbearing, and disagreeable if not kept in their place.

Excerpts from Public Opinion Questionnaire F

2. Although many people may scoff, it may yet be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.

3. America is getting so far from the true American way of life that force may be necessary to restore it.

6. It is only natural and right that women be restricted in certain ways in which men have more freedom.

9. Too many people today are living in an unnatural, soft way; we should return to the fundamentals, to a more red-blooded, active way of life.

10. It is more than a remarkable coincidence that Japan had an earthquake on Pearl Harbor Day, December 7, 1944.

12. The modern church, with its many rules and hypocrisies, does not appeal to the deeply religious person; it appeals mainly to the childish, the insecure, and the uncritical.

14. After we finish off the Germans and Japs, we ought to concentrate on other enemies of the human race such as rats, snakes, and germs.

17. Familiarity breeds contempt.

19. One should avoid doing things in public which appear wrong to others, even though one knows that these things are really all right.

20. One of the main values of progressive education is that it gives the child great freedom in expressing those natural impulses and desires so often frowned upon by conventional middle-class society.

23. He is, indeed, contemptible who does not feel an undying love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

24. Today everything is unstable; we should be prepared for a period of constant change, conflict, and upheaval.

28. Novels or stories that tell about what people think and feel are more interesting than those which contain mainly action, romance, and adventure.

30. Reports of atrocities in Europe have been greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

31. Homosexuality is a particularly rotten form of delinquency and ought to be severely punished.

32. It is essential for learning or effective work that our teachers or bosses outline in detail what is to be done and exactly how to go about it.

35. There are some activities so flagrantly un-American that, when responsible officials won’t take the proper steps, the wide-awake citizen should take the law into his own hands.

38. There is too much emphasis in college on intellectual and theoretical topics, not enough emphasis on practical matters and on the homely virtues of living.

39. Every person should have a deep faith in some supernatural force higher than himself to which he gives total allegiance and whose decisions he does not question.
42. No matter how they act on the surface, men are interested in women for only one reason.

43. Sciences like chemistry, physics, and medicine have carried men very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.

46. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery school stuff compared to some of the goings-on in this country today, even in circles where people might least expect it.

47. No insult to our honor should ever go unpunished.

50. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

53. There are some things too intimate or personal to talk about even with one's closest friends.

55. Although leisure is a fine thing, it is good hard work that makes life interesting and worthwhile.

56. After the war, we may expect a crime wave; the control of gangsters and ruffians will become a major social problem.

58. What a man does is not so important so long as he does it well.

59. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.

60. Which of the following are the most important for a person to have or to be? Mark X the three most important.

- artistic and sensuous
- popular, good personality
- drive, determination, will power
- broad, humanitarian social outlook
- neatness and good manners
- sensitivity and understanding
- efficiency, practicality, thrift
- intellectual and serious
- emotional expressiveness, warmth, intimacy
- kindness and charity

65. It is entirely possible that this series of wars and conflicts will be ended once and for all by a world-destroying earthquake, flood, or other catastrophe.

66. Books and movies ought not to deal so much with the sordid and seamy side of life; they ought to concentrate on themes that are entertaining or uplifting.

67. When you come right down to it, it's human nature never to do anything without an eye to one's own profit.

70. To a greater extent than most people realize, our lives are governed by plots hatched in secret by politicians.

73. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around so much and mix together so freely, a person has to be especially careful to protect himself against infection and disease.

74. What this country needs is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in.

75. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped.

77. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.
Public Opinion Questionnaire A

This is an investigation of general public opinion concerning Jewish people. The following are statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Please mark each one in the left margin, according to the amount of your agreement or disagreement, by using the following scale:

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<tr>
<th>(+1): slight support, agreement</th>
<th>(−1): slight opposition, disagreement</th>
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<td>(+2): moderate support, agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>(+3): strong support, agreement</td>
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1. Jews seem to prefer the most luxurious, extravagant, and sensual way of living.

2. The Jews must be considered a bad influence on Christian culture and civilization.

3. In order to maintain a nice residential neighborhood it is best to prevent Jews from living in it.

4. A major fault of the Jews is their conceit, overbearing pride, and their idea that they are a chosen race.

5. One trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they stick together and connive, so that a Gentile doesn’t have a fair chance in competition.

6. Colleges should adopt a quota system by which they limit the number of Jews in fields which have too many Jews now.

7. No matter how Americanized a Jew may seem to be, there is always something basically Jewish underneath, a loyalty to Jewry and a manner that is never totally changed.

8. Jewish power and control in money matters is far out of proportion to the number of Jews in the total population.

9. A step toward solving the Jewish problem would be to prevent Jews from getting into superior, profitable positions in society, for a while at least.

