

Types And Syndromes

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Chapter XIX from *The Authoritarian Personality*

A. The Approach

Hardly any concept in contemporary American psychology has been so thoroughly criticized as that of typology. Since "any doctrine of types is a halfway approach to the problem of individuality, and nothing more," (9) any such doctrine is subject to devastating attacks from both extremes: because it never catches the unique, and because its generalizations are not statistically valid and do not even afford productive heuristic tools. From the viewpoint of general dynamic theory of personality, it is objected that typologies tend towards pigeonholing and transform highly flexible traits into static, quasi-biological characteristics while neglecting, above all, the impact of historical and social factors. Statistically, the insufficiency of twofold typologies is particularly emphasized. As to the heuristic value of typologies, their overlapping, and the necessity of constructing "mixed types" which practically disavow the original constructs, is pointed out. At the hub of all these arguments is aversion against the application of rigid concepts to the supposedly fluid reality of psychological life.

The development of modern psychological typologies, as contrasted, for example, with the old scheme of "temperaments," has its origin in psychiatry, in the therapeutic need for a classification of mental diseases as a means of facilitating diagnosis and prognosis. Kraepelin and Lombroso are the fathers of psychiatric typology. Since the clear-cut division of mental diseases has in the meantime completely broken down, the basis of typological classifications of the "normal," derived from the former, seems to vanish. It is stigmatized as a remnant of the "taxonomic phase of behavior theory" the formulation of which "tended to remain descriptive, static and sterile" (80). If not even the mentally diseased, whose psychological dynamics are largely replaced by rigid patterns, can be sensibly divided according to types, how, then, is there any chance of success for procedures such as the famous one of Kretschmer, the *raison d'être* of which was the standard classification of manic-depression and dementia praecox?

The present state of the discussion on typology is summed up by Anne Anastasi (11) as follows:

"Type theories have been most commonly criticized because of their attempt to classify individuals into sharply divided categories . . . Such a procedure implies a multi-modal distribution of traits. The introverts, for example, would be expected to cluster at one end of the scale, the extroverts at the other end, and the point of demarcation between them should be clearly apparent. Actual measurement, however, reveals a unimodal distribution of all traits, which closely resembles the bell-shaped normal curve.

"Similarly, it is often difficult to classify a given individual definitely into one type or the other. The typologists, when confronted with this difficulty, have frequently proposed intermediate or 'mixed' types to bridge the gap between the extremes. Thus Jung suggested an ambivert type which manifests neither introvert nor extrovert tendencies to a predominant degree. Observation seems to show, however, that the ambivert category is the largest, and the decided introverts and extroverts are relatively rare. The reader is referred, for example, to the distribution curve obtained by Heidebreder with an introversion questionnaire administered to zoo college students. . . . It will be recalled that the majority of scores were intermediate and that as the extremes of either introversion or extroversion were approached, the number of cases became progressively smaller. The curve, too, showed no sharp breaks, but only a continuous gradation from the mean to the two extremes. As was indicated in Chapter II, the same may be said of all other measurable traits of the individual, whether social, emotional, intellectual, or physical.

"It is apparent, then, that insofar as type theories imply the classification of individuals into clear-cut classes, they are untenable in the face of a mass of indisputable data. Such an assumption, however, is not necessarily inherent in all systems of human typology. It is more characteristic of the popular versions and adaptations of type theories than of the original concepts. To be sure, type psychologists have often attempted to categorize individuals, but this was not an indispensable part of their theories; their concepts have occasionally been sufficiently modified to admit of a normal distribution of traits."

In spite of such concessions to more satisfactory categorizations, the "nominalistic" exclusion of typological classifications has triumphed to such a degree that it is almost tantamount to a taboo, no matter how urgent the scientific and pragmatic need for such classifications may be. It should be noted that this taboo is closely related to the notion, still taught by numerous academic psychiatrists, that mental diseases are essentially inexplicable. If one would assume, for the argument's sake, that psychoanalytic theory has really succeeded in establishing a number of dynamic schemata of psychoses, by which the latter become "meaningful" within the psychological life of the individual in spite of all their irrationality and the disintegration of the psychotic personality, the problem of typology would be completely redefined.

It cannot be doubted that the critique of psychological types expresses a truly humane impulse, directed against that kind of subsumption of individuals under pre-established classes which has been consummated in Nazi Germany, where the labeling of live human beings, independently of their specific qualities, resulted in decisions about their life and death. It is this motive which has been stressed particularly by Allport (9); and Boder has demonstrated in great detail in his study

of “Nazi Science” the interconnections of psychological *pro et contra* schemes, the repressive function of categories such as Jaensch’s “*Gegentypus*” and the arbitrary manipulation of empirical findings (47). Thus, enquiries devoted to the study of prejudice have to be particularly cautious when the issue of typology comes up. To express it pointedly, the rigidity of constructing types is itself indicative of that “stereopathic”¹ mentality which belongs to the basic constituents of the potentially fascist character. We need only to refer, in this connection, to our high scorer of Irish descent who attributes his personal traits unhesitatingly to his national extraction. Jaensch’s “anti-type,” for example, is an almost classic case of the mechanism of projection, the effectiveness of which in the make-up of our high scorers has been established, and which in Jaensch’s has wormed its way into the very same science whose task it would be to account for this mechanism. The essentially undynamic, “antisociological,” and *quasi*-biological nature of classifications of the Jaensch brand is directly opposed to the theory of our work as well as to its empirical results.²

Yet all these objections do not dispose altogether of the problem of typology. Not all typologies are devices for dividing the world into sheep and buck, but some of them reflect certain experiences which, though hard to systematize, have, to put it as loosely as possible, hit upon something. Here one has to think primarily of Kretschmer, Jung, and Freud. It should be particularly emphasized that Freud, whose general emphasis on psychological dynamics puts him above the suspicion of any simple “biologism” and stereotypical thinking, published as late as 1931 (39) a rather categorical typology without bothering much about the methodological difficulties of which he must have been aware very well, and even, with apparent naïveté, constructing “mixed” types out of the basic ones. Freud was too much led by concrete insights into the matters themselves, had too intimate a relationship to his scientific objects, to waste his energy on the kind of methodological reflections which may well turn out to be acts of sabotage of organized science against productive thinking. This is not to say that his typology has to be accepted as it stands. Not only can it be criticized by the usual anti-typological arguments to which reference was made at the beginning of this chapter; as Otto Fenichel has pointed out, it is also problematic from the viewpoint of orthodox psychoanalytic theory. What counts, however, is that Freud found such a classification worthwhile. One has only to look at the relatively easy and convincing integration of different kinds of twofold typologies in Donald W. MacKinnon’s *Structure of Personality* (in 55) to gain the impression that typologies are not alto-

gether arbitrary, do not necessarily do violence to the manifoldness of the human, but have some basis in the structure of psychological reality.

The reason for the persistent plausibility of the typological approach, however, is not a static biological one, but just the opposite: dynamic and social. The fact that human society has been up to now divided into classes affects more than the external relations of men. The marks of social repression are left within the individual soul. The French sociologist Durkheim in particular has shown how and to what extent hierarchical social orders permeate the individual’s thinking, attitudes, and behavior. People form psychological “classes,” inasmuch as they are stamped by variegated social processes. This in all probability holds good for our own standardized mass culture to even higher a degree than for previous periods. The relative rigidity of our high scorers, and of some of our low scorers, reflects psychologically the increasing rigidity according to which our society falls into two more or less crude opposing camps. Individualism, opposed to inhuman pigeonholing, may ultimately become a mere ideological veil in a society which actually is inhuman and whose intrinsic tendency towards the “subsumption” of everything shows itself by the classification of people themselves. In other words, the critique of typology should not neglect the fact that large numbers of people are no longer, or rather never were, “individuals” in the sense of traditional nineteenth-century philosophy. Ticket thinking is possible only because the actual existence of those who indulge in it is largely determined by “tickets,” standardized, opaque, and overpowering social processes which leave to the “individual” but little freedom for action and true individuation. Thus the problem of typology is put on a different basis. There is reason to look for psychological types because the world in which we live is typed and “produces” different “types” of persons. Only by identifying stereotypical traits in modern humans, and not by denying their existence, can the pernicious tendency towards all-pervasive classification and subsumption be challenged.

The construction of psychological types does not merely imply an arbitrary, compulsive attempt to bring some “order” into the confusing diversity of human personality. It represents a means of “conceptualizing” this diversity, according to its own structure, of achieving closer understanding. The radical renunciation of all generalizations beyond those pertaining to the most obvious findings would not result in true empathy into human individuals but rather in an opaque, dull description of psychological “facts”: every step which goes beyond the factual and aims at psychological meaning — as it has been defined in Freud’s basic statement that all our experi-

¹ *stereopathy*: Persistent stereotyped thinking.

² It should be remembered that Jaensch’s anti-type is defined by synaesthesia, that is to say, the supposed or actual tendency of certain people “to have color experiences when listening to a tone, or to music in general, and to have tone experiences when looking at colors or pictures” (Boder, in (47), p. 15). This tendency is interpreted by Jaensch as a symptom of degeneracy. It may well be assumed that this interpretation is based on historical reminiscence rather than on any factual psychological findings. For the cult of synaesthesia played a large role within the lyrical poetry of the same French authors who introduced the concept of *décadence*, particularly Baudelaire. It can be noted, however, that synaesthetic imagery fulfills a specific function in their works. By clouding the division between different realms of sense perception, they simultaneously try to efface the rigid classification of different kinds of objects, as it is brought about under the practical requirements of industrial civilization. They rebel against reification.³ It is highly characteristic that an entirely administrative ideology chooses as its archfoe an attitude which is, above all, rebellion against stereotypy. The Nazi cannot stand anything which does not fit into his scheme and even less anything which does not recognize his own reified, “stereopathic” way of looking at things.

ences are meaningful (“*dass alle unsere Erlebnisse einen Sinn haben*”) — inevitably involves generalizations transcending the supposedly unique “case,” and it happens that these generalizations more frequently than not imply the existence of certain regularly recurring *nuclei* or syndromes which come rather close to the idea of “types.” Ideas such as those of orality, or of the compulsive character, though apparently derived from highly individualized studies, make sense only if they are accompanied by the implicit assumption that the structures thus named, and discovered within the individual dynamics of an individual, pertain to such basic constellations that they may be expected to be representative, no matter how “unique” the observations upon which they are based may be. Since there is a typological element inherent in any kind of psychological theory, it would be spurious to exclude typology *per se*. Methodological “purity” in this respect would be tantamount to renouncing the conceptual medium or any theoretical penetration of the given material, and would result in an irrationality as complete as the arbitrary subsumptiveness of the “pigeonholing” schools.

Within the context of our study, another reflection of an entirely different nature points in the same direction. It is a pragmatic one: the necessity that science provide weapons against the potential threat of the fascist mentality. It is an open question whether and to what extent the fascist danger really can be fought with psychological weapons. Psychological “treatment” of prejudiced persons is problematic because of their large number as well as because they are by no means “ill,” in the usual sense, and, as we have seen, at least on the surface level are often even better “adjusted” than the non-prejudiced ones. Since, however, modern fascism is inconceivable without a mass basis, the inner complexion of its prospective followers still maintains its crucial significance, and no defense which does not take into account the subjective phase of the problem would be truly “realistic.” It is obvious that psychological countermeasures, in view of the extent of the fascist potential among modern masses, are promising only if they are differentiated in such a way that they are adapted to specific groups. An over-all defense would move on a level of such vague generalities that it would in all probability fall flat. It may be regarded as one of the practical results of our study that such a differentiation has at least to be *also* one which follows psychological lines, since certain basic variables of the fascist character persist relatively independently of marked social differentiations. There is no psychological defense against prejudice which is not oriented toward certain psychological “types.”

We would make a fetish of the methodological critique of typology and jeopardize each attempt of coming psychologically to grips with prejudiced persons if a number of very drastic and extreme differences — such as the one between the psychological make-up of a conventional anti-Semite and a sadomasochistic “tough guy” — were excluded simply be-

cause none of these types is ever represented in classic purity by a single individual.

The possibility of constructing largely different sets of psychological types has been widely recognized. As the result of the previous discussions, we base our own attempt on the three following major criteria:

a. We do not want to classify human beings by types which divide them neatly statistically, nor by ideal types in the usual sense which have to be supplemented by “mixtures.” Our types are justified only if we succeed in organizing, under the name of each type, a number of traits and dispositions, in bringing them into a context which shows some unity of meaning in those traits. We regard those types as being scientifically most productive which integrate traits, otherwise dispersed, into meaningful continuities and bring to the fore the interconnection of elements which belong together according to their inherent “logic,” in terms of psychological understanding of underlying dynamics. No mere additive or mechanical subsumption of traits under the same type should be permitted. A major criterion for this postulate would be that, confronted with “genuine” types, even so-called deviations would no longer appear as accidental but would be recognizable as meaningful, in a structural sense. Speaking genetically, the consistency of meaning of each type would suggest that as many traits as possible can be deduced from certain basic forms of underlying psychological conflicts, and their resolutions.

b. Our typology has to be a *critical* typology in the sense that it comprehends the typification of men itself as a social function. The more rigid a type, the more deeply does he show the hallmarks of social rubber stamps. This is in accordance with the characterization of our high scorers by traits such as rigidity and stereotypical thinking. Here lies the ultimate principle of our whole typology. Its major dichotomy lies in the question of whether a person is standardized himself and thinks in a standardized way, or whether he is truly “individualized” and opposes standardization in the sphere of human experience. The individual types will be specific configurations within this general division. The latter differentiates *prima facie* between high and low scorers. At closer view, however, it also affects the low scorers themselves: the more they are “typified” themselves, the more they express unwittingly the fascist potential within themselves.⁴

c. The types must be constructed in such a way that they may become productive pragmatically, that is to say, that they can be translated into relatively drastic defense patterns which are organized in such a way that differences of a more individual nature play but a minor role. This makes for a certain conscious “superficiality” of typification, comparable to the

⁴It should be stressed that two concepts of types have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there are those who are types in the proper sense, typified persons, individuals who are largely reflecting set patterns and social mechanisms, and on the other hand, persons who can be called types only in a formal-logical sense and who often may be characterized just by the *absence* of standard qualities. It is essential to distinguish the real, “genuine” type structure of a person and his merely belonging to a logical class by which he is defined from outside, as it were.

situation in a sanatorium where no therapy could ever be initiated if one did not divide the patients into manic-depressives, schizophrenics, paranoiacs, and so forth, though one is fully aware of the fact that these distinctions are likely to vanish the deeper one goes. In this connection, however, the hypothesis may be allowed that if one could only succeed in going deep *enough*, at the end of the differentiation just the more universal “crude” structure would reappear: some basic libidinous constellations. An analogy from the history of the arts may be permitted. The traditional, crude distinction between Romanesque and Gothic style was based on the characteristic of round and pointed arches. It became apparent that this division was insufficient; that both traits were overlapping and that there were much deeper-lying contrasts of construction between the two styles. This, however, led to such complicated definitions that it proved impossible to state in their terms whether a given building was Romanesque or Gothic in character though its structural totality rarely left any doubt to the observer to which epoch it belonged. Thus it ultimately became necessary to resume the primitive and naïve classification. Something similar may be advisable in the case of our problem. An apparently superficial question such as “What kind of people do you find among the prejudiced?” may easily do more justice to typological requirements than the attempt to define types at first sight by, say, different fixations at pregenital or genital developmental phases and the like. This indispensable simplification can probably be achieved by the integration of *sociological* criteria into the psychological constructs. Such sociological criteria may refer to the group memberships and identifications of our subjects as well as to social aims, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. The task of relating psychological type criteria to sociological ones is facilitated because it has been established in the course of our study that a number of “clinical” categories (such as the adulation of a punitive father) are intimately related to social attitudes (such as belief in authority for authority’s sake). Hence, we may well “translate” for the hypothetical purposes of a typology a number of our basic psychological concepts into sociological ones most closely akin to them.

These considerations have to be supplemented by a requirement prescribed by the nature of our study. Our typology, or rather, scheme of syndromes, has to be organized in such a way that it fits as “naturally” as possible our empirical data. It should be borne in mind that our material does not exist in an empty space, as it were, but that it is structurally pre-determined by our tools, particularly the questionnaire and the interview schedule. Since our hypotheses were formulated according to psychoanalytic theory, the orientation of our syndromes toward psychoanalytic concepts is reinforced. Of course, the limitations of such an attempt are narrow since we did not “analyze” any of our subjects. Our characterization of syndromes has to concentrate on traits that have proved to be psychoanalytically significant rather than on the ultimate dynamic patterns of depth psychology.

In order to place the following typological draft into its

proper perspective, it should be recalled that we have pointed out in the chapter on the F scale that all the clusters of which this scale is made up belong to one single, “over-all” syndrome. It is one of the outstanding findings of the study that “highness” is essentially *one* syndrome, distinguishable from a variety of “low” syndromes. There exists something like “the” potentially fascist character, which is by itself a “structural unit.” In other words, traits such as conventional-ity, authoritarian submissiveness and aggressiveness, projectivity, manipulativeness, etc., regularly go together. Hence, the “subsyndromes” which we outline here are not intended to *isolate* any of these traits. They are all to be understood within the general frame of reference of the high scorer. What differentiates them is the emphasis on one or another of the features or dynamics selected for characterization, not their exclusiveness. However, it seems to us that the differential profiles arising within the over-all structure can readily be distinguished. At the same time, their interconnection by the over-all potentially fascist structure is of such a nature that they are “dynamic” in the sense that transitions from one to the other could easily be worked out by analyzing the increase or decrease of some of the specific factors. Such a dynamic interpretation of them could achieve more adequately — that is to say, with a better understanding of the underlying processes — what is usually done in a haphazard way by the “mixed types” of static typologies. However, theory and empirical substantiation of these dynamic relations among the syndromes could not be touched upon within the present research.

The principle according to which the syndromes are organized is their “type-being” in the sense of rigidity, lack of cathexis,⁵ stereopathy. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the order of our syndromes represents a more dynamic “scale of measurement.” It pertains to potentialities, and accessibility to countermeasures, but not to overt prejudice — basically to the problem of “over-all highness” vs. “lowness.” It will be seen, for example, that the case illustrating the psychologically relatively harmless syndrome at the bottom of our scheme is extremely high in terms of overt anti-minority prejudice.

Pragmatic requirements as well as the idea that the high scorers are generally more “typed” than the low scorers seem to focus our interest on the prejudiced person. Yet, we deem it necessary also to construct syndromes of low scorers. The general direction of our research leads us to stress, with a certain one-sidedness, psychological determinants. This, however, should never make us forget that prejudice is by no means an entirely psychological, “subjective” phenomenon. It has to be remembered what we pointed out in Chapter XVII: that “high” ideology and mentality are largely fomented by the objective spirit of our society. Whereas different individuals react differently, according to their psychological make-up, to the ubiquitous⁶ cultural stimuli of prejudice, the objective element of prejudice cannot be neglected if we want to understand the attitudes of individuals or psychologi-

⁵ *cathexis*: the concentration of mental energy on one particular person, idea, or object (esp. to an unhealthy degree).

⁶ *ubiquitous*: present, appearing, or found everywhere.

cal groups. It is therefore not sufficient to ask, "Why is this or that individual ethnocentric?" but rather: "Why does he react positively to the omnipresent stimuli, to which this other man reacts negatively?" The potentially fascist character has to be regarded as a product of interaction between the cultural climate of prejudice and the "psychological" responses to this climate. The former consists not only of crude outside factors, such as economic and social conditions, but of opinions, ideas, attitudes, and behavior which appear to be the individual's but which have originated neither in his autonomous thinking nor in his self-sufficient psychological development but are due to his belonging to our culture. These objective patterns are so pervasive in their influence that it is just as much of a problem to explain why an individual resists them as it is to explain why they are accepted. In other words, the low scorers present just as much of a psychological problem as do the high scorers, and only by understanding them can we obtain a picture of the objective momentum of prejudice. Thus the construction of "low" syndromes becomes imperative. Naturally, they have been chosen in such a way as to fit as well as possible with our general principles of organization. Yet it should not come as a surprise that they are more loosely interconnected than the "high" ones.

The syndromes to be discussed have been developed gradually. They go back to a typology of anti-Semites worked out and published by the Institute of Social Research (57). This scheme was modified and extended to the low scorers during the present research. In its new form, which emphasized the more psychological aspects, it was applied particularly to the Los Angeles sample; the interviewers here tried as far as possible to ascertain the relation between their case findings and the hypothetical types. The syndromes which are presented here are the result of the modifications which this draft underwent on the basis of our empirical findings, and of continuous theoretical critique. Still, they have to be regarded as tentative, as an intermediate step between theory and empirical data. For further research, they need redefinition in terms of quantifiable criteria. The justification of presenting them now lies in the fact that they may serve as guides for this future research. Each syndrome is illustrated by a profile of one characteristic case, mainly on the basis of the interview protocol of each person selected.

B. Syndromes Found Among High Scorers

A rough characterization of the several types may precede their detailed presentation. *Surface Resentment* can easily be recognized in terms of justified or unjustified social anxieties; our construct does not say anything about the psychological fixations or defense mechanisms underlying the pattern of opinion. With the *Conventional* pattern, of course, acceptance of conventional values is outstanding. The superego was never firmly established and the individual is largely under the sway of its external representatives. The most obvious underlying motive is the fear of "being different." The *Author-*

itarian type is governed by the superego and has continuously to contend with strong and highly ambivalent id tendencies. He is driven by the fear of being weak. In the *Tough Guy* the repressed id tendencies gain the upper hand, but in a stunted and destructive form. Both the *Crank* and the *Manipulative* types seem to have resolved the Oedipus complex through a narcissistic withdrawal into their inner selves. Their relation to the outer world, however, varies. The cranks have largely replaced outward reality by an imaginary inner world; concomitantly, their main characteristic is projectivity and their main fear is that the inner world will be "contaminated" by contact with dreaded reality: they are beset by heavy taboos, in Freud's language by the "*délire de toucher*."⁷ The manipulative individual avoids the danger of psychosis by reducing outer reality to a mere object of action: thus he is incapable of any positive cathexis. He is even more compulsive than the authoritarian, and his compulsiveness seems to be completely ego-alien: he did not achieve the transformation of an externally coercive power into a superego. Complete rejection of any urge to love is his most outstanding defense.

In our sample, the conventional and the authoritarian types seem to be by far the most frequent.