10. Districts containing many Jews always seem to be smelly, dirty, shabby, and unattractive.

11. There are too many Jews in the various federal agencies and bureaus in Washington, and they have too much control over our national policies.

12. The Jewish problem is so general and deep that one often doubts that democratic methods can ever solve it.

13. There are a few exceptions, but in general Jews are pretty much alike.

14. Jews tend to lower the general standard of living by their willingness to do the most menial work and to live under standards that are far below average.

15. It is wrong for Jews and Gentiles to intermarry.

16. The Jews should not pry so much into Christian activities and organizations nor seek so much recognition and prestige from Christians.

17. Much resentment against Jews stems from their tendency to keep apart and to exclude Gentiles from Jewish social life.

18. It is best that Jews should have their own fraternities and sororities, since they have their own particular interests and activities which they can best engage in together, just as Christians get along best in all-Christian fraternities.

19. One thing that has hindered the Jews from establishing their own nation is the fact that they really have no culture of their own; instead, they tend to copy the things that are important to the native citizens of whatever country they are in.

20. The Jews should give up their un-Christian religion with all its strange customs (kosher diet, special holidays, etc.) and participate actively and sincerely in the Christian religion.

21. It is sometimes all right to ban Jews from certain apartment houses.

22. One big trouble with Jews is that they are never contented, but always try for the best jobs and the most money.

23. Jews tend to remain a foreign element in American society, to preserve their old social standards and to resist the American way of life.

24. Anyone who employs many people should be careful not to hire a large percentage of Jews.

25. Jews go too far in hiding their Jewishness, especially such extremes as changing their names, straightening noses, and imitating Christian manners and customs.

26. There is little doubt that Jewish pressure is largely responsible for the U. S. getting into the war with Germany.
Public Opinion Questionnaire S

This is an investigation of general public opinion concerning Jewish people. The following are statements with which some people agree and others disagree. Please each one in the left margin, according to the amount of your agreement or disagreement, by using the following scale:

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1. The Jews should make sincere efforts to rid themselves of their conspicuous and irritating faults, if they really want to stop being persecuted.

2. War shows up the fact that the Jews make sacrifices for their country.

3. It would hurt the business of a large concern if it had too many Jewish employees.

4. There is something different and strange about Jews; one never knows what they are thinking or planning, nor what makes them tick.

5. Jews may have moral standards that they apply in their dealings with each other, but with Christians they are unscrupulous, ruthless, and undependable.

6. The best way to eliminate the Communist menace in this country is to control the Jewish element which guides it.

7. The trouble with letting Jews into a nice neighborhood is that they gradually give it a typical Jewish atmosphere.

8. The Jew’s first loyalty is to Jewry rather than to his country.

9. In order to handle the Jewish problem, Gentiles must meet fire with fire and use the same ruthless tactics with the Jews that the Jews use with the Gentiles.

10. I can hardly imagine myself marrying a Jew.

11. Jews seem to have an aversion to plain hard work; they tend to be a parasitic element in society by finding easy, nonproductive jobs.

12. It is not wise for a Christian to be seen too much with Jews, as he might be taken for a Jew, or be looked down upon by his Christian friends.

13. One general fault of Jews is their overaggressiveness, a strong tendency always to display their Jewish looks, manners, and breeding.

14. There seems to be some revolutionary streak in the Jewish make-up as shown by the fact that there are so many Jewish Communists and agitators.

15. One of the first steps to be taken in cleaning up the movies and generally improving the situation in Hollywood is to put an end to Jewish domination there.

16. Jews should be more concerned with their personal appearance, and not be so dirty and smelly and unkempt.

17. The Jewish districts in most cities are results of the clannishness and stick-togetherness of Jews.

18. Most hotels should deny admittance to Jews, as a general rule.

19. The true Christian can never forgive the Jews for their crucifixion of Christ.

20. Jewish millionaires may do a certain amount to help their own people, but little of their money goes into worthwhile American causes.

21. Jewish leaders should encourage Jews to be more inconspicuous, to keep out of professions and activities already overcrowded with Jews, and to keep out of the public notice.

22. There is little hope of correcting the racial defects of the Jews, since these defects are simply in their blood.

23. The Jews keep too much to themselves, instead of taking the proper interest in community problems and good government.

24. It would be to the best interests of all if the Jews would form their own nation and keep more to themselves.

25. When Jews create large funds for educational or scientific research (Rosenwald, Heller, etc.) it is mainly due to a desire for fame and public notice rather than a really sincere scientific interest.

26. On the whole, the Jews have probably contributed less to American life than any other group.