1. Surface Resentment

The phenomenon to be discussed here is not on the same logical level as the various "types" of high and low scorers characterized afterwords. As a matter of fact, it is not in and of itself a psychological "type," but rather a condensation of the more rational, either conscious or preconscious, manifestations of prejudice, in so far as they can be distinguished from more deep-lying, unconscious aspects. We may say that there are a number of people who "belong together" in terms of more or less rational motivations, whereas the remainder of our "high" syndromes are characterized by the relative absence or spuriousness of rational motivation which, in their case, has to be recognized as a mere "rationalization." This does not mean, however, that those high scorers whose prejudiced statements show a certain rationality *per se* are exempt from the psychological mechanisms of the fascist character. Thus the example we offer is high not only on the F scale but on all scales: she has the *generality* of prejudiced outlook which we have taken as evidence that underlying personality trends were the ultimate determinants. Still, we feel that the phenomenon of "Surface Resentment," though generally nourished by deeper instinctual sources, should not be entirely neglected in our discussion since it represents a sociological aspect of our problem which might be underestimated in its importance for the fascist potential if we concentrate entirely on psychological description and etiology.⁸

We refer here to people who accept stereotypes of prejudice from outside, as ready-made formulae, as it were, in order to rationalize and — psychologically or actually — overcome overt difficulties of their own existence. While their personalities are unquestionably those of high scorers, the stereotype

⁷delirium of (or "against") touching (French)

⁸etiology: the study of causes or origins.

of prejudice as such does not appear to be too much libidinalized, and it generally maintains a certain rational or pseudo-rational level. There is no complete break between their experience and their prejudice: both are often explicitly contrasted one with the other. These subjects are able to present relatively sensible reasons for their prejudice, and are accessible to rational argumentation. Here belongs the discontented, grumbling family father who is happy if somebody else can be blamed for his own economic failures, and even happier if he can derive material advantages from anti-minority discrimination, or the actually or potentially “vanquished competitors,” such as small retailers, economically endangered by chain stores, which they suppose to be owned by Jews. We may also think of anti-Semitic Negroes in Harlem who have to pay excessive rents to Jewish collectors. But these people are spread over all those sectors of economic life where one has to feel the pinch of the process of concentration without seeing through its mechanism, while at the same time still maintaining one’s economic function.

5043, a housewife with extremely high scores on the scales who “had often been heard discussing the Jews in the neighborhood,” but is “a very friendly, middle-aged” person who “enjoys harmless gossip,” expressed high respect for science and takes a serious though somewhat repressed interest in painting. She “has fears about economic competition from zootsuiters” and “the interview revealed that similar attitudes are strongly held about Negroes.” She “has experienced quite a severe comedown in terms of status and economic security since her youth. Her father was an extremely wealthy ranch owner.”

Although her husband was making a good living as a stock broker when she married him in 1927, the stockmarket crash and the ensuing depression made it necessary for her to grapple with economic problems, and finally it even became necessary for them to move in with her wealthy mother-in-law. This situation has caused some friction while at the same time relieving her of a great deal of responsibility. In general, the subject seems to identify herself with the upper middle-class, thus striking a balance between her upper-class background and her present precarious middle-class position. Although she does not admit this into her ego, the loss of money and status must have been very painful to her; and her strong prejudice against Jews infiltrating the neighborhood may be directly related to her fear of sinking “lower” on the economic scale.

The consistently high scores of this subject are explained by the interviewer on the basis of a “generally uncritical attitude” (she always “agrees very much” on the questionnaire) rather than by an active, fascist bias, which does not come out in the interview. Characteristic is the relative absence of serious family conflicts.

She was never severely disciplined; on the contrary, both parents tended to give in to her wishes and she was ostensibly their favorite. . . . There was never any serious friction and, continuing through the present, the relationship among the siblings and the family in general is still very close.

The reason why she was chosen as a representative of “Surface Resentment” is her attitude in race questions. She “shows a very strong prejudice towards all minority groups” and “regards the Jews as a problem,” her stereotypes follow-

ing “pretty much the traditional pattern” which she has taken over mechanically from outside. But “she does not feel

that *all* Jews necessarily exhibit all the characteristics. Also she does not believe that they can be distinguished by looks or any special characteristics, except that they are loud and often aggressive.

The last quotation shows that she does not regard those features of the Jews which she incriminates as inborn and natural. Neither rigid projection nor destructive punitiveness is involved:

With regard to the Jews she feels that assimilation and education will eventually solve the problem.

Her aggressiveness is evidently directed against those who might, as she fears, “take something away from her,” either economically or in status, but the Jews are no “countertype.”

Hostility is openly expressed toward the Jews who have been moving into the neighborhood as well as toward those Jews who she believes “run the movies.” She seems to fear the extension of their influence and strongly resents the “infiltration” of Jews from Europe.

She also expresses the above-mentioned differentiation between “outside” stereotypy and concrete experiences, thus keeping the door open for a mitigation of her prejudice, though, according to the interviewer, if a fascist wave should arise, “it seems likely that she would display more hostility and quite possibly accept fascist ideology”:

Experiences with Jews have been limited to more or less impersonal contacts with only one or two closer acquaintances, whom she describes as “fine people.”

It may be added that if there is any truth in the popular “scapegoat theory” of anti-Semitism, it applies to people of her kind. Their “blind spots” are at least partly to be attributed to the narrow, “petty bourgeois” limitations of experience and explanation on which they have to draw. They see the Jew as the executor of tendencies actually inherent in the total economic process, and they put the blame upon him. It is a postulate necessary for the equilibrium of their ego that they must find some “guilt” responsible for their precarious social situation: otherwise the just order of the world would be disturbed. In all probability, they primarily seek this guilt within themselves and regard themselves, preconsciously, as “failures.” The Jews relieve them superficially of this guilt feeling. Anti-Semitism offers them the gratification of being “good” and blameless and of putting the *onus* on some visible and highly personalized entity. This mechanism has been institutionalized. Persons such as our case 5043 probably never had negative experiences with Jews, but simply adopt the externally pronounced judgment because of the benefit they draw from it.

2. The “Conventional” Syndrome

This syndrome represents stereotypy which comes from outside, but which has been integrated within the personality as part and parcel of a general conformity. In women there is special emphasis on neatness and femininity, in men upon being a “regular” he-man. Acceptance of prevailing standards

is more important than is discontent. Thinking in terms of ingroup and outgroup prevails. Prejudice apparently does not fulfill a decisive function within the psychological household of the individuals, but is only a means of facile identification with the group to which they belong or to which they wish to belong. They are prejudiced in the specific sense of the term: taking over current judgments of others without having looked into the matter themselves. Their prejudice is a "matter of course," possibly "preconscious," and not even known to the subjects themselves. It may become articulate only under certain conditions. There is a certain antagonism between prejudice and experience; their prejudice is not "rational" inasmuch as it is little related to their own worries but at the same time, at least on the surface, it is not particularly outspoken, on account of a characteristic absence of *violent* impulses, due to wholesale acceptance of the values of civilization and "decency." Although this syndrome includes the "well-bred anti-Semite," it is by no means confined to upper social strata.

An illustration of the latter contention, and of the syndrome as a whole, is 5057, a 30-year-old welder, "extremely charming in manner," whose case is summarized by the interviewer as follows:

He presents a personality and attitudinal configuration encountered rather frequently among skilled workers, and is neither vicious nor exploitive, but instead merely reflects the prejudices of his own ingroup in the fashion of the "Conventional" anti-Semite.

His acceptance of his own situation as well as his underlying concern with status is evidenced by the description of his occupational attitude:

The subject likes his work very much. He expressed absolutely no reservations about his present job. It was clear from the outset that he sees himself as a skilled craftsman, and finds in welding a chance for creative and constructive activity. He did say that one limitation is that welding is certainly not a "white-collar" job; it is physically dirty and carries with it some hazards. His satisfaction with his present work is further corroborated by his questionnaire statement that if he were not restricted in any way his occupation would be in the same line of work, perhaps on the slightly higher level of welding engineer.

His professional outlook is optimistic in a realistic way, with no indications of insecurity. His conventionalism is set against "extremes" in every respect: thus he

selected Christian Science because "it is a quieter religion than most . . . religion should restrain you from overindulgences of any kind, such as drinking, gambling, or anything to excess." . . . He has not broken away from his grandparents' teachings and hasn't ever questioned his religious beliefs.

Most characteristic of the subject's over-all attitude are the following data from his questionnaire:

Replying to the projective question, "What moods or feelings are the most unpleasant or disturbing to you?" the subject mentioned "disorder in my home or surroundings" and "the destruction of property." The impulse which he finds hard to control is "telling people what is wrong with them." In answering the question, "What might drive a person nuts?" he said, "Worry — A person should be able to control their mind as well as their body."

With regard to ethnocentrism he is, in spite of his general moderateness and seeming "broad-mindedness," in the high quartile. The specific color of his anti-minority attitude is provided by his special emphasis upon the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy: he does not have, or does not like to have, "contacts" with the outgroup, and at the same time he projects upon them his own ingroup pattern and emphasizes their "clannishness." His hostility is mitigated by his general conformity and his expressed value for "our form of government." However, a certain rigidity of his conventional pattern is discernible in his belief in the unchangeability of the traits of the outgroup. When he experiences individuals who deviate from the pattern, he feels uneasy and seems to enter a conflict situation which tends to reinforce his hostility rather than to mitigate it. His most intense prejudice is directed against the Negroes, apparently because here the demarcation line between in- and outgroup is most drastic.

Concerning other minorities his remarks are as follows:

The biggest minority problem right now, according to the subject, is that of the Japanese-Americans "because they are coming back." Subject feels they should be "restricted in some way and their parents deported." As for their traits: "I have had no personal contact with them except in school where they always seemed to be good students. I have no personal dislike for them."

When questioned as to the "Jewish problem" subject commented, "They certainly stick together. They support each other a lot more than the Protestants do." He thinks they should not be persecuted just because they are Jewish. "A Jew has just as much right to freedom in the United States as anyone else." This was followed by the statement: "I hate to see an excessive amount of them coming in from other countries. I favor complete exclusion of Jewish immigrants."

His rejection of the Jews is primarily based on their difference from the subject's conventional ingroup ideal, and the Jews themselves are differentiated according to degrees of assimilation:

Subject can recognize a Jew by the "kinkiness" of his hair, his heavy features, his thick nose, and sometimes by his thick lips. As for Jewish "traits," the subject remarked that there are "different types of Jews just as there are different types of Gentiles." He spoke of the "kikey type, like those at Ocean Park," and the "higher type, like those in Beverly Hills."

As to the relation between stereotypy and experience,

"What contacts I have had have all been on the good side. When I was running the gas station in Beverly Hills I had to deal quite a bit with them, but I cannot remember any unfortunate experiences with them. All the experiences were rather pleasant in fact." At this point, the subject recounted an experience with a Jewish delicatessen owner in Ocean Park. At the time the subject was 8–10 years old. He was selling magazines in this area, and went into the store to try to sell a magazine to the owner. While waiting to get the owner's attention he spied a wonderful-looking coffee cake and wished that he could have it. The man bought the magazine and noticed the longing look on the boy's face. Apparently thinking that the boy did not have enough money to buy it, he took it out of the case, put it in a bag, and gave it to the boy. From the respondent's account of this incident, it was apparent that this gesture was both humiliating and gratifying at the same time. He recalls how embarrassed he was that the man should think that he was "poor and hungry."

Subject believes that there are some "good" Jews as well as

“bad” Jews — just as there are “good” and “bad” Gentiles. However, “Jews as a whole will never change, because they stick together close and hold to their religious ideals. They could improve the opinion that people have of them, nevertheless, by not being so greedy.” . . . Would permit those Jews already here to remain, though he adds, “Jews should be allowed to return to Palestine, of course.” Further, “I would not be sorry to see them go.” With respect to the educational quota system the subject expressed his approval, though he suggested the alternative of having “separate schools established for the Jews.”

3. The “Authoritarian” Syndrome

This syndrome comes closest to the over-all picture of the high scorer as it stands out throughout our study. It follows the “classic” psychoanalytic pattern involving a sadomasochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex, and it has been pointed out by Erich Fromm under the title of the “sadomasochistic” character (56). According to Max Horkheimer’s theory in the collective work of which he wrote the socio-psychological part, external social repression is concomitant with the internal repression of impulses. In order to achieve “internalization” of social control which never gives as much to the individual as it takes, the latter’s attitude towards authority and its psychological agency, the superego, assumes an irrational aspect. The subject achieves his own social adjustment only by taking pleasure in obedience and subordination. This brings into play the sadomasochistic impulse structure both as a condition and as a result of social adjustment. In our form of society, sadistic as well as masochistic tendencies actually find gratification. The pattern for the translation of such gratifications into character traits is a specific resolution of the Oedipus complex which defines the formation of the syndrome here in question. Love for the mother, in its primary form, comes under a severe taboo. The resulting hatred against the father is transformed by reaction-formation into love. This transformation leads to a particular kind of superego. The transformation of hatred into love, the most difficult task an individual has to perform in his early development, never succeeds completely. In the psychodynamics of the “authoritarian character,” part of the preceding aggressiveness is absorbed and turned into masochism, while another part is left over as sadism, which seeks an outlet in those with whom the subject does not identify himself: ultimately the outgroup. The Jew frequently becomes a substitute for the hated father, often assuming, on a fantasy level, the very same qualities against which the subject revolted in the father, such as being practical, cold, domineering, and even a sexual rival. Ambivalence is all-pervasive, being evidenced mainly by the simultaneity of blind belief in authority and readiness to attack those who are deemed weak and who are socially acceptable as “victims.” Stereotypy, in this syndrome, is not only a means of social identification, but has a truly “economic” function in the subject’s own psychology: it helps to canalize his libidinous energy according to the demands of his overstrict superego. Thus stereotypy itself tends to become heavily libidinated and plays a large role in the subject’s inner household. He develops deep “compulsive” character traits, partly by retrogression to the anal-sadistic phase of de-

velopment. Sociologically, this syndrome used to be, in Europe, highly characteristic of the lower middle-class. In this country, we may expect it among people whose actual status differs from that to which they aspire. This is in marked contrast to the social contentment and lack of conflict that is more characteristic of the “Conventional” syndrome, with which the “Authoritarian” one shares the conformist aspect.

Interview M352 begins as follows:

(Satisfaction?) “Well, I’m the head operator — shift foreman — rotating schedules. . . . (Subject emphasizes “head” position) — small department — 5 in department — 5 in a shift — I get personal satisfaction . . . that I have 5 people working for me, who come to me for advice in handling the production that we make, and that the ultimate decision . . . is mine, and in the fact that in the ultimate decision, I should be *right* — and am usually, and the knowledge that I am correct gives me personal satisfaction. The fact that I earn a living doesn’t give me any personal satisfaction. It’s these things that I have mentioned . . . knowing that I am pleasing someone else also gives me satisfaction.”

The denial of material gratifications, indicative of a restrictive superego, is no less characteristic than the twofold pleasure in being obeyed and giving pleasure to the boss.

His upward social mobility is expressed in terms of overt identification with those who are higher in the hierarchy of authority:

(What would more money make possible?) “Would raise our standard, auto-mobile; move into better residential section; associations with business and fraternal, etc., would be raised . . . to those in a bracket higher, except for a few staunch friends which you keep always; and naturally, associate with people on a higher level — with more education and more experience. After you get there, and associate with those people . . . that fires you on to the next step higher. . . .”

His religious belief has something compulsive and highly punitive:

“My belief is that, just according to the Bible, there is a God — the world has gone along and needed a Savior, and there was one born-lived, died, risen again, and will come back some time; and the person who has lived according to Christianity will live forever — those who have not will perish at that time.”

This overt rigidity of conscience, however, shows strong traces of ambivalence: what is forbidden may be acceptable if it does not lead to social conflict. The over-rigid superego is not really integrated, but remains external.

“Adultery, as long as never found out, is o.k. — if found out, then it’s wrong — since some of the most respected people do it, it must be all right.”

The subject’s concept of God is plainly identical with such an externalized superego or, to use Freud’s original term, with the “ego ideal,” with all the traits of a strong, but “helpful” father:

“Well, when it comes down to the fundamentals, everybody has an idea of some sort: may not call Him God, but an ideal that they live up to and strive to be like. . . . Heathens or anybody else has some sort of religion, but it is something that they put their faith in that can do things for them — can help them.”

The genetic relation between the “Authoritarian” syndrome and the sadomasochistic resolution of the Oedipus complex is borne out by some statements of the subject about his own

childhood:

“Well, my father was a very strict man. He wasn’t religious, but strict in raising the youngsters. His word was law, and whenever he was disobeyed, there was punishment. When I was 12, my father beat me practically every day for getting into the tool chest in the back yard and not putting everything away . . . finally he explained that those things cost money, and I must learn to put it back.” . . . (Subject explains that his carelessness led to a beating every day, as promised by the father, and finally after several weeks, he simply quit using the tools altogether, because “I just couldn’t get ’em all back”) . . . “But, you know, I never hold that against my father — I had it coming. He laid the law down, and if I broke it, there was punishment, but never in uncontrolled anger. My father was a good man — no doubt about that. Always interested in boys’ activities.

“My father was a great fraternal man; was out practically every night. Took an active part always on committees — a good mixer, everybody liked him . . . a good provider. We always had everything we needed, but no unnecessary luxuries . . . no whims provided for. . . Father felt they were luxuries that probably — felt they were unnecessary . . . Yes, rather austere. . . (Which parent closest to?) I think my father. Although he beat the life out of me, I could talk to him about anything.” . . . (Subject emphasizes that his father always gave everyone, including himself, a square deal.)

The subject has been “broken” by the father: he has been overadjusted. It is exactly this aspect which bears the main emphasis in his anti-Semitism. He who admires brute force blames the Jews for their recklessness in practical matters.

“The Jews seem to be taking advantage of the present-day situation, I think. Now, they want to — they’re bringing these Jews in from Europe, and they seem to click together, somehow, and they seem to be able to corner capital. They’re a peculiar people — no conscience about anything except money.” (Subject apparently meant, here, no conscience about money, although maybe about other things.) “If you stand in the way of their making money, they’ll brush you aside.”

Rigidity of the image of the Jew, visible already in the “Conventional” syndrome, tends to become absolute and highly vindictive:

“To me a Jew is just like a foreigner in the same class as-y, oh, I was gonna say a Filipino. You would be pointed out . . . they observe all these different religious days that’s completely foreign to me — and they stick to it — they don’t completely Americanize. . . (What if there were less prejudice against them?) I don’t know — I can’t help but feel that a Jew is meant to be just the way he is — no change possible — a sort of instinct that will never lose — stay Jewish right straight through. (What ought to be done?) They have the ability to get control — now, how we’re gonna stop ’em . . . probably have to pass some regulation prohibiting them.”

Again the idea of authority is the focal point: the Jews appear dangerous to him as usurpers of “control.”

One last feature of the “Authoritarian” syndrome should be mentioned. It is the psychological equivalent of the “nobility-for-the-poor” ideology discussed in Chapter XVII. The identification of the “authoritarian” character with strength is concomitant with rejection of everything that is “down.” Even where social conditions have to be recognized as the reason for the depressed situation of a group, a twist is ap-

plied in order to transform this situation into some kind of well-deserved punishment. This is accompanied by moralistic invectives indicative of strict repression of several desires:

He went on to emphasize that you should segregate Negroes and whites, that by all means give equal opportunities and everything instead of “evading the problem” as he called it. He refers to high prevalence of venereal disease among Negroes, which he blames on their low morals and, under further questioning by the interviewer, he finally attributes it to “congested conditions of living” and tries very hard to explain what he means. This leads to a lack of modesty and respect for privacy — everybody’s thrown together — “lose the distance that is supposed to be between people.” etc., etc.

The emphasis on “distance,” the fear of “close physical contacts” may be interpreted as corroborative of our thesis that, for this syndrome, the ingroup–outgroup dichotomy absorbs large quantities of psychological energy. Identification with the familial structure and ultimately with the whole ingroup becomes, to this kind of individual, one of the main mechanisms by which they can impose authoritarian discipline upon themselves and avoid “breaking away” — a temptation nourished continuously by their underlying ambivalence.

4. The Rebel And The Psychopath

The resolution of the Oedipus complex characteristic of the “Authoritarian” syndrome is not the only one that makes for a “high” character structure. Instead of identification with parental authority, “insurrection” may take place. This, of course, may in certain cases liquidate the sadomasochistic tendencies. However, insurrection may also occur in such a way that the authoritarian character structure is not basically affected (56).⁹ Thus, the hated paternal authority may be abolished only to be replaced by another one — a process facilitated by the “externalized” superego structure concomitant with the over-all picture of the high scorer. Or masochistic transference to authority may be kept down on the unconscious level while resistance takes place on the manifest level. This may lead to an irrational and blind hatred of all authority, with strong destructive connotations, accompanied by a secret readiness to “capitulate” and to join hands with the “hated” strong. It is exceedingly difficult to distinguish such an attitude from a truly non-authoritarian one and it may be well-nigh impossible to achieve such a differentiation on a purely psychological level: here as much as anywhere else it is the socio-political behavior that counts, determining whether a person is truly independent or merely replaces his dependency by negative transference.

The latter case, when it is combined with an urge to take pseudo-revolutionary actions against those whom the individual ultimately deems to be weak, is that of the “Rebel.” This syndrome played a large role in Nazi Germany: the late Captain Roehm, who called himself a “*Hochverräter*” in his autobiography, is a perfect example. Here we expect to find the “Condottiere”¹⁰ which was included in the typology drafted by the Institute of Social Research in 1939, and described as

⁹Cf. also in this connection Erikson, E. H., *Hitler’s Imagery and German Youth* (25).

¹⁰*Condottiere*: mercenary leaders employed by Italian city-states from the late Middle Ages until the mid-sixteenth century.

follows:

This type has arisen with the increased insecurity of post-war existence. He is convinced that what matters is not life but chance. He is nihilistic, not out of a “drive for destruction” but because he is indifferent to individual existence. One of the reservoirs out of which this type arises is the modern unemployed. He differs from former unemployed in that his contact with the sphere of production is sporadic, if any. Individuals belonging to this category can no longer expect to be regularly absorbed by the labor process. From their youth they have been ready to act wherever they could grab something. They are inclined to hate the Jew partly because of his cautiousness and physical inefficacy, partly because, being themselves unemployed, they are economically uprooted, unusually susceptible to any propaganda, and ready to follow any leader. The other reservoir, at the opposite pole of society, is the group belonging to the dangerous professions, colonial adventurers, racing motorists, airplane aces. They are the born leaders of the former group. Their ideal, actually an heroic one, is all the more sensitive to the “destructive,” critical intellect of the Jews because they themselves are not quite convinced of their ideal in the depths of their hearts, but have developed it as a rationalization of their dangerous way of living (57, p. 135).

Symptomatically, this syndrome is characterized, above all, by a penchant for “tolerated excesses” of all kinds, from heavy drinking and overt homosexuality under the cloak of enthusiasm for “youth” to proneness to acts of violence in the sense of “*Putsch*.”¹¹ Subjects of this type do not have as much rigidity as do those who exhibit the orthodox “Authoritarian” syndrome.

The extreme representative of this syndrome is the “Tough Guy,” in psychiatric terminology the “Psychopath.” Here, the superego seems to have been completely crippled through the outcome of the Oedipus conflict, by means of a retrogression to the omnipotence fantasy of very early in-fancy. These individuals are the most “infantile” of all: they have thoroughly failed to “develop,” have not been molded at all by civilization. They are “asocial.” Destructive urges come to the fore in an overt, non-rationalized way. Bodily strength and toughness — also in the sense of being able to “take it” — are decisive. The borderline between them and the criminal is fluid. Their indulgence in persecution is crudely sadistic, directed against any helpless victim; it is unspecific and hardly colored by “prejudice.” Here go the hoodlums and rowdies, plug-uglies, torturers, and all those who do the “dirty work” of a fascist movement.

Robert M. Lindner’s extensive case study, *Rebel Without a Cause* (74), offers a description and dynamic interpretation of the “Tough Guy” which establish the affinity of this type to the “Rebel” as well as to the “Authoritarian” character. According to Lindner:

The psychopath is not only a criminal; he is the embryonic Storm-Trooper; he is the disinherited, betrayed antagonist whose aggressions can be mobilized on the instant at which the properly-aimed and frustration-evoking formula is communicated by that leader under whose tinsel aegis license becomes law, secret and primitive desires become virtuous ambitions readily attained, and compulsive behavior formerly deemed punishable becomes the order of the day.

The psychopath is described as a “rebel, a religious disobeyer of prevailing codes and standards” whose main characteristic is that he cannot wait, “cannot delay the pleasures of gratification” — an inability suggesting that, together with the failure to build up a superego, the formation of the ego has been crippled, in spite of the bridled “egotism” of such persons. As to the masochistic component, the following passage from Lindner may be quoted:

That the psychopath is burdened with guilt and literally seeks punishment has been observed by the author in countless cases. The clue to this strange situation lies, as one would suspect, in the Oedipus situation. Deprived of an avenue to satisfactory post-Oedipal adjustment and continuously beset by the consequent incest and parricidal fantasies, the mergent guilt can be assuaged only through expiation. “I have sinned against my father and I must be punished” is the un verbalized theme of psychopathic conduct: and for this reason they very often commit crimes free from acquisitional motives, marry prostitutes or, in the case of women, apportion their charms occupationally in an attempt at self-castigation. That such activities constitute a species of “neurotic gain” is also to be considered. The fact of punishment sought, received and accepted does not complete the tale: there is in addition a narcissistic “yield” which derives directly from the punitive act and mediates the original need. This is naturally on a subliminal level of apprehension, unreportable directly but always noticeable.

Examples of the rebel-psychopath are to be found in our San Quentin sample. We think mainly of the psychopath, *Floyd*, our *M658*, and the “Tough Guy,” *Eugene*, our *M662A*, dealt with extensively in Chapter XXI. If the traits under consideration here do not appear so vividly there, it should be borne in mind that the guiding interest of the San Quentin study was defined by our over-all variables rather than by psychological subgroups among the high and low scorers. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the prison situation works as a heavy check on the expression of the decisive traits of the psychopath who, after all, is not a psychotic and behaves, in a certain sense, quite “realistically.” In addition, his completely living “for the moment,” his lack of ego identity enables him to adapt himself successfully to a given situation: when talking to an interviewer, he is likely not to display directly the attitudes indicative of his “toughness.” Rather, the latter have to be inferred indirectly, particularly from certain speaking habits, such as the frequency of references to bodily violence. It is with an eye to such indices that the statements of those two San Quentin interviewees should be read. Neither the widespread existence of the “Tough Guy” syndrome, particularly in marginal spheres of society, nor its importance for some of the most sinister aspects of the fascist potential can be doubted.

5. The Crank

In so far as the introjection of paternal discipline in the “Authoritarian” syndrome means continuous repression of the id, this syndrome can be characterized by frustration in the widest sense of the term. However, there seems to be a pattern in which frustration plays a much more specific role.

¹¹*putsch*: A secretly planned and suddenly executed attempt to overthrow a government.

This pattern is found in those people who did not succeed in adjusting themselves to the world, in accepting the “reality principle” — who failed, as it were, to strike a balance between renunciations and gratifications, and whose whole inner life is determined by the denials imposed upon them from outside, not only during childhood but also during their adult life. These people are driven into *isolation*. They have to build up a spurious inner world, often approaching delusion, emphatically set against outer reality. They can exist only by self-aggrandizement, coupled with violent rejection of the external world. Their “soul” becomes their dearest possession. At the same time, they are highly projective and suspicious. An affinity to psychosis cannot be overlooked: they are “paranoid.” To them, prejudice is all-important: it is a means to escape acute mental diseases by collectivization, and by building up a pseudo-reality against which their aggressiveness can be directed without any *overt* violation of the “reality principle.” Stereotypy is decisive: it works as a kind of social corroboration of their projective formulae, and is therefore institutionalized to a degree often approaching religious beliefs. The pattern is found in women and old men whose isolation is socially reinforced by their virtual exclusion from the economic process of production. Here belong organized war mothers, ham-an’-egggers, and regular followers of agitators even in periods when racist propaganda is at a low ebb. The often-abused term “lunatic fringe” has a certain validity with regard to them: their compulsiveness has reached the stage of fanaticism. In order to confirm to each other their pseudoreality, they are likely to form sects, often with some panacea of “nature,” which corresponds to their projective notion of the Jew as eternally bad and spoiling the purity of the natural. Ideas of conspiracy play a large role: they do not hesitate to attribute to the Jews a quest for world domination, and they are likely to swear by the Elders of Zion. A significant social trait is semi-erudition, a magical belief in science which makes them the ideal followers of racial theory. They can hardly be expected above a certain educational level, but also rarely among workers. *F124*

is a woman over 50 years of age, tall, heavily built, with sharp features, prominent gray-blue eyes, a pointed nose, thin lips, straight mouth line. She had a bearing which was meant to be impressive.

This “impressiveness” actually implies a pathological sense of inner superiority, as if she belonged to a secret order, at the same time being surrounded by people whose names she does not want to mention, since otherwise she might divulge too vulgar or dangerous implications:

She doesn’t care for her fellow-workers. Some have all the degrees but no common sense. She wouldn’t like to mention names, but she’d like to tell me what goes on. Some just spend their time gossiping together. She doesn’t believe she could do more than just speak to her fellow-workers. Very scornful of them, feels superior and aloof. . . . They don’t know her at all — no indeed — implies she’s a very special somebody and could reveal her gifts to them but doesn’t.

Her interest in internal and as far as possible external status is strongly colored by an overemphasis on “connections,” which suggests “ideas of reference”:

She has been a “governess” in the home of President X’s family . . . and in President Y’s son’s family — first the older son, then the younger. Talked to Mrs. Y on the phone when she was in the White House at the time of the birth of the third child. And her sister worked for S. who later was governor of a south-western state.

As to her spurious “inner world,” semi-erudition, and pseudo-intellectuality, the following account is highly characteristic:

She reads a great deal — “good” books — went through the schools in her Texas home town about equal to seventh grade now. She also draws and writes and was learning to play an instrument. One picture she drew here at school but never showed it to anyone. It was of two mountains and the sun in between shining on the valley in which the mist was rising. This just “came” to her, too, though she had never had any training. It was really beautiful. She writes stories, too. When she was left a widow, instead of chasing after men like some women, she wrote stories. One was a fantasy for Mary Pickford. It would have been just right for her to play in, but of course, she’d never shown it to anyone. It was called *Little May and O’June* and had come to her once when she had her children on a picnic. A love fantasy about Little May (the girl) and O’June (the boy). Her daughter was very gifted, too. An artist . . . who drew Texas Blue Bonnets — “the state flower, you know.” — saw her daughter’s work and said, “You’ve got a real genius there.” He wanted to give the daughter lessons, but she refused, saying, “No, Mother, he would just spoil my style; I know how to draw what I want to draw.”

With regard to race questions, her hatred shows the paranoid tendency towards stopping nowhere — in principle she would be willing to stigmatize every group she can lay her hands on and only reluctantly confines herself to her favorite foes.

She thinks the “Japs, Jews, and Niggers should go back where they came from.” . . . “Of course, then the Italians should go back where they belong in Italy, but — well, the three main ones who don’t belong here are the Japs, Jews, and Niggers.”

Her anti-Semitism shows strong traces of projectivity, of the fake mysticism of the “blood,” and of sex envy. The following statement reveals her attitudinal pattern:

“The Jews feel superior to Gentiles. They wouldn’t pollute their blood by mixing it with Gentiles. They would bleed us of our money and use our women for mistresses, but they wouldn’t marry among us, and they want their wives spotless. The Y’s entertained Jews quite often. I don’t know if it was their money or what. That’s why I didn’t vote for Y the second time. I’d seen too many fat Jew women and hooked-nose men at their house. Of course, I’ve heard Pres. Roosevelt’s mother had some Jewish blood, too.” Left the B’s because they were Jews. They had a home like a palace and wanted her to stay. They said, “We knew it was too good to be true” . . . when she was leaving.

Striking is the similarity between the subject’s way of thinking and a certain kind of crackpot religious movement, based on readiness to hear “inner voices” which give both moral uplifting and sinister advice:

The Catholics have been wonderful to her, and she admires them but wouldn’t join their church. There was something inside her that said “No.” (She gestures her rejection.) She has an individualistic religion. Once she was out walking in the early morning — the birds were singing — she raised her hands and her face to the sky, and they were wet . . . (She considered it a supernatural phenomenon.)

6. The “Manipulative” Type

This syndrome, potentially the most dangerous one, is defined by stereotypy as an extreme: rigid notions become ends rather than means, and the whole world is divided into empty, schematic, administrative fields. There is an almost complete lack of object cathexis and of emotional ties. If the “Crank” syndrome had something paranoid about it, the “Manipulative” one has something schizophrenic. However, the break between internal and external world, in this case, does not result in anything like ordinary “intro-version,” but rather the contrary: a kind of compulsive overrealism which treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled, manipulated, seized by the subject’s own theoretical and practical patterns. The technical aspects of life, and things *qua* “tools” are fraught with libido. The emphasis is on “doing things,” with far-reaching indifference towards the content of what is going to be done. The pattern is found in numerous business people and also, in increasing numbers, among members of the rising managerial and technological class who maintain, in the process of production, a function between the old type of ownership and the workers’ aristocracy. Many fascist-political anti-Semites in Germany showed this syndrome: Himmler may be symbolic of them. Their sober intelligence, together with their almost complete absence of any affections makes them perhaps the most merciless of all. Their organizational way of looking at things predisposes them to totalitarian solutions. Their goal is the construction of gas chambers rather than the pogrom.¹² They do not even have to hate the Jews; they “cope” with them by administrative measures without any personal contacts with the victims. Anti-Semitism is reified, an export article: it must “function.” Their cynicism is almost complete: “The Jewish question will be solved strictly legally” is the way they talk about the cold pogrom. The Jews are provocative to them in so far as supposed Jewish individualism is a challenge to their stereotypy, and because they feel in the Jews a neurotic overemphasis on the very same kind of human relationships which they are lacking them-selves. The ingroup-outgroup relationship becomes the principle according to which the whole world is abstractly organized. Naturally, this syndrome can be found in this country only in a rudimentary state.

As to the psychological etiology of this type, our material sets us certain limitations. However, it should be borne in mind that compulsiveness is the psychological equivalent of what we call, in terms of social theory, reification. The compulsive features of the boy chosen as an example for the “Manipulative” type, together with his sadism, can hardly be overlooked — he comes close to the classical Freudian conception of the “anal” character and is in this regard reminiscent of the “Authoritarian” syndrome. But he is differentiated from the latter by the simultaneity of extreme narcissism

and a certain emptiness and shallowness. This, however, involves a contradiction only if looked at superficially, since whatever we call a person’s emotional and intellectual richness is due to the intensity of his object cathexes. Notable in our case is an interest in sex almost amounting to preoccupation, going with backwardness as far as actual experience is concerned. One pictures a very inhibited boy, worried about masturbation, collecting insects while the other boys played baseball. There must have been early and deep emotional traumata, probably on a pregenital level. *M108*

is going to be an insect toxicologist and work for a large organization like Standard Oil or a university, presumably not in private business. He first started in chemistry in college but about the third term began to wonder if that was what he really wanted. He was interested in entomology in high school, and while hashing in a sorority he met a fellow worker in entomology, and in talking about the possibility of combining entomology and chemistry, this man said he thought it would be a very good field to investigate a little further. He found out insect toxicology had everything that combined his interests, wasn’t overcrowded, and that he could make a good living there, and that there wasn’t likely to be a surplus as there would be in chemistry or engineering.

Taken in isolation, the professional choice of this subject may appear accidental, but when viewed in the context of the whole interview, it assumes a certain significance. It has been pointed out by L. Lowenthal (75) that fascist orators often compare their “enemies” to “vermin.” The interest of this boy in entomology may be due to his regarding the insects, which are both “repulsive” and weak, as ideal objects for his manipulation.¹³

The manipulative aspect of his professional choice is stressed by himself:

Asked what he expects to get from the job other than the economic side, he said that he hopes to have a hand in organizing the whole field, that is, in organizing the knowledge. There is no textbook, the information is scattered, and he hopes to make a contribution in organizing the material.

His emphasis on “doing things” goes so far that he even appreciates people whom he otherwise hates, though in a terminology with destructive overtones. Here belongs his statement about Roosevelt, which was quoted in part in Chapter XVII:

Asked about the good points of Roosevelt, he said, “Well, the first term he was in office he whipped the U. S. into shape. Some people argue he only carried out Hoover’s ideas, but actually he did a good job which was badly needed he usurped power that was necessary to do something — he took a lot more power than a lot.” . . . Asked whether his policies were good or bad, subject replied, “Well, at any rate, he was doing something.”

His political concepts are defined by the friend-foe relationship, in exactly the same way as the Nazi theoretician Karl Schmitt defined the nature of politics. His lust for organization, concomitant with an obsession with the domination of

¹²*pogrom*: an organized, often officially encouraged massacre or persecution of a minority group, especially one conducted against Jews.

¹³This, of course, covers only a superficial aspect. It is well known from psychoanalysis that insects and vermin serve frequently as symbols for siblings. The fantasies involved here may be traces of the little boy’s wish to beat his little brother until he “keeps quiet.” Manipulativeness may be one form in which death wishes for the siblings are allowed to come to the fore. “Organizers” are frequently persons who want to exercise domineering control over those who are actually their *equals* — substitutes for the siblings over whom they wish to rule, like the father, as the next best thing, if they cannot kill them. Our insect toxicologist mentions frequent childhood quarrels with his sister.

nature, seems boundless:

“There will always be wars. (Is there any way of preventing wars?) No, it’s not common goals but common enemies that make friends. Perhaps if they could discover other planets and some way of getting there, spread out that way, we could prevent wars for a time, but eventually there’d be wars again.”

The truly totalitarian and destructive implications of his dichotomous way of thinking become manifest in his statement about the Negroes:

(What can we do about the Negroes?) “Nothing can be done. There are two factions. I’m not in favor of interbreeding because this would produce an inferior race. The Negroes haven’t reached the point of development of Caucasians, artificially living and absorbing from the races.” He would approve of segregation, but that’s not possible. Not unless you are willing to use Hitler’s methods. There are only two ways of handling this problem — Hitler’s methods or race mixture. Race mixture is the only answer and is already taking place, according to what he has read, but he’s against it. It wouldn’t do the race any good.

This logic allows only for one conclusion: that the Negroes should be killed. At the same time, his way of looking at the prospective objects of manipulation is completely unemotional and detached: although his anti-Semitism is marked he doesn’t even claim that you can

“tell the Jews by their appearance, they’re just like other people, all kinds.”

His administrative and pathologically detached outlook is again evidenced by his statement on intermarriage:

He said that if he were an American businessman in Germany or England he’d probably marry first an American woman if he could, then he might marry a German or an English woman.

However, “swarthy” people like Greeks or Jews have no chance in this experimental setup. It is true, he has nothing against his Spanish brother-in-law, but expresses his approval by the phrase that “you couldn’t tell him from a white person.”

He takes a positive attitude towards the church for manipulative purposes:

“Well, people want church; there is a purpose, it sets standards for some people, but for other people, it is not necessary. A general sense of social duty would do the same thing.”

His own metaphysical views are naturalistic, with a strong nihilistic coloring:

Asked about his own beliefs he said he’s a mechanistic — there is no supernatural entity, not concerned with us as humans; it goes back to a law of physics. Humans and life are just an accident — but an inevitable accident. And then he tried to explain that — that there was some matter accrued when the earth was started and it was almost by accident that life started and it just kept on.

As to his emotional structure:

His mother is “just Mom”; he seems to have some respect for his father and father’s opinions, but there was no real attachment any place. He said as a child he had a lot of friends, but on further questioning, he couldn’t mention any closer friends. He did a lot of reading as a child. Didn’t have many fights — couldn’t remember them — didn’t have any more than any other boys. He has no real close friends now. His closest friends were when he was in the 10th or 11th grade, and he still keeps track

of some of them, he said. (How important are friends?) “Well, they’re especially important in younger years, and in your older years you don’t enjoy life as much without them. I don’t expect my friends to help me get along.” They’re not needed so much at present age, but he supposed that at the interviewer’s age it would be very important to have friends.

Finally it should be mentioned that the only moral quality that plays a considerable role in the thinking of this subject is loyalty, perhaps as a compensation for his own lack of affection. By loyalty he probably means complete and unconditional identification of a person with the group to which he happens to belong. He is expected to surrender completely to his “unit” and to give up all individual particularities for the sake of the “whole.” *M108* objects to Jewish refugees not having been “loyal to Germany.”

C. Syndromes Found Among Low Scorers

The following schematic observations may help towards orientation among the “low” syndromes. The *Rigid* low scorers are characterized by strong superego tendencies and compulsive features. Paternal authority and its social substitutes, however, are frequently replaced by the image of some collectivity, possibly molded after the archaic image of what Freud calls the brother horde. Their main taboo is directed against violations of actual or supposed brotherly love. The *Protesting* low scorer has much in common with the “Authoritarian” high scorer, the main difference being that the further-going sublimation of the father idea, concomitant with an undercurrent of hostility against the father, leads to the conscientious rejection of heteronomous authority instead of its acceptance. The decisive feature is opposition to whatever appears to be tyranny. The syndrome of the *Impulsive* low scorer denotes people in whom strong id impulses were never integrated with ego and superego. They are threatened by overpowering libidinous energy and in a way as close to psychosis as the “Crank” and the “Manipulative” high scorer. As to the *Easy-Going* low scorer, the id seems to be little repressed, but rather to be sublimated into compassion, and the superego well developed, whereas the extraverted functions of the otherwise quite articulate ego frequently do not keep pace. These subjects sometimes come close to neurotic indecision. One of their main features is the fear of “hurting” anyone or anything by action. The construct of the *Genuine Liberal* may be conceived in terms of that balance between superego, ego, and id which Freud deemed ideal.

In our sample the “Protesting” and the “Easy-Going” low scorers apparently occur most frequently. Emphasizing, however, once again that the low scorers are as a whole less “typed” than the high scorers, we shall refrain from any undue generalization.

1. The “Rigid” Low Scorer

We may start with the “low” syndrome that has most in common with the over-all “high” pattern, and proceed in the direction of sounder and more durable “lowness.” The syndrome which commands first attention is the one which shows the

most markedly stereotypical features — that is to say, configurations in which the absence of prejudice, instead of being based on concrete experience and integrated within the personality, is derived from some general, external, ideological pattern. Here we find those subjects whose lack of prejudice, however consistent in terms of surface ideology, has to be regarded as accidental in terms of personality, but we also find people whose rigidity is hardly less related to personality than is the case with certain syndromes of high scorers. The latter kind of low scorers are definitely disposed towards totalitarianism in their thinking; what is accidental up to a certain degree is the particular brand of ideological world formula that they chance to come into contact with. We encountered a few subjects who had been identified ideologically with some progressive movement, such as the struggle for minority rights, for a long time, but with whom such ideas contained features of compulsiveness, even of paranoid obsession, and who, with respect to many of our variables, especially rigidity and “total” thinking, could hardly be distinguished from some of our high extremes. All the representatives of this syndrome can in one way or another be regarded as counterparts of the “Surface Resentment” type of high scorer. The accidentalness in their total outlook makes them liable to change fronts in critical situations, as was the case with certain kinds of radicals under the Nazi regime. They may often be recognized by a certain disinterestedness with respect to crucial minority questions *per se*, being, rather, against prejudice as a plank in the fascist platform; but sometimes they also see *only* minority problems. They are likely to use clichés and phraseology hardly less frequently than do their political opponents. Some of them tend to belittle the importance of racial discrimination by labeling it simply as a by-product of the big issues of class struggle — an attitude which may be indicative of repressed prejudice on their own part. Representatives of this syndrome can often be found, for example, among young, “progressive” people, particularly students, whose personal development has failed to keep pace with their ideological indoctrination. One of the best means for identifying the syndrome is to note the subject’s readiness to deduce his stand towards minority problems from some general formula, rather than to make spontaneous statements. He also may often come forward with value judgments which cannot possibly be based on any real knowledge of the matter in question.

F139 is a religious educator.

For the past ten years she has considered herself very progressive. Lately she has little time to read, but her husband reads and studies constantly and keeps her up to date by discussion. “My favorite world statesman is Litvinov.¹⁴ I think the most dramatic speech of modern times is the one he made at the Geneva conference when he pleaded for collective security. It has made us very happy to see the fog of ignorance and distrust surrounding the Soviet Union clear away during this war. Things are not settled yet though. There are many fascists in our own country who would fight Russia if they could.”

The hollowness of her enthusiasm about Litvinov has already been noted in our discussion of stereotyped thinking

in politics (Chapter XVII). The same seems to be true of her assertion that she is an internationalist, followed up by her rhetorical question, “Would I be a true Christian if I weren’t?” This is typical of the “deductive” way of thinking which seems to characterize the rigid low scorer. The present subject seems to proceed in the same way as she approaches minority questions.

Subject believes that all people are one, and again she feels that is the only point of view possible for a true Christian.

The somewhat sweeping expression “that all people are one” should be noted: a person free of stereotypy would rather tend to acknowledge differences and to take a positive stand towards differentiation. What is meant is probably “equal in the sight of God” and she deduces her tolerance from this general assumption.

As mentioned in the chapter on politics, the superficiality of her progressivism is indicated by her highly aggressive attitude towards alcoholism, called by herself “one of her pet subjects,” which plays almost the same role as do certain paranoid ideas in the “Cranks” among the high scorers. It may be recalled in this connection, that Alfred McClung Lee has demonstrated the close connection between prohibitionism and prejudiced ways of thinking. As a matter of fact, there is evidence enough that this “Rigid” low scorer has more than a sprinkling of the “high” mentality. There is the emphasis on “status,” with reference to her daughter:

“I feel badly about her school too — (names the school). The influx of people with lower educational and cultural standards than ours has had effect on the schools of course.”

There are destructive fantasies, thinly veiled by “sensible” moral reflections:

“The same with smoking. I am not really worried about it though. No one of either side of our family ever smoked or drank, with one exception. My husband’s sister smoked. She is dead now.”

There is a rationalization of punitiveness:

“If I could bring about Prohibition tomorrow I would do it. I believe in preventing everything that doesn’t make man better — that makes him worse. Some people say if you forbid something it makes people do it on the sly. Well, I say, how about murder, and robbery, and dope? We have prohibited them and some people still commit crimes, but we do not think of taking off the ban on them.”

And there is, finally, official optimism, a characteristic reaction-formation against underlying destructiveness:

“If one didn’t always have hope and believe everything was moving upwards, one’s Christianity wouldn’t mean anything, would it?”

Under changing conditions she might be willing to join a subversive movement as long as it pretended to be “Christian” and to “move upwards.”

¹⁴Maxim Litvinov (1876–1951). Russian revolutionary and prominent Soviet diplomat.

¹⁵This term was suggested by J. F. Brown.

2. The “Protesting” Low Scorers¹⁵

This syndrome is in many respects the counterpart of the “Authoritarian” high scorer. Its determinants are psychological rather than rational. It is based on a specific resolution of the Oedipus complex which has deeply affected the individuals in question. While they are set against paternal authority, they have at the same time internalized the father image to a high degree. One may say that in them the superego is so strong that it turns against its own “model,” the father, and all external authorities. They are thoroughly guided by *conscience* which seems to be, in many cases exhibiting this pattern, a secularization of religious authority. This conscience, however, is quite autonomous and independent of outside codes. They “protest” out of purely moral reasons against social repression or at least against some of its extreme manifestations, such as racial prejudice.¹⁶ Most of the “neurotic” low scorers who play such a large role in our sample show the “Protest” syndrome. They are often shy, “retiring,” uncertain about themselves, and even given to tormenting themselves with all kinds of doubts and scruples. They sometimes show certain compulsive features, and their reaction against prejudice has also an aspect of having been forced upon them by rigid superego demands. They are frequently guilt-ridden and regard the Jews *a priori* as “victims,” as being distinctly different from themselves. An element of stereotypy may be inherent in their sympathies and identifications. They are guided by the wish to “make good” the injustice that has been done to minorities. At the same time they may be easily attracted by the real or imaginary intellectual qualities of the Jews which they deem to be akin to their desire to be “aloof” from worldly affairs. While being nonauthoritarian in their way of thinking, they are often psychologically constricted and thus not able to act as energetically as their conscience demands. It is as if the internalization of conscience has succeeded so well that they are severely inhibited or even psychologically “paralyzed.” Their eternal guilt feelings tend to make them regard *everyone* as “guilty.” Though they detest discrimination, they may find it sometimes difficult to stand up against it. Socially, they seem usually to belong to the middle class, but it is hard to define their group membership in more precise terms. However, our material seems to indicate that they are frequently to be found among people who underwent serious family troubles, such as a divorce of their parents. *F127*

is extremely pretty in the conventional “campus girl” style. She is very slight, blond, fair-skinned, and blue-eyed. She wears a becoming “sloppy Joe” sweater, daintily fixed blouse, and brief skirt, with bobby socks. She wears a sorority pin. She is very friendly and interested, seems to enjoy the discussion, but is quite vague in her answers about family life until the interview is quite well along. Then she suddenly decides to reveal the most important single fact in her life — her parents’ divorce which she usually hides — and from that point on speaks with apparent freedom about her own feelings.

She shows the characteristic neurotic concern with herself,

indicative of a feeling of impotence: she has a somewhat magical belief in psychology, apparently expecting that the psychologist knows more about her than she does herself:

What she would like above all is to be a psychiatrist. (Why?) “Because psychiatrists know more about people. Everyone tells me their troubles. I don’t think there is anything more satisfying than to be able to help people with their problems. But I don’t have the brains or the patience to be a psychiatrist. That is just an idea.”

Her attitude towards the father is hostile:

Father is a lawyer. At present he is enlisted in the army and is somewhere in the Pacific, in charge of a Negro battalion. (What does he think about that?) “I don’t know what he thinks about anything.”

Her social attitude is a combination of conformist “correctness,” the emphatic and self-confessed desire for “pleasure” (almost as if her conscience would order her to enjoy herself), and a tendency towards retiring internalization. Her indifference to “status,” though perhaps not quite authentic, is noteworthy.

(Interests?) “Oh fun — and serious things too. I like to read and discuss things. I like bright people — can’t stand clinging vines. Like to dance, dress up, go places. Am not much good at sports, but I play at them — tennis, swimming. I belong to a sorority and we do lots of war work as well as entertaining service men. (Subject names sorority.) (That is supposed to be a good house isn’t it?) They say so. I didn’t think there was anything very special about it.”

Her social progressiveness is characterized by both an element of fear and a conscientious sense of justice:

(What do you think about poverty?) “I hate to think of it. And I don’t think it is necessary. (Who is to blame?) Oh, I don’t mean the poor people are. I don’t know, but you would think that by now we could work out a way so that everyone would have enough.”

Her anxiety makes her more aware of the fascist potential than most other low scorers are:

“It would be terrible to have Nazis here. Of course there are some. And they would like to have the same thing happen... Lots of Jewish kids have a hard time — in the service, and in going to medical school. It isn’t fair. (Why the discrimination?) I don’t know unless it is the Nazi influence. No, it went back before that. I guess there always are some people who have ideas like the Nazis.”

Her indignation is primarily directed against “unfairness.” The notion that “there are always people with ideas like the Nazis” is remarkable: a highly developed sense of responsibility seems to give her an understanding in social matters that goes far beyond her purely intellectual insight. Psychologically, the complete absence of prejudice in her case seems best understood as a superego function, since the girl relates a rather unpleasant experience which otherwise might well have made her prejudiced: she was kidnapped, as a child of four, by a Negro but

“He didn’t hurt me. I don’t think I was even scared.”

As to the genetic background of her attitude, the following

¹⁶It was pointed out in Chapter XVIII that religion, when it has been internalized, is an effective antidote against prejudice and the whole fascist potential, notwithstanding its own authoritarian aspects.

clinical data are pertinent:

"I am more like my father I am afraid and that isn't good. He is a very impatient man, overbearing, and everything for himself. He and I didn't get along. He favored my sister because she played up to him. But both of us suffered with him. If I even called my sister a name as kids will do when they fight, I got spanked, and hard. That used to worry my mother. For that reason she hardly ever punished us, because he did it all the time, and mostly for nothing. I was spanked constantly. I remember that better than anything. (Do you think your mother and father loved each other?) No, perhaps they did at first, but my mother couldn't stand the way he treated us. She divorced him." (She flushes and her eyes fill with tears as she says this. When interviewer commented that she had not realized the parents were divorced she says" — I wasn't going to say anything. I hardly ever do.")

As to neurotic traits: there are indications of a strong mother-fixation:

"I don't want mother to ever get married again. (Why?) I don't know. She doesn't need to. She can have friends. She is very attractive and has lots of friends but I couldn't stand to have her marry again. (Do you think she might anyway?) No. She won't if I don't want her to."

And there are symptoms of sexual inhibition, based on her experience of the breakdown of her parents' marriage.

(Boys?) "Oh, I don't get serious and I don't want them to. I neck a little of course, but nothing to give them any idea I am cheap. I don't like cheap fellows either."

Her statement that she does not want to commit herself because she is afraid of war marriages is probably a rationalization.

3. The "Impulsive" Low Scorer

The case of an "impulse-ridden" low scorer has been described by Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford (38). They write:

The most markedly pathological case from among our low scorers showed in an extreme degree a pattern that was different from that which we have regarded as most typical of our low extremes. This girl was clearly impulse ridden. Her ego was lined up with her id, so that all kinds of excesses were made to seem permissible to her. In stating why she liked Jews she gave much the same reasons that the high extremes had given for hating them.

There is reason to assume that this case represents a syndrome of its own, being in some respects the counterpart of the psychopathic high scorer. This syndrome stands out in all-adjusted people who have an extremely strong id, but are relatively free of destructive impulses: people who, on account of their own libidinous situation, sympathize with everything they feel to be repressed. Moreover, they are those who respond so strongly to all kinds of stimuli that the ingroup-outgroup relation has no meaning to them — rather, they are attracted by everything that is "different" and promises some new kind of gratification. If they have destructive elements, these seem to be directed against themselves instead of against others. The range of this syndrome seems to reach from *libertines* and "addicts" of all kinds, over certain asocial characters such as prostitutes and nonviolent criminals, to certain psychotics. It may also be noted that in Germany very

few Nazis were found among actors, circus folk, and vagrants — people whom the Nazis put into concentration camps. It is difficult to say what are the deeper psychological sources of this syndrome. It seems, however, that there is weakness both in the superego and in the ego, and that this makes these individuals somewhat unstable in political matters as well as in other areas. They certainly do not think in stereotypes, but it is doubtful to what extent they succeed in conceptualization at all.

Our illustration, *F205*, is selected from the Psychiatric Clinic material:

She is a pleasantly mannered, attractive young college girl who is obviously seriously maladjusted and who suffers from great mood swings, tension, who cannot concentrate on her school work and has no goals in life... Sometimes she is extremely upset, comes crying and "mixed up," complains that she is not being helped fast enough. Therapist feels that she cannot stand any deeper probing, that therapy will have to be mostly supportive, because of her weak ego, possibility of precipitating a psychosis. Schizoid tendencies.

She is set against prejudice with a strong accent on "interbreeding," probably an expression of her own impulse for promiscuity: there should be no "boundaries":

(Prejudices?) "If there were interbreeding between races it might help in the combining of cultures — it may internationalize culture. I think there should be one system of education everywhere. It may not be practical — but perhaps selective breeding would be possible — an accumulation of good traits might come out. And the imbeciles could be sterilized." (Quotes some study on heredity subject has learned about.) "It seems improvements aren't made fast enough. The whole society is ill and unhappy."

The last sentence indicates that her own discontent leads her, by the way of empathy, towards a rather radical and consistent critique of society. The keenness of her insight as well as her being attracted by what is "different" comes out even more clearly in her statement on minority problems:

"There is a terrific amount of minority oppression — prejudice. There is a fear of minorities, a lack of knowledge. I would like to assimilate all groups — internationally. Would want the education of the world unified. The minorities themselves also keep themselves apart. It's a vicious circle. Society makes them outcasts and they react this way." (Differences?) (Interviewer tried hard to have subject describe differences between groups, but subject insisted): "All differences that exist are due to conditions people grow up in and also to the emotional responses (to discrimination). (Jews?) I don't see how they are different as a group. I have Jewish friends... Maybe they are more sensitive because of prejudice against them. But that's good."

According to the clinical data the girl is a genuine Lesbian, who was severely reprimanded because of her homosexuality, and became afterwards "rather promiscuous to determine whether she did react sexually to men." "All emotionally upset in one way or the other," she said. Her later history indicates that the Lesbian component is stronger than anything else.

It may be added that the Los Angeles sample contains three call-house girls, all of them completely free of prejudice and also low on the F scale. Since their profession tends to make them resentful about sex altogether, and since they profess

symptoms of frigidity, they do not seem to belong to the “Impulsive” syndrome. However, only much closer analysis could ascertain whether the ultimate basis of their character formation is of the “impulsive” kind and has only been hidden by later reaction-formations, or whether their low score is due to a purely social factor, namely the innumerable contacts they have with all kinds of people.

4. The “Easy-Going” Low Scorer

This syndrome is the exact opposite of the “Manipulative” high scorer. Negatively, it is characterized by a marked tendency to “let things go,” a profound unwillingness to do violence to any object (an unwillingness which often may approach, on the surface level, conformity), and by an extreme reluctance to make decisions, often underscored by the subjects themselves. This reluctance even affects their language: they may be recognized by the frequency of unfinished sentences, as if they would not like to commit themselves, but rather leave it to the listener to decide on the merits of the case. Positively, they are inclined to “live and let live,” while at the same time their own desires seem to be free of the acquisitive touch. Grudging and discontent are absent. They show a certain psychological richness, the opposite of constrictedness: a capacity for enjoying things, imagination, a sense of humor which often assumes the form of self-irony. The latter, however, is as little destructive as their other attitudes: it is as if they were ready to confess all kinds of weaknesses not so much out of any neurotic compulsion as because of a strong underlying sense of inner security. They can give themselves up without being afraid of losing themselves. They are rarely radical in their political outlook, but rather behave as if they were already living under nonrepressive conditions, in a truly human society, an attitude which may, sometimes, tend to weaken their power of resistance. There is no evidence of any truly schizoid tendencies. They are completely nonstereopathic — they do not even resist stereotypy, but simply fail to understand the urge for subsumption.

The etiology of the “Easy-Going” syndrome is still somewhat obscure. The subjects in whom it is pronounced seem not to be defined by the preponderance of any psychological agency, or by retrogression to any particular infantile phase though there is, superficially seen, something of the child about them. Rather, they should be understood *dynamically*. They are people whose character structure has not become “congealed”: no set pattern of control by any of the agencies of Freud’s typology has crystallized, but they are completely “open” to experience. This, however, does not imply ego weakness, but rather the absence of traumatic experiences and defects which otherwise lead to the “reification” of the ego. In this sense, they are “normal,” but it is just this normality which gives them in our civilization the appearance of a certain immaturity. Not only did they not undergo severe childhood conflicts, but their whole childhood seems to be determined by motherly or other female images.¹⁷ Perhaps they may best be characterized as those who know no fear of

women. This may account for the absence of aggressiveness. At the same time, it is possibly indicative of an archaic trait: to them, the world has still a matriarchal outlook. Thus, they may often represent, sociologically, the genuine “folk” element as against rational civilization. Representatives of this syndrome are not infrequent among the lower middle-classes. Though no “action” is to be expected of them, one may count on them as on persons who, under no circumstances, ever will adjust themselves to political or psychological fascism. The aforementioned *M711*

is very amiable, mild, gentle, casual, slow, and somewhat lethargic in both voice and manner. He is quite verbal, but very circumstantial. His statements are typically surrounded with qualifications to which he commonly devotes more attention than to the main proposition. He seems to suffer from pervasive indecision and doubt, to be pretty unsure of his ideas, and to have great difficulty in committing himself to positive statements on very many matters. In general, he tends to avoid committing himself to things, either intellectually or emotionally, and in general avoids getting involved in things.

He describes his choice of profession as accidental, but it is interesting that he was originally a landscape architect — which may imply a desire for the restitution of nature rather than its domination — and later became an interviewer in government employment, a job that gives him the gratification of helping other people without his stressing, however, this aspect narcissistically. He is not indifferent to wealth and admits his wish for “security,” but is, at the same time, totally unimpressed by the importance of money *per se*. His religious attitude has been described in Chapter XVIII, and it fits psychologically, in every detail, into the make-up of the “Easy-Going” syndrome. It may be added that he “does not believe in the Immaculate Conception” but doesn’t think “it makes any difference.”

When asked about discipline in childhood, he answers “practically none,” “very undisciplined.” His strong attachment to his mother is emphasized without any inhibition: the only period of his childhood when there were any “bones of contention” was when his mother “exhibited her possessiveness. She didn’t like the gals I went with.” What he himself likes about women is described as follows:

“Awfully hard to say when you’re pretty sold on a gal... Seems to have all the things I like — fun to be with, brains, pretty. She likes me, which is important. We share things together. (What enjoy doing together?) Music, reading, swimming, dancing. Most of the things which don’t require too much energy, which makes it good.”

It is remarkable that there is no trace of hostility against the father — whom he lost very early — in spite of the mother-fixation. It is the imaginative gift of the father which lingers in his memory:

(Pleasant memories of father?) “Lots of pleasant memories, because he spoiled us when he was home, always cooking up wonderful ideas for things to do. (Mother and father got along?) I think very well. (Which parent take after?) I don’t know, because I didn’t know my father very well. (Father’s faults?) Don’t know.”

¹⁷The subject chosen as an illustration of this type “was brought up in a household of women — mother and grandmother.”

Most significant are his statements on race issues:

(What think of minority group problems?) "I wish I knew. I don't know. I think that is one problem we should all be working on. (Biggest problem?) Negroes, in terms of numbers. . . I don't think we've ever faced the problem squarely. . . Many Negroes have come to the West Coast. . . (Have you ever had Negroes as friends?) Yes . . . Not intimately, though have known a number that I've liked and enjoyed. (What about intermarriage?) I think it's a false issue . . . They say, 'What if your sister married a Negro?' I wouldn't have any feelings about it, frankly. . . (Negro traits?) No."

As to the Jews, he does not come to their "defense," but actually denies that they are a "problem":

(What about the Jewish problem?) "I don't think there is a Jewish problem. There again, I think that's been a herring for agitators. (How do you mean?) Hitler, Ku Klux Klan, etc. (Jewish traits?) No . . . I've seen Jewish people exhibit so-called Jewish traits, but also many non-Jewish people." . . . (Subject emphasizes there is no distinction along racial lines.)

The danger implicit in the "Easy-Going" syndrome, i.e., too great reluctance to use violence even against violence, is suggested by the following passage:

(What about picketing Gerald K. Smith?) "I think Gerald K. Smith¹⁸ should have an opportunity to speak, if we are operating under a democracy. (What about picketing as registering a protest?) If a certain group wants to, they have a right to. . . I don't think it's always effective."

That the subject's attitude of noncommitment to any "principle" is actually based on a sense of the concrete and not purely evasive is indicated by the following highly elucidating passage:

(Interviewer reads question . . . about tireless leader and refers to subject as agreeing a little, asks for elaboration.) "I agree a little. However, the opposite of that, Huey Long, was a courageous, tireless leader and Hitler (laughs). It depends. (How do you mean?) Well, I admired Willkie; I admired Roosevelt; I admired Wallace. But, I don't think we should ever have leaders in whom the people put their faith and then settle back. People seem to seek leaders to avoid thinking for themselves."

This subject's interview concludes with the dialectical statement that "power is almost equivalent to the abuse of power."

5. The Genuine Liberal

By contrast to the pattern just described, this syndrome is very outspoken in reaction and opinion. The subject in whom it is pronounced has a strong sense of personal autonomy and independence. He cannot stand any outside interference with his personal convictions and beliefs, and he does not want to interfere with those of others either. His ego is quite developed but not libidinalized — he is rarely "narcissistic." At the same time, he is willing to admit id tendencies, and to take the consequence — as is the case with Freud's "erotic type" (39). One of his conspicuous features is moral courage, often far beyond his rational evaluation of a situation. He cannot "keep silent" if something wrong is being done, even if he seriously endangers himself. Just as he is strongly "individualized" himself, he sees the others, above all, as individuals, not as

specimens of a general concept. He shares some features with other syndromes found among low scorers. Like the "Impulsive," he is little repressed and even has certain difficulties in keeping himself under "control." However, his emotionality is not blind, but directed towards the other person as a *subject*. His love is not only desire but also compassion — as a matter of fact, one might think of defining this syndrome as the "compassionate" low scorer. He shares with the "Protesting" low scorer the vigor of identification with the underdog, but without compulsion, and without traces of overcompensation: he is no "Jew lover." Like the "Easy-Going" low scorer he is anti-totalitarian, but much more consciously so, without the element of hesitation and indecision. It is this configuration rather than any single trait which characterizes the "Genuine Liberal." Aesthetic interests seem to occur frequently.

The illustration we give is a girl whose character of a "genuine liberal" stands out the more clearly, since, according to the interviewer, she is politically naïve like the majority of our college women, regardless whether they are high or low.

No "ticket" is involved. *F515*

is a 21-year-old college student. She is a handsome brunette with dark, flashing eyes, who exudes temperament and vitality. She has none of the pretty-pretty femininity so frequently seen in high subjects, and would probably scorn the little feminine wiles and schemes practiced by such women. On the contrary, she is extremely frank and outspoken in manner, and in build she is athletic. One senses in her a very passionate nature and so strong a desire to give intensely of herself in all her relationships, that she must experience difficulty in restraining herself within the bounds of conventionality.

Apart from a semiprofessional interest in music she also "enjoys painting and dramatics." As to her vocation, however, she is still undecided. She

has taken nurses' aid training. She liked helping people in this way. "I enjoyed it. I feel that I could now take care of a sick person. It didn't bother me to carry bed-pans and urinals. I learned that I could touch flesh without being squeamish. I learned to be tactful about certain things. And then it was patriotic! (slightly joking tone). People liked me. (Why did they like you?) Because I smiled, and because I was always making cracks — like I'm doing now."

Her views with regard to minorities are guided by the idea of the individual:

"Minorities have to have just as many rights as majorities. They are all people and should have just as many rights as the majority. There should be no minorities; there should only be individuals and they should be judged according to the individual. Period! Is that sufficient?"

(Negroes?) "Same thing! Still as individuals. Their skin is black, but they are still people. Individuals have loves and sorrows and joys. I don't think you should kill them all or liquidate them or stick them in a corner just because they are different people. I would not marry one, because I should not want to marry a person who has a trait I don't like, like a large nose, etc. I would not want to have children with dark skins. I would not mind if they live next door to me." (Earlier in the interview subject had brought out the fact that she had also to care for Negro patients during her nurses' aid work, and that she had not minded at all having to give baths to them, etc.)

(Jews?) "Same! Well I could marry a Jew very easily. I could

¹⁸Gerald K. Smith (1898–1976). Founder of the America First Party (1944), pro-segregation.

even marry a Negro if he had a light enough skin. I prefer a light skin. I don't consider Jews different from white people at all, because they even have light skins. It's really silly. (What do you think are the causes of prejudice?) Jealousy. (Explain?) Because they are smarter and they don't want any competition. We don't want any competition. If they want it they should have it. I don't know if they are more intelligent, but if they are they should have it."

The last statement shows complete absence of any aspect of guilt feelings in her relation to the Jews. It is followed up by the joke:

"Maybe if the Jews get in power they would liquidate the majority! That's not smart. Because we would fight back."

Her views on religion, with a slightly humorous touch, are centered in the idea of Utopia. She mentions the word herself, when referring to her reading of Plato. The gist of her religion is contained in the statement: "Perhaps we will all be saved." This should be compared with the prevailing "anti-Utopian" attitude of our subjects.

The description of both her parents contains elements of her own ego ideal, in quite an unconventional way:

"Father has been employed for 25 years in the freight complaint department of the ____ R.R. Co. His work involves the hiring of many men. He has about 150 people working under him." (Subject described her father as follows:) "He could have been vice-president by now — he has the brains — but he does not have the go-get-in nature; he is not enough of a politician. He is broad-minded — always listens to both sides of a question before making up his mind. He is a good 'arguenter' for this reason. He is understanding. He is not emotional like mother. Mother is emotional, father factual. Mother is good. She has a personality of her own. She gives to all of us. She is emotional. She keeps Daddy very satisfied. (In what way?) She makes a home for him to come home to — he has it very hard at the

office. It's living. Their marriage is very happy — everybody notices it. Their children perform too — people notice them! Mother is very friendly. Understanding. She gives sympathy. People love to talk to her. Someone calls her up on the telephone and they become lifelong friends just from having talked on the telephone! She is sensitive; it is easy to hurt her."

Her attitude towards sex is one of precarious restraint. Her boy friend

wants to have sexual intercourse everytime that they have a date — in fact he wanted it the first time he dated her — and she doesn't want it that way. She cries every time he tries something, so she supposes it cannot be right for her. She thinks that friendship should precede sexual relations, but he thinks that sex relations are a way of getting to know each other better. Finally she broke with him three days ago (said with mock tearfulness). He had said, "Let's just be friends," but she didn't want that either! The sex problem bothers her. The first time she danced with him he told her that he thought she wanted intercourse; whereas she just wanted to be close to him. She is worried because she didn't mean it the other way, but perhaps unconsciously she did!

It is evident that her erotic character is connected with a lack of repression with regard to her feelings towards her father: "I would like to marry some-one like my father."

The result of the interview is summed up by the interviewer:

The most potent factors making for the low score in this case are the open-mindedness of the parents and the great love subject's mother bore all her children.

If this can be generalized, and consequences be drawn for high scorers, we might postulate that the increasing significance of the fascist character depends largely upon basic changes in the structure of the family itself (see Max Horkheimer, 53a